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ABSTRACT 
 
This contribution looks at the relevance of conspiracy in international criminal law. It 
establishes that conspiracy was introduced into international criminal law for 
purposes of prevention and to combat the collective nature of participation in 
commission of international crimes. Its use as a tool of accountability has, however, 
been affected by conflicting conceptual perceptions of conspiracy from common law 
and civil law countries. This conflict is displayed in the decisions on conspiracy by 
the international criminal tribunals, and finally culminates into the exclusion of 
punishment of conspiracy in the Rome Statute. It is questionable whether this latest 
development on the law of conspiracy was a prudent decision. While the function of 
conspiracy as a mode of liability is satisfactorily covered by the modes of 
participation in the Rome Statute, its function as a purely inchoate crime used to 
punish incomplete crimes is missing. This study creates a case for inclusion in the 
Rome Statute, punishment of conspiracies involving international crimes that do not 
extend beyond the conceptual stage, to reinforce the Statute’s purpose of 
prevention. This conspiracy should reflect the characteristics of conspiracy 
acceptable under both common law and civil law systems. This means excluding the 
far reaching and often problematic characteristics exemplified in the common law 
conspiracy. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
A. Background to the Study 
The nature of international crimes is that they are crimes that are typically committed 
by a collective.1 The contextual element of these crimes shows that they almost 
always involve organised violence and large scale atrocities, which can only be 
achieved by a large number of individuals working together towards such criminal 
purpose. One question that the international community then often has to grapple 
with is how to hold the individual perpetrators involved in such systemic criminality 
accountable. A legal tool that has been considered appealing in such circumstances 
is the crime of conspiracy. 
Conspiracy is an inchoate crime used to punish two or more people who agree to 
carry out a crime.2 As a crime, conspiracy is considered to be well established in 
common law jurisdictions.3 At common law, conspiracy is a distinct crime, separate 
from the target crime that the conspirators agree upon and plan to commit. The 
common law concept of conspiracy carries with it certain evidential and procedural 
features, which enable the prosecution to construct a broad umbrella of liability at the 
early stages of planning to carry out criminal conduct.4 All that is required in a 
conspiracy charge is to establish whether from a defendant’s conduct it can 
                                                          
1 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, decision on the confirmation of 
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 501; Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A (AC), Judgment, 15 July 
1999, para. 191; M. A. Drumbl, 99 Northwestern University Law Review (2005), pp. 570-1; A. 
Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 167; G. P. Fletcher, 111 Yale Law Journal (2002), p. 
1514, asserting that international crimes involve deeds that are by their very nature ‘committed by 
groups and typically against individuals and members of groups’; A. Nollkaemper, in A. Nollkaemper 
and H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (2009), p. 1; J. D. Ohlin, 5 JCIJ 
(2007), p. 73; B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(2009), p. 82. 
2 J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 187; W. A. Schabas, An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd edn. (2007), p. 214; G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2005), marg. no. 621. 
3 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2008), p. 227; G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal 
Law (2000), p. 221; J. D. Ohlin, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2007), p. 149; H. Donnedieu de Vabres, 
in G. Mettraux, Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), p. 244. 
4 See below Ch 2 section B. 
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generally be inferred that he was in some way aware of and part of an agreement to 
commit the underlying crime, and was in some way concerned to see it carried out. 
Thus, the concept of conspiracy is capable of linking several individuals in one 
general criminal scheme, facilitating their prosecution, and making it easier to obtain 
convictions against the alleged defendants.5 Described as “the darling of the modern 
prosecutor’s nursery”,6 conspiracy is considered an essential and appealing legal 
device for the prosecution of criminal groups.7 The main justifications for punishing 
conspiracy is that group offences are considered to pose more danger than offences 
committed by individuals, and it is also seen to play a central role in preventing 
crime.8 
The significant role of conspiracy in common law jurisdictions contributed to its 
introduction in the international realm for the first time at Nuremberg. The prosecutor 
representing the United States while advocating for inclusion of the charge of 
conspiracy, asserted that the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime were the 
inevitable outcome of the criminal conspiracy of the Nazi party.9 In 1948, the 
Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the 
Genocide Convention) was agreed upon and entered into force on 12 January 
1951.10 The Genocide Convention establishes genocide as an international crime. 
Article 3 (b) of the Convention criminalises conspiracy to commit genocide. The 
travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention show that the rationale for this 
was to ensure that, in view of the serious nature of the crime of genocide, the mere 
                                                          
5 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 149; P. Gillies, 10 Ottawa L. Rev. (1973), p. 275; 
see below Ch 2 section B for detailed illustration. 
6 See statement of Learned Hand an American philosopher and judge, in Harrison v. United States, 7 
F. 2d 259 (2d Cir.1925), cited in W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law (2003), p. 615. 
7 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 149 describing it as a, ‘legal weapon that works 
well against the mob’; N. Kaytal, 112 Yale Law Journal (2003), p. 1307 et seq. 
8 See below Ch 2 section B. III. 
9 See below Ch 2 section B. 
10 Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of U.N General Assembly on 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S 277, 
288 I.L.M. 761. 
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agreement to commit genocide should be punishable.11 The adoption of this 
Convention marked the second instance in which conspiracy was recognised in 
international criminal law.   
In 1993 to manage the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security 
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).12 Article 4 (3) (b) of the ICTY Statute provides for conspiracy to commit 
genocide. In 1995 to deal with the atrocious crimes committed in Rwanda, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established and likewise, its 
Statute provides for conspiracy to commit genocide.13 The United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (ICC) adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute) in 1998.14 Departing from previous statutes in the field of international 
criminal law, the Rome Statute did not expressly provide for the crime of 
conspiracy.15 This course of events raises the question what relevance the crime of 
conspiracy has in the modern practice of international criminal law, creating doubts 
on the future of a crime once suggested to have ‘irretrievably entered into the 
international criminal law regime’.16 This issue requires further critical reflection.  
B. Statement of the Problem 
Despite its underlying function of facilitating prosecution of crimes perpetrated by a 
plurality of persons, and addressing the need of law enforcement to stop criminal 
                                                          
11 Prosecutor v Musema, ICTR-96-13-A (TC), para. 185. 
12 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/RES/827(1993) 
annex. 
13 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) annex.  
14 The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 and came into force on 1 July 2002.  
15  G. P. Fletcher, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(2009), p. 107 opines that in this sense the ‘Rome Statute breaks from the common law pattern of 
defining criminal liability by rejecting the crime of conspiracy’. 
16 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 151. 
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conduct while still at its preliminary stage before it results into any serious social 
harm, the crime of conspiracy has been surrounded by controversy both within the 
domestic and international spheres. Criminal conspiracy in the domestic front has 
especially been criticised for being ambiguous and prone to abuse by prosecutors, 
threatening the safeguards that constitute a healthy notion of due process.17 The 
crime has in the past been used by prosecutors to exploit vulnerable defendants, 
and it may be used to cast a wide net of criminal liability catching a number of 
individuals likely to be innocent of any wrong doing.18 It is also seen as a tool that 
may be used to repress freedom of association and speech, threatening the main 
foundations of a liberal democratic society.19 Conspiracy has also been criticised for 
undermining the delicate balance between individual criminal responsibility and 
organised criminal groups by applying criminal liability to all members of a group 
perceived to be criminal, creating an unacceptable form of collective guilt.20 
In the international front, from the onset of its introduction the concept of conspiracy 
was rejected and has continually been objected to by countries from civil law 
jurisdictions.21 It is often alleged that the crime of conspiracy is largely a common law 
concept alien to the civil law countries.22 Although vigorously opposed, conspiracy 
was eventually included in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, formed to hold 
                                                          
17 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 157; P. Gillies, 10 Ottawa L. Rev. (1973), p. 274; 
see Ch 2 below for detailed analysis. 
18 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 157; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 946. 
19 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 158. 
20 See U.S. v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 579 (1940) p. 581, with Judge Learned Hand noting the possibility 
of great oppression from the doctrine of conspiracy, when prosecutors use it as a drag net to catch all 
those who have been associated ‘in any degree whatever with the main offenders’; A. Fichtelberg, 17 
Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 159; P. Gillies, 10 Ottawa L. Rev. (1973), p. 291; J. Meierhenrich, 2 
Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci. (2006), p. 346; J. D. Ohlin, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2007), p. 158, in 
this respect Ohlin asserts that ‘conspiracy doctrine demonstrates the tension between collective 
action and individual liability’. 
21 See below Chs 3 and 5 for further analysis. 
22 See Jackson J. in Krulewitch v United States, 336 U.S. 440, 450 (1949), asserting that the 
conspiracy doctrine does not commend itself to jurists of civil law countries; A. Fichtelberg, 17 
Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 151; G. P. Fletcher, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2007), 
p. 444; E. Wise, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. (2000), p. 305. 
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major war criminals of the Third Reich in Nazi Germany accountable. Conspiracy 
thereafter formed an essential part of the prosecution strategy, and was one of the 
main charges against the defendants. Objections against inclusion of the conspiracy 
offence in the Charter did not however rest with the compromises finally adopted at 
the negotiation table, they later emerged to haunt the prosecution during the trials, 
greatly affecting the interpretation and application of the crime of conspiracy.23 
Although negotiations on the Genocide Convention did not generate much objection 
to the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide,24 its use as a tool of accountability 
before the ad hoc tribunals has seen the tension between the two leading legal 
systems (common law and civil law) resurface. The dilemma of the tribunals is 
particularly displayed in the debate on the prudence of convicting a defendant both 
for the crime of conspiracy and its underlying crime.25 Under common law a 
defendant’s liability for conspiracy subsists even in face of its executed underlying 
crime. In several civil law jurisdictions, the idea of merely criminalising an agreement 
to commit a crime is generally not acceptable, and even in the exceptional cases 
where it is considered punishable, the justification for punishing the agreement 
disappears once its underlying crime has been committed. The conspiracy in this 
latter instance merges into the completed substantive crime. These conflicting 
perceptions on punishing an agreement to commit a crime have found their way into 
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, contributing to contradictory judgments on 
the same issue. 
                                                          
23 See below Ch 3 section B. III. 
24 See J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 186; W. A. Schabas, in O. 
Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd edn. (2008), 
Article 6 marg. no. 26. 
25 See below Ch 3 section G. II. 2. 
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The criticisms against conspiracy in the domestic front have also followed with equal 
fervour into the international realm. Conspiracy has been labelled as a tool of 
collective guilt,26 and is also attributed to providing the legal underpinnings of two 
equally controversial concepts. These concepts include declaring certain 
organisations to be criminal and subsequently punishing its members, which was 
done at Nuremberg, and joint criminal enterprise in the ad hoc tribunals. These 
concepts have also invariably been referred to as forms of conspiracy liability.27 
Whether the aforesaid criticism is justified and to what extent these concepts are 
related to conspiracy is questioned. 
The failure to expressly include criminal responsibility for conspiracy in the Rome 
Statute has drawn mixed reactions, leading to the question whether conspiracy was 
intentionally dropped in the Rome Statute,28 or its exclusion was the work of 
inadvertent drafters.29 While some scholars view such exclusion as a step in the right 
direction, asserting that it is an indication of a stronger commitment ‘to the principle 
of individual accountability’,30 others consider it a setback especially with respect to 
prosecution of the crime of genocide, where conspiracy is considered to have played 
an essential role in holding perpetrators of such crimes accountable before the ad 
hoc tribunals.31 Some scholars nonetheless, submit that conspiracy may still be 
                                                          
26 G. P. Fletcher, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2007), p. 448; E. van Sliedregt, The 
Criminal Responsibility of individuals for violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), pp. 15-
38. 
27 R. P. Barrett and L. E. Little, 88 Minn. L. Rev (2003), p. 53; A. M. Danner, J. S. Martinez, 93 Calif. 
Law Rev. (2005), p. 110; A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 165; J. Meierhenrich, 2 
Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. (2006), pp. 341-57; S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev 
(eds.),The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (1990), pp. 219-20, observing that conspiracy 
supplied the doctrinal underpinnings of the idea of criminal organisations. 
28 See T. R. Dalton, Cornell Law Student Papers (2010), p. 2; J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 201, asserting that exclusion of the crime of conspiracy to commit 
genocide was a desire by states to change the law in this regard.  
29 W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn. (2009), p. 315.  
30 G. P. Fletcher, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2007), p. 448. 
31 Y. Askar, Implementing International Humanitarian Law: From the Ad Hoc Tribunals to a Permanent 
International Criminal Court (2004), p. 230; Mohamed C. Othman, Accountability for International 
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punishable under the Rome Statute by virtue of Article 21, which recognises 
customary law as one of the sources of law that the ICC may look into.32 It is 
doubtful that the ICC will consider recognising criminal responsibility for conspiracy 
through this avenue. It has also been questioned whether conspiracy as a crime has 
indeed developed into a norm of customary international law, with some scholars 
asserting that conspiracy as a substantive offence has generally been rejected at the 
international level.33 
Although it has been expressed that adoption of an international standard for a crime 
of conspiracy as a customary international norm would facilitate the prosecution of 
international crimes,34 it has also been asserted that a sceptical eye should be cast 
upon the use of the concept of conspiracy as a crime, especially in international 
criminal trials, given the multifaceted problems that come with it.35 The above 
considerations set the stage for further investigation as to why conspiracy, a concept 
designed essentially to combat collective criminal action, which happens to be one of 
the distinct features of international crimes, does not seem to have universal 
approval, and remains one of the most contested areas in contemporary criminal 
law.36  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda and East Timor (2005), p. 224; W. A. Schabas, 
Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn. (2009), pp. 314-315. 
32 R. P. Barrett and L. E. Little, 88 Minn. L. Rev (2003), p. 82. 
33 T. R. Dalton, Cornell Law Student Papers (2010), p. 1 et seq. asserting that there is no firm 
foundation for conspiracy as a substantive international crime; J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty 
Publications, Paper 24 (2009), pp. 188 et seq; see also T. Stenson, 1 The Journal of International 
Law & Policy (2003-2004), p. 1, stating that the international community has failed to clearly state 
whether or not inchoate crimes such as conspiracy should be included in a general statement of 
customary international law; B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International 
Criminal Justice (2009), p. 91, stating that conspiracy to commit an international crime does not form 
part of customary law. 
34 T. Stenson, 1 The Journal of International Law & Policy (2003-2004), p. 23. 
35 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 151. 
36 J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 187. 
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I. Objectives of the Study 
The use of criminal conspiracy as a tool of accountability in international criminal law 
has been surrounded with both controversy and confusion from its inception, putting 
into question its legitimacy and effectiveness as a crime in international criminal law 
where group dynamics are often involved. The main objective of this study is to 
address what constitutes the crime of conspiracy, what role it has played in the 
development of international criminal law, and whether it will play any significant role 
in future prosecutions before the ICC following the failure to expressly provide for it 
in the Rome Statute. More specifically the study will critically analyse the following 
issues: 
1. It will look into the origins and function of conspiracy in domestic jurisdictions, 
clarifying its precise legal contours and the rationale for its existence. 
2. The study will establish whether punishment of conspiracy is a general 
principle of law recognised by the major legal systems of the world, discussing 
in particular the legal theory and practice of jurisdictions considered to be 
representative of common law and civil law legal systems in punishing crimes 
carried out in concert. 
3. The study will also illuminate on the evolution of the crime of conspiracy in the 
international front, discussing the controversy between the common law and 
civil law jurisdictions and the influence this has had in the interpretation, 
application, and development of criminal conspiracy as a substantive crime in 
international criminal law. 
4.  The study will establish:  
a) The status of conspiracy as a norm under international criminal law and,  
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b) Whether conspiracy is a legitimate substantive crime under international 
criminal law. 
5. It will consider what role if any criminal conspiracy is likely to have in 
establishing criminal responsibility in future prosecutions before the ICC. 
II. Methodology 
My analysis looks at the identifiable state practice, jurisprudence of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials, ICTY, ICTR, ICC, the texts of relevant laws and international 
instruments. I also look at leading textbooks, law journal articles, and various other 
texts, including internet sources. 
III. Overview of Chapters 
The study consists of six chapters. This first chapter is the introduction, setting out 
the background to the study, statement of the problem and giving an outline of the 
chapters.  
The second chapter traces the historical background of criminal conspiracy in the 
domestic front, and includes a comparative analysis of the current practice in 
individual nations both in common law and civil law jurisdictions. The research 
focuses on the laws of the countries that the author perceives to be leading 
representative countries in the common law (United States and United Kingdom), 
and civil law (Germany, Spain, France, Italy) legal systems. An understanding of the 
perception and function of the concept of criminal conspiracy within the different 
systems will clarify the controversy surrounding the crime at the international level. 
The third chapter entails a critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials, the ICTY and ICTR with respect to the crime of conspiracy. It 
discusses the treatment and function of conspiracy before the international tribunals 
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and its effectiveness as a tool of accountability in international criminal law. It also 
looks into the influence of conspiracy legal theory on other tools of accountability 
recognised in the jurisprudence of the international tribunals. 
The fourth chapter illuminates on the debate of the status of conspiracy as a 
substantive crime under customary international law. 
The fifth chapter contains an analysis of the place of conspiracy in the Rome Statute, 
discussing whether it may be punishable under this legal regime, and if not whether 
a gap has resulted in the prosecution of international crimes following its exclusion, 
with appropriate recommendations made thereafter. 
A general conclusion is laid out in chapter six, the final chapter of this study.  
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Chapter Two: Comparative Analysis 
A. Introduction 
It has been suggested that conspiracy is pre-dominantly a common law concept and 
does not have a prominent role in civil law countries.37 In fact, the majority of the civil 
law jurisdictions are considered to reject the idea of criminal conspiracy in principle, 
and instead have alternative criminal concepts that perform the analogous function 
of conspiracy. The difference in perception and use of criminal conspiracy between 
common law and civil law jurisdictions has been the centre of controversy at the 
international front and has influenced the role and development of criminal 
conspiracy in international criminal law. Since national criminal laws and doctrine 
inspire and guide the development of international criminal law, a study of the 
various systems will create a better understanding of the theories surrounding the 
international law concept of conspiracy. It is therefore important to analyse the 
historical background of conspiracy, the practice adopted by individual states in its 
application, its merits and demerits in the various criminal law systems. This chapter 
consists of a comparative analysis on the law of criminal conspiracy in common law 
and civil law jurisdictions. A look at the alternative structures that seem to perform 
the equivalent function of common law conspiracy within the civil law jurisdictions is 
also undertaken. Special attention is given to the law in the United Kingdom and 
United States, two countries under the common law system in which conspiracy law 
is well established. In the case of civil law countries the study will focus on the laws 
of four prominent countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, which have well 
                                                          
37 G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2000), p. 221; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal 
Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 17; W. J. 
Wagner, 42 The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 2 (1951), p. 171. 
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established legal systems and present a good overview of the laws in most civil law 
jurisdictions. 
B. Common Law Jurisdictions 
Criminal conspiracy may be described to be as old as common law, with its origins 
being traced back to the early developments of law in the United Kingdom.38 This 
study therefore begins with an analysis of conspiracy law in the United Kingdom from 
its historical background to the current developments. 
I. United Kingdom 
1. Historical Background 
The birth of criminal conspiracy can be traced back to the reign of Edward I.39 
Conspiracy was introduced to redress the abuse of ancient criminal procedure. 
Incidences of persons coming together and instituting false charges were frequent 
with insufficient legal mechanisms in force to address this vice.40 To fill this gap in 
the law the crime of conspiracy was introduced through the enactment of several 
statutes, culminating into the enactment of The Third Ordinance of Conspirators, 33 
Edw. I passed in 1304, and The Statute of 4 Edward III, C.II (1330).41 When persons 
agreed to obtain false charges or to bring false appeals or to maintain malicious 
suits, they could be held liable for conspiracies. The early offence of conspiracy was 
restricted to the offences against the administration of justice and was strictly 
construed, confining it to the precise and definite language of the statutes. A 
                                                          
38 People v Schwimmer 66 A, D, 2d 91, 94 (2d Dept. 1978). 
39 For a detailed account of historical evolution, see A. Harding, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society (1982), pp. 89-108; B. F. Pollack, 35 Geo. L. J. (1947) pp. 328-352; F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard 
Law Review (1922), pp. 393-427; R. S. Wright, The Law of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements 
(1873). 
40 F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard Law Review (1922), p. 394. 
41 B. F. Pollack, 35 Geo. L. J. (1947), p. 340. 
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defendant’s liability for conspiracy would only arise when the person he or she had 
falsely accused was charged and later acquitted.42 
The later part of the 16th century saw the court revise its stand on the strict 
interpretation of the crime of conspiracy. This revolution was initiated by the Court of 
Star Chamber in the Poulterers’ Case decided in 1611.43 In this case the defendants 
had agreed to bring a false accusation of robbery against Mr Stone. Their efforts 
failed because the innocence of Mr Stone was so obvious that the jury refused to 
charge him of the crime alleged. Mr Stone subsequently instituted an action for 
damages against his false accusers. The defendants argued that Stone was not 
entitled to his claim as he had neither been indicted nor acquitted as provided for in 
the statutes on conspiracy. The court rejected the defendants’ submissions and 
found them guilty. It made the ground-breaking decision that the essence of the 
offence of conspiracy was the agreement the defendants had made together, rather 
than the false indictment and subsequent acquittal. This decision led to the 
development of the well settled doctrine of modern law of conspiracy, which 
recognises that the agreement is the gist of this crime, and no further steps need to 
have been taken to put it into effect.44 
In the 17th century, conspiracy was further expanded to include agreements to 
commit all crimes of whatever nature.45 This interpretation later opened a door for 
the idea that a combination may be criminal, although its object would not be strictly 
                                                          
42 A. Harding, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (1982), p. 91; F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard Law 
Review (1922), at pp. 396, 397. 
43 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (1611) cited in F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard Law Review (1922), p. 398; Cf. R. Hazel, 
Conspiracies and Civil Liberties (1974), p. 14. 
44 B. F. Pollack, 35 Geo. L. J. (1947), p. 342. 
45 This expansion was motivated by several factors among them the need for a broader and more 
moral law. The 17th century witnessed the confusion of law and morals fuelling ambiguity in the justice 
system, see F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard Law Review (1922), p. 400; R. S. Wright, The Law of Criminal 
Conspiracies (1873), p. 26. 
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criminal when performed by a single person.46 Much ambiguity and confusion 
prevailed during this period with respect to the crime of conspiracy. In 1832 Lord 
Denman, in an attempt to clarify what constituted a conspiracy charge, made the 
statement that a conspiracy indictment must “charge a conspiracy either to do an 
unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means”.47 This well-known and now important 
statement was perceived to provide a solution to the difficulties experienced in the 
application of criminal conspiracy, and other judges who had struggled with the 
concept of conspiracy, enthusiastically embraced this guideline.48 The principle 
provided by Lord Denman’s statement could conveniently be adapted to suit any 
case relating to conspiracy, without giving much thought to the prevailing 
circumstances of the case. The ambiguity generated by use of the term ‘unlawful’ 
made conspiracy a convenient charge to bring against offenders when other ways of 
establishing their guilt were unavailable.49 The elasticity of the term also made it 
possible for judges to reflect their prejudices in their decisions leading to 
unpredictability in this class of cases and in some instances undesirable results.50 
                                                          
46 The expansive interpretation of conspiracy at the time, was especially as a result of what Pollack 
and Sayre termed as an unfortunate statement made by a renowned scholar Hawkins, who asserted 
in Pleas of crowns that “...there can be no doubt but that all confederacies whatsoever, wrongful to 
prejudice a third person are highly criminal at common law”. The ambiguity of the term “wrongful” 
created confusion as to whether it meant “criminal means” on the one hand or on the other hand 
“tortious” or “immoral”. See B. F. Pollack, 35 Geo. L. J. (1947), p. 345; F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard Law 
Review (1922), p. 402; also D. Harrison, Conspiracy as a Crime and as a Tort in English Law (1924), 
pp. 25 et seq. 
47 Quoted in, F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard Law Review (1922), p. 405. This statement is viewed by Sayre 
as a reincarnation of the statement made by the renowned scholar Hawkins, and is seen to have 
created more confusion in the law of conspiracy .The formula was used in several circumstances to 
expand criminal conspiracy to apply to acts that, though considered immoral, were not in any way 
criminal. Though this formula became notorious it was later to be repudiated by its author. This 
ambiguity gave judges the liberty to conveniently impose their individual notions of justice. See also, 
R. Hazel, Conspiracies and Civil Liberties (1974), p.15 noting that the term ‘unlawful’ actually meant 
something wider than merely criminal. 
48 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 614. 
49 B. F. Pollack, 35 Geo. L. J. (1947), p. 346. 
50 B. F. Pollack, 35 Geo. L. J. (1947), p. 347, observing that interpreting “unlawful” to mean “criminal” 
was seen as a much too narrow definition. Conversely, interpreting it to mean “wrongful” made the 
definition much too wide, making it possible to include in the crime any type of combination which 
seemed to be socially oppressive or undesirable, though the acts committed in themselves did not 
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The leeway judges had in conspiracy cases is seen to have made them serve as 
quasi-legislators, creating new offences.51 
This broad nature of conspiracy law also made it subject to abuse by prosecutors 
who used it to pursue a government agenda.52 In the United Kingdom, prosecutors 
used conspiracy in the late 18th century to suppress critics of the government and 
later in early 20th century it was used in both the United Kingdom and United States 
to counter union movements.53 Lord Denman’s statement eventually shaped the 
crime of conspiracy in common law jurisdictions, where it often refers to a 
combination between two or more persons formed for the purpose of doing either an 
unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.54 
The unpredictability of common law criminal conspiracy was mainly because it 
extended its reach beyond the boundary of criminal offences, making it subject to 
much criticism.55 Until the 1970s conspiracy under English criminal law was left to 
the whims of the judiciary. In this context it was capable of infinite growth and could 
accommodate any situation. Often conspiracy was used to prosecute conduct which 
was more of an antisocial nature rather than a criminal end.56 On several occasions, 
criminal conspiracy convictions punished acts that were civil wrongs and not 
essentially criminal. Two cases illustrate the tendency of the courts to expand 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
constitute crimes; see also criticism by R. S. Wright, The Law of Criminal Conspiracies (1873), pp. 62-
67. 
51 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 956; A. Harding, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society (1982), p. 91. 
52 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 956. 
53 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 956; also see D. Burgman, 29 DePaul L. Rev. 
(1979), p. 80; R. S. Wright, The Law of Criminal Conspiracies (1873), pp. 45-62, making reference to 
cases misused by judges against trade unions in the course of the 19th century. 
54 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law (2003), p. 615. 
55 D. Harrison, Conspiracy as a Crime and as a Tort in English Law (1924), pp. 80-114. 
56 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 5th edn. (2006), p. 455; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a 
Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models Against Criminal Collectives (2011), 
p. 73. 
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conspiracy. In Shaw v DPP,57 Shaw had published a booklet called the ‘Ladies 
Directory’, which advertised the names and addresses of prostitutes. The booklet 
indicated, “...that the advertisers could be got in touch with at the telephone numbers 
given and were offering their services for sexual intercourse and, in some cases, for 
the practice of sexual perversion”.58 Shaw was convicted for a number of offences 
under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and the Obscene Publications Act 1959, and 
was also convicted for “conspiracy to corrupt public morals”. On appeal, his 
counsel’s submission that no offence such as conspiracy to corrupt public morals 
existed was rejected and the House of Lords upheld his conviction. In the judgment 
Lord Tucker observed: “It has for long been accepted that there are some 
conspiracies which are criminal although the acts agreed to be done are not per se 
criminal or tortious if done by individuals”. The court held that where defendants 
agree to carry out acts that threaten to cause extreme injury to the public, they would 
be guilty of conspiracy to effect public mischief. In Kamara v DPP,59 students were 
convicted for conspiracy to trespass after occupying the High Commission of Sierra 
Leone in London with the intent of gaining publicity for their political grievances 
although trespassing was a tort and not a crime. On appeal, their contention that 
there was no such offence as conspiracy to trespass was dismissed and their 
conviction upheld. The appellate court was of the view that since an agreement to do 
an unlawful act was a conspiracy and the commission of a tort was an unlawful act, it 
followed that an agreement to commit any act of trespass was an indictable 
conspiracy. In the judgment, Lord Hailsham observed that conspiracy to trespass 
was a form of conspiracy to effect a public mischief.60 
                                                          
57 Shaw v DPP (1962) A. C. 220. 
58 Shaw v DPP (1962) A. C. at 220-221. 
59 (1973) 2 All E. R. 1242. 
60 Kamara v DPP (1973) 2 All E. R. 1242 at pp.1254 and 1258. 
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The uncertainty and elasticity of criminal conspiracy led to much criticism by legal 
scholars and practitioners. The criticisms catalysed the making of certain reforms 
and continues to affect contemporary developments on conspiracy law. To some 
extent, the judiciary’s conscience to the injustice caused by several decisions made 
with respect to conspiracy cases was awakened, and as a result it began to make 
decisions that rejected the broad policy of social defence, adopted to justify the 
extension of criminal conspiracy to all sorts of conduct considered to be anti-social.61 
To streamline the law on conspiracy, the legislature decided to codify criminal 
conspiracy, following recommendations of the Law Commission report number 76.62 
The report observed that common law conspiracy was vague and capable of growing 
in silly ways, which might offend the principle of certainty. The legislature enacted 
the Criminal Law Act of 1977 (CLA) in which part 1 provides for statutory conspiracy. 
The House of Lords has acknowledged that this change was a radical amendment to 
the law of criminal conspiracy.63 Only two forms of conspiracy are maintained under 
the new law: statutory conspiracy and the common law conspiracies to defraud and 
to corrupt public morals or to outrage public decency.64 
                                                          
61 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 5th edn. (2006), p. 456.The two notable decisions that 
rejected the elasticity of conspiracy were: DPP v Bhagwan (1972) A. C. 60, and DPP v Withers (1975) 
A. C. 842. In Bhagwan the House of Lords held that there is no general crime of conspiracy to defeat 
the purpose of an Act of Parliament, and in Withers, the accused had been convicted for conspiring to 
obtain confidential information by deceit from the banks and government departments, the House of 
Lords while quashing these convictions declared that there was no general offence known to law of 
conspiracy to effect a public mischief. 
62 Law Commission No. 76, Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform, 1976 [hereinafter Law Com. No. 
76]. This commission based its analysis from: The Law Commission Working Paper No. 50, Inchoate 
Offences: Conspiracy, Attempt and Incitement [hereinafter Law Com. 50]. 
63 See Regina v. Ayres (1984) A. C. 447, 453-54. 
64 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 457 et seq; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. 
Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 508; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan 
Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 359 et seq.; N. Padfield, Criminal Law, 6th edn. (2008), p. 155 et 
seq. This study however, mainly concerns itself with statutory conspiracy, which consists of the 
majority of cases. 
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2. Statutory Conspiracy 
Section 1 (1) of the Criminal Law Act (CLA) makes it an offence for a person to 
agree with another or others to carry out what would amount to a criminal offence.65 
Such an agreement amounts to conspiracy to commit the underlying offence. The 
CLA requires that the parties make the agreement with the intention that it will result 
in commission of the object of the conspiracy. 
A minimum of two people are sufficient to form a conspiracy. However, certain 
persons are exempt from liability for the offence of conspiracy. Section 2 (1) CLA 
provides that the intended victim of the offence cannot be guilty of conspiracy.66 
Section 2 (2) CLA provides that there can be no conspiracy where the only other 
person to the agreement is a spouse, a person under the age of criminal 
responsibility, or an intended victim.67 
                                                          
65 The offence of Statutory Conspiracy is set out by s 1 (1) and s 1 (2) of the CLA which states: 
1 (1) Subject to the following provisions of this part of this Act ,if a person agrees with any other 
person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in 
accordance with their intentions, either- 
a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by one or more 
parties to the agreement, or 
b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence or any 
offences impossible, he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences. 
(2) Where liability for any offence may be incurred without knowledge on the part of the person 
committing it of any particular fact or circumstance necessary for the commission of the offence a 
person shall nevertheless not be guilty of conspiracy to commit that offence by virtue of subsection (1) 
above unless he and one other party to the agreement intend or know that fact or circumstance shall 
or will exist at the time when the conduct constituting the offence is to take place. 
66 It is suggested that victim here refers to offences which exist for purposes of protecting the victim, 
see M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 273; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, 
Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 513; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 
11th edn. (2005), p. 395. 
67 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 460, stating that the law in this case 
places, ‘the value of marital confidence above the public interest in having conspirators brought to 
justice…’; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials 5th edn. (2003), p. 
513; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 11th edn. (2005), p. 394; N. Padfield, Criminal Law, 
6th edn. (2008), p. 156; also see Chrastny (1991) 1 W. L. R 1381, where the court noted it was 
possible to hold a husband and wife liable for conspiracy where a third party was also involved. The 
husband and wife were considered as one conspirator and the third party considered the second 
conspirator; The agreement would also be punishable if the married couple had entered into it before 
marriage, M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 273. 
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2.1. Elements of Statutory Conspiracy 
The jurisprudence illustrates that to prove statutory conspiracy the prosecution must 
show the existence of two elements: the agreement, which is the actus reus, and the 
mens rea, which is the intention to enter into the agreement to carry out the intended 
underlying offence. The exercise of distinguishing between these two elements with 
respect to the offence of conspiracy is not always an easy task. This is because the 
act of agreeing is itself considered to be essentially a ‘mental operation’.68 
a) The Agreement 
The offence of conspiracy lies in making the agreement and it is not necessary for 
any other action to be performed in pursuance of the agreement.69 In R v 
Simmonds,70 the court observed that a conspiracy involves two or more persons 
acting or planning to act in concert under some agreement in pursuit of a criminal 
design.71 Conspiracy is a continuing offence that lasts until either the criminal 
purpose is achieved or the agreement is brought to an end.72 
It must be shown that the parties to the agreement had a meeting of minds for the 
agreement to exist. Mere negotiation does not suffice.73 This requires that the 
                                                          
68 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 374; see also M. Allen, Textbook on 
Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 276. 
69 Mulcahy v R (1868) LR 3 HL 306; Law Com. No. 76, para. 1.21; M. Allen, Criminal Law, 9th edn. 
(2007) p. 272; A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 460; C. M. V. Clarkson & 
H. M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 504; P. Gillies, The Law of 
Criminal Conspiracy, 2nd edn. (1990), p. 16; J. Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd 
edn. (2008), p. 799; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 362; N. Padfield, 
Criminal Law, 6th edn. 2008, p. 156. 
70 [1969] 1 Q. B. 685. 
71 R v. Siracusa [1989] Crim. L. R. 712, with O’Connor LJ stating, ‘the essence of conspiracy is the 
agreement’. 
72 DPP v. Doot (1973) All E. R. 940 HL, noting that conspiracy is a continuing offence that lasts until 
the agreement is realised or otherwise terminated, and different conspirators may join it at various 
times; R v Simmonds [1969] 1 Q. B. 685; M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law,  9th edn. (2007), p. 
273; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 363. 
73 M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 276; A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal 
Law, 5th edn. (2006), pp. 459-60; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 513; J. Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 3rd edn. 
(2008), p. 799; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 363. 
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conspirators at least define the main elements of the agreement, which means they 
agree on a course of conduct that also has to embrace the intended 
consequences.74 If no agreement is reached the conspiracy charge will fail. It is not 
necessary for the parties to have physically met. All that needs to be shown is that 
the co-conspirators knew there were other parties to the agreement, and the 
defendant at least communicated with one other party to the conspiracy on the 
common criminal objective.75 The agreement may be express or implied.76 In 
practice, courts usually infer the existence of the agreement from behaviour that 
appears to be concerted, rather than direct evidence of a meeting, which the 
prosecution can hardly rely on, given the secretive nature of conspiracies.77 The 
danger of such focus is that too much attention is given to these acts, which may blur 
the fact that the acts in themselves are not the conspiracy but merely evidence of 
it.78 The two or more persons must agree to carry out conduct that is criminal, and 
not knowing that the conduct agreed upon is criminal does not amount to a 
defence.79 
                                                          
74 A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
Against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 81; see also M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. 
(2007), p. 276; A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), at p. 461; C. M. V. Clarkson 
& H. M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 513; J. Herring, Criminal Law: 
Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edn. (2008), pp. 799, 800. 
75 This was observed in West (1948) 1 K. B. 709; “In law all must join in one agreement, each with 
others, in order to constitute one conspiracy. They may join in at various times, each attaching himself 
to that agreement; any one of them may not know all the other parties, but only that there are other 
parties; any one of them may not know the full extent of the scheme to which he attaches himself, but 
what each must know is that there is coming into existence, or is in existence a scheme which goes 
beyond the illegal act which he agrees to do”. Also see M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. 
(2007), p. 273; J. Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edn. (2008), p. 799; D. 
Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 365. 
76 M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 272. 
77 See R v. Simmonds (1969) 1 Q. B. 685; A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 
461; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 364. 
78 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 461; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan 
Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 364. 
79 R v. Griffiths (1966) 1 Q. B. 589, where the court observed that it must be shown that the alleged 
parties to a conspiracy were acting in pursuance of a criminal purpose held in common between 
them; A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 461. 
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b) The Mental Element 
The mens rea of criminal conspiracy requires that each party to the conspiracy know 
the facts or circumstances with respect to the agreement’s objective, and must 
intend to be part of the agreement, intending also that its underlying offence be 
carried out.80 Knowledge of the facts or circumstances surrounding the objective of 
the conspiracy means that a conspirator must have full intention to commit the 
underlying crime, or has knowledge of the facts or circumstances that make the 
underlying conduct criminal. The requirement of full intention and knowledge of 
circumstances applies to all offences even those of strict liability, negligence, or 
recklessness.81 In R v Ali, Hussan, Khan and Bhatti,82 it was held that statutory 
conspiracy has a strict mens rea requirement. Recklessness does not suffice. The 
court observed that to the extent to which a substantive offence imposed liability 
without knowledge of any particular fact or circumstance necessary for commission 
of the offence, a defendant would nevertheless not be liable of conspiracy to commit 
such an offence. Such liabilty would only arise in a case that the defendant and at 
least another party to the agreement intended or knew this fact or circumstance shall 
exist at the time the conduct constituting the offence is to take place.83 
The mens rea requirement that a party to a conspiracy also needs to intend the 
consequences of such conspiracy has raised some difficulties resulting in diverse 
opinions. The House of Lords held in R v Anderson,84 that it was sufficient for the 
prosecution to establish by way of mens rea that the defendant had agreed on a 
                                                          
80 M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), pp. 280-84; A. Ashworth, Principles of 
Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 462; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), 
pp. 374-82; N. Padfield, Criminal Law, 6th edn. 2008, pp. 157-60. 
81 Section 1 (2) CLA 1977; A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 462-63; D. 
Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), pp. 377-81. 
82(2006) Q. B. 322. 
83 See also R v. Saik (2006) UKHL 18, Lord Hope of Craighead at para. 58. 
84(1986) A. C. 27 HL. 
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course of conduct that he intended to play some part in and knew it would involve 
the commission of an offence, adding that it was not necessary to prove that he 
intended the course of action. In this case, the defendant was convicted with several 
others on account that they had conspired to facilitate the escape of one of them 
from prison. The defendant’s submission that although he had supplied diamond 
wire to cut bars, he had not intended for the plan to be carried out, neither did he 
believe in the possibility of its success, was rejected. Lord Bridge in the case 
asserted: 
The necessary mens rea of the crime is, in my opinion, established if, and only if, it is 
shown that the accused when he entered into the agreement, intended to play some 
part in the agreed course of conduct in furtherance of the criminal purpose which the 
agreed course of conduct was intended to achieve. 
This rationale has been criticised for being a distortion of substantive principles of 
criminal law. It is asserted that it creates the strange impression that one may be 
guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime although they did not intend it, and it also 
raises some difficulty where the defendant although being part of the conspiracy 
does not agree to play some part in the agreed course of conduct.85 Departing from 
this position, other decisions require that the prosecution clearly establish the 
intended consequence of the conspiracy and a conspirator’s intention in relation to 
these consequences.86 This often determines the extent of each conspirator’s 
criminal responsibility. This later view was confirmed in R v. Siracusa,87 a case 
involving organised smugglers trading in massive quantities of heroin from Thailand 
                                                          
85 M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 280-82; A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal 
Law, 5th edn. (2006), at p. 463-4; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials 5th edn. (2003), p. 518; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 11th edn. (2005), p. 375-
77; N. Padfield, Criminal Law, 6th edn. 2008, p. 157. 
86 R v Edwards (1991) Crim. L. Rev. 45; R v. Ashton (1992) Crim. L. Rev. 667; R v. Harvey (1999) 
Crim L. R. 70; Yip Chiu-Cheung v. R (1994) 3 W. L. R. 514; M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th 
edn. (2007), p. 276. 
87 (1989) Crim. L. Rev. 712. 
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and cannabis from Kashmir to Canada, where the court tried to clarify the confusion 
created by the Anderson case. The court held that although a person smuggling 
heroin could be convicted of the substantive crime if he thought he was smuggling 
cannabis, the same analogy would not apply to the conspiracy charge, asserting that 
the prosecution is required to prove the accused’s intent in relation to specific 
intended consequences. O’ Connor LJ observed: 
[I]f the prosecution charge a conspiracy to contravene…the Customs and Excise 
Management Act by the importation of heroin, then the prosecution must prove that 
the agreed course of conduct was the importation of heroin. This is because the 
essence of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement and in simple terms, you do not 
prove an agreement to import heroin by proving an agreement to import cannabis. 
On the issue of a conspirator’s intention to participate in some way in the 
commission of the underlying offence, the court in Siracusa noted that ‘participation 
in conspiracy is infinitely variable: it can be passive or active’.88 Further, it clarified 
that it was sufficient for the prosecution to show that an accused assented to play his 
part 'in the agreed course of conduct, however innocent in itself, knowing that the 
part to be played by one or more of the others will amount to or involve the 
commission of an offence'.89 
Another issue of concern is where the agreed course of conduct leads to 
commission of other offences that were not intended. The main question posed here 
is whether such consequences in the case that they were foreseeable should be 
deemed as intended. The most common view is that consequences should only be 
limited to those that were intended by the parties.90  
                                                          
88 R v. Siracusa (1990) 90 Cr. App. R 340 at p. 349. 
89 R v. Siracusa (1990) 90 Cr. App. R 340-57; R v. Hollinshead, Dettlaf and Griffiths, Crim. L. Rev. 
653 (1985). 
90 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 377; see also C. M. V. Clarkson & 
H. M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 514; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in 
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2.2. Accessorial Liability 
Under the United Kingdom criminal law system, a party to a conspiracy that intends 
the underlying crime to be committed shall be guilty of such offence when committed 
by a co-conspirator.91 This however, is not the rule with respect to cases where the 
conspirators although involved in a form of conspiracy have had no contact with 
each other or are unaware of each other’s existence. In such an instance, the 
commission of an offence by one of the conspirators only makes the other/s liable for 
the conspiracy but not the underlying substantive offence.92 A conspirator who plays 
a very minor role in the commission of the substantive offence, which is the object of 
the conspiracy, may be charged as if they actually committed the substantive crime. 
The reasoning behind this practice was explained by Lord Pearson in Director of 
Public Prosecution v. Doot,93 when he likened a conspirator’s agreement to a 
contract. Each conspirator being a party to the agreement benefits from each of the 
acts of the co-conspirators. In practice however, few cases follow the guidelines laid 
out in the Doot case. The courts prefer to hold a conspirator who does not participate 
directly in the commission of an offence liable for accessorial liability, and not 
principally liable for the object of the conspiracy.94 
2.3. Charging Practice 
Conspiracy ‘in the eye of the law’95 is considered to be a crime on its own merit. The 
practice under common law was that all conspiracies except for conspiracy to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models Against Criminal Collectives (2011), 
p. 93. 
91 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 170. 
92 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 170. 
93 1973 A. C. 807. 
94 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 980; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 
11th edn. (2005), p. 170. 
95 Regina v Button 11 Q. B. 929 (1848). 
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commit treason were punishable as misdemeanours.96 Being a misdemeanour 
meant that in situations where the conspirators agreed to commit a substantive crime 
that was classified as a felony and successfully carried it out, the conspiracy would 
merge into the substantive crime. This practice was allowed because of certain 
procedural advantages that the law availed to a defendant in a trial involving a 
misdemeanour and not in a felony trial.97 
Under the CLA, in principle statutory conspiracy remains a separate offence from its 
underlying substantive offence, and does not merge with the substantive offence 
even when the substantive offence is committed. Unlike the practice under common 
law, this position also applies even in the case where the crime involved is a felony. 
This principle of law was recognised in the case of Regina v. O’ Connell,98 when 
Lord Campbell stated: 
Where they have actually done what they intend to do, it may be more proper to 
prosecute them for their illegal acts; but, in point of law, they remain liable for the 
offence of entering into the conspiracy. 
In support of this position, the Queen’s Bench in Regina v. Button,99 dismissed an 
appeal by appellants who had been convicted for conspiracy to defraud their 
employer. The appellants had argued that there being evidence of commission of the 
substantive offence, no conviction should be allowed for the charge of conspiracy, 
which merges into the substantive offence. The court rejected this proposition 
                                                          
96 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 970. 
97 See K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 970. 
98 8 Eng. Rep. 1061 (H. L.1844) at p. 1154 cited in K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 
971. 
99 11 Q. B. 929 (1848). 
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affirming that the two offences were different, dismissing the appellants concerns 
that they might be punished twice for the same offence.100 
Prosecutors therefore, also have the option of prosecuting suspects only for 
conspiracy, even in the instance where there is sufficient evidence of commission of 
the substantive offence.101 The prosecutors especially prefer to charge conspiracy 
for the procedural and evidential advantages that come with it.102 The courts 
however, do not encourage this practice because a conspiracy charge is usually 
seen as causing confusion both to the judge and jury. Furthermore, the courts 
consider conspiracy to be a more difficult concept to comprehend than its underlying 
substantive crime.103 In addition, an indictment for the vague offence of conspiracy is 
seen to create difficulty for a defendant in laying out a defence.104 
The prosecution may also choose to simultaneously institute charges for conspiracy 
and the substantive crime. This practice is also not viewed favourably by the British 
appellate courts because of the confusion that is usually characteristic of most such 
trials. Although the appellate courts do not prohibit double charging, they have been 
very critical of the practice.105 The additional conspiracy charge is seen to complicate 
the trial and is considered to add nothing beneficial to the trial. It is also seen as 
making trials intolerably long and allows the admission of evidence that would 
                                                          
100 See also R v. Dawson (1960) 1 W. L. R. 163; R v. Griffiths (1966) 1 Q. B. 589; Verrier v. DPP 
(1966) 3 All E. R. 568. 
101 The courts have interpreted section 3 (3) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 as allowing this practice, K. 
A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 973; also see A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 
5th edn. (2006), p. 458. 
102 C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 507; K. A. 
David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 973; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. 
(2005), pp. 363, 400. 
103 Regina v. West 32 Crim. App. 152 (1948); A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ 
and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models Against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 95; D. Ormerod, 
Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 392-93. 
104 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 972; P. Gillies, 10 Ottawa L. Rev. (1973), p. 274; 
these criticisms were also noted in Law Com. No. 50, paras. 54-58 and Law Com. No. 76, para. 1.64-
1.71.  
105 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 458; The Law Society according to 
para. 57 of the Law Com. No. 50, also recommended that prosecutors should not be allowed to 
charge both conspiracy and its underlying complete substantive offence. 
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otherwise be inadmissible. This was the courts view in Regina v. Dawson,106 where 
the court quashed the conviction of six defendants who had been charged and 
convicted of one count of conspiracy and 14 counts of fraud. The court, to deal with 
the problem created by double charging, devised a new analytical approach of first 
evaluating the substantive charge and then determining the viability of the 
conspiracy charge. This approach changed the the traditional practice of first 
evaluating the conspiracy charge.107 The court’s view on the benefit of such an 
approach was that it would enable the state to bring smaller and more manageable 
conspiracies before the court, as opposed to a single, large and complicated 
conspiracy.  
The case of Regina v. Griffiths,108 also illustrates the courts disdain towards the 
practice of double charging. Nine defendants were charged and convicted of one 
count of conspiracy to defraud the government and 24 counts of the substantive 
offence of false pretences. During the trial the state called 60 witnesses and the 
defence 35 witnesses. A total of 263 exhibits were produced by both sides. On 
appeal, the court reversed the convictions holding that the prosecution had failed to 
prove that there was a single comprehensive conspiracy among all the defendants. 
The appellate court observed that during the trial two types of confusion were 
experienced. The first was the “general confusion”, which made the jurors to 
complain. The second was the “procedural confusion”, which required the judge to 
instruct the jury that certain evidence though admissible with respect to the 
conspiracy charge could not be considered in the instance of the substantive 
offence. The court, in expressing its disapproval of the practice, stated: 
                                                          
106 44 Crim. App. 87 (1960). 
107 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 976. 
108  (1966) 1 Q. B. 589. 
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The practice of adding what may be called a rolled–up conspiracy charge to a 
number of counts of substantive offences has become common. We express the very 
strong hope that this practice will now cease and that the courts will never again have 
to struggle with this type of case [...]. 
In spite of their disapproval, the appellate courts have continued to allow convictions 
for both conspiracy and the completed offence to stand. This especially occurs in the 
instance where an appellant does not question the double conviction on appeal.109 
The courts have also refrained from establishing a rule restricting the prosecution 
from bringing both a charge of conspiracy and the substantive offence, preferring to 
deal with the problem on a case by case basis.110 The Law Reform Commission also 
recognised the challenges raised by double charging, but instead of recommending 
a rule that would abolish this practice, it preferred to issue a practice rule that 
requires the prosecution to justify joinder of the conspiracy and substantive counts, 
failure to which the prosecution has to choose to pursue one of either of the 
counts.111 This recommendation was adopted by the Queen’s Bench division issuing 
a practice notice direction dated 9th May 1977 to the effect that, ‘where an 
indictment contains counts alleging substantive offences and a related conspiracy 
count, the prosecution may justify the joinder or be required to elect to proceed on 
the substantive or conspiracy counts [...]. A joinder is justified for this purpose if the 
judge considers that the interests of justice demand’.112 
                                                          
109 See K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 980. This is illustrated by the case of Director 
of Public Prosecution v. Doot 1973 A. C. 807 where the court let a conviction for the offence of 
importing cannabis into the United Kingdom together with the conspiracy to import dangerous drugs 
to stand because the defendants did not challenge it on appeal. The court nonetheless, observed that 
had the issue been raised the court would have rejected the argument, because the court accords 
deference to the trial court’s determinations. 
110 K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 978. 
111 Law Com. No. 76, paras. 1.67, 1.69, its justification for this approach was, ‘to guard against the 
jury having to acquit a defendant because he has not been charged with what the evidence 
establishes he is guilty of, whether it is conspiracy or the substantive offence. Substantive counts are 
charged in case the evidence of the conspiracy breaks down; conspiracy is charged in case the 
evidence on the substantive counts against one or more defendants breaks down’. 
112 Practice Direction [1977] 2 All E. R. 540. 
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2.4. Enforcement  
An accused may be convicted on both counts of conspiracy and the substantive 
offence, and if the court makes such a conviction it is required to give separate 
sentences on each count.113 The possibility of double punishment is however, not 
encouraged by the appellate courts. In D.P.P. v. Stewart,114 the defendant was 
charged for the offence of conspiracy under the Customs Act and for the substantive 
crime of failing to offer foreign currency to an authorised dealer. The defendant was 
convicted and sentenced to a fine of 30,000 pounds or six months for each offence. 
On appeal, the sentence for the conspiracy offence was reduced to a nominal 100 
pounds. The court’s reasoning was that because the two offences arose from the 
same set of facts to impose substantial penalties on both counts would be excessive. 
On acquittals, the law recognises that an accused may be found guilty although his 
alleged co-conspirators are acquitted.115 Such a conviction can be quashed if the 
circumstances of the conviction are inconsistent with the acquittal of the other 
persons involved. 
One question that had previously presented a dilemma to the courts is whether a 
conspiracy conviction can receive a longer sentence than the sentence available for 
the substantive crime. Under common law, the punishment of conspiracy was not 
dependent on the punishment of the completed crime. Therefore, it was possible to 
receive any of the wide range of sentences available at the discretion of the court.116 
It was the practice of the courts to give a harsher penalty for conspiracy charges in 
                                                          
113 A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
Against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 95; Wasik M., Emmins on Sentencing, 3rd edn. (2001), p. 147. 
114 3 W. L. R. 884 (1982). 
115 Section 5 (8) CLA; M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 274-75; D. Ormerod, 
Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 397. 
116 M. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), p. 398; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, 
Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 508; D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 
11th edn. (2005), p. 397. 
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the event two situations: The first situation applied in the instance where the 
conspiracy involved a continuing criminal activity. In Rex v. Morris,117 the court 
rejected the defendant’s appeal against his four year sentence for the misdemeanour 
of conspiracy to evade duties of customs. The defendant had argued that this 
sentence was historically disproportionate. The court was of the view that a longer 
sentence was appropriate in the case where the conspiracy involved more than one 
distinct activity. The defendant’s activity of importing more than 10,000 watches daily 
was described as ‘wholesale smuggling’ that had taken place over several months. 
The conspiracy in this case was regarded as much more significant than any other 
objective of the conspiracy. The second situation was in the case where the 
conspiracy involved a single crime of exceptional circumstances. In Verrier v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions,118 the defendant received a seven year sentence for 
conspiracy to defraud, when the maximum sentence for the crime of fraud was five 
years. His appeal against the sentence was dismissed. The House of Lords held that 
a judge may have reasons to treat the conspiracy offence differently and to consider 
it more serious than the substantive offence. 
The law in the United Kingdom on this aspect has since changed, following 
recommendation by the Law Commission. Part I section 3 of the 1977 Act sets out 
the penalties for conspiracy. Section 3 (3) of the CLA provides that a person 
convicted of statutory conspiracy is only liable to a sentence of imprisonment not 
exceeding the maximum sentence provided for its target offence. Where the 
conspiracy involves the commission of more than one offence, the maximum 
sentence would be the longest of the sentences provided. The possibility of receiving 
a life imprisonment also exists for one convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, or 
                                                          
117 1 K. B. 394 (1951); K. A. David, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 973. 
118 2 A. C. 195 (1967). 
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any offence for which a sentence for life imprisonment is provided by law, and other 
offences punishable by imprisonment for which no maximum term is given.119 In 
some instances, the Act gives the court powers to impose a fine at their discretion in 
lieu of or in addition to dealing with the accused person.120 
 In the case where the court convicts for both conspiracy and substantive offence, 
the court is required to state whether the underlying sentences of the respective 
convictions will be served concurrently or consecutively.121 If the sentences are to be 
served concurrently, the longer of the sentences is taken as the aggregate sentence, 
whereas in the case of consecutive sentences, the sum of both sentences is the 
aggregate even if it is greater than the maximum that would be imposed for any one 
of the offences.122 It is important that the court ensures that even while imposing in 
particular consecutive sentence, the overall sentence should reflect the total 
seriousness of the conduct being punished.123 
II. United States 
Conspiracy law in the United States was inherited from its common law background. 
Congress has since enacted several conspiracy statutes. The current law on federal 
conspiracy is one provided by Congress, and includes the jurisprudence showing the 
courts understanding of the law on conspiracy.124 Conspiracy is widely used to 
counter organised crime, and is one of the most commonly charged federal crimes in 
                                                          
119 Section 3 (2) CLA. 
120 Section 3 (1) CLA. 
121 A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
Against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 95. 
122  R v. Prime (1983) 5 Cr. App. R(s) 127. 
123 See Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 158 (2); Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
section 166 (3) (b); Jones v. DPP (1962) A. C. 635, at p. 647; Wasik M., Emmins on Sentencing, 3rd 
edn. (2001), pp. 148-9.  
124 See Doyle C., Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, Congressional Research Service, 
Congress Report April 30, 2010, p. 3. 
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the United States.125 It has played and continues to have a pivotal role in the 
punishment of uncompleted criminal conduct in white-collar cases, narcotics, and 
more recently terrorism.126 Congress enacted a general criminal conspiracy statute 
U.S.C.18 § 371, which makes it a crime to conspire to commit any crime against the 
United States or to defraud the United States.127 In addition to this general statute, 
specific provisions in other federal statutes criminalise conspiracy to commit certain 
substantive offences.128 Most of the conspiracy laws are broadly tailored, usually 
setting out the statement of conspiracy objective considered to be criminal, and in 
some instances providing for an overt act requirement. This gives latitude to the 
courts to define the elements of the crime, and the law pertaining to several issues 
that arise during the prosecution of conspiracy cases.129 The Model Penal Code is 
the other source of law that attempts to add more certainty and coherence to the law 
on criminal conspiracy.130 Section 5.03 of the Model Penal Code provides that to 
agree with another to commit a crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit a crime, 
or to agree to aid a person in the planning or commission of a crime or attempt or 
solicitation to commit such a crime, makes one liable for conspiracy. Although 
                                                          
125 P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 947; J. Winograd, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. (2004), p. 611. 
126 R. M. Chesney, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. (2007), p. 425 et seq; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 950; 
Strader K. J., White Collar Crime Cases, Materials, and Problems (2009), p. 51. 
127 Section 371 states;  
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offence against the United States, or to defraud 
the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more such 
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
If, however, the offence, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanour 
only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for 
such misdemeanour.  
128 Examples include conspiracy to restrain trade 15 U.S.C. Sec 1 (2000); conspiracy to bribe in 
sporting events 18 U.S.C. Sec 224 (2000); conspiracy to deprive persons of their civil rights 18 U.S.C 
Sec 241 (2000); conspiracy to violate Controlled Substances Act 21 U.S.C. Sec 846 (2000). 
129 H. Wechsler, W. K. Jones, and H. L. Korn, 61 Columbia Law Review (1961), p. 957. 
130 H. Wechsler, W. K. Jones, and H. L. Korn, 61 Columbia Law Review (1961), p. 957; also see G. E. 
Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), pp. 6-8, they comment that the model penal 
code is a proposed formulation of statutes relating to criminal law, and is available to the legislature 
as a guide in making legislation in the underlying field. 
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Congress has not adopted the Model Penal Code into federal law, a significant 
portion of it has been adopted by several States.131 
A conspiracy must involve two or more persons.132 At common law, a husband and 
wife were considered to be one unit and could not make up the two parties 
necessary to form a conspiracy where they were the sole conspirators. Several 
courts in the United States have rejected this rule, observing that the reasons that 
existed to support the rule no longer prevail in present day settings.133 A corporation 
may also be held criminally liable for conspiracy, if its employees and agents carried 
out such conspiracy at least in part for the benefit of the company.134 Following the 
introduction of Wharton's rule, when the nature of a crime is such that it necessarily 
requires concert of action to be committed, which means it is impossible to commit 
such crime without agreeing to do so, then the prosecution in such a case is 
precluded from charging the participants with conspiracy. An example would be in 
the case where adultery is a crime, the two participants can only be charged with the 
substantive offence and not conspiracy.135 
1. Elements of the Offence 
The jurisprudence shows that under federal law most conspiracies consist of three 
elements: an agreement to carry out an unlawful act, knowingly engaging in the 
conspiracy with intention to realise its object, commission of an act by one or more 
                                                          
131 K. A. David, 25 Vand.J.Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 960; G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th 
edn. (1999), p. 6. 
132 United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F. 3d 566, 580 (7th Cir. 2005), where the court observed that ‘the 
elements of the crime of conspiracy are not satisfied unless one conspires with at least one true co-
conspirator’; United States v Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274 (2003). 
133 See United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54-5 (1960). This rule however, is not decisively settled; 
see further views in W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 657. 
134 United States v. Singh, 518 F. 3d 236, 249-51 (4th Cir. 2008). 
135 See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770 (1975) at p. 774; W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th 
edn. (2003), p. 658; for further discussions on limitations of this rule see V. J. Tatone, 61 Journal of 
Urban Law (1984), p. 505 et seq. 
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members of the conspiracy directed towards realising the object of the conspiracy, 
otherwise referred to as the ‘overt act’.136 
a) The Agreement 
The agreement to carry out the unlawful act is the actus reus and is the essence of 
criminal conspiracy.137 It is considered to be a manifestation of the intention 
conceived in the mind.138 It is the act of agreeing in itself which is criminalised. In 
United States v. Pullman,139 the court observed that the agreement to commit an 
unlawful act was the essential evil the crime of conspiracy is directed at. It is from the 
agreement that courts can determine issues such as, the requisite mental element, 
the requisite number of conspirators, and the number of conspiracies in existence.140  
The prosecution does not have to prove the existence of a formal or express 
agreement. The agreement may be implicit, inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of the case.141 In United States v. Delgadio,142 the court noted that a 
conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence showing concert of action. 
Since conspiracy is largely surrounded by secrecy, proving it by direct evidence is a 
difficult if not impossible task to fulfil. In such circumstances, the use of 
circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy becomes essential. Courts being 
sympathetic to the prosecution’s hardship have been willing to let the prosecution 
                                                          
136 G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), pp. 355-56; G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking 
Criminal Law (2000), pp. 218-19; W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 621. 
137 See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 
(1975); United States v. Beil, 577 F. 2d 1313, 1315 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v Chavez, 549 
F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2008); G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p. 356; G. 
P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), pp. 218, 219. 
138 This was the expression of the court in State v. Carbone, 10 N. J. 329, 91 A. 2d 571 (1952), it 
observed that “...the mind proceeds from a secret intention to the overt act of mutual consultation and 
agreement,” cited in W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 622. 
139 187 F. 3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 1999). 
140 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 622. 
141 Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 777 (1975); United States v Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F. 3d 
32, 39 (1st Cir. 2010); G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p. 356. 
142 321 F. 3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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‘rely on inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators’.143 
The course of conduct from which the courts may infer conspiracy include: ‘…the 
joint appearance of defendants at transactions and negotiations in furtherance of the 
conspiracy; the relationship among co-defendants; mutual representation of 
defendants to third parties; and other evidence suggesting unity of purpose or 
common design and understanding among conspirators to accomplish the objects of 
the conspiracy’.144 
The parties to the agreement must agree on a common objective. In United States v. 
Milligan,145 the court asserted that it was necessary for the government to prove a 
meeting of minds between the alleged conspirators to achieve an unlawful 
objective.146 The meeting of minds in this instance does not however, apply the 
same standard like that required with respect to contracts.147 A mere tacit 
understanding does suffice. In United States v. Desena,148 the court stated that 
although the proof of a formal agreement was not necessary, the prosecution had to 
at least prove a tacit understanding between the parties to further violation of the 
law. The objective of the agreement should be to achieve an illegal goal.149 Under 
common law, it was possible for acts not considered criminal when carried out by a 
single person, to be punishable as conspiracy when carried out by a combination of 
persons. This common law position may still prevail in some jurisdictions in the 
United States, save for instances where statute limits conspiracy to apply only where 
                                                          
143 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 59 S. Ct 467, 83 L. Ed. 610 (1939). 
144 United States v. Wardell, 591 F. 3d 1279 at 1287-288 (10th Cir. 2009). 
145 17 F. 3d 177,182-83 (6th Cir. 1994). 
146 See also G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p. 366. 
147 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 622. 
148 260 F. 3d 150,155 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Searan, 259 F. 3d 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2001). 
149 State of New Jersey v. Brian Samuels A-0967-02 T 40967-02T4 court noted that the agreement 
must have a specific crime as its goal. 
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its object is a crime or a felony.150 Most States have preferred to restrict the 
application of conspiracy to criminal objectives following its history of prosecutorial 
and judicial abuse.151 
b) The Mental Element 
An accused is only culpable of conspiracy if he knew of the conspiracy and 
voluntarily participated in it.152 This implies that the accused had the intent to bring 
about the object of the conspiracy. In United States v. Ceballos,153 the court 
observed that in order to convict a defendant of conspiracy, the prosecution had to 
prove that the defendant knew of the conspiracy, and joined it with intent to commit 
the offences, which were part of the conspiracy’s objectives. The knowledge 
requirement is satisfied once the prosecution shows the defendant’s awareness of 
the essential nature of the conspiracy. This means it suffices to prove that the 
defendant only had knowledge of the general scope of the conspiracy. This was 
aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in Blumenthal v. United States,154 when it 
stated: 
Secrecy and concealment are essential features of [a] successful conspiracy. The 
more completely they are achieved, the more successful the crime. Hence the law 
rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing 
sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without 
requiring evidence of knowledge of all details or of the participation of others. 
Otherwise the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty in proof and of 
correlating proof with pleading would become insuperable, and conspirators would go 
free by their very ingenuity. 
                                                          
150 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 636; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), pp. 962-65. 
151 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 639. 
152 See G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p. 372, asserting that there has to 
be an intent to agree and intent to realise the object of the conspiracy; see also R. M. Chesney, 80 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. (2007), pp. 452-54; W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), pp. 628-29. 
153 340 F. 3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2001). 
154 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947). 
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The evidence of knowledge must be clear.155 Furthermore, in cases involving 
specific intent crimes, the prosecution is required to show beyond reasonable doubt 
that the defendant had the specific intent to violate the substantive statute 
involved.156 The element of knowledge may also be satisfied by showing the 
accused acted with wilful blindness. A defendant will not be shielded from culpability 
where the defendant is seen to have deliberately avoided knowledge of a 
conspiracy.157 Wilful blindness is a form of constructive knowledge that allows 
imputation of knowledge if the evidence shows the accused purposely closed his 
eyes to avoid knowing what was taking place around him, when given reason to 
believe further inquiry is necessary and can satisfy the mental element of the 
underlying offence.158 In United States v. Reyes,159 the court stated that wilful 
blindness in a conspiracy case exists where the defendant realised the probability of 
existence of the conspiracy, but avoided final confirmation. This was also confirmed 
in United States v. Faulkner,160 where the court held that it would be appropriate to 
infer deliberate ignorance where a defendant claims lack of guilt, but the evidence 
supports inference of deliberate indifference. 
However, mere knowledge of the existence and goals of a conspiracy does not of 
itself make one a conspirator, the prosecution must show that the defendant has a 
more positive attitude towards the forbidden undertaking. The evidence must show 
that more than just knowledge there is informed and interested cooperation by the 
defendant. The defendant ‘must in some sense promote [the] venture […making] it 
                                                          
155 United States v. Cellabos, 340 F. 3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2001). 
156 See United States v. Cellabos, 340 F. 3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Samaria, 239 F. 
3d 228 (2d Cir. 2001). 
157 See United States v. Whittington, 26 F. 3d 456 (4th Cir. 1994), where the court noted that in a case 
of wilful blindness if the defendant was unaware of what was happening it was because he 
deliberately shut his eyes to it. 
158 United States v. Ereme, No. 05-4263 (4th Cir.) Unpublished. 
159 302 F. 3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002). 
160 17 F. 3d 745, 767-768 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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his own, have a stake in its outcome or make an affirmative attempt to further its 
purpose’.161  
On the aspect of voluntary participation, it is sufficient for the prosecution to show the 
defendant wilfully participated in the conspiracy at some stage with knowledge of the 
unlawful nature of his participation. This does not require proof that the accused 
entered into the conspiracy with full knowledge of its details or that he participated in 
all phases and aspects of the conspiracy.162 Once the existence of a conspiracy is 
established, evidence of the accused person’s slight or remote connection with the 
conspiracy will be enough to show the accused was a knowing member of the 
conspiracy.163 The acts carried out by the defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy 
objective suffice to prove that the accused was a knowing participant. In the 
alternative, the prosecution needs only to establish the existence of a conspiracy, 
and the accused person’s intent to further its objectives. The prosecution may prove 
the defendant’s participation entirely through circumstantial evidence. In United 
States v. Whittington,164 the court observed that proof of knowing participation in 
conspiracy can be shown by ‘circumstantial evidence such as relationship with other 
members of the conspiracy, the length of his association, attitude, conduct and the 
nature of the conspiracy’. It is not necessary to show the defendant knew all the 
details, objectives or participants in a conspiracy. 
The courts have nonetheless been very cautious in establishing ‘knowing 
participation’ from mere association.165 In United States v. Maliszewski,166 the court 
                                                          
161 United States v. Ceballos, 340 F. 3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 
579 at 580 (2d. Cir. 1940); Direct sales v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); G. E. Dix and M. M. 
Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p. 356. 
162United States v. Ereme, No.05-4263 (4th Cir.) Unpublished. 
163 See United States v. Leahy, 82 F. 3d 624,633 (5th Cir. 1996). 
164 26 F. 3d 456, 465 (4th Cir. 1994). 
165 Doyle C., Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, Congressional Research Service, Congress 
Report April 30, 2010, p. 6. 
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observed that participation in a conspiracy’s common purpose and plan can be 
inferred from the defendant’s actions and reactions to circumstances, but mere 
presence at the scene of crime was not sufficient evidence of participation. This was 
illustrated in United States v. Pupo,167 where the court held that mere knowledge, 
acquiescence, or approval of crime was not enough to establish an individual as 
being part of a conspiracy to distribute drugs, and mere presence at the scene of a 
drug distribution was not sufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy. The court 
observed that the defendant's actions must be more consistent with participation 
than with mere acquiescence. In such cases, the jury has often preferred the 
addition of other evidence to find conspiracy apart from mere close association with 
co-conspirator. In United States v. Samaria,168 the court observed that a cab driver, 
who took conspirators in a stolen credit card scheme to their requested destinations, 
did not have the requisite knowledge and specific intent necessary to be considered 
a participant in the conspiracy. The court stated '[t]he broad reach of the federal 
conspiracy statute does not extend so far as to permit conviction upon evidence of 
mere association or suspicion'. 
c) The Overt Act Requirement 
Although under common law it was not necessary to establish conspiracy by proving 
an overt act, most conspiracy statutes in the United States now require proof that 
one or more members of the conspiracy carried out an act (otherwise known as an 
overt act) in furtherance of the conspiracy.169 In Yates v United States,170 the court 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
166 161 F. 3d 992, 1006 (6th Cir. 1998). 
167 841 F. 2d 1235, 1238 (4th Cir. 1988). 
168 239 F. 3d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 2001). 
169 G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p. 357; Doyle C., Federal Conspiracy 
Law: A Brief Overview, Congressional Research Service, Congress Report April 30, 2010 p. 8; G. P. 
Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), p. 223; P. J. Henning, 44 Wayne L. Rev. (1998-1999), p. 
1316. 
170 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957). 
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stated that the rationale for the overt act requirement was to show that the 
conspiracy is at work and not a mere scheme in the minds of the perpetrators.171 To 
support a conspiracy conviction, the overt act does not have to be unlawful, neither 
does it need to be the substantive offence itself, it only needs to be a step toward the 
criminal objective.172 The defendant needs not to have personally carried out the 
overt act, a co-conspirator’s overt act will be sufficient to hold other co-conspirators 
liable.173 The overt act must be an act carried out before commission of the 
substantive crime, or before the objective of the conspiracy is realised.174 
1.1. Accessorial Liability (The Pinkerton Doctrine) 
A party to a conspiracy may be held liable for foreseeable substantive offences 
committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the 
party did not participate in commission of such substantive offences, or have any 
knowledge of them. This rule was laid down in Pinkerton v. United States.175 
Pinkerton was convicted for conspiring with his brother to evade tax, including other 
substantive counts of tax fraud allegedly carried out by his brother. The Court of 
Appeal dismissed his appeal, rejecting the allegation that he was not the party that 
carried out the plan, although, there was evidence showing that at the time some of 
the offences were committed the appellant was in jail. The court observed that as 
long as co-conspirators had not withdrawn from the conspiracy, they were aiding the 
                                                          
171 See also D. Burgman, 29 DePaul L. Rev. (1979), p. 101, stating that the overt act shows the 
conspiracy is meant to be carried out, and thus evidence of the serious threat it poses. 
172 See United States v. Rehak, 589 F. 3d 965, 971 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Crabtree, 979 F. 
2d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992), where the court stated that an overt act does not have to be the 
substantive crime; United States v. Montour, 944 F. 2d 1019, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991), here the court 
observed that an overt act need not be inherently criminal; G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 
4th edn. (1999), p. 358; G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), p. 224.  
173 United States v LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 2002). 
174 See United States v McKinney, 954 F. 2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1992). 
175 328 U.S. 640 (1946); also see United States v. Solis 299 F. 3d 420 (5th Cir. 2002) the court 
observed that a party to a conspiracy may be held criminally liable for an act, committed by a co-
conspirator even if the party did not know of the act and did not participate in it, as long as it was 
foreseeable. 
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commission of the substantive offence.176 The court while making this holding 
observed that the offence for which a conspirator will be held liable must be one in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and was reasonably foreseeable. It added that a 
defendant could only escape liability for such an offence, by showing they had 
withdrawn from the conspiracy at the time of commission of the alleged offence.177 
Courts have been willing to interpret knowing participation and find liability on 
account of foreseeability mainly because of due process concerns.178 In United 
States v. Corneaux,179 the court held that the defendants who were experienced 
drug dealers must have been aware of the prevalent use of firearms in drug deals, 
therefore, they could be held liable for the foreseeable offence of a co-conspirator 
possessing a firearm during the drug deal in furtherance of conspiracy.  
A defendant who joins a conspiracy is also likely to be considered to have adopted 
acts done by co-conspirators prior to joining the conspiracy, therefore, liable for 
them. In United States v. Rea,180  the court observed that being present from the 
inception of a conspiracy was not a prerequisite for a defendant to incur liability for 
acts committed by co-conspirators, both before and after the defendant became a 
member of the conspiracy. This rule of liability does not extend to substantive crimes 
committed by co-conspirators before the defendant joined the conspiracy.181 In 
United States v. Ocampo,182 the court held the defendant was liable for acts done by 
co-conspirators prior to having joined the conspiracy, but declined to extend 
culpability to substantive offences committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, prior 
                                                          
176 United States v Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) at p. 646. 
177 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) at 646; State v. Barton, 424 A. 2d 1033 (R. 
I.1981); United States v. Robertson, 474 F. 3d 432 (7th Cir. 2007). 
178 United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F. 3d 163,196-97 (1st Cir. 2000). 
179 955 F. 2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992). 
180 958 F. 2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir.1991). 
181 United States v. Blackmon, 839 F. 2d 900, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1988). 
182 973 F. 2d 1015, 1022-23 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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to the defendant’s participation. Liability does not also extend to acts done after the 
defendant’s withdrawal from the conspiracy.183 
Under the Pinkerton doctrine, distinction between accessories and perpetrators is 
eliminated, and any conspirator can be liable for the multitude of offences carried out 
by co-conspirators in pursuance of the conspiracy. Every participation or contribution 
makes one a perpetrator under the conspiracy, and all participants thereto are 
equally responsible for all actions pursuant to the conspiracy.184 The Pinkerton 
doctrine is criticised for spreading liability too widely, carrying with it the strong 
implication of guilt by association. It is seen as undermining a fundamental principle 
of criminal law that requires liability to be founded on an individual's personal guilt.185 
Holding a co-conspirator liable for acts that he had no knowledge of, or control over, 
or would have objected to, is seen as imposing liability for a crime to which the co-
conspirator did not have the requisite mens rea.186 Not all states favour the principle 
in this doctrine and some courts have rejected it.187 The Model Penal Code’s 
provision on conspiracy also rejects Pinkerton liability.188  
To counter the criticisms, various theories have been used to justify the Pinkerton 
rule. Participation in the formation of the conspiracy is considered to sufficiently 
establish intent of the conspirators in respect to commission of the underlying 
                                                          
183 See United States v. Luthian, 976 F. 2d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992), the court held that a defendant 
could not be held liable for substantive offences committed after withdrawal from a conspiracy.  
184 G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), p. 660; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (a), which states: 
‘Whoever commits an offence against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces 
or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal’. 
185 G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000) p. 663, observes that this controversial theory 
derives from the influence of the law of agency. 
186 W. R. La Fave, Substantive Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2005), §13.3 a. 
187 The doctrine has been rejected in the State of Washington, see State v Stein, 144 Wn. 2D  236, 
241-42, 27P. 3d 184, 188-89 (Wash. 2001); State of Arizona, see State ex.rel. Woods v Cohen, 173 
Ariz.497, 501, 844. P. 2d 1147, 1151 (Ariz.1992); State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S. E. 2d 128 
(1980), where the North Carolina Supreme Court asserted that the principle behind Pinkerton was an 
erroneous idea, cited in G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p.137; J. D. Ohlin, 
98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, (2007), p. 148. 
188 Model Penal Code § 5.03. 
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crimes. As a consequence, each conspirator is seen to have instigated the 
commission of the underlying crimes, thereby making them vicariously criminally 
responsible. Here, commission of the said criminal acts is considered to have been 
dependent upon the encouragement and material support of members of the 
conspiracy as a whole.189 Pinkerton liability is also favoured for its supposed 
deterrent effect. It is argued that group activity presents a greater potential danger to 
the public than the action of an individual, and should therefore, be discouraged with 
rules such as Pinkerton. This provides an incentive against joining a criminal 
conspiracy in the first place.190 
The theory underlying Pinkerton liability resembles the accesorial liability theory in the United 
Kingdom criminal law, known as joint enterprise liability.191 Under this concept, persons who 
agree to undertake a criminal venture are liable for all criminal acts arising from the ambit of 
the common criminal purpose.192 Similar to conspiracy, agreement forms an essential part of 
this theory of liability. 
1.2. Withdrawal, Impossibility, and End of Conspiracy 
To avoid liability on account of withdrawal, a conspirator is required to make an 
unequivocal withdrawal. The court has interpreted this to mean that the conspirator 
must commit ‘affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and in a 
manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators’.193 Merely stopping to 
                                                          
189 G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p.137; see also J. D. Ohlin, 98 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology (2007), pp. 147 et seq., grounding the justification for Pinkerton liability on the group 
will, which results from collective reasoning, asserting at p. 183, ‘that group deliberations are 
sufficiently integrated to yield collective intentions of the sort that might ground the mens rea for 
Pinkerton’. 
190 G. E. Dix and M. M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p.137; Katyal N. K., 112 Yale Law 
Journal (2003), pp. 1372-73.  
191 J. D. Ohlin, Chicago Journal of International Law (2011), p. 705-6. 
192 R. v. Anderson; R. v. Morris (1966) 2 Q. B. 110; see R. v. Powell (Anthony) and English, 1 A. C. 1 
(HL 1999), for a detailed discussion of the various situations that may arise under this concept; J. 
Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edn. (2008), pp. 849-50. 
193 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464 (1978); Hyde v. United States, 225 
U.S. 347, 369 (1912); United States v. Dabbs, 134 F. 3d 1071 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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participate in the conspiracy is not sufficient. In United States v. Febus,194 the court 
held that the defendant was still part of a conspiracy despite a decade long absence 
from the conspiracy, because the defendant had not affirmatively acted to abandon 
the conspiracy. Such withdrawal only stops a defendant from being held liable for 
any further acts committed in the future pursuant to the conspiracy, but does not 
exempt him from liability for acts carried out before the withdrawal.195 
Failure to achieve the illegal objective of a conspiracy does not shield a defendant 
from liability. In United States v Feola,196 the court stated that the law of conspiracy 
permits punishment for the agreement and overt act whether the crime agreed upon 
is committed or not. A defendant may be held liable for conspiracy even in the case 
where the object of the conspiracy is impossible to achieve. In United States v. 
Rodriguez,197 the court held that factual impossibility is no defence to a conspiracy 
charge. It observed that the crime is the illegal agreement and it did not matter that 
the purpose of the agreement was not achieved, or even that achieving such 
purpose was factually impossible.198 
A conspiracy only comes to an end once its objective is achieved or its purpose 
abandoned.199 In United States v Roshko,200 the court held that a conspiracy to 
                                                          
194 218 F.3d 784, 796 (7th Cir. 2000). 
195 Ohlin J. D., 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2007), p. 205. 
196 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975). 
197 215 F.3d 110.116 (1st Cir. 2000). 
198 There is a distinction between factual impossibility and legal impossibility. Whereas factual 
impossibility is “impossibility due to the fact that an illegal act cannot physically be accomplished” a 
legal impossibility refers to “impossibility due to the fact that what the defendant intended to do is not 
illegal”. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th edn. (1999), p. 759. In the latter case of legal impossibility a 
defence lies. In United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F. 3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2000), the court held that a 
defendant cannot be held liable for a crime for which there was no charge and which does not exist 
under federal law. §371 inherently recognises the defence of legal impossibility by requiring proof that 
the defendant intended to commit any offence against the United States; see also J. Winograd, 41 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. (2004), p. 632. 
199 See United States v Knowles, 66 F. 3d 1146, 1155 (11th Cir. 1995). 
200 969 F. 2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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defraud the government ended when the INS approved the defendant’s application 
for a green card, which was the object of the conspiracy. 
1.3. Procedural Attributes of a Conspiracy Charge 
In the United States, a conspiracy charge allows the prosecution to have the trial in 
any location where any of the conspirators carried out an overt act.201 This possibility 
gives the prosecution the choice of having the trial at a place of its convenience 
regardless of the inconvenience it may pose to the defendant.202 The prosecution is 
also allowed to try the conspirators jointly in one trial.203 Alleging a conspiracy allows 
the prosecution to introduce certain co-conspirator statements made ‘during the 
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy’, which would otherwise be excluded 
under the hearsay rule.204 A conspiracy charge also gives the prosecution the 
                                                          
201 See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 218 (2005). 
202 One of the constitutional guarantees for a defendant under the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution is to have the criminal trial at the place where the crime occurred. In the case of 
conspiracy this would be where the agreement was made, but to establish this in an ‘omnipresent’ 
offence such as conspiracy is difficult. In United States v. Corres, 356 U.S. 405, 78 S.Ct. 875, 2 L.Ed. 
2d 873 (1958), the court criticised the advantage given to the prosecution on this account, stating that 
it defeated the purpose of the sixth amendment, which is to “safeguard against the unfairness and 
hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place”; see G. E. Dix and M. M. 
Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), p. 354; W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), pp. 616, 
617. 
203 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rule 8 states:- 
(a) Joinder of offences. The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts with 
2 or more offences if the offences charged-whether felonies or misdemeanours or both-are of the 
same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or 
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. 
(b) Joinder of Defendants. The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or 
transactions, constituting an offence or offences. The defendants may be charged in one or more 
counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count; also see Zafiro v. 
United States, 5056 U.S. 534, 537 (1993), noting that Joint trials are seen to promote efficiency in the 
justice system and serve the interest of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts; see W. R. La Fave, 
Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 613 at 620, arguing that such joint trials are seen to present the 
defendant with certain disadvantages, which include a limited discretion in determining members of 
the jury, and increase the likely hood of a defendant’s conviction. 
204 Federal Rules of Evidence rule 801 (d) (2) (E), the rationale for this exception is that co-
conspirators are agents of one another, and a co-conspirator is considered the best witness to a 
conspiracy; In United States v. Angiulo, 847 F. 2d 956 (1st Cir. 1988), the court observed, “As long as 
it is shown that a party, having joined a conspiracy, is aware of the conspiracy’s features and general 
aims, statements pertaining to the details of the plans to further the conspiracy can be admitted 
against the party even if the party does not have specific knowledge of the acts spoken of”; Anderson 
v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 94 S. Ct. 2253, 41 L, Ed. 2d 20 (1974); United States v. Kelly, 204 F. 
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possibility of eluding restrictions under the statute of limitations.205 Since conspiracy 
is a continuing offence, it is able to avoid the constraints of ex post facto principle.206 
An enhancement of the penalty of an on-going conspiracy would not offend the ex 
post facto laws as long the conspiracy had not yet been completed at the time the 
new law was enacted.207 In addition, since conspiracy and its contemplated crime 
are considered to be separate crimes, the double jeopardy clause is no impediment 
for their successive prosecution or punishment.208 
1.4. Enforcement 
The conspiracy charge is considered to be a separate offence from the target 
offence and does not merge with the completed substantive offence.209 Therefore, a 
defendant may be sentenced separately for the two offences. In Callanan v. United 
States,210 the court held that a defendant, who had been convicted of one count of 
conspiracy and another for the substantive offence under the Hobbs Anti-
Racketeering Act, could be sentenced separately for each conviction. The court 
stated that cumulative sentencing was permissible unless there was a statute 
prohibiting this practice. It further observed that cumulative sentencing was not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2000); W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 618; J. Winograd, 41 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. (2004), p. 633. 
205 18 U.S.C 3282 provides that the statute of limitations for most federal crimes is five years. In 
reference to conspiracy crimes with an overt act requirement, the statute of limitations begins with the 
last overt act carried out in furtherance of the conspiracy, while for those with no overt act 
requirement, it begins to run when the conspiracy is abandoned or its objectives accomplished; see 
United States v. Seher, 562 F. 3d 1344 1364 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bornman, 559 F. 3d 
150, 153 (3d Cir. 2009). 
206 The law governing ex post facto prohibits the application of criminal laws to conduct that was not 
criminal at time of its commission, and the application of more severe punishment than that 
prescribed at the time the criminal conduct was carried out, U.S. Constitution Art I, §§ 9, 10. 
207 United States v. Julian, 427 F. 3d 471, 482 (7th Cir. 2005), noting “It is well established that a 
statute increasing a penalty with respect to a criminal conspiracy which commenced prior to, but was 
continued beyond the effective date of the statute, is not ex post facto as to that crime”. 
208 United States v. Yearwood, 518 F. 3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2008); U.S. Constitution Amendment V 
declares that no person shall ’be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb’. 
209 The merger doctrine was rejected by the court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) 
at 643, when it noted that a conspiracy 'has ingredients, as well as implications, distinct from the 
completion of the unlawful project'; also in Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.770, 777-78 (1975). 
210 364 U.S. 587 (1961); see also G. C. Thomas, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1985), pp. 49-50. 
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cumulative punishment, justifying the practice with the danger inherent in a 
conspiracy that extends beyond the target crime. Nonetheless, the court 
acknowledged that cumulative sentencing could in some cases amount to harsh 
punishment. In Pereira v. United States,211 the Supreme Court held that cumulative 
sentencing did not violate the double jeopardy rule, because the legal requirements 
and evidence of proving conspiracy and the completed substantive offence were 
different. The court, in addition, observed that even in the instance where the 
prosecution used the same overt acts to prove the conspiracy and the substantive 
offence this still did not violate the double jeopardy rule.212 However, practice shows 
that persons convicted of both conspiracy and its target offence are hardly punished 
separately. Most convictions on conspiracy and its object crime require that the 
sentences be served concurrently, and consecutive sentences are very rarely 
given.213 
In principle, it may also be possible in some cases for a defendant convicted of 
conspiracy to be given a longer sentence than that which is prescribed for the 
substantive offence.214 In Clune v. United States,215 the defendants were found guilty 
of conspiracy to obstruct the United States mail and were sentenced to 18 months in 
prison. This sentence was more severe than the $100 fine penalty for the 
substantive offence. The appellate court upheld this sentence stating that since 
conspiracy was a separate offence from the substantive offence, it could be 
punished separately. The court noted that a statute could provide a penalty for the 
offence of conspiracy that was more severe than the penalty for the substantive 
                                                          
211 347 U.S. 1(1954). 
212 For further critics on the double jeopardy rule see K. G. Schuler, 91 Michigan Law Review (1993), 
p. 2220 et seq: V. J. Tatone, 61 Journal of Urban Law (1984), p. 505 et seq. 
213 P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 938. 
214 Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-78 (1975). 
215 159 U.S. 590 (1895). 
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offence.216 In United States v. Cattle King Packing Co,217 the court of appeal upheld 
a sentence where the defendant was convicted on one count of conspiracy and six 
separate counts of substantive offences connected with the conspiracy. The 
defendant was sentenced to four years for the conspiracy offence, although the 
maximum sentence for any of the substantive offences was three years.218 
Reforms have led to streamlining of sentencing laws in respect to conspiracy 
charges. Currently, under the general conspiracy law U.S.C 18 section 371, 
conspiracies are punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. In 
reference to other conspiracies, their respective statutes prescribe punishment 
similar to their underlying crimes, making them subject to more severe punishment 
than conspiracies covered in section 371.219 In addition, all conspiracies are subject 
to a fine of not more than $ 250,000 (in the case of organisations not more than $ 
500,000) and may serve as a basis for a restitution or forfeiture order.220 
A defendant may be convicted of conspiracy even if the charge alleges that unknown 
persons participated in the conspiracy as long as the evidence supports such 
participation.221 A defendant may also still be convicted of conspiracy although all 
other defendants alleged to have been members of the conspiracy are acquitted.222 
                                                          
216 Clune v. United States, 159 U.S.  590 (1895) at 595.  
217 793 F. 2d 232 (10th Cir. 1986). 
218 See also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); cf Pinkerton v.United States, 328 
U.S. 640 (1946). 
219 21 U.S.C 846 (conspiracies relating to drug trafficking); 18 U.S.C 2339 B (conspiracies relating to 
terrorist attacks); 18 U.S.C § 1962 (d) (conspiracies relating to racketeering); 18 U.S.C (conspiracies 
relating to fraud). 
220 See Doyle C, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, Congressional Research Service, 
Congress Report April 30, 2010, pp. 10-12. 
221 In United States v. Martinez, 83 F. 3d 371, 375, (11th Cir. 1996), the court declared that a 
conspiracy conviction could stand even if the other alleged conspirators had not been identified. 
222 United States v. Loe, 248 F. 3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2001); Model Penal Code § 5.04 (1). 
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III. The Rationale of Conspiracy Law in Common Law Systems 
Doubts have been raised about the logic of making conspiracy criminal. The critics 
often question the wisdom of attaching punishment at the moment of agreement, 
which is seen to pose no known social danger or harm.223 Several justifications have 
been advanced for the existence of conspiracy as a distinct crime. An overview 
shows that generally two main rationales support the use of criminal conspiracy in 
common law jurisdictions. The first is its role in the prevention of crime, also known 
as the early intervention rationale. An agreement to commit a crime presents with it 
the potential danger of its adherents actually setting out to realise its criminal 
objective. Second, conspiracy is seen to have an important role in combating 
criminal enterprises, since any group dedicated to the commission of crimes is 
considered to present an on-going threat to society.224  
The early intervention or prevention rationale was the main reason for retention of 
criminal conspiracy in the United Kingdom. The Law Commission observed that 
‘conspiracy needs to be retained as a crime as it enables the criminal law to 
intervene at an early stage before a contemplated crime had actually been 
committed…’.225 Conspiracy is seen as essential in tackling preparatory criminal 
conduct, as opposed to attempt which applies to conduct, which ‘[…] is more than 
merely preparatory to the commission of an offence’.226 This rationale is also 
recognised in the United States, where conspiracy is seen as an important tool in 
                                                          
223 See A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), pp. 455-60; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. 
M. Keating, Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2003), pp. 504-8; I. H. Dennis, 93 LQR (1977), pp. 31 et seq.; 
Abraham S. Goldstein, 68 Yale L.J. (1959), pp. 414 et seq.; Philip E. Johnson, 61 Cal. L. Rev. (1973), 
pp. 1140 et seq.; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 966. 
224 R. J. Hoskins, 6 N.Y.U. J. Int’l & Pol. (1973), p. 245; also see D. Burgman, 29 DePaul L. Rev. 
(1979), pp. 84-86 . 
225 Law Com. No. 76, report, para 1.5; see also C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, Criminal Law, 5th 
edn. (2003), p. 507; D. Omerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 399; A. Ashworth, 
Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 455. 
226 The Criminal Attempts Act of 1981 at section 1 (1). 
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striking at preparatory activities involving crimes.227 In United States v. Feola,228 the 
court observed that early intervention and prosecution was justified by the increased 
likelihood of the crime occurring once the parties came to agreement. It described 
the agreement as the crystallisation of criminal intent. Doubts have been cast on this 
rationale, since a majority of cases involve conspiracies that have already been 
carried out far enough that their constitutive acts could be punished as attempt and 
incitement, or the underlying crime has in any case been committed making it 
sufficient to charge the defendants for the  substantive criminal conduct.229 
The second justification for conspiracy may be referred to as the ‘group danger’ 
rationale. It aims at dealing with the supposed continuous and inherent danger that 
criminal enterprises are seen to pose to the society.230 The exceptional danger is 
inferred from the special dynamics that group behaviour is considered to cultivate. 
These dynamics include: i) the group develops a destructive identity that suppresses 
personal identity, ii) groups are considered likely to have extreme attitudes and 
behaviour, iii) it is more difficult to discourage a group from undertaking criminal 
activities, iv) several persons working together encourage specialisation creating 
more efficiency in execution of crimes, v) specialisation means criminal conduct is 
spread over a number of persons making it difficult to trace criminal responsibility to 
any particular individual, especially those who may be considered most criminally 
responsible for their organisation and planning roles.231 The group danger rationale 
                                                          
227 R. M. Chesney, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. (2007), p. 448; N. K. Katyal, 112 The Yale Law Journal (2003), 
pp. 1310, 1311; W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 620. 
228 420 U.S. 671 (1975) at 694. 
229 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), pp. 458-9; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. 
Keating, Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2003), p. 507; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), pp. 930-31, 937. 
230 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), pp. 455, 458; D. Omerod, Smith & 
Hogan: Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 399.  
231 See N. K. Katyal, 112 The Yale Law Journal (2003), pp. 1315-25; see also Law Com. No. 76, para 
1.6, on conspiracy’s important role in ‘striking at the heart’ of criminal activities by providing a ‘useful 
means whereby persons who plan or organize crimes, but take no active part in them, can more 
easily be brought to justice’; D. Burgman, 29 DePaul L. Rev. (1979), pp. 84-86; C. M. V. Clarkson & 
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was particularly popular with the English courts in the 17th and 18th centuries. The 
focus by the courts on the potential harm of group conduct is illustrated by a 
statement made in Quinn v. Leathem.232 Here, the court made an interesting 
observation that innocent acts carried out by an individual may “become dangerous 
and alarming [when performed in a conspiracy], just as a grain of powder is 
harmless but a pound may be highly destructive”. This rationale was later viewed 
with disfavour by the courts. Several courts now regarded it as flawed and misguided 
because the focus in conspiracy cases shifted from the combination of conspirators 
to the damage the conspiracy caused.233 Lord Glaisdale’s quote in Regina v. 
Withers, 234 shows the emerging criticism to the group conduct theory: 
And although some conduct which causes or tends to cause extreme injury to the 
public may be heinous and more damaging when committed by numbers, not all 
such conduct will be so; nor may some such conduct when committed by numbers 
be necessarily more heinous and damaging than other such conduct when 
committed by an individual. 
Currently, the courts in England hardly mention the group conduct rationale in their 
conspiracy decisions, preferring to justify the enforcement of conspiracy simply from 
the perspective that it is provided in the criminal law statute.235 In contrast, the group 
danger rationale is especially prominent in the United States. The courts have often 
observed that the action of two or more people coming together poses more threat to 
the society than the act of one. In Krulewitch v. United States,236 Justice Jackson 
observed that ‘the strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
H. M. Keating, Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2003), p. 507; K. A. David 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 
966; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
Against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 76. 
232 (1901) A. C. 495, cited in K. A. David 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 963. 
233 R. v. Kamara  (1974) A. C. 104. 
234 (1975) A. C. 842 at 870 (appeal taken from England).  
235 K. A. David 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), p. 966; also see A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal 
Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 458; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2003), p. 
507, stating that this rationale is unproven. 
236 336 U.S. 78 (1915) at 88. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 52 
dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone ranger’. The potential 
danger is seen from the possibility that a criminal partnership can achieve more 
complex goals in comparison to an individual effort, and furthermore, the likelihood of 
abandoning the object of the agreement decreases when people act in a group.237 
This apprehension towards concerted criminal activity is also compounded by the 
possibility of the group evolving to perpetrate other criminal activities.238 Certain 
scholars have cast doubt onto the presupposition that group behaviour presents a 
greater danger to society as opposed to a single individual with equal motivation and 
determination to cause harm. It is argued that it doesn’t always follow that several 
persons who come together towards a criminal purpose necessarily mean a greater 
danger to society, than an individual who is resolute on committing equally if not 
more heinous crimes.239   
To combat the exceptional danger and the special circumstances that relate to group 
criminal activity, the conspiracy charge carries with it certain procedural 
conveniences and evidential benefits. These exceptional advantages of a conspiracy 
charge are used by investigators as bargaining tools to extract information from co-
conspirators. They particularly, facilitate the prosecution of persons who would 
otherwise escape criminal responsibility, because it is difficult to determine their 
exact role in commission of a crime. This especially applies to the organisers and 
                                                          
237 Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S 587, 593 (1961); K. A. David 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (1993), 
p. 969; cf A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal 
Models Against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 77. 
238 The court in United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1985), observed that the group had 
potential of ’educating and preparing conspirators for further and habitual practices’; also see Justice 
Frankfurter in Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) where he states, ‘Nor is the danger 
of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end toward which it was embarked. Combination in 
crime makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the 
group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the 
substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise’. 
239 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 458; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. 
Keating, Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2003), p. 507; I. H. Dennis, 93 LQR (1977), p. 49; A. Maljevic, 
‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models Against Criminal 
Collectives (2011), pp. 76-77; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), pp. 932-34.  
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 53 
planners who often do not have a direct role in commission of the crimes.240 As a 
consequence, the prosecution is able to roll up charges indicting several crimes, 
which otherwise on their own would not be considered serious enough, under the 
charge of conspiracy. This makes it possible for a large number of defendants to be 
held criminally responsible.241 In such cases, the conspiracy charge is considered to 
give a more rounded impression or a true picture of facts and circumstances 
surrounding commission of the crimes, especially, in terms of planning and the 
various roles played by the participants.242 
IV. Summary  
Under common law jurisdictions, conspiracy is a crime that creates criminal 
responsibility for the mere fact of agreeing to commit a criminal offence, irrespective 
of whether its underlying objective is carried out. It is an inchoate crime, distinct and 
separate from the substantive crime that the conspirators plan to commit. Several 
jurisdictions have now codified the law on conspiracy. This has given more clarity to 
a concept that has had a long winding history, initially created to punish those who 
collaborated to subvert the justice system and later gradually evolved to 
accommodate all sorts of crimes and nuisances. In the United Kingdom, section 3 of 
the CLA provides for statutory conspiracy while in the United States, 18 U.S.C 371 
the general conspiracy provision, outlaws conspiracy to commit some other federal 
                                                          
240 See Law Com. No. 76, para 1.6, asserting that conspiracy makes it easier ‘to explain to a jury a 
simple requirement of proof of an agreement than to make clear that someone who has not actually 
done anything can be guilty, by reason of complicity, of the substantive crime’; A. Ashworth, Principles 
of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), p. 458; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. Keating, Criminal Law, 5th edn. 
(2003), p. 507; N. K. Katyal, 112 The Yale Law Journal (2003), p. 1307 et seq.  
241 P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 940. 
242 See A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), pp. 457-58; C. M. V. Clarkson & H. 
M. Keating, Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2003), p. 507, describing this as the “full story” rationale; D. 
Omerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), p. 400; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a 
Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models Against Criminal Collectives (2011), 
p. 77; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 928 et seq. 
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crime. In addition, both jurisdictions have other statutes that specifically prohibit 
conspiracy to carry out other proscribed criminal conduct. 
The essential elements of conspiracy are similar in both jurisdictions. The first 
element is the agreement which forms the backbone of a conspiracy charge. It must 
involve at least two people. The crime is complete upon making of the agreement. 
Although the act of agreeing may be considered to be a wholly mental operation, it is 
usually manifested in the spoken or written words of the conspirators, or by some 
other overt action. The second element is the intent to enter into an agreement, and 
intent to carry out its underlying objective, which involves the commission of a 
substantive crime. It must be shown that the conspirators engaged in the conspiracy 
with knowledge and intention to further its goals. A third element that certain statutes 
in the United States specifically provide for, as a safeguard against prosecution of 
what may be termed to be mere thought or speech alone, is the overt act 
requirement. The prosecution should show that one of the conspirators has carried 
out some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy scheme. Although the overt act 
requirement is not specifically provided for in all conspiracy statutes, in practice, it is 
an element that may be inferred from all conspiracy cases. The conspiracy is not 
only some wish resting in the mind of its authors, there is often some outward 
manifestation indicating that the conspirators are already at work. An overt act by a 
single conspirator is sufficient to use in a conspiracy charge against all other alleged 
conspirators.  
The conspiracy charge has a double personality trait. A defendant charged with 
conspiracy may be held liable under two heads. First, the defendant may be held 
liable for agreeing to be part of a conspiracy to commit an underlying offence, and 
second, for any other substantive offences carried out by co-conspirators in 
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furtherance of the conspiracy. The defendant need not have contemplated or 
participated in these substantive offences to be criminally responsible, it is only 
sufficient for the prosecution to show that given the object of the conspiracy these 
offences were foreseeable. In the first sense, conspiracy is a separate inchoate 
crime, while in the second sense, it is a form of complicity. 
Once the conspiracy is entered into, to escape liability, a renouncing defendant must 
show he carried out positive acts to prevent the conspiratorial plan from being 
realised. A defendant may be convicted of conspiracy even though all other alleged 
conspirators are acquitted. Since conspiracy is an independent offence, one may be 
charged with either the conspiracy or its target offence or both. The practice of 
charging both the conspiracy and its underlying offence is however not encouraged, 
particularly in the United Kingdom where the prosecution is required to justify a 
decision to institute cumulative charges.  
In principle, a defendant may also be convicted for both conspiracy and its 
underlying substantive crime. The practice of double conviction again finds most 
disfavour in the appellate courts of the United Kingdom. In many instances, this 
practice has been viewed as carrying with it implications of double punishment. Even 
in the United States where conviction for both charges may be common, most courts 
have a preference to order that both sentences be served concurrently. Previously, it 
was possible for a conspiracy charge to attract more punitive measures than its 
underlying offence, this possibility has since radically been curtailed. Reforms have 
led to adoption of provisions that set out specific punishment for a conspiracy 
charge. At most, punishment of conspiracy can only be equivalent to the punishment 
prescribed for its underlying substantive crime. 
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V. Analysis 
Certain critical issues stand out with respect to the conspiracy doctrine under the 
common law jurisdictions. First, conspiracy is considered to be inherently an 
ambiguous and vague crime.243 Perhaps, the statement that perfectly captures this 
alleged characteristic is Justice Jackson’s description of conspiracy as an ‘elastic, 
sprawling and pervasive offence…so vague that it almost defies definition, 
chameleon like [taking] on a special coloration from each of the many independent 
offences on which it may be overlaid’.244 While the idea of making an agreement to 
commit a crime is clear and has no ambiguity, the challenge emerges with proving 
the existence of an act that is often mental in its composition. The uncertainty and 
ambiguity of conspiracy often manifests itself in the difficult task of the prosecution 
showing what constitutes the agreement and its requisite mental element. These 
elements are not easy to prove. 
Second, often persons who agree to pursue a criminal end will do it in very secretive 
circumstances. Such persons are very discreet in their conduct to avoid discovery. 
To deal with the challenge posed by proving the existence of conspiracies several 
procedural and evidential exceptions are availed to the prosecution. Here, the 
rationale is that the defendants should not benefit from their ingenuity. Therefore, the 
law allows wide latitude in the use of circumstantial evidence to infer existence of 
conspiracy. This latitude has in some cases led to defendants being connected to a 
conspiracy with very little evidence to prove it.245 In addition, once the prosecution 
shows on a balance of probability that a conspiracy exists, a declaration by any of 
                                                          
243 See F. B. Sayre, 35 Harvard Law Review (1921-1922), p. 393, ’A doctrine so vague in its outlines 
and uncertain in its fundamental nature as criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it 
is a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought’; see also P. Gillies, 10 Ottawa 
L. Rev. (1978), p. 274; W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 616. 
244 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S. Ct. 716, 93 L. Ed. 790 (1949). 
245 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 619; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 943. 
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the co-conspirators may be admitted in evidence against all other alleged co-
conspirators to prove involvement in the conspiracy. These exceptions are heavily 
skewed in favour of the prosecution and have been criticised for ‘overcompensating 
for the difficulties faced by prosecution'.246 The conspiracy charge does away with 
stringent mens rea and actus rea requirements, which are needed to establish 
responsibility for traditional forms of crime. This makes it a very attractive charge for 
the prosecution, especially, because it presents a high probability that the alleged 
conspirators will be found guilty.247 Although it is true that these exceptions place the 
defendant in a conspiracy case in a particularly vulnerable position, without them the 
conspiracy charge would be rendered redundant. To guard against unjust verdicts 
arising from conspiracy charges, several constitutional and procedural safeguards 
exist in the various jurisdictions, where a balance is drawn between the benefits that 
any exception presents as against its prejudicial effect to the defendant. In practice, 
these safeguards are also bolstered with the cautious manner in which the judiciary 
often treats conspiracy charges, always demanding a higher standard of proof from 
the prosecution than that actually asserted in theory. These safeguards ensure that 
more often than not only defendants who have played a meaningful role in the 
conspiracy are held criminally liable. 
The third issue that perhaps is the most controversial aspect of common law 
conspiracy arises from its second personality trait, which makes a defendant liable 
for all foreseeable substantive crimes carried out in furtherance of the conspiracy 
even without his contribution, knowledge or participation. This broad reach of 
                                                          
246 W. R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), p. 619. 
247 Despite the conspiracy charge being considered the “darling” of the prosecutor, several interests 
are usually considered before resorting to this charge. The decision to prosecute must be balanced 
against the possibility of it being outweighed by the undesirable factors associated with conspiracy 
prosecutions. See S. A. Selz, 5 Am. J. Crim. L. (1977), p. 35, for a more detailed account, of factors 
influencing conspiracy prosecutions in Chicago; also P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 938; J. 
Winograd, 41 Am Crim. L. Rev. (2004), p. 613. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 58 
conspiracy, which recognises vicarious liability for acts of accomplices, shows the 
potential danger of a conspiracy charge lapsing into a crime that promotes guilt by 
association. The advantage of this practice is that the prosecutor’s burden is 
lightened. Once it is shown that the defendant had some connection with a 
conspiracy, the need to show the defendant’s role in other offences committed 
pursuant to the conspiracy is absolved. Prosecutors often take advantage of this 
feature of common law conspiracy, using it as a bargaining tool to extract information 
from alleged co-conspirators. This complicity feature of the common law conspiracy 
is also applauded for its potential deterrent effect. The knowledge that a conspiracy 
charge carries with it such far reaching consequences can act as a discouragement 
of any desire to be involved in such criminal association. Nonetheless, to hold a 
defendant liable for crimes that he neither contemplated nor approved of violates the 
principle personal culpability. One should only be criminally responsible for an 
offence that he consciously contributes to or participates in. There has certainly been 
a withdrawal from applying this aspect of conspiracy with the courts in the United 
Kingdom. The courts mostly demand that an accused can only be held liable for 
crimes that he specifically intended pursuant to the conspiracy, this effectively 
excludes the alleged foreseeable crimes. Some States in the United States have 
also rejected this rule, which is reflected in the Pinkerton doctrine, choosing instead 
to adopt provisions reflected in the Model Penal Code that exclude liability for such 
conduct.  
The fourth critical issue is the practice of cumulatively charging and punishing 
conspiracy and its target crime. Since conspiracy is a crime distinct from its 
underlying offence, the practice of charging both offences is both legally and logically 
justifiable. The main contention is the rationale of pursuing conspiracy when there is 
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evidence that its contemplated crime has in any case been realised. The idea of 
punishing both the conspiracy and its contemplated offence and even in some 
instances giving a harsher sentence to a conspiracy charge seems to be excessive 
punishment. It is inequitable to the perceived damage that the conspiracy may seem 
to present. Prosecutors prefer to have the cumulative charges in circumstances in 
which they are not sure of obtaining a conviction for the substantive crime alone. The 
conspiracy charge in this case acts more like a buffer zone or safety net mechanism. 
The practice of charging both the conspiracy and its underlying offence is often 
superfluous and there is very little or no practical justification for it, given that more 
often than not the same set of facts and same evidence is used to prove both 
offences. Several courts have expressed their general disapproval of this practice, 
noting that the extra conspiracy charge only brings more confusion and adds no 
particular benefit to the trial. So much time is also consumed as a result of such 
trials. It would be preferable in the circumstances if the use of conspiracy is restricted 
to only prosecute incomplete crimes and should be prosecuted with its complete 
underlying offence in exceptional circumstances. A rule to restrict this practice would 
be most appropriate. The practice adopted by the United Kingdom to deal with this 
problem provides a highly recommendable guideline. Any choice by a prosecutor to 
bring cumulative charges is required to be justified, with the conspiracy charge only 
being allowed in instances it is considered to be of particular benefit to a case. The 
circumstances under which a conspiracy charge may be allowed include: i) cases of 
factual and legal complexity where the interest of justice demands the need to 
present the overall picture of prevailing circumstances of commission of the crime, ii) 
cases where evidential constraints make it difficult to meet the requisite burden of 
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proof for the underlying offence, and iii) cases where the conspiracy is seen to have 
more far reaching dangerous consequences than just its contemplated crime.248 
C. Civil Law Countries 
The Nuremberg trial made obvious that the common law approach to criminal 
conspiracy was foreign to civil law countries.249 A crime considered to be so vague 
as to defy definition and always “predominantly mental in composition”, does not fit 
well in the civil law countries’ approach to the principle of legality.250 Traditionally, 
civil law countries do not recognise the broad concept of common law conspiracy, 
where conspiracy is a separate crime punishable regardless of its results. Among the 
few civil law countries that proscribed conspiracy, most mainly restricted its 
punishment to politically subversive crime and it was rarely prosecuted.251 Whereas 
conspiracy in common law countries is considered to be an effective tool in 
combating criminal enterprises, civil law jurisdictions have alternative methods of 
dealing with criminal enterprises. In the recent past, however, more civil law 
jurisdictions have introduced conspiracy in their criminal law systems and extended 
its use to crimes beyond the field of political plots. This section of the thesis looks at 
to what extent conspiracy is recognised and the approach used with respect to the 
concept of criminal conspiracy in Germany, Spain, France, and Italy. It also looks at 
the alternative structures that these jurisdictions use to deal with crimes carried out 
                                                          
248 See N. Kaufman, ‘Problems Encountered in Investigating and Prosecuting Conspiracies to commit 
Terrorist Offences’. Paper presented at the First Annual Conference on Human Security, Terrorism 
and Organized Crime in the Western Balkan Region (2006), commenting on the British Practitioners 
Handbook Archbold, p. 6. 
249 Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 78 (1915) at 88 observed that conspiracy 
as understood in common law, ’does not commend itself to jurists of civil law countries, despite 
universal recognition that an organised society must have legal weapons for combating organised 
criminality’; R. J. Hoskins, 6 N.Y.U. J. Int’l & Pol. (1973), p. 245; W. J. Wagner, 42 The Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science (1951), p. 171; see also Ch 3 below. 
250 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 78 (1915), pp. 447-448; C. Pelser, 4 Utrecht Law Review 
(2008), p. 58.  
251 C. Pelser, 4 Utrecht Law Review (2008), p. 58; W. J. Wagner, 42 The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science (1951), p. 171.  
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by combinations, explaining to what extent they differ with or are similar to the 
common law concept of conspiracy. 
I. Germany 
§§ 30 (2), 31, 127, 129 and 129a of the German “Strafgesetzbuch” (StGB)252 are the 
main provisions which criminalise conduct that would otherwise be punished under 
the notion of conspiracy in common law countries. 
1. Criminal Agreement (“Conspiracy”)253 
§ 30 (2) StGB provides for punishment of criminal agreement. This section is part of 
the general part (“Allgemeiner Teil”) of the StGB which contains basic legal principles 
that apply to all crimes of the special part (“Besonderer Teil”). The history of § 30 
goes back to 1876, when it was included into the German criminal code as a reaction 
to the so called Duchesne case.254 In 1873, Duchesne, a blacksmith from Belgium, 
tried to instigate the Archbishop of Paris and the Jesuit province of Belgium Joseph 
Hippolyte Guibert, to pay him money for the killing of German chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck. The Archbishop refused to do so, and reported the matter to the 
authorities. This type of conduct was at the time not criminal in Belgium and at the 
request of German authorities, the Belgian Criminal Code was amended to make it 
punishable in the future. This incident influenced the German government to include 
in the German criminal code a crime that would criminalise conduct such as 
Duchesne’s, leading to introduction of the then § 49a on 26 February 1876. For the 
first time in Germany this provision implicitly made punishable conduct relating to 
                                                          
252 The German Penal Code. 
253 “Versuch der Beteiligung”. 
254 See on the Duchesne case C. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. II (2006), § 28, marginal no. 
75; J. Wessels/W. Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 40th edn. (2010), marginal no. 564. 
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criminal agreements.255 The law on criminal agreement has evolved over a number 
of years to what it is now in the StGB.256 § 49a was amended in 1943 and the term 
agreement was then explicitly added. Apart from criminalising unsuccessful 
instigation and unsuccessful aiding and abetting, the provision created criminal 
responsibility for whoever offers or agrees to commit a criminal offence, or seriously 
gets involved in such activities.257 A minor change was introduced in 1953, 
exempting from punishment those who withdrew from the criminal agreement.258 The 
second law on reform of the criminal law changed the wording of § 49a, splitting the 
content into § 30, and § 31 of the current StGB.259 Consequently, § 30 (1) StGB, 
provides that a person who attempts to induce another to commit a felony shall be 
liable, and § 30 (2) StGB makes it criminal for one to declare willingness or accept 
an offer or agree with another to commit or abet the commission of a felony.260 § 31 
                                                          
255 § 49a Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich (Reichsgesetzblatt 1876, pp. 25), stated: (1) Wer 
einen Anderen zur Begehung eines Verbrechens oder zur Theilnahme an einem Verbrechen 
auffordert, oder wer eine solche Aufforderung annimmt, wird, soweit nicht das Gesetz eine andere 
Strafe androht, wenn das Verbrechen mit dem Tode oder mit lebenslänglicher Zuchthausstrafe 
bedroht ist, mit Gefängniß nicht unter drei Monaten, wenn das Verbrechen mit einer geringeren Strafe 
bedroht ist, mit Gefängnis bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Festungshaft von gleicher Dauer bestraft.  
(2) Die gleiche Strafe trifft denjenigen, welcher sich zur Begehung eines Verbrechens oder zur 
Theilnahme an einem Verbrechen erbietet, sowie denjenigen, welcher ein solches Erbieten annimmt.  
(1) Whosoever asks another to commit a crime or to take part in a crime, or whosoever accepts such 
an invitation, shall unless the law states otherwise, where the crime is punishable by death or life 
imprisonment be liable to not less than three months imprisonment, where the crime is punishable by 
a lesser punishment be liable to imprisonment of up to two years, or of equal duration as the crime. 
(2) The same punishment shall be imposed to one who offers to commit a crime or take part in a 
crime, and to one who accepts such an offer or proposition. (Translation by Author) 
256 See for a more detailed account on its development H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des 
Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; C. Roxin; Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. II 
(2003), § 28, marginal no. 75; J. Wessels/W. Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 40th edn. (2010), 
marginal no. 564; in English language see R. J. Hoskins, 6 N.Y.U. J. Int’l & Pol. (1973), pp. 254-260; 
A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’ (2011); also W. J. Wagner, 42 
The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science (1951), pp. 175-177. 
257 Verordnung zur Angleichung des Strafrechts des Altreichs und der Alpen- und Donau-Reichsgaue 
(Strafrechtsangleichungsverordnung) from Reichsgesetzblatt 1943 I, p. 339). 
258 Drittes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz, Bundesgesetzblatt 1953 I, pp. 735. 
259 Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts, Bundesgesetzblatt 1969 I, pp 717. 
260 § 30 StGB reads :  
(1) Wer einen anderen zu bestimmen versucht, ein Verbrechen zu begehen oder zu ihm anzustiften, 
wird nach den Vorschriften über den Versuch des Verbrechens bestraft. (...) 
(2) Ebenso wird bestraft, wer sich bereit erklärt, wer das Erbieten eines anderen annimmt oder wer 
mit einem anderen verabredet, ein Verbrechen zu begehen oder zu ihm anzustiften. 
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StGB provides for an opportunity for a participant (perpetrator) in the criminal 
agreement to avoid criminal responsibility, by exempting from liability the perpetrator 
who voluntarily withdraws from the inducement, declaration or agreement to commit 
a felony, and makes some earnest effort to prevent commission of the crime.261 Two 
instances of exemption are given to the renouncing perpetrator. The first exemption 
is in the instance where the contemplated crime is not carried out independent of the 
renouncing perpetrator’s efforts, and the second exemption is when the 
contemplated crime occurs independent of the renouncing perpetrator’s previous 
conduct. In both instances, the renouncing perpetrator’s good faith effort to stop the 
crime is sufficient.  
The offence of participation in a criminal agreement in the StGB is a form of criminal 
participation rather than a specific or distinct criminal offence, like in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1) A person who attempts to induce another to commit a felony or abet another to commit a felony 
shall be liable according to the provisions governing attempted felonies. (…) 
(2) A person who declares his willingness or who accepts the offer of another or who agrees with 
another to commit or abet the commission of a felony shall be liable under the same terms. 
(Translation from M. Bohlander, The German Criminal Code, a modern English translation). 
261 § 31 StGB reads:  
Rücktritt vom Versuch der Beteiligung 
(1) Nach § 30 nicht bestraft, wer freiwillig 
1. den Versuch aufgibt, einen anderen zu einem Verbrechen zu bestimmen, und eine etwa 
bestehende Gefahr, daß der andere die Tat begeht, abwendet, 
2. nachdem er sich zu einem Verbrechen bereit erklärt hatte, sein Vorhaben aufgibt oder, 
3. nachdem er ein Verbrechen verabredet oder das Erbieten eines anderen zu einem Verbrechen 
angenommen hatte, die Tat verhindert 
(2) Unterbleibt die Tat ohne Zutun des Zurücktretenden oder wird sie unabhängig von seinem 
früheren Verhalten begangen, so genügt zu seiner Straflosigkeit sein freiwilliges und ernsthaftes 
Bemühen, die Tat zu verhindern 
Withdrawal from conspiracy 
(1) A person shall not be liable under § 30 if he voluntarily 
1. gives up the attempt to induce another to commit a felony and averts any existing danger that the 
other may commit the offence; 
2. after having agreed to commit a felony or accepted the offer of another to commit a felony prevents 
the commission of the offence; or 
3. after having agreed to commit a felony or accepted the offer of another to commit a felony prevents 
the commission of the offence. 
(2) If the offence is not completed regardless of his actions or if it is committed independently of his 
previous conduct, his voluntary and earnest effort to prevent the completion of the offence shall 
suffice for exemption from liability. (Translation from M. Bohlander, The German Criminal Code, a 
modern English translation). 
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conspiracy in the common law countries.262 This provision on punishing criminal 
agreements extends criminal responsibility to the earliest stages of preparing to 
commit serious offences. Its location in the general part of the StGB is interpreted to 
mean that it allows for protection of all legal interests.263 
1.1. Elements of the Offence of participation in Criminal Agreement 
§ 30 (2) only punishes agreements in relation to commission of a felony 
(“Verbrechen”). § 12 (1) StGB, defines a felony as an unlawful act punishable by a 
minimum sentence of one year imprisonment. Unlike the American federal criminal 
conspiracy, this provision on criminal agreement makes no reference to an ‘overt act’ 
requirement. 
a) Agreement 
Under German criminal law agreement forms the essence of the offence of 
participation in a criminal agreement. It is the actus reus and is defined as the 
coming together of wills to commit a crime, or to instigate another to commit a 
crime.264 At least two people are required to enter into the agreement.265 Such 
                                                          
262 H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; 
C. Roxin; Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. II (2006), § 28, marginal no. 75; Schünemann B., Leipziger 
Kommentar, 12th edn. (2006), § 30 marginal no. 1; J. Wessels/W. Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 
40th edn. (2010), marginal no. 564; also see M. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law 
(2009), p. 175, referring to the offence of participation in a criminal agreement as attempted 
participation; G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), p. 221; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a 
Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against Criminal Collectives (2011), 
p. 59. Some commentators, especially those of the 19th century, argued that it should be considered 
a separate criminal offence, see Franz v. Liszt, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts, 5th edn. (1996), 
p. 344. 
263 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 2 et seq; B. 
Schünemann, Leipziger Kommentar, 12th edn. (2006), § 30 marginal no. 1.  
264 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 12; H.-H. 
Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; A. 
Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against 
Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 62; R. Maurach, ‘Die Problematik der Verbrechensverabredung’, 
Juristen Zeitung (1961), pp. 137, 139; C. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. II (2006), § 28, 
marginal no. 43; Schünemann B., Leipziger Kommentar, 12th edn. (2006), § 30 marginal no. 60; J. 
Wessels/W. Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 40th edn. (2010), marginal no. 564.  
265 RGSt (decisions of the Supreme Court of the German Reich) Vol. 5, p. 8; H.-H. Jescheck/T. 
Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; C. Roxin, Strafrecht 
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agreement may be reached by different means of communication and may be 
demonstrated either explicitly or implicitly. It is imperative that the parties had 
finished negotiations on the main elements of the purpose of the agreement and 
jointly made the decision to carry it out.266 
Only two forms of participation in a criminal agreement are punishable. Those who 
agree to commit a crime as co-perpetrators and those who agree to jointly instigate 
commission of a crime will be considered to be the perpetrators in a criminal 
agreement.267 Agreements between aiders, or aiders and perpetrators are seen to 
have neither the quality, nor the seriousness that makes them worthy of 
punishment.268 This clearly differs from the common law perspective where all 
participants in an agreement to commit a crime, regardless of what their form of 
participation was, are considered criminally responsible under conspiracy. 
b) Mens Rea 
The participants in the agreement have to know that they agree upon the 
commission of a criminal offence and they must intend that the agreed crime be 
committed.269 Since the object of the agreement does not need to be agreed upon in 
full detail, the perpetrators do not need to have knowledge of every detail of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. II (2006), § 28, marginal no. 43; Schünemann B., Leipziger Kommentar, 12th 
edn. (2006), marginal no. 60. 
266 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengestze, 58th edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 12; A. Hoyer, 
Systematischer Kommentar, 7th edn (2001), § 30 marginal no. 46 et seq; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in 
a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against Criminal Collectives (2011), 
p. 63. 
267 See Schünemann B., Leipziger Kommentar, 12th edn. (2006), § 30 marginal no. 72, who refers to 
conspiracy as a pre-stage of co-perpetration; also see H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des 
Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal 
Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 65; J. 
Wessels/W. Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 40th edn. (2010), § 30 marginal no. 560. 
268 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of 11.7.1961, no. 1 StR 257/61; decision of the Federal 
Supreme Court of 27.1.1983, no. 3 StR 437/81; Schünemann B., Leipziger Kommentar, 12th edn. 
(2006), § 30 marginal no. 72. 
269 Commentators refer to the need of the conspirators to seriously want to commit the underlying 
crime, see T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 12; 
H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; R. 
Maurach, ‘Die Problematik der Verbrechensverabredung’, Juristen Zeitung (1961), pp. 137, 139. 
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commission of the crime. It suffices if they only know the basic elements of the 
agreed crime.270 The participant in a criminal agreement does not need to have 
personally known the other participants. The prosecution is only required to show 
that the perpetrator knows there is at least another person with whom he agrees to 
carry out the underlying criminal objective.271 Perpetrators may also be held 
criminally liable for criminal agreement even if they acted only with indirect intent 
(Eventualvorsatz/Dolus eventualis).272 
1.2. Merger and Enforcement 
Under German criminal law, once the underlying crime of the criminal agreement has 
been completed or attempted, the criminal agreement merges with the substantive 
crime, making only the substantive crime punishable.273 The rationale behind such 
merger seems to be the value that is actually protected is that which the substantive 
crime makes criminal, hence, once the substantive crime has been carried out, the 
need of punishing the criminal agreement disappears. This may also be considered 
from the perspective that the whole idea behind conspiracy, like all other inchoate 
crimes, is to punish incomplete crimes. Therefore, when the underlying crime is 
completed the justification for punishing conspiracy disappears. This is a 
characteristic that makes the German concept of conspiracy differ from the 
                                                          
270 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 7; H.-H. 
Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; A. 
Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’ (2011), p. 67. 
271 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 9; H.-H. 
Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 III; A. 
Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against 
Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 68. 
272 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 18.10.1955, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1956, pp. 30, 31; decision of the Higher Regional Court of Cologne of 1.6.1951, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1951, p. 612; C. Roxin, Leipziger Kommentar, 11th edn. (2003), § 30 marginal no. 63. 
273 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 18; R. J. 
Hoskins, 6 N. Y. U. Int’l & Pol. (1973), p. 257; H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts 
Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 V.; W. Joecks, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 
2nd edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no. 66. 
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conspiracy under common law countries, where conspiracy is a distinct crime that 
remains punishable even when its underlying offence has been executed. 
There may be instances where the perpetrators agree to carry out a crime but 
actually commit a completely different offence, a situation referred to as cases of 
‘qualitative excesses’.274 In these latter cases the perpetrators will be held 
simultaneously liable for the criminal agreement and the committed crime. There 
may also be occasions where the perpetrators agree to commit a crime and end up 
committing a crime more serious than the crime agreed upon. In such cases of 
‘quantitative excesses’, the perpetrators will only be held criminally liable for the 
committed offence.275 
One who participates in a criminal agreement under the German criminal law is 
considered to be less culpable than one who participates in actual commission of the 
substantive criminal conduct. The law directs that a mere participant in a criminal 
agreement should get a much lower sentence.276 Participants in a criminal 
                                                          
274 H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 V.; 
A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against 
Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 70. 
275 H.-H. Jescheck/T. Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5th edn. (1996), § 65 V.; 
W. Joecks, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 2nd edn. (2011), § 30 marginal no .66; A. 
Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against 
Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 70. 
276 See § 49 StGB Besondere gesetzliche Milderungsgründe: 
(1) Ist eine Milderung nach dieser Vorschrift vorgeschrieben oder zugelassen, so gilt für die Milderung 
folgendes: 
1. An die Stelle von lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe tritt Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter drei Jahren 
2. Bei zeitiger Freiheitsstrafe darf höchstens auf drei Viertel des angedrohten Höchstmaßes erkannt 
werden. Bei Geldstrafe gilt dasselbe für die Höchstzahl der Tagessätze. 
3. Das erhöhte Mindestmaß einer Freiheitsstrafe ermäßigt sich 
im Falle eines Mindestmaßes von zehn oder fünf Jahren auf zwei Jahre, 
im Falle eines Mindestmaßes von drei oder zwei Jahren auf sechs Monate, 
im Falle eines Mindestmaßes von einem Jahr auf drei Monate, 
im Falle eines Mindestmaßes von einem Jahr auf drei Monate, 
(2) Darf das Gericht nach einem Gesetz, das auf diese Vorschrift verweist, die Strafe nach seinem 
Ermessen mildern, so kann es bis zum gesetzlichen Mindestmaß der angedrohten Strafe herabgehen 
oder statt auf Freiheitsstrafe auf Geldstrafe erkennen.  
Special mitigating circumstances established by law 
(1) If the law requires or allows for mitigation under this provision, the following shall apply: 
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agreement under the StGB are punished in accordance with the rule defining 
punishment for attempted crime, with the difference being that whereas the rules on 
punishing attempt allow for the possibility of mitigation, § 30 makes mitigation 
mandatory for cases related to the offence of criminal agreement.277 Furthermore, 
the offence of criminal agreement under the German criminal law does not recognise 
features of vicarious criminal liability like the common law conspiracy. 
2. Criminal Associations 
To address the specific problem of criminal enterprises the StGB has specific 
provisions that deal with criminal organisations. §§ 127, 129 and 129a prohibit the 
forming, joining or participating in activities of armed groups (§ 127 StGB), criminal 
organisations (§ 129 StGB) and terrorist organisations (§ 129 a StGB) respectively. 
Under § 127 StGB one is liable to imprisonment or a fine if he or she unlawfully 
forms or commands a group in possession of weapons or dangerous instruments or 
joins such a group, provides it with weapons, money or any support.278 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1. Imprisonment of not less than three years shall be substituted for imprisonment for life. 
2. In cases of imprisonment for a fixed term, no more than three quarters of the statutory maximum 
term may be imposed. In case of a fine the same shall apply to the maximum number of daily units. 
3. Any increased minimum statutory term of imprisonment shall be reduced as follows: 
a minimum term of ten or five years, to two years; 
a minimum term of three or two years, to six months; 
a minimum term of one year, to three months; 
in all cases to the statutory minimum. 
(2) If the court may in its discretion mitigate the sentence pursuant to a law which refers to this 
provision, it may reduce the sentence to the statutory minimum or impose a fine instead of 
imprisonment. (Translation from M. Bohlander, The German Criminal Code, a modern English 
translation)  
277 See § 30 (1) read together with § 30 (2) StGB; § 23 StGB defining rules on sentencing criminal 
attempt; § 49 StGB setting out rules on limits of mitigation. 
278 § 127 Bildung bewaffneter Gruppen 
Wer unbefugt eine Gruppe, die über Waffen oder andere gefährliche Werkzeuge verfügt, bildet oder 
befehligt oder wer sich einer solchen Gruppe anschließt, sie mit Waffen oder Geld versorgt oder sonst 
unterstützt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft. 
§ 127 Forming armed groups 
Whosoever unlawfully forms or commands a group in possession of weapons or other dangerous 
instruments or joins such a group, provides it with weapons or money or otherwise supports it, shall 
be liable to imprisonment of not more than two years or a fine.(Translation from, M. Bohlander, The 
German Criminal Code, a modern english translation). 
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To form or participate as a member, recruit members, or in any way support an 
organisation whose aim or activities are directed at the commission of crimes, makes 
one liable under § 129 StGB to imprisonment of up to five years or a fine. The 
provision even goes as far as creating criminal responsibility for attempt to form such 
an organisation.279 Participation as a member requires that one integrate into the 
association, subordinate one’s will to that of the association and take part in  
activities of the association directed towards the commission of criminal offences.280 
This means that criminal responsibility for membership does not arise by mere 
declaration of membership or by one’s passive behaviour.281 § 129 extends criminal 
responsibility to the preparatory stage of criminal offences. By making it possible for 
intervention of criminal law at these initial stages it represents one of the preventive 
tools used to counter criminal associations.282 This provision was initially adopted to 
fight political associations trying to achieve their goals by illegal means, but from 
1951 its course changed to punish behaviour related to criminal activities in 
                                                          
279The provision reads in part: 
Forming criminal organisations  
(1) Whosoever forms an organisation the aims or activities of which are directed at the commission of 
offences or whosoever participates in such an organisation as a member, recruits members or 
supporters for it or supports it, shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine. 
(2) … 
(3) The attempt to form an organisation as indicated in subsection (1) above shall be punishable. 
§ 129 Bildung krimineller Vereinigungen 
(1) Wer eine Vereinigung gründet, deren Zwecke oder deren Tätigkeit darauf gerichtet sind, Straftaten 
zu begehen, oder wer sich an einer solchen Vereinigung als Mitglied beteiligt, für sie um Mitglieder 
oder Unterstützer wirbt oder sie unterstützt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahren oder mit 
Geldstrafe bestraft.  
(2)… 
(3) Der Versuch, eine in Absatz 1 bezeichnete Vereinigung zu gründen, ist strafbar.  
280 K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2005), § 129 marginal no. 
59. 
281 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129 marginal no. 24; A. 
Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against 
Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 43; K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum 
Strafgesetzbuch (2005), § 129 marginal no. 61. 
282 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 11.10.1978, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1979, pp. 172, 173; decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 21.10.2004, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2005, pp. 80, 81; T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 
129 marginal no. 3; K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2005), § 
129 marginal no. 1. 
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general.283 Since the 1970’s it has mainly been used against terrorist and other 
organised criminal associations. 
To qualify as a criminal organisation pursuant to § 129 StGB, such an association 
requires a certain level of organisation,284 needs to exist for a certain period of 
time,285 should consist of at least three persons,286 who subordinate their individual 
will to the will of the organisation.287 These requirements make up the objective 
elements of this provision.288 In reference to its subjective elements, all forms of 
participation in this provision (i.e. founding, membership, recruiting and supporting) 
presume a direct intent, and with the exception of recruiting, indirect intent (dolus 
eventualis) would also apply to the other forms.289 Intent here embraces an 
                                                          
283 See T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129 marginal no.1; A. 
Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models against 
Criminal Collectives (2011), pp. 26-33 for a detailed discussion on the historical development of this 
law which is traced back to the end of the 18th century during the reign of Friedrich Wilhem, the King 
of Prussia. 
284 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 11.10.1978, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1979, p. 172; decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 10.1.2006, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2006, p. 1603; T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 
129 marginal no.6; K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2005), § 
129 marginal no. 21 H.-J. Rudolphi/U. Stein, Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 
7th/8th edn. (2006), § 129 marginal no. 5. 
285 H.-J. Rudolphi/U. Stein, Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 7th/8th edn. (2006), § 
129 marginal no. 6a. 
286 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 11.10.1978, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1979, pp. 172-173; idem decision of 10.1.2006, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2006, p. 1603; T. 
Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129 marginal no. 6; K. Miebach/J. 
Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, (2005), § 129 marginal no. 22. 
287 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 1.10.1991, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1992, 1518; decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 11.10.1978, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1979, p. 172; T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129 
marginal no. 7; K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2005), § 129 
marginal no. 30-33; H.-J. Rudolphi/U. Stein, Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 
7th/8th edn. (2006), § 129 marginal no. 6b, 6c. 
288 A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
against Criminal Collectives (2011), pp. 35-38. 
289 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 3.10.1979, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1980, p. 64; T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129 marginal no. 34. 
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awareness of all objective elements of such criminal association and a general 
awareness that its activities are directed towards commission of criminal offences.290  
It is possible that a member commits certain criminal activity pursuant to the criminal 
organisation, and such criminal activity happens to breach some additional criminal 
norms other than membership in a criminal association punishable under § 129. The 
general rule is that if the crimes are of the same seriousness or less serious than the 
crime of membership in a criminal organisation, in accordance with § 52 StGB all 
these offences will be considered to be one criminal offence, that is membership in a 
criminal organisation.291 If however, various criminal activities are committed by a 
member pursuant to the criminal organisation, which other than violating § 129 
violate other criminal norms that are more serious than the crime of membership in a 
criminal association itself, then in this case § 53 StGB directs that the situation be 
treated as concurrence of offences. Here, the perpetrator will be convicted 
separately for each of the more serious crimes, but the penalty given shall be an 
aggregate sentence taking into account the sanction prescribed for the most serious 
offence and increasing it.  Stiffer penalties of imprisonment ranging from six months 
to five years are prescribed for the ringleaders or “Hintermänner”,292 and in cases 
where the organisation is formed to carry out certain serious crimes.293 An 
                                                          
290 A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
against Criminal Collectives (2011), pp. 68, 69. 
291 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 11.6.1980, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1980, 2718; H.-J. Rudolphi/U. Stein, Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 7th/8th edn. 
(2006), § 129 marginal no. 34. 
292 See § 129 (4) StGB. The “Hintermann” is one who although not a member of the criminal 
organisation, exercises spiritual or economical influence on the leading structures of such an 
organisation; decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 12.5.1954, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1954, p. 1253. 
293 See A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 55, describing the three situations recognised as defining the 
category of serious crimes, i) if the association has a serious goal such as removing the constitutional 
order of Germany to replace it with a dictatorial one, ii) if activities of the criminal association are 
directed towards carrying out offences usually defined as organised criminal activities such as drug 
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accomplice whose role was minor may be discharged from liability, and one who 
voluntarily makes effort to prevent the organisation from carrying out the planned 
crime or discloses the same to the authorities may also be discharged from liability, 
or the same may act as a mitigating factor to the sentence the court decides to 
give.294 
In 1976, in times when the German government had to deal with the terroristic 
radical left wing organisation RAF (“Rote Armee Fraktion” – Red Army Fraction), § 
129 a StGB was introduced as a qualified crime in relation to § 129 StGB.295 In 
addition to the material elements of § 129 StGB, § 129 a StGB requires a special 
intent that is directed at the commission of serious crimes (felonies), which include 
murder or other grave offences against persons, and since 2002, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes or grave offences against a person. § 129 a (3) StGB, 
further introduces an independent crime that makes a person liable to imprisonment 
from six months to five years, for forming an organisation 'directed at threatening’ the 
commission of any of the offences highlighted in subsections 1 and 2. This 
subsection was created to comply with the EU Framework decision of 13 June 2002 
(2002/584/JHA) on combating terrorism.296 It can be inferred from the provisions and 
the respective commentaries that with the group crimes, an accused’s criminal 
responsibility only accrues for participation in the group or organisation, and not for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
trafficking, human trafficking, and iii) in case of less serious crimes if their consequences are of an 
extraordinary nature. 
294 See § 129 (5) and (6) StGB.  
295 T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129a, marginal no. 2; H.-J. 
Rudolphi/U. Stein, Systematischer Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 7th/8th edn. (2006), § 129 
marginal no. 1 et seq; also see M. Kilchling, ‘Organised Crime Policies in Germany’, in C. Fijnaut and 
L. Paoli (eds), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European 
Union and Beyond (2004), pp. 717-762, at p. 746, observing that courts tend to interpret terrorist 
activities in article 129a as an aggravated form of article 129. 
296 Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Rahmenbeschlusses des Rates vom 13. Juni 2002 zur 
Terrorismusbekämpfung vom 22.12.2002, Bundesgesetzblatt 2003 I, 2836. 
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other crimes committed by the group, unless they participate or contribute to their 
commission. 
The creation of §§ 129, 129a StGB as well as every amendment with respect to 
these provisions have been accompanied by harsh criticism from German 
scholars.297 The criticism has especially been directed towards the very low 
threshold used to criminalise supporting acts. One scholar observes for example, 
that §129 penalises to a great extent behaviour that may be considered to be socially 
acceptable (“sozialadäquate Verhaltensweise”).298 By this, it is said, the legislator 
criminalises the mere mental attitude of the perpetrator (“Gesinnungsstrafrecht”).299 
The high minimum penalty and extension of the catalogue of crimes, for which the 
organisation must be directed at, to crimes that are not typically terrorist acts has 
also been the subject of criticism.300 This position of law is seen to lead to the 
possibility of circumstances in which mere membership to a group that aims to 
commit certain crimes in some cases may most likely receive a stiffer penalty, than 
the commission of the crimes provided for in § 129a StGB.301 
                                                          
297 For an overview see T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129a 
marginal no.1a. 
298 F. Dencker, Kritische Justiz (1987), pp. 36, 49.  
299 F. Dencker, Kritische Justiz (1987), pp. 36, 49: also see M. Kilchling, in C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli 
(eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union 
and Beyond (2004), p. 746, who states that as a result the Federal Court of Appeals has established 
very high evidentiary standards for the subjective elements of the offences set out in articles 129 and 
129 a to avoid abuse of the two provisions. 
300 K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2005), § 129a, marginal. no. 
11, 12, give as examples § 305a (“Destruction of important means of production”) and § 316b 
(“Disruption of public services”) StGB. 
301 K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (2005), § 129a, marginal. 
nos. 11, 12; see further F. Dencker, Kritische Justiz (1987), pp. 36, 49, who considers measures 
adopted in these provisions to be rather similar to those of a state run by the police 
(“polizeistaatlichen Charakters”). 
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Criminal associations are seen to pose increased danger for the legal goods and 
interests that the state and its citizens seek to protect.302 Generally, the legal interest 
protected under the provisions §§ 127, 129 and 129a StGB is ‘public security and the 
state’s order’.303 In addition, criminal associations are considered to present a 
general danger to society arising from their internal dynamics, where the individual’s 
will is subordinated to that of the group. This reduces a feeling of individual 
responsibility thereby making it easier for its members to commit crimes.304 The 
practical relevance of §§ 127 to 129a StGB is relatively low, given that there have 
been few prosecutions.305 
The crimes set out in §§ 127, 129 and 129a StGB bear certain similarities with the 
offence of criminal agreement in § 30 StGB. Both concepts create criminal 
responsibility for co-operation in carrying out crime, and criminalise conduct involved 
in the preparatory stages of a crime. However, some crucial conceptual differences 
can be identified. While it is sufficient for two people to form a criminal agreement, 
the crimes of criminal association require the involvement of at least three people 
and a certain level of organisation. In particular, under § 129 and § 129a StGB the 
mere agreement by a perpetrator to commit or contribute directly to the target crimes 
would not be sufficient to create criminal liability, instead, they require the 
performance of an act by such a perpetrator that supports the functional ability of the 
                                                          
302 A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy: Different Legal Models 
against Criminal Collectives’ (2011), p. 34. 
303 Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 22.2.1995, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1995, p. 2117, 2118; decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 10.3.2005, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2005, p. 1668, 1669; T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. 
(2011), § 129, marginal no. 2; K. Miebach/J. Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch 
(2005), § 129 marginal no. 1. 
304 The German Federal Supreme Court decision of 11.10.1978, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1979, 172-173; A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal 
Models against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 34. 
305 Most authors consider the provisions to be important rather for their symbolic value, see T. 
Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2011), § 129a, marginal no. 3; with regard to 
symbolic criminal law in general see W. Hassemer, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1989), p. 553. 
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organisation itself. Whereas the offence of criminal agreement in § 30 StGB is 
classified as a mode of participation, the crimes on criminal association are distinct 
crimes in their own right.  
II. Spain 
1. The Offence of Conspiracy (Criminal Agreement) 
The offence of conspiracy in Spain is not considered a crime in its own right but is 
classified as attempted participation.306 Liability for conspiracy is provided in article 
17 of the Spanish criminal code.307 This article actually refers to punishment for 
attempted participation in respect only to some crimes.308 Article 17.1 provides that 
two or more people are liable for conspiracy when they agree upon the commission 
of a crime and resolve to execute it. Subsection three of the article further makes 
conspiracy punishable only with respect to those crimes specifically proscribed by 
law. It is interesting to note that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
are among the crimes, which are punishable under conspiracy in the Spanish 
criminal code.309 
                                                          
306 F. Muñoz Conde and M. García Arán, Derecho Penal-Parte General, 8th edn. (2010), p. 448 et 
seq; José Luis De la Cuesta, in C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, 
Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004), p. 802. 
307 Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal. 
308 Article 17 states: 
1. La conspiración existe cuando dos o más personas se conciertan para la ejecución de un delito y 
resuelven ejecutarlo. 
2. … 
3. La conspiración y la proposición para delinquir sólo se castigáran en los casos especialmente 
prexistos en la Ley.  
 
1. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to the commission of a crime and resolve to 
execute it. 
2. ... 
3. The conspiracy and incitement to commit a crime is punished only in cases expressly provided for 
by law. (Translation by Author). 
309 Article 615 referring to crimes against the international community. Other provisions which provide 
for crimes punishable for conspiracy are: articles 141 makes it criminal to conspire to commit murder; 
151 conspiracy to assault; 168 conspiracy to kidnap; 269 conspiracy to commit robbery with violence; 
extortion, fraud, criminal conversion; 304 knowingly receiving stolen goods; 373 conspiracy to commit 
drug related crimes; 477 conspiracy to commit treason; 488 conspiracy to commit crimes against the 
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To constitute a conspiracy there should be a union of wills by its participants, 
reflected in a complete and concrete plan, aimed towards the commission of the 
same act, and with a firm intention to carry it out.310 In the instance that the 
underlying crime is committed, the conspiracy merges into the substantive 
offence.311 The participants in the conspiracy are then classified either as 
perpetrators or accessories depending on their role in contributing to commission of 
the target crime. This fact of merger confirms that conspiracy under Spanish law is a 
mode of participation as opposed to a crime in its own right. All members of a 
conspiracy are equally liable for participation in the conspiracy.312 Since conspiracy 
is classified as attempted participation, it is also absorbed into attempt of the target 
offence, once the actions of the participants qualify as such.313 Conspiracy under 
Spanish law, unlike the common law conspiracy, does not attribute vicarious liability 
to a defendant for acts carried out by other co-conspirators in pursuance of the 
conspiracy, without any contribution on the part of the defendant.314 Liability for 
conspiracy attracts a much lower punishment or penalty in comparison to its target 
offence.315 A co-conspirator who decides to abandon a conspiracy will only escape 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
crown (killing, assaulting and kidnapping); 519 illegal association (described in art. 515 to constitute 
those who come together for purposes of committing a crime); 548 conspiracy to commit crimes 
against public order; 553 conspiracy to attack a public servant; 579 conspiracy to commit terrorist 
crimes; 585 conspiracy to help Spanish enemies attack Spain. 
310 José Luis De la Cuesta, in C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, 
Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004), p. 802. 
311 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte General, 8th edn. (2010), p. 447. 
312 Obote-Odora A., 8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law (2001), para. 19. 
313 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte General, 8th edn. (2010), p. 449. 
314 José Luis De la Cuesta, in C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, 
Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004), p. 802, stating that no 
special attributes have been introduced in Spain to broaden the field of conspiracy. 
315 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte General, 8th edn. (2010), p. 448, referring to 
conspiracy as attracting a penalty which is lower in one or two degrees than the punishment of its 
target offence. For example in the case of homicide the Spanish Penal code provides for a penalty of 
10 to 15 years imprisonment, following the formula provided for punishing conspiracy, conspiracy to 
commit homicide would make one liable for 5 years to 10 years (one degree lower) or 2 years and 6 
months to 5 years (two degrees lower) imprisonment. 
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liability if the act is done voluntarily and sufficient effort is used to effectively frustrate 
the conspiracy.316 
2. Criminal Organisation Offences 
To counter the special dangers posed by group criminal activity the Spanish criminal 
code, in its special part, provides for certain group crimes that specifically address 
this issue. The first category of crimes is that referring to illicit associations. Although 
the Spanish constitution does recognise the fundamental right of association,317 illicit 
associations are criminalised in articles 515 to 521, to punish those who abuse this 
fundamental right. Article 515 criminalises and provides for punishment of four types 
of illicit associations.318 The first refers to illicit associations whose goal is to commit 
a felony or after their formation, promote commission of such crime, or those whose 
intention is to continually commit or promote the commission of misdemeanours in 
                                                          
316 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte General, 8th edn. (2010), p. 449. Voluntarily 
in this context means a decision made without any initial intervention from the authorities. 
317 Article 22 of the Spanish Constitution. 
318 Article 515 states: Son punibles las asociaciones ilícitas, teniendo tal consideración: 
1. Las que tengan por objeto cometer algún delito o, después de constituidas, promuevan su 
comisión, así como las que tengan por objeto cometer o promover la comisión de faltas de forma 
organizada, coordinada y reiterada. 
2. (abroged) 
3. Las que, aun teniendo por objeto un fin lícito, empleen medios violentos o de alteración o control 
de la personalidad para su consecución. 
4. Las organizaciones de carácter paramilitar. 
5. Las que promuevan la discriminación, el odio o la violencia contra personas, grupos o 
asociaciones por razón de su ideología, religión o creencias, la pertenencia de sus miembros o de 
alguno de ellos a una etnia, raza o nación, su sexo, orientación sexual, situación familiar, enfermedad 
o minusvalía, o inciten a ello. 
6. (abroged) 
 
The following shall be considered punishable as illicit associations: 
1. An association formed to commit a felony, or an association which after its foundation, promotes 
the commission of such crimes, and those association formed for purposes of committing or to 
promote the commission of misdemeanours in an organised, coordinated and consistent manner. 
2. [Deleted].  
3. Those associations which, although designed for a lawful purpose, use violent means or alter or 
control personality to achieve their goals. 
4.  Any paramilitary organizations. 
5. Those associations which promote discrimination, hatred or violence against persons, groups or 
associations on grounds of ideology, religion or beliefs, membership of its members or any of them to 
an ethnic group, race or nationality, gender, sexual orientation , family situation, illness or disability, or 
incite such conduct. 
6. [Deleted]. (Translation by Author). 
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an organised, and co-ordinated manner. The second type (subsection 3) refers to 
associations which although have a legitimate aim use violent means or means that 
control personalities to achieve their aim. The third one (subsection 4) refers to 
associations of paramilitary character and the last one (subsection 5) refers to 
associations that promote discrimination, hatred or violence against people, groups, 
or associations because of ideology, religion or other beliefs. Under article 517 it is 
criminal to be a member of an illicit association. The provision further provides for a 
distinction between simple members and the founders, directors and presidents of 
such a group by giving more severe punishment for those in leadership positions.319 
Co-operation with such an illicit association is also punishable under article 518. Co-
operation here means any help or support given to the association, which is not 
sufficient to qualify one giving such assistance as a member of the association.320  
Both conspiracy in the Spanish criminal code and the crime of illicit associations 
punish cooperation for purposes of committing crimes, but certain differences exist. 
Unlike the concept of conspiracy in the Spanish criminal code, the crime of 
membership in an illicit association is independent and is punishable regardless of 
commission of crimes pursuant to its criminal goal.321 Therefore, a defendant in this 
case would be liable for both the crime of membership and any other crime he 
contributes to. The concept of illicit association further targets associations with a 
long term goal and such associations should consist of at least three persons. It may 
                                                          
319 Leaders will be sentenced to 2-4 years’ imprisonment, a fine and are prohibited from holding public 
office for 6-12 years. Members are only sentenced to 1-3 years’ imprisonment and a fine. 
Art. 517 reads: En los casos previstos en los números 1 y 3 al 6 del artículo 515 se impondrán las 
siguientes penas: 
1. A los fundadores, directores y presidentes de las asociaciones, las de prisión de dos a cuatro 
años, multa de doce a veinticuatro meses e inhabilitación especial para empleo o cargo público por 
tiempo de seis a doce años.  
2. A los miembros activos, las de prisión de uno a tres años y multa de doce a veinticuatro meses. 
320 See Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 18th edn. (2010), p. 849. 
321 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 18th edn. (2010), p. 847. 
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have a complex or organised power structure depending on its activities, with a 
criminal programme and division of labour.322 
Recently, to fortify the crime of illicit associations, the legislature introduced certain 
provisions in the criminal code creating criminal responsibility for belonging to 
criminal organisations or groups.323 The promotion, creation, organisation, co-
ordination, or leadership of a criminal organisation is a criminal offence.324 Active 
participation, membership and co-operation with such an organisation are also 
punished. The constitutive elements of a criminal organisation are five: i) the 
existence of a group, ii) such group should consist of more than two persons, iii) it 
should have an indefinite time structure/ stable character, iv) its members share 
functions and tasks in an agreed or co-ordinated manner and v) has a goal to 
commit serious crimes or repeatedly commit misdemeanours.325 Punishment for 
                                                          
322 The Spanish Supreme Court defines criminal associations as groups of at least three persons 
organised in a hierarchical manner, with discipline being an integral part of their operation, STS, 2nd 
hall, 25-1 and 27-5-1988; Muñoz Conde, Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 18th edn. (2010), p 847; 
José Luis De la Cuesta, ‘Organised Crime Control Policies in Spain: A ‘Disorgansied’ Criminal Policy 
for ‘Organised’ Crime, in in C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, 
Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004), p. 800. 
323 Organic Law 5/2010 of 22 June.  
324 Art. 570 bis of the Spanish criminal code states: 
1. Quienes promovieren, constituyeren, organizaren, coordinaren o dirigieren una organización 
criminal serán castigados con la pena de prisión de cuatro a ocho años si aquélla tuviere por finalidad 
u objeto la comisión de delitos graves, y con la pena de prisión de tres a seis años en los demás 
casos; y quienes participaren activamente en la organización, formaren parte de ella o cooperaren 
económicamente o de cualquier otro modo con la misma serán castigados con las penas de prisión 
de dos a cinco años si tuviere como fin la comisión de delitos graves, y con la pena de prisión de uno 
a tres años en los demás casos. 
A los efectos de este Código se entiende por organización criminal la agrupación formada por más de 
dos personas con carácter estable o por tiempo indefinido, que de manera concertada y coordinada 
se repartan diversas tareas o funciones con el fin de cometer delitos, así como de llevar a cabo la 
perpetración reiterada de faltas. 
1. Whosoever promotes, constitutes, organises, directs, coordinates an organization created for 
criminal purposes will be punished with imprisonment from four to eight years if its purpose or object 
is the commission of serious crimes, with imprisonment of three to six years in other cases, and those 
who actively participate in the organization, form part of it or support it financially or otherwise, shall 
be punished with imprisonment from two to five years if it was intended to commit serious crimes and 
with imprisonment of one to three years in other cases. 
For the purposes of this Code a criminal organization means a group of a stable nature or exists for 
an indefinite period consisting of more than two people, who concertedly and in a coordinated manner 
carry out various tasks or functions in order to commit serious crimes and to repeatedly bring about 
the commission of misdemeanours. (Translation by Author). 
325 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 18th edn. (2010), p. 910. 
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involvement in such an organisation depends on the crimes, which constitute the 
goal of the organisation.326 The punishment here is cumulative with punishment for 
other crimes committed by such organisation.  
Article 570 ter further criminalises the creation, financing or membership in a criminal 
group.327 A criminal group is defined as a union of at least two people not having one 
or more traits of the criminal organisation with the goal of committing serious crimes 
or repeatedly committing misdemeanours. Criminal groups are not necessarily 
organised in any hierarchical manner and may be referred to as loose associations. 
Also punishable under criminal groups are terrorist groups, which were previously 
punishable as illicit associations.328 Similarities can be drawn between the 
                                                          
326 For those involved in formation and leadership of the organisation punishment ranges from 4-8 
years for serious crimes and 3-6 years for misdemeanours. Those involved at the membership or co-
operation level will be liable for 2-5 years for serious crimes and 1-3 years for misdemeanours, see 
Art. 570 bis 1 note 241 of the Spanish criminal code. 
327 Article 570 ter in part reads: 1. Quienes constituyeren, financiaren o integraren un grupo criminal 
serán castigados: 
… 
A los efectos de este Código se entiende por grupo criminal la unión de más de dos personas que, 
sin reunir alguna o algunas de las características de la organización criminal definida en el artículo 
anterior, tenga por finalidad o por objeto la perpetración concertada de delitos o la comisión 
concertada y reiterada de faltas. 
 
Whosoever constitutes, finances a criminal group or integrates into it will be punished 
… 
For the purposes of this Code a criminal groups means the union of at least two people who 
concertedly, without meeting one or more of the characteristics of the criminal organization as defined 
in the previous article, have the purpose or intend the commission of serious crimes or the repeated 
commission of misdemeanours. (Translation by Author). 
328 Article 571 states in part: 
1. Quienes promovieren, constituyeren, organizaren o dirigieren una organización o grupo terrorista 
serán castigados con las penas de prisión de ocho a catorce años e inhabilitación especial para 
empleo o cargo público por tiempo de ocho a quince años. 
… 
3. A los efectos de este Código, se considerarán organizaciones o grupos terroristas aquellas 
agrupaciones que, reuniendo las características respectivamente establecidas en el párrafo segundo 
del apartado 1 del artículo 570 bis) y en el párrafo segundo del apartado 1 del artículo 570 ter, tengan 
por finalidad o por objeto subvertir el orden constitucional o alterar gravemente la paz pública 
mediante la perpetración de cualquiera de los delitos previstos en la Sección siguiente. 
 
1. Whosoever promotes, constitutes, organises or directs a terrorist organization or group shall be 
punished with imprisonment from eight to fourteen years and specific disqualification from holding 
public office for a period of eight to fifteen years. 
… 
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constitutive elements of a criminal group and the concept of conspiracy under 
common law jurisdictions. Like with common law conspiracy, two people suffice to 
form a criminal group, and it does not need to be organised in a hierarchical 
structure. The offence on criminal groups is also an independent crime. 
The element of shared functions or tasks in an agreed manner makes the crimes of 
criminal organisation and groups resemble the conduct punishable as conspiracy 
under the Spanish criminal code. However, certain fundamental differences can be 
identified.329 First, while only two persons form a conspiracy, a criminal organisation 
ought to consist of more than two persons, even though, two people may be 
considered to form a criminal group. Secondly, punishment of conspiracy is 
restricted to only certain crimes specifically proscribed by law, whereas a criminal 
organisation or group may have the goal to commit any crime. Thirdly, while 
punishment for conspiracy is more dependent on its target crime, the law proscribes 
specific punishment for participants in a criminal organisation or group independent 
of punishment proscribed for their target crimes. Fourth, whereas the concept of 
conspiracy under the Spanish criminal code is punishable only while its target crime 
remains unexecuted, the criminal organisations and groups offences are 
autonomous and are punishable irrespective of their target crimes. The elements of 
criminal organisation in the Spanish criminal code sufficiently resemble those of illicit 
associations, which also include organisation in a hierarchical structure and have a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3. For the purposes of this Code terrorist organizations or groups is considered to comprise of those 
that bring together all the characteristics set forth respectively in the second subparagraph of 
paragraph 1 of article 570 bis) and in the second paragraph of article 570 paragraph 1 ter, whose 
purpose or intention is to subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter the public peace by the 
perpetration of any offense provided for in the next section.[The next section refers to Section II on 
TERRORISM AND RELATED CRIMES added by Law 5 / 2010 of 22 June]. 
329 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 18th edn. (2010), p. 910. 
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fairly permanent structure (established for an indefinite period), it is admitted that 
indeed an overlap exists between both crimes.330  
III. France 
The French Penal Code331 has several provisions that proscribe conduct carried out 
through criminal association. Chapter II makes punishable certain offences involving 
co-operation for criminal purposes against the institutions of the Republic. This 
chapter falls under the fourth book of the penal code, which proscribes felonies and 
misdemeanours against the nation, the state and public peace.332 Conspiracy as a 
distinct crime does not exist under French law, but conduct of conspiracy nature is 
made punishable in two concepts, that of ‘complot’ and ‘association de malfaiteurs’. 
1. Complot  
Article 412-2 proscribes complot. This offence has also been referred to in other 
forums as conspiracy.333 The translation of article 412-2 reads: 
Plotting consists of a resolution agreed upon by two or more to commit an attack 
where the resolution was put into effect by one or more material actions. 
Plotting is punished by ten years' imprisonment and a fine of € 150,000. 
The penalty is increased to twenty years' criminal detention and a fine of € 300,000 
where the offence was committed by a person holding public authority. 334 
The term ‘attack’ means ‘the commission of one or more acts of violence liable to 
endanger the institutions of the Republic or violate the integrity of the national 
                                                          
330 Muñoz Conde and García Arán, Derecho Penal Parte Especial, 18th edn. (2010), p. 911. It is 
argued that the crime of illicit associations was not sufficient to accommodate all possible types of 
criminal organisations. 
331 Referred to as Code Pénal. 
332  Livre IV Des crimes et délits contre la nation, l’État et la paix publique (Code Pénal). 
333 See Musema, ICTR (TC), para. 186. 
334 The article reads: Constitue un complot la résolution arrêtée entre plusieurs personnes de 
commettre un attentat lorsque cette résolution est concrétisée par un ou plusieurs actes matériels. 
Le complot est puni de dix ans d'emprisonnement et de 150000 euros d'amende. 
Les peines sont portées à vingt ans de détention criminelle et à 300000 euros d'amende lorsque 
l'infraction est commise par une personne dépositaire de l'autorité publique.(Translation in text 
extracted from French Penal Code -translated version, in www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes).  
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territory’.335 Use of the terms ‘resolution agreed upon by two or more persons’ 
equates complot or ‘plotting’ to punishing conduct of conspiracy nature, under which 
an agreement to commit a crime is punishable. Complot becomes punishable only 
when one or more material acts in relation to it are carried out. This requirement of 
performance of ‘one or more material acts’ may be equated to the Anglo-American 
common law conspiracy ‘overt act’ requirement. Complot is only punishable if it is 
proved that it was a precisely determined concrete plan.336 In the first case that 
complot is punished with 10 years’ imprisonment it is considered to be a 
misdemeanour (délit), and in the second case of 20 years imprisonment it is 
punished as a felony (crime). 
2. Association de malfaiteurs (Criminal Associations) 
The provisions that create criminal responsibility for participation in a criminal 
association also make punishable conduct of conspiratorial nature.337 Article 450-1 
defines a criminal association as any group formed or any conspiracy (‘entente’) 
established with a view to prepare for the commission of a felony or a misdemeanour 
punishable by at least five years. The preparation must be marked by one or more 
material actions.338 This essentially means that simple membership in a criminal 
                                                          
335 Art. 412-1 French Penal Code states: Constitue un complot la résolution arrêtée entre plusieurs 
personnes de commettre un attentat lorsque cette résolution est concrétisée par un ou plusieurs 
actes matériels. 
336 See decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 12 mai 1980: Bull. Crim., no. 153. 
337 T. Godefroy in, C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in  Europe, Concepts, Patterns and 
Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004) p. 769, actually refers to this offence as 
criminal conspiracy; also see H. Donnedieu de Vabres, in G. Mettraux, Perspectives on the 
Nuremberg Trial (2008), p. 245. 
338 Art. 450-1 states: Constitue une association de malfaiteurs tout groupement formé ou entente 
établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, d'un ou plusieurs 
crimes ou d'un ou plusieurs délits punis d'au moins cinq ans d'emprisonnement. 
Lorsque les infractions préparées sont des crimes ou des délits punis de dix ans d'emprisonnement, 
la participation à une association de malfaiteurs est punie de dix ans d'emprisonnement et de 150000 
euros d'amende. 
Lorsque les infractions préparées sont des délits punis d'au moins cinq ans d'emprisonnement, la 
participation à une association de malfaiteurs est punie de cinq ans d'emprisonnement et de 75000 
euros d'amende.  
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association will not create criminal responsibility unless it is tied to the preparation of 
an offence.339 This provision especially targets conduct preliminary to commission of 
serious crimes carried out by criminal associations.340 The crime of illicit associations 
has undergone a number of transformations since its inception after the French 
Revolution.341 The first provisions that proscribed organised criminal groups were 
contained in the Napoleonic Penal Code of 1811.342 It was adopted to punish the 
gangs of rural bandits that emerged after the revolution and terrorised the French 
countryside.343 Any association of persons with a criminal goal directed towards 
person or property was declared to be a crime against the public peace (art. 265). 
This law only applied to criminal organisations with a hierarchical or formal structure 
constituting of leaders and subordinates (art. 266), and membership in such 
organisations was punishable although no crimes had yet been executed following 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(A criminal association consists of any group formed or any conspiracy established with a view to the 
preparation, marked by one or more material actions, of one or more felonies, or of one or more 
misdemeanours punished by at least five years' imprisonment. 
Where the offences contemplated are felonies or misdemeanours punished by ten years' 
imprisonment, the participation in a criminal association is punished by ten years' imprisonment and a 
fine of € 150,000. 
Where the offences contemplated are misdemeanours punished by at least five years' imprisonment, 
the participation in a criminal association is punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of € 
75,000). 
339 T. Godefroy in, C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in  Europe, Concepts, Patterns and 
Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004), p. 770. 
340 See decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 29 December 1970: JCP 71, II, 1670, 
affirming the application of this provision to situations where members of such association had not yet 
committed the crimes.; T. Godefroy in, C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, 
Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004) p. 769. 
341 See Alexander D. Tripp, 20 Fordham Int’l. L. J. (1996), p. 263, pp. 304-310 for a brief account of 
the history. 
342 Code Pénal Arts. 265-68 (1811) (Fr.). The respective articles stated: 
Art. 265: Every association of those who would commit crimes against persons or property is a crime 
against the public peace. 
Art. 266: The crime is complete when the group is organised, or there is correspondence between the 
groups and their leaders or commanders, or by gatherings to settle accounts or to distribute or divide 
the gains from their misdeeds. 
Art. 267: When no one else has joined or followed in the crime, the principals, the directors of the 
association, and the commanders in chief or those of lower rank, shall be punished by forced labour. 
Art. 268: All other individuals who provided any service whatsoever to the gangs, and those who 
freely and knowingly provided the gangs or their divisions with arms, munitions, instruments of crimes, 
lodgings, hiding places, or meeting places, shall be incarcerated. (Extracted from Alexander D. Tripp, 
20 Fordham Int’l. L. J. (1996), pp. 305-306. 
343 T. Godefroy, in C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, Patterns and 
Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004) p. 769. 
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their establishment (art. 267). The requirement that such organisation had to be 
large, have a fairly permanent structure, be organised in a hierarchical manner and 
have members with a criminal past proved to be ineffective with the increase of 
loosely organised criminal groups otherwise referred to as anarchist groups.344 
These anarchist groups by their very nature and philosophical ideologies were 
opposed to hierarchical organisations.345 In response to this new phenomenon, the 
French Parliament revised the criminal association statutes, removing the 
requirement that a criminal association must have a formal structure. The revised 
laws no longer required a specified number of members, hierarchy, or division of 
spoils, and a criminal association could be created by an agreement to commit 
serious crimes.346 A requirement that defendants must commit at least one overt act 
in furtherance of the criminal association was further, added by parliament in 
1981.347 The revised French Penal Code that came into effect on 1 March 1994 
expanded the target offences of criminal associations to include misdemeanours 
punishable by 10 years imprisonment.348  
Criminal association is an offence independent of its target offences.349 As currently 
defined in the French Penal Code, the offence of illicit associations refers to a group 
offence whose main elements include, a collective understanding of the criminal 
purpose, an aim to prepare for certain criminal acts and an intention that the criminal 
                                                          
344 See E. M. Wise, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com (2000), p. 315. 
345 Alexander D. Tripp, 20 Fordham Int’l. L. J. (1996), p. 307. 
346 Code Pénal article 265 (1893) (Fr.). “Toute association formée, quelle que soit sa durée ou le 
nombre de ses membres, toute entente établie dans le but de préparer ou de commettre des crimes 
contre les personnes ou les propriétés, constituent un crime contre la paix publique”.  
(Every association, regardless of the number of its members, every understanding made with the goal 
preparing to commit or committing crimes against people or property, is a crime against the public 
peace) [Extracted from, Alexander D. Tripp, 20 Fordham Int’l. L. J. (1996), p. 307]. 
347 Law no. 81-82 of 2 February 1981, 1981 B.L.D, 86 (Fr). 
348 Loi n. 92-1336 of 16 Dec. 1992, art. 373, J.O at 17,586, 23 Dec. 1992, (Fr.) modified by loi n. 93-
913 of 19 July 1993, J.O. at 10,199, 20 July, 1993 (Fr.); see articles 450-1 to 450-3 Code Pénal. 
349 See decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 22 January 1986: Bull. crim., no. 29; 
decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 30 April 1996: Bull. crim., no. 176; also 
Alexander D. Tripp, 20 Fordham Int’L.J. (1996) 263, p. 308. 
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acts be carried out.350 The members do not need to know every activity of the group; 
all that is necessary is that they are aware of the criminal nature of such 
association.351 It is not necessary that the crimes that constitute such an 
association’s objective are clearly defined or determinable; it suffices that the 
members of such an association carry out one or more preparatory acts in relation 
thereto.352 The members do not need to have personally carried out the offences or 
preparatory acts to be considered liable under this offence.353 These requirements 
resemble common law conspiracy, and the provision has also in some instances 
been referred to as a conspiracy provision.354 Although conspiracy constitutes an 
integral part of what may be defined as a criminal association, it is not the agreement 
that creates criminal responsibility but rather the criminal association created as a 
result of such criminal agreement (‘entente’). 
The French Penal Code also gives an opportunity to a renouncing member of the 
criminal association to be exempted from liability. Any person, who has participated 
in a criminal association and discloses the existence of such group or conspiracy to 
competent authorities, enabling its members to be identified before any prosecution 
is instituted, will be exempted from punishment.355 Under the French Law one is only 
criminally liable for his own conduct.356 This provision negates the possibility of 
having an expansive conspiracy theory, which allows for attribution of liability for 
                                                          
350 Decision of the French High court (Criminal Division), 26 May 1999: Bull. crim., no. 103; T. 
Stenson, 1 The Journal of International Law & Policy (2003-2004), p. 23.  
351 Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 11 June 1970: Bull. crim., no. 199. 
352 Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 22 August 1959: Bull. crim., no. 389; 
decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 20 June 1989, Martin, inédit; decision of the 
French High Court (Criminal Division), 15 déc. 1993: Dr. pénal 1994, comm. No 131. 
353 Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 4 July 1989, inédit. 
354 See the translated French Penal Code, the Code actually uses the term ‘conspiracy’ for the term 
‘entente’ which refers to agreement in www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes; also see Musema, ICTR 
(TC) para. 186. 
355 Art. 450-2 French Penal code. 
356 Art. 121-1 French Penal Code. 
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conduct carried out by other members of such criminal association or co-
conspirators. 
Certain circumstances under the French Penal Code are considered to lead to 
heavier sentences.357 Among these special circumstances are included crimes 
committed by organised gangs and agreements made to carry out certain 
offences.358 This is a clear indication of how serious such conduct is considered to 
be, in terms of endangering society. An organised gang is defined as any group 
formed or association established with a view to the preparation of one or more 
criminal offences.359 Such preparation should be marked by one or more material 
actions. The definition of an organised gang includes a criminal association, which 
may be constituted by an agreement and also includes conduct of conspiracy nature 
itself (‘entente’). The penal code also makes it criminal to participate in a group 
formed or an agreement established with a view to preparation of certain serious 
crimes.360 
                                                          
357 Section III of the French Penal Code (‘De la définition de certaines circonstances entraînant 
l’aggravation, la dimunition ou l’exemption des peines’). 
358 T. Godefroy, in C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli (eds.), Organised Crime in  Europe, Concepts, Patterns and 
Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond (2004) p. 770. 
359 Art. 132-71 French Penal Code states: Constitue une bande organisée au sens de la loi tout 
groupement formé ou toute entente établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs 
faits matériels, d’une ou de plusiers infractions. (An organised gang within the meaning of the law is 
any group formed or association established with a view to the preparation of one or more criminal 
offences, preparation marked by one or more material actions) (Translation from the translated 
French Penal Code). 
360 These crimes include felonies defined by articles 211-1(Genocide) and 212-2(Crimes against 
humanity) and crimes punished by criminal imprisonment for life ( article 212-3 French Penal Code); 
(Article 214-4) participation in an organised gang to carry out eugenic practice aimed at organising the 
selection of persons or carrying out any procedure designed to cause the birth of a child identical to 
another person, is punished by criminal imprisonment for life and a fine of €7,500,000.00; (Article 222-
4) where an organised gang subjects a person to torture or to acts of barbarity the penalty is 
aggravated and the persons involved will be liable to 30 years criminal imprisonment; (Article 222-34) 
leading or organising a group with the objective to produce, manufacture, import, export, transport, 
retention, offer, sale, acquisition or unlawful use of drugs is punished by criminal imprisonment for life 
and a fine of € 7,500,000.00; (Article 225-4-1) when human trafficking is carried out by an organised 
gang it is punishable by 20 years imprisonment for life and a fine of € 3,000,000. 
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IV. Italy 
1. Criminal Agreement 
As a general principle of law, preparatory acts under Italian law are not punishable if 
their underlying crime is not committed, unless the preparatory acts in themselves 
are considered to be crimes.361 In Italian criminal law, when two or more people 
agree to carry out a crime and fail to execute it, they are not liable for punishment for 
the mere act of agreement (conspiracy), unless the law specifically provides 
otherwise.362 The exceptional cases in which criminal agreements may be 
punishable relate to offences directed against the state that are subversive in 
nature.363 The rationale behind this is that conspiracy is considered to be a mere 
state of mind, which causes no harm. Although conspiracy in itself is not punishable, 
the judge may make an order for security measures (libertà vigilata).364 Security 
measures are applied if a person shows the capability of being socially dangerous. 
This however, is not considered to be punishment. Criminal liability only begins after 
an attempt of the crime is carried out.365 
                                                          
361 See article 56 Codice Penale (The Italian Penal Code); G. Marinucci and E. Dolcini, Manuale di 
Diritto Penale, Parte Generale (2009), p. 376. 
362 Article 115 Codice Penale states: 
Salvo che la legge disponga altrimenti, quolora due o più persone si accordino allo scopo di 
commettere un reato, e questo non sia commesso, nessuna di esse è punibile per il solo fatto dell’ 
accordo. (Except as the law provides otherwise, whenever two or more persons agree to commit an 
offence, and it is not committed, none of them shall be punishable for the mere fact of agreement). 
[Translation from.THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 40 (American Series of Foreign Penal Codes vol.23, 
Edward M. Wise & Allen Maitlin trans., 1978 extracted from E. M. Wise, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L & Com 
(2000), p. 312]; also see G. Marinucci and E. Dolcini, Manuale di Diritto Penale, Parte Generale 
(2009), pp. 377-78. 
363 These include: art. 270 Associazioni sovversive (Subversive associations); art. 271 Associazioni 
antinazionali (Anti-national associations); art. 304 Cospirazione politica mediante accordo (Political 
conspiracy by agreement); art. 305 Cospirazione politica mediante associazione (Political conspiracy 
through association); art. 306 Banda Armata: Formazione e partecipazione (Armed gang: Training 
and participation). [Translation by Author]. 
364 See article 228 Codice Penale; M. Maiwald, Einführung in das italienische Strafrecht und 
Strafprozessrecht (2009), p. 139. 
365 See article 56 (Delitto tentato) Codice Penale. 
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Instead of the concept of conspiracy like in the common law countries, to deal with 
situations in which crimes are committed through the cooperation of more than one 
person, the Italian law recognises the concept IL CONCORSO DI PERSONE NEL REATO 
(Persons working together in crime).366 To be punishable under this concept there 
must be a plurality of persons, the commission of a crime, the accused’s conduct 
must have some causal influence to the crime committed, and an accused must 
participate with knowledge and intention to contribute to perpetration of the crime. 
2. Criminal Associations 
To deal with the problem of crimes committed by a group of people acting in concert, 
the Italian penal code provides for the crime Associazione per delinquere (Criminal 
Association) under part IV on crimes against public order.367 Italy has a long history 
of criminal organisations, and provisions against criminal groups exist from the time 
of Roman law.368 The current Italian Penal Code promulgated in 1931 introduced 
article 416, which provides that where three or more persons combine to carry out 
criminal acts they shall be punishable for this reason alone.369 In this provision the 
agreement that underlies such combination is not punished, but rather the product of 
it, which is the criminal association.370 The criminal association is not required to 
have a specific hierarchical structure, only that it should be of a permanent nature, 
consisting of at least three persons committed to carrying out an open ended series 
                                                          
366 G. Marinucci and E. Dolcini, Manuale di Diritto Penale, Parte Generale (2009), p. 394 et seq. 
367 Provided in Codice Penale titled ‘Dei Delitti Contro L’ordine Pubblico’. 
368 See A. D. Tripp, 20 Fordham Int’l. L. J. (1996), pp. 297-304 for a brief overview of history. 
369 I. Quando tre o più persone si associano allo scopo di commettere più delitti, coloro che 
promuovono o costituiscono od organizzano l'associazione sono puniti, per ciò solo, con la reclusione 
da tre a sette anni. 
II. Per il solo fatto di partecipare all'associazione, la pena è della reclusione da uno a cinque anni. 
 (I. When three or more people associate for the purpose of committing more than one crime, those 
who promote or constitute or organise the association shall be punished, for that alone, by 
imprisonment from three to seven years.   
II. For the act of participating in the association alone, the punishment shall be imprisonment from one 
to five years) (Translation extracted from E. M. Wise, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L & Com (2000), p. 316). 
370 A. D. Tripp, 20 Fordham Int’l. L. J. (1996) at p. 300; E. M. Wise, 27 Syracuse J. Int’l L & Com. 
(2000), p. 317. 
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of criminal conduct.371 Membership to such an association or organisation should be 
voluntary, with its members agreeing to pursue the shared criminal goal of such 
association.372 It is not sufficient for the members to plan only a fixed number of 
crimes or commit isolated criminal acts they must intend to engage in a continuous 
series of criminal conduct, otherwise, they would only be considered liable as 
accomplices in the case of the isolated or fixed number of crimes committed, as 
opposed to being guilty as members of a criminal association.373 The criminal 
association is punished in such circumstances, for the additional danger it poses to 
the society with its indeterminate criminal programme. 
To further reinforce the provision on criminal associations, in 1982, article 416 bis 
was added into the Italian Penal Code, making anyone who forms a mafia type 
organisation liable to a penalty of imprisonment.374 A group of three or more people 
who use intimidation to commit crimes, or gain control over businesses or public 
contracts may be labelled a Mafia association. A person who gives assistance to the 
                                                          
371 7 Manzini, Trattaro Di Diritto Penale Italiano (1986), p. 195;  
372 7 Manzini, Trattaro Di Diritto Penale Italiano (1986), p. 195;  
373 7 Manzini, Trattaro Di Diritto Penale Italiano (1986), pp. 194, 195, 202. 
374 Law no. 646 of 13 September 1982, 9 Racc. Uff. 2537 (1982) (It.); Art. 416 bis states in part:  
I. Chiunque fa parte di un'associazione di tipo mafioso formata da tre o più persone, è punito con la 
reclusione da cinque a dieci anni 
II. … 
III. L'associazione è di tipo mafioso quando coloro che ne fanno parte si avvalgano della forza di 
intimidazione del vincolo associativo e della condizione di assoggettamento e di omertà che ne deriva 
per commettere delitti, per acquisire in modo diretto o indiretto la gestione o comunque il controllo di 
attività economiche, di concessioni, di autorizzazioni, appalti e servizi pubblici o per realizzare profitti 
o vantaggi ingiusti per sé o per altri,…. 
… 
VII. Le disposizioni del presente articolo si applicano anche alla camorra e alle altre associazioni, 
comunque localmente denominate, che valendosi della forza intimidatrice del vincolo associativo 
perseguono scopi corrispondenti a quelli delle associazioni di tipo Mafioso. (Whoever belongs to a 
mafia-type association comprised of three or more persons shall be punished by imprisonment from 
five to ten years… 
An association is a mafia-type association when those who belong to it rely on the intimidative force of 
associative ties, and on the discipline and code of silence resulting therefrom, in order to commit 
crimes, to acquire directly or indirectly the management or control of economic activities, of 
concessions, permits, public contracts and services, or to obtain unjust profits or benefits for 
themselves or others….  
The provisions of this article also apply to the Camorra, and other associations regardless of their 
local titles, that use the force of intimidation of the associative bond to follow the same goals as a 
mafia-type association). 
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Mafia organisation without intending to join it may be held criminally responsible for 
aiding and abetting the organisation under the doctrine of external complicity. Such a 
person is liable for the same penalties that a member of such an organisation would 
receive.375 
V. Summary  
The act of merely agreeing to commit a crime is expressly punished only in the 
German and Spanish Criminal Codes, and even so the offence of criminal 
agreement (“conspiracy”) in both instances is not a distinct crime, but a general form 
of liability dependent on its target offence. While in common law jurisdictions 
conspiracy is utilised as the main legal tool for dealing with the challenges of criminal 
enterprises, the countries under civil law jurisdiction prefer to use the concept of 
punishing participation in a criminal association (organisation/group) or what is 
otherwise referred to as the ‘criminal association rule’. 
Under the German criminal code when two or more people agree to commit a crime 
or jointly instigate commission of a crime they shall be liable for punishment. Unlike 
in common law jurisdictions, the offence of criminal agreement here is applied more 
restrictively. It only applies to felonies and once the contemplated crime is realised, it 
merges into the substantive crime. Whereas conspiracy under common law 
jurisdictions may in some cases be considered equally serious as or more serious 
than its contemplated criminal act, under the German criminal code the mere 
participation in a criminal agreement is considered to attract less culpability than the 
substantive crime. A participant in a criminal agreement is only liable for his personal 
contribution to such agreement, and will not be held criminally responsible for other 
                                                          
375 A. D. Tripp, 20 Fordham Int’l. L. J. (1996), p. 304. By virtue of art. 110 Codice Penale, accomplices 
are held liable as principals in commission of a crime; also see G. Marinucci and E. Dolcini, Manuale 
di Diritto Penale, Parte Generale (2009), p. 408.  
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acts, which he did not contemplate, consent, or in any way contribute to, although 
carried out in pursuance of the criminal agreement. This is in contrast to the doctrine 
of Pinkerton or accessorial liability under the common law concept of conspiracy. 
To combat crimes carried out by criminal groups the German criminal code prohibits 
the formation, membership, recruitment or supporting activities of armed groups 
(§127 StGB), criminal organisations (§ 129 StGB) and terrorist organisations (§ 129 
a StGB). These crimes, like the common law concept of conspiracy, extend criminal 
responsibility to the preparatory stages of criminal participation. A criminal 
organisation ought to have at least three people who subordinate their will to that of 
the organisation. It needs to exist for a certain period of time and have a certain level 
of organisation. This definition excludes cases where persons spontaneously come 
together to execute a certain crime, a situation that common law conspiracy would 
address. The offence of participation in a criminal organisation, like common law 
conspiracy, is a distinct offence, creating separate criminal responsibility from its 
contemplated crimes. Participation in a criminal organisation does not act as a form 
of complicity like in the case of common law conspiracy. It requires that the alleged 
accused through some personal act promoted the criminal objectives of the 
organisation, and such participant is only liable to the extent of their contribution. 
The Spanish criminal code also makes punishable the act of two or more people 
agreeing to commit a crime. Similar to the offence of criminal agreement under 
German criminal law, conspiracy here is not a distinct crime but is classified as 
attempted participation. Punishment for conspiracy is restricted to only those crimes 
specifically proscribed by law. Conspiracy under Spanish law does not also act as a 
form of complicity. Group criminal activity is preferably dealt with under the offences 
on illicit associations (arts. 515 to 521), criminal organisations (art. 570 bis 1) and 
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criminal groups (art. 570 ter). The crimes on criminal association require a 
combination of more than two persons with a long-term goal of committing crimes, 
and with exception of the crime of criminal groups, which requires a minimum of two 
persons, such an association should have some form of hierarchical organisation. 
Like the common law conspiracy, the crimes on criminal association are independent 
crimes punishable irrespective of commission of their underlying crimes. Whereas 
punishment of conspiracy under the Spanish criminal code is restricted to only some 
crimes, criminal organisations are punishable regardless of the crimes they intend to 
pursue.   
Conspiracy as a distinct crime does not exist under French law, but punishment for 
conduct of conspiracy nature may be inferred from punishment of two forms of crime, 
complot and association de malfaiteurs. A resolution by two or more people to carry 
out acts of violence that endanger institutions of the republic or violate the integrity of 
the national territory is punishable under complot (arts. 412-2). Association de 
malfaiteurs creates criminal responsibility for participation in a criminal association 
(arts. 450-1). A criminal association is created either by a group or by an agreement 
(‘entente’) to commit serious crimes that is, felonies or misdemeanours, punishable 
by a minimum sentence of five years. The offence of illicit associations does not 
require a specified number of members or structure, all that is needed is a collective 
of persons with a common understanding of the criminal purpose, who aim to 
prepare for certain crimes and have an intention that they be committed. To prove 
criminal agreement (either as complot or entente) the prosecution must show the 
carrying out of an overt act or some physical evidence aimed at procuring a certain 
criminal end. The elements of the offence of illicit associations closely resemble 
common law conspiracy, however, this offence does not punish the criminal 
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agreement itself but rather the criminal association that it creates. The offence of 
criminal association like common law conspiracy is a distinct crime independent of its 
target offences. Unlike common law conspiracy, which also acts as a form of 
complicity, the offence of criminal associations under French law is distinct from 
complicity. Under French criminal law carrying out certain crimes by organised gangs 
whose definition includes criminal associations is seen as a circumstance that may 
lead to aggravation of penalty. A clear indication of how serious the act of combining 
for criminal purposes is considered. 
As a general rule conspiracy is not punishable under Italian law unless the law 
expressly provides otherwise. It may be inferred from this principle that in certain 
circumstances conduct of conspiracy nature will be punished. These exceptional 
circumstances refer mainly to crimes considered to be a threat to public order. 
Although conduct of conspiracy nature is not punishable per se, a Judge may make 
an order on security measures to ensure the goals of such conduct do not 
materialise. Such measures are applied only if a person shows capability of being 
socially dangerous. Like in most civil law countries criminal enterprises under the 
Italian criminal code are combated through the offences on criminal associations. 
The combination of three or more persons committed to carrying out an open-ended 
series of crimes is subject to punishment by imprisonment (art. 416). Although it can 
be inferred that agreement is the underlying factor behind such combination, the 
crime of criminal association does not target the agreement but rather the product of 
it.  Such an association need not have any specific hierarchical structure, but it ought 
to be of a permanent nature and must have an indeterminate programme for the 
commission of several criminal acts. The offences on criminal associations are 
independent crimes and are also distinct from complicity. To deal with the issue of 
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complicity like in the situations envisaged by the common law conspiracy, the Italian 
criminal law prefers to analyse such conduct under the concept of ‘Il Concorso Di 
Persone Nel Reato’, a concept of complicity that deals with situations where two or 
more persons are involved in commission of a crime.  
 D. Evaluation 
The above analysis shows that express punishment for the offence of criminal 
agreement or conspiracy is only found in the United Kingdom, United States, 
Germany and Spain. The constitutive elements of conspiracy as defined by both 
systems are similar. These elements include an agreement, concerted will to act, 
and the common goal to achieve the contemplated criminal act. In the United States, 
there is the added requirement that there is need for proof of an overt act carried out 
in furtherance of the conspiracy, for such conspiracy to be punishable. This 
requirement can be compared to the legal requirements under Spanish law, where a 
conspiracy is only punishable on the evidence of a complete and concrete plan 
aimed towards commission of its underlying crime. This overt act requirement is 
often to ensure that the conspiracy being punished is not an act that still rests in the 
minds of its participants but is actually an act already being implemented. Although, 
the other jurisdictions do not expressly provide for an overt act requirement, this is 
an element that can be inferred from the practical cases.  
Whereas under common law jurisdictions conspiracy is an independent inchoate 
crime, in Germany and Spain conspiracy is a mode of attempted participation that 
merges into the crime once it is attempted or committed. Conspiracy under the 
common law jurisdictions has special evidential and procedural advantages and also 
acts as a form of complicity. The civil law countries do not provide any exceptional 
rules for charges relating to the offence of criminal agreement, and the principle of 
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liability for personal conduct is strictly adhered to. Therefore, under civil law 
jurisdictions, participation in a conspiracy does not conclusively act as a form of 
complicity for crimes committed pursuant to it. The conspiracy offence under 
common law jurisdictions is considered serious enough to at times attract a penalty 
almost equivalent to that of its contemplated crime. This contrasts to the perception 
of the conspiracy offence in civil law countries, where it is seen to involve the least 
culpability, with the law directing that punishment thereof be considerably low in 
comparison to that required for its target offence.  
Unlike common law countries, which use conspiracy as the main legal tool to deal 
with the special challenges presented by crimes carried out by organised criminal 
groups, most civil law countries prefer to use the “criminal association rule”. Here, 
the focus is in the formation of a criminal gang for purposes of carrying out criminal 
acts. The relevant laws that deal with criminal association mainly place emphasis on 
the criminal organisation or group rather than its underlying criminal agreement. 
Criminal responsibility here arises as a result of participation in an organisation or 
group with a criminal objective. Like conspiracy under common law jurisdictions, the 
offences related to criminal associations are independent crimes. This means they 
are distinct from their target offences, with criminal liability arising although none of 
the crimes that form part of their criminal objective have been committed.  
While it would be sufficient for two persons to form a conspiracy, in most cases 
participation in criminal association offences require a minimum of at least three 
participants and should have some form of hierarchical structure. A conspiracy exists 
from the moment an agreement is made, therefore, a combination of individuals 
spontaneously formed to commit a crime might be held criminally responsible under 
the concept of conspiracy. In contrast, most offences on criminal association are 
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punishable only from the moment that such an association is functionally and 
organisationally capable of realising its criminal goals. This often requires that such 
association has existed for a certain period or has a long term goal to commit crimes. 
Participation in a criminal association requires involvement in activities of forming 
and supporting such organisation or group. This means that a mere declaration 
indicating that one agrees with the aims of such an association might not suffice to 
create criminal responsibility, one must through some personal act support the 
objectives of such association.  
Under the concept of conspiracy, because all participants are considered to have 
equally contributed in reaching the agreement, the only form of participation is that of 
a conspirator. Common law conspiracy also acts as a conclusive form of complicity, 
making participants in such conspiracy liable for all offences carried pursuant to it. 
The offences on criminal associations recognise that participants can have different 
roles in their operation and often prescribe different punishment for the various roles, 
with the highest penalties being proscribed for those who participate in the formation 
and leadership roles. Participation in a criminal organisation does not form an 
automatic basis to be held liable for crimes carried out pursuant to it, for an accused 
has to have specifically contributed to such offence to be found culpable. Most civil 
law countries instead prefer to use their specific complicity provisions to deal with 
such conduct.  
Intention in conspiracy is directed to the agreement and target crime, while intention 
in criminal associations is mostly directed towards the criminal association and not 
its underlying offences save for the instances where members demonstrate their 
membership through commission of offences that form part of the association’s 
criminal objective.  
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Of the two concepts, the common law conspiracy model seems, obviously to have a 
broader scope of application. The restrictive requirements on what constitutes 
criminal associations have proved insufficient in combating all circumstances 
involving group criminal activity. This situation is created by the ingenious ways used 
by such groups to circumvent the law continuously. To deal with these challenges, 
some civil law jurisdictions have been forced to reform their law. As a result, they 
choose to enact laws that broadly define what constitutes criminal associations, 
making the constitutive elements closely resemble those of conspiracy under 
common law jurisdictions. This is reflected in the French criminal law, where an illicit 
association can be formed by an agreement marked by some form of material action. 
In Spain, a criminal group can be constituted by a union of two persons excluding the 
need for a hierarchical structure. The illicit association crime under Italian law also 
excludes the hierarchical structure requirement. The German law goes to the extent 
of even making criminal the mere attempt to form a criminal organisation. In fact, 
some German scholars criticise German laws on what may create criminal 
responsibility for supporting a criminal organisation, which is seen to go as far as 
criminalising the mere mental attitude. This criticism reflects similar views that have 
been raised against the conspiracy offence. All these reforms are an indication of the 
continuous need to deal with potential criminal activity at the most earliest possible 
opportunity. The aim is to achieve this goal by use of a legal tool that can adequately 
deal with all forms of criminal outfits that present potential danger to the public. 
If one looks at conspiracy as a group of persons cooperating for criminal purposes, it 
may be correct to draw an inference that the concept of punishing participation in a 
criminal association is equivalent to criminal responsibility that arises under 
conspiracy. That persons come together in a criminal association agreement must 
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be an important underlying factor for such cooperation. Both conspiracy and 
participation in criminal association offences extend criminal responsibility into the 
earliest preparatory stage of committing crimes and are generally justified on 
grounds of prevention. Whereas conspiracy under common law jurisdictions 
generally has the goal of preventing all crimes, prevention under the offences on 
criminal association is directed towards protecting the integrity and security of the 
state from specific dangerous groups seen to pose a threat to public order.  
E. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it may be observed that criminalisation of the mere act of agreeing to a 
commit a crime is not a general principle of law in all jurisdictions. However, there 
seems to be a gradual acceptance, albeit with much criticism, that in certain 
instances the punishment of an agreement to commit serious crimes is necessary. 
The concept of conspiracy as a distinct crime is predominantly accepted in common 
law jurisdictions. Although in Germany and Spain agreeing to commit a crime is 
expressly made punishable in regards to certain serious crimes, such an offence is 
not a distinct crime but rather a form of attempted participation. Therefore, under 
common law jurisdictions when two or more people agree to carry out a crime and 
execute it, in principle, they are liable for both conspiracy and its underlying offence. 
In contrast, for the aforesaid civil law jurisdictions, liability for the criminal agreement 
only stands if its underlying offence is not executed or even attempted. The practice 
in common law countries, however, shows an increase in policy and practice that 
discourages the prosecution of conspiracy and its complete underlying offence, save 
for specific cases where the interests of justice may so demand.  
As an inchoate crime, conspiracy provides the state with a legal tool, which allows it 
to intervene early before the criminal object of the conspiracy is even attempted. 
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Apart from its preventive relevance, it is also seen to address the inherent danger, 
which crimes carried out by combinations pose to the society. The judiciary in 
common law jurisdictions has interpreted the elements of conspiracy expansively. 
Thus, conspiracy has acquired certain distinct features, which make it an especially 
attractive tool for law enforcers in combating collective criminality. A defendant 
charged with conspiracy faces the possibility of his liability being extended to other 
criminal acts carried out in pursuance of the conspiracy by co-conspirators, although 
these were carried out without his knowledge, consent or participation. The 
expansive features of common law conspiracy theory are often criticised for violating 
the criminal law principle, which demands that there can be no punishment without 
personal fault. 
To deal with the danger of group criminality, the offences on participation in a 
criminal association in civil law jurisdictions can be considered to perform the 
analogous function of the conspiracy doctrine under common law jurisdictions. 
Originally, the constitutive elements of such criminal organisations required that they 
be organised in some form of hierarchical structure to be considered punishable, but 
continuous reforms show that in some jurisdictions, such as France, such 
organisations are constituted upon merely agreeing to engage in certain criminal 
conduct, accompanied by some material action towards their preparation. These 
reforms are instigated by the need to adopt a model of criminal liability that 
sufficiently deals with criminal collectives. Such a model needs to create criminal 
responsibility for such conduct, early enough before fairly advanced plans are made, 
and ensure that all associated with such collectives, both at the leadership and 
merely supportive level, are held accountable. Towards this goal, the conspiracy 
concept seems to be the more flexible model. 
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Chapter Three: Conspiracy in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals 
A. Introduction 
Criminal conspiracy entered the scene of international criminal law at the instigation 
of the Americans because of its unique features of combating collective criminality in 
common law jurisdictions. The use of conspiracy in the prosecution of international 
crimes has, however, not received overwhelming support, affecting its role and status 
as a tool of accountability in international criminal law. As explained in the second 
chapter of this study, the concept of conspiracy as an independent crime is not a 
general principle of law and is mainly appreciated by common law countries. 
Although the act of agreeing to commit a crime has gradually come to be accepted 
as giving rise to criminal responsibility in civil law jurisdictions, it is not an 
independent crime and is punished very restrictively with respect to certain serious 
crimes that are specifically proscribed by law. Also, the criminal agreement offence in 
civil law jurisdictions does not have certain features that are distinctively 
characteristic of the common law conspiracy. The dilemma of the conspiracy charge 
before the international criminal tribunals is reconciling these two conflicting 
perspectives. This chapter traces the journey of criminal conspiracy from the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, through to the ad hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. The purpose is to give an insight into the status of conspiracy as a crime in 
international law, in light of the jurisprudence of international tribunals. It contains an 
overview of what role conspiracy has played in the prosecution of international 
crimes, giving a clearer understanding of conspiracy as it has been perceived and 
developed by the international tribunals. It further shows the balance or 
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compromises that the international tribunals have adopted to resolve the conflicting 
common law and civil law ideologies on the concept of conspiracy.  
The concept of conspiracy has also been accredited for providing the doctrinal legal 
foundation of two liability theories that have equally generated much criticism. These 
theories are criminal organisations as dealt with at Nuremberg and joint criminal 
enterprise applied by the Yugoslavia and Rwanda ad hoc tribunals. This part of the 
study will look into the relationship between conspiracy and these two concepts. It 
also clarifies on the nature of the relationship between conspiracy and certain 
concepts such as planning and preparation that have often been equated to the idea 
of conspiracy. 
B. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
At the end of World War II the victorious powers entered into an agreement to 
establish a tribunal for the prosecution of war criminals whose offences had no 
particular geographical location.376 Attached to the agreement was a charter, which 
defined the constitution, jurisdiction and function of the tribunal.377 
                                                          
376 International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: A collection of Documentary 
Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for 
Presentation before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of The 
United States of America, The French Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans 
Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk, Hjlamar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und 
Halbach, Karl Doenitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin 
Bormann, Franz von Paper, Artur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Constatin von Neurath, and Hans 
Fritzche, Individually and as Members of Any of the Following Groups or Organisations to which they 
respectively belonged, namely: Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps der Politischen 
Leiter der Nationalsozial istischen Deustchen Arbeitepartei (commonly known as the “SS”) and 
including die Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the “SD”); die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret die 
Sturmabteilungen der N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the “SA”) and the General Staff and High 
Command of the German Armed Forces. (Hereinafter IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression): 
Agreement by the government of the United States of America, the provisional government of the 
French Republic, the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the prosecution and punishment of the 
major war criminals of the European Axis, Chapter 1, pp. 1-3. 
377 See IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Chapter II, Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, pp. 4-12. 
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I. The Charter 
Article 6 of the Charter provided for the crimes that would be the subject matter 
jurisdiction for the tribunal. These crimes included crimes against peace, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Conspiracy was mentioned in two instances in the 
Article. In the first place, conspiracy was included within the provision on crimes 
against peace. Its second appearance was in a general conspiracy clause in the last 
paragraph of Article 6. This latter clause provided for attribution of liability to persons 
who, although they did not personally execute the listed crimes, participated or 
contributed to their formulation or execution in other capacities. It must be noted that 
this last provision referred to all the crimes within Article 6.378 
The Americans proposed the idea of including conspiracy in the Nuremberg 
Charter.379 The rationale behind this proposal was to have a concept that provided a 
basis to reach a large number of guilty people against whom there might not have 
been direct evidence of having carried out the violent acts, but who were 
                                                          
378 Article 6 of the Charter reads: 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there 
shall be individual responsibility: 
1. CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
2. WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws of customs of war. Such violations shall include, 
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other 
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of 
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
3. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law 
of the country where perpetrated. 
Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan. See IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. 
I: Charter of the International Military Tribunal, part II. Jurisdiction and General Principles, p. 5. 
379 The proposal was initiated by Colonel Murray C. Bernays an American lawyer working in the war 
Department, see B. F. Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg. The Documentary Record 1944-
1945, Doc. 16 (1982), pp. 33-7; T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir 
(1992), pp. 35-6; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 16. 
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nonetheless participants in the ‘common plan or enterprise or conspiracy’.380 The 
Anglo-American conspiracy was a very appealing concept to the Americans, more 
particularly for the evidentiary advantages it promised. The use of conspiracy would 
facilitate the possibility of netting the big fish in the Nazi Regime, who it seemed 
would otherwise elude justice. Not surprisingly, this proposal received much 
opposition from the French and Russians who were not familiar with the concept.381 
These differences necessitated negotiations that eventually led to the adoption of a 
conspiracy, which Pomorski describes as a product of ‘compromise and patchwork’, 
although, superficially it seemed to largely resemble the Anglo American 
conspiracy.382 
II. The Trial 
The trial of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) began on October 18, 1945, with 
the indictment of 24 major war criminals and six organisations.383 The indictment 
constituted four counts:384 (i) participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of a crime against peace; war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
(ii) planning; initiating and waging wars of aggression and other crimes against 
peace, (iii) war crimes, and (iv) crimes against humanity. The focus of this study is 
                                                          
380 B. F. Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg. The Documentary Record 1944-1945, Doc. 16 
(1982), p. 35; also see J. A. Bush, 109 Columbia law Review (2009), pp. 1137-40, opining that 
conspiracy was proposed due to the sheer volume of devastation and the shortage of individualized 
documentary evidence; S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.),The Nuremberg 
Trial and International Law (1990), p. 219. 
381 The French especially found the concept most appalling. This opposition had already been 
anticipated by the Americans following the advice of the then Assistant Attorney General, Professor 
Herbert Wechsler. See S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg 
Trial and International Law (1990), pp. 218-19; B. F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (1977), 
p. 36. 
382 S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.),The Nuremberg Trial and International 
Law (1990), p. 221; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 18. 
383 See IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp. 1-190.   
384 See IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Chapter III, Indictment, pp. 14-82, attached 
appendix 1. 
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mainly restricted to the analysis of the conspiracy charge and the charge on criminal 
organisations in the IMT judgment. 
1. Count One-The Common Plan or Conspiracy: The Findings 
 
The first count charged the defendants with participating as ‘leaders, organisers, 
instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit, or which involved commission of, crimes against peace, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity…and…are individually responsible for their own 
acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or 
conspiracy’.385 
The prosecution presented a conspiracy that covered 25 years from the time of 
formation of the Nazi Party in 1919 to the end of the war in 1945. It submitted that 
the party was the “instrument of cohesion among the defendants” from which they 
carried out the purpose of the conspiracy, and further, that participation in affairs of 
the Nazi Party and the government was evidence of participation in the 
conspiracy.386 The tribunal rejected this submission on the time frame of the 
conspiracy, holding that although the Charter had not defined conspiracy, it was 
essential that the conspiracy referred to be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose, 
and not too far removed from the time of its decision and action.387 The tribunal then 
proceeded to limit the time span of the conspiratorial acts it would consider to those 
carried out between 1937 and 1939. Despite recognising the submission by the 
prosecution of a single grand conspiracy, the tribunal did not make any finding on 
                                                          
385 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Chapter III, Indictment, p. 15. 
386 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Chapter III, Indictment, p. 16; see also H. Leventhal 
et al., 60 Harvard LR (1947), pp. 863-867, for summary of the prosecution’s case on conspiracy. 
387 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgement, p. 54. 
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this. It instead asserted that the evidence established with certainty the existence of 
many separate plans by certain defendants to prepare and wage war.388 
Although the first count charged the defendants with conspiracy to carry out all the 
three listed crimes in the Charter, the tribunal rejected the two later conspiracies on 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. It observed that contrary to the 
prosecution’s perception, the Charter did not provide for conspiracy to commit war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The tribunal was of the view that although the 
last paragraph of Article 6 seemed to give the impression that it provided for 
conspiracy with respect to all crimes, this provision did not actually create new or 
separate crimes. The tribunal instead asserted that the provision was only intended 
to establish responsibility of persons participating in the common plan to wage 
aggressive war.389 
The count on conspiracy to wage aggressive war addressed crimes committed 
immediately before the war began. The tribunal, for purposes of convenience, 
decided to analyse the law on the common plan or conspiracy together with the 
second count of planning and waging war, observing that the same evidence had 
been produced to support both counts.390 The tribunal was of the view that both 
counts were similar in substance. In effect, the tribunal equated conspiracy to the 
planning and preparation of aggressive war, observing that the same had been 
carried out in a systematic manner. Interestingly, in spite of the above assertion, the 
tribunal decided that it would still proceed to determine the guilt of the defendants 
under both counts.391 The tribunal rejected the defence argument that a plan cannot 
exist in a dictatorship, stating that a plan executed by several persons, though 
                                                          
388 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgement, p. 55. 
389 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgement, p. 56. 
390 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgement, p. 54. 
391 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgement, p. 54. 
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conceived by one person, was still a plan, and the participants could not avoid 
liability by alleging that they had been directed to do so by its author.392 It was noted 
that by co-operating with the author of the plan with full knowledge of his aims, the 
defendants had made themselves parties to the plan.393 
It appears that the tribunal approached a finding of guilt under the charges of 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy with great caution. In the end, only 
eight of the 24 indicted war criminals were found guilty of participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy.394 The eight were considered to have, at some occasion, had a 
close association with Hitler as part of his inner circle of advisers. The respective 
defendants were found to have attended the conferences in which Hitler had 
expressed his aggressive plans. Their liability for conspiracy was inferred from the 
substantial role they played in the formulation of aggressive plans with full 
knowledge of the illegal nature of the war, having intent that force be used and were 
in a position to contribute to a decision to invade.395 A finding of guilt was only made 
where the evidence of knowledge and active participation was conclusive. 
2. Membership in a Criminal Organisation  
 
Apart from the crime of conspiracy, another controversial theory of liability 
considered before the IMT was that of criminal organisations. The concept of criminal 
organisations has been considered to be equivalent to criminal conspiracy, with 
                                                          
392 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgement, p. 55. 
393 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp. 55-6, the tribunal 
asserted, ‘Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the cooperation of 
statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, and businessmen. When they, with knowledge of his aims, 
gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to their cooperation, they made themselves 
parties to the plan he had initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of 
them if they knew what they are doing’. 
394 The eight defendants include: Herman Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm 
Keitel, Alfred Rosenburg, Alfred Jodl, Von Neurath and Erich Raeder. 
395 S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.),The Nuremberg Trial and International 
Law (1990), p. 221; see also J. A. Bush, 109 Columbia law Review (2009), pp. 1162-63; H. 
Donnedieu de Vabres, in G. Mettraux, Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), p. 251; H. 
Leventhal et al., 60 Harvard LR (1947), pp. 878-79. 
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Meierhenrich describing it as an ‘innovative and highly controversial conspiracy 
theory’.396 He considers that the doctrinal underpinnings of the criminal organisations 
concept were founded on conspiracy, observing that it was another tool of 
accountability that reflected the prosecution’s obsession with the idea of collective 
criminality after World War II. This makes it necessary to analyse the relationship 
between these two concepts, establishing the extent of their similarity or difference.  
While conspiracy was intended to net the big fish, criminal organisation was to be 
used for the smaller fish.397 The idea was to use conspiracy to prosecute the Nazi 
leaders alongside certain organisations, and a conviction of the organisations would 
be sufficient to establish guilt of any of their members.398 Article 9 of the Nuremberg 
Charter provided: 
At trial of any individual of any group or organisation the Tribunal may declare (in 
connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or 
organisation of which the individual was a member was a criminal organisation.399 
Article 10 further reinforced Article 9 by providing that once the tribunal declared an 
organisation criminal, this would be final and the ‘competent national authority of any 
Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership’.400 In light 
of these provisions, Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL. 10) of Germany made it 
                                                          
396 J. Meirhenrich, 2 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. (2006), p. 342; also see E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal 
Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), pp. 16, 21, 
describing the concept as an ‘offshoot’ of conspiracy. 
397 B. F. Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg. The Documentary Record 1944-1945, Doc. 16 
(1982), pp. 98-102; see also J. A. Bush, 109 Columbia Law Review (2009), p. 1140; C. Damgaard, 
Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: Selected Pertinent Issues (2008), p. 
189; H. Leventhal et al., 60 Harvard LR (1947), p. 887; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility 
of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 16.  
398 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), p. 162; IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. 
I: Chapter V, Opening Address for the United States, p. 170, asserting that the tribunal’s ‘verdict of 
guilt, against these organisations will render prima facie guilt…upon thousands of members’; B. F. 
Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg. The Documentary Record 1944-1945, Doc. 16 (1982), p. 
35. 
399 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Chapter 
II, Article 9, p. 6. 
400 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Chapter 
II, Article 10, p. 6. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 109 
criminal to be a member of the organisations declared criminal by the tribunal, 
providing that this would be punishable by death, life imprisonment with or without 
hard labour or a fine.401 The rationale of this concept was illuminated in the 
memorandum of Colonel Murray C. Bernays, also the brain behind the use of 
conspiracy in prosecution of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime: 
Behind each Axis war criminal […] lies the basic criminal instigation of the Nazi 
doctrine and policy. It is the guilty nature of this instigation that must be established, 
for only thus will the conviction and punishment of the individuals concerned achieve 
their true moral and juristic significance. In turn, this approach throws light on the 
nature of the individual’s guilt, which is not dependent on the commission of specific 
criminal acts, but follows inevitably from the mere fact of voluntary membership in 
organisations devised solely to commit such acts.402 
As a result, six Nazi organisations were indicted at Nuremberg: the Reich Cabinet, 
the leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS and SD, the Gestapo, the SA and the 
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. Although the 
tribunal did accept the criminalisation of organisations in principle, the far-reaching 
consequences proposed by the prosecution on this theory did not appeal to its sense 
of justice. The tribunal stated that group criminality, being a novel concept, should be 
carefully addressed to avoid punishing innocent persons.403 It noted, rightly so, that 
the declaration of organisations as criminal should be exercised in accordance with 
certain well settled legal principles, one of which is that criminal guilt is personal and 
mass punishment should be avoided. With this observation, the tribunal proceeded 
to clip wings of the criminal organisation concept curtailing its far reaching 
                                                          
401 See CCL. 10, Article II, subsection 1 (d) making it criminal to be a member “in categories of a 
criminal group or organisation declared criminal by the tribunal” and subsection 3, setting out forms of 
punishment. 
402 B. F. Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg. The Documentary Record 1944-1945, Doc. 16 
(1982), p. 35. 
403 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgement, p. 86. 
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consequences, indicating that membership in such an organisation alone would not 
be sufficient to show criminality. It stated: 
Since the declaration with respect to the organisations and groups will […] fix the 
criminality of its members, that definition should exclude persons who had no 
knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organisation and those who were 
drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the 
commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the 
organisation.404 
In essence, once the tribunal declared that an organisation was criminal, the criminal 
nature of the group could no longer be challenged. This then created a rebuttable 
presumption of guilt to members of such an organisation. To be criminally 
responsible a member of such an organisation must have had knowledge of its 
criminal nature and voluntarily decided to remain a member. The tribunal eventually 
declared only three of the accused organisations criminal with certain rigorous 
qualifications: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS and SD and the 
Gestapo.405  
The concept of criminal organisations bears some similarity with the concept of 
conspiracy. As noted by the tribunal, ‘[a] criminal organisation is analogous to a 
criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal 
purposes’.406 Like conspiracy, the concept of criminal organisations was designed to 
create criminal responsibility for situations involving mass organised criminality with 
many participants. It was an ambitious attempt by the prosecution to overcome any 
evidential or procedural burden that it would otherwise encounter in proving every 
individual’s role in the crimes perpetrated pursuant to the Nazi regime. In fact, when 
                                                          
404 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, p. 86. 
405IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp. 86-107. 
406IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, p. 86; see also H. Donnedieu 
de Vabres, in G. Mettraux, Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), p. 251, asserting that the 
common feature to both concepts is they ‘involve a plurality of agents who associate and coordinate 
their efforts with a view to achieve the purposes of a criminal enterprise’. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 111 
submitting on the concept of criminal organisations at Nuremberg, the prosecution 
maintained that it was part of the conspiracy concept. It added that as soon as an 
organisation was declared criminal, its members would be responsible for the 
criminal acts of each other like in a conspiracy.407 The defence opposed this 
submission, with one of the defence counsels even describing it as a ‘legal 
monstrosity’.408 Similar to criticisms against the common law concept of conspiracy 
that recognises vicarious liability for acts of accomplices to the extent that they were 
foreseeable although not intended, the main criticism against the proposed theory of 
criminal organisations was that it had an element of collective criminality.409 
Certain distinctions can be identified between the two concepts. While conspiracy by 
itself is an inchoate crime, the concept of criminal organisation at Nuremberg 
required commission of crimes by its members before such an organisation was 
declared criminal. Secondly, the indictment with respect to criminal organisations 
was directed at the alleged criminal organisations themselves, while the conspiracy 
indictment did not charge the conspiracy itself but the individual defendants alleged 
to have participated in the conspiracy as conspirators.410 Similarities may be drawn 
between the concept of criminal organisations at Nuremberg and the criminalisation 
of membership in certain organisations formed for the purpose of criminal ends in 
civil law jurisdictions.411  
                                                          
407 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 23. 
408 See S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and 
International Law (1990), p. 240. 
409 H. Kelsen, in G. Mettraux, Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), pp. 284-285; E. van 
Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(2003), p. 16, asserting that both conspiracy and the concept of criminal organisations are concepts of 
collective criminal theory; B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International 
Criminal Justice (2009), p. 90. 
410 See N. H. B. Jorgensen, in Andre Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt, (eds.), System 
Criminality in International Law (2009), p. 207. 
411 See Ch 2 section C, the law of criminal associations in the jurisdictions of Germany, Spain, France 
and Italy. The prosecution had noted at Nuremberg that this concept was not novel with several 
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III. Evaluation 
Whether the conspiracy at Nuremberg was successful is debatable. Although on the 
face of it conspiracy set out in the Charter largely resembled the Anglo American 
conspiracy, the interpretation eventually applied by the tribunal leads to a different 
conclusion. The conspiracy recognised by the tribunal was a narrow version of the 
conspiracy proposed by the Americans and submitted by the prosecution. This is a 
clear reflection of the distrust or disfavour the judges of the tribunal had towards this 
concept.412 The tribunal decided to limit liability for conspiracy in several ways. 
In the first place, conspiracy was restricted to the crime of aggression. This decision 
has largely been attributed to the ambiguous manner in which the Charter was 
drafted with respect to the crime of conspiracy.413 Whereas the American proposal 
had envisaged conspiracy as a crime in its own right, the conspiracy provided for in 
the Charter failed to feature as one of the separate principal offences. It was 
relegated to the background in the clause of paragraph 6 (a), which referred to 
crimes against peace. No similar clause was provided with respect to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. By placing conspiracy within the provision on crimes 
against peace alongside other ways of participating in this crime, the conspiracy in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
national jurisdictions penalising members of certain bodies considered criminal and the bodies 
themselves. The proposal to criminalise certain organisations actually came from France; see E. van 
Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(2003), p. 21. 
412 The charge drew various sentiments from the Judges in the tribunal strangely having the Judge 
from the Soviet Union highly in its favour and the American Judge like his French colleague very 
critical of it. Eventually a compromise was reached. See S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. 
Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (1990), pp. 229-30; B. F. Smith, 
Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (1977), pp. 119-136; T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg 
Trials: A Personal Memoir (1992), pp. 550-54. 
413 J. A. Bush, 109 Columbia law Review (2009), p. 1139; H. Leventhal et al., 60 Harvard LR (1947), 
p. 868; S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and 
International Law (1990), p. 222; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 18, noting that the controversies surrounding 
negotiations at Nuremberg left their mark as reflected in the final draft, that saw the proposed 
conspiracy loose much of its initial prominence. 
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the Charter resembled more a mode of participation in the crime of aggression, as 
opposed to an independent crime.414  
The language of the general clause on conspiracy in the last paragraph of Article 6 is 
consistent with conspiracy as a form of complicity. It refers to all the crimes, giving 
the impression that conspiracy as a form of complicity would be applicable to all the 
listed crimes. Under common law, conspiracy as a form of complicity makes it 
possible to hold conspirators criminally responsible for all acts carried out in 
pursuance of the conspiracy by other co-conspirators, but only if the alleged criminal 
agreement between them has been proved. In this sense therefore, the common law 
conspiracy would allow the defendants to be considered vicariously liable for all 
crimes listed in the Charter. The tribunal, contradicting the express language of the 
Charter, chose to limit the application of this clause to crimes against peace. 
Although one may be critical of the tribunal’s decision to limit conspiracy in this 
manner, its interpretation in the circumstances was consistent with its initial decision 
to limit conspiracy to crimes against peace. Criminal responsibility for conspiracy as 
a form of complicity under common law derives from and is only applicable in the 
instance where the independent crime of conspiracy is considered punishable. In the 
circumstances, crimes against peace was the only category of crime for which such 
vicarious liability could be construed. The tribunal’s decision to restrict conspiracy 
only to the crime of aggression put the possibility of being held liable for conspiracy 
for the other two crimes out of reach. If the drafters had intended for conspiracy to 
apply to all crimes then the eventual draft of the Charter was a poor reflection of 
such intention, leaving much room for the judges to construe their own interpretation. 
                                                          
414 In fact this is the view expressed by the French Judge H. Donnedieu de Vabres, in G. Mettraux, 
Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), p. 249. 
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Secondly, the tribunal limited the duration of the conspiracy by restricting it only to 
acts carried out just before the war, between 1937 and 1939. This, in effect, put out 
of the tribunal’s reach acts carried out in preparation of the war before 1937, and 
other conspiratorial plans carried out in much later years. Thirdly, the tribunal 
rejected the common law rule of conspiracy, which imputes liability for all acts done 
in pursuance of the conspiratorial objective, to participants who joined the conspiracy 
at a much later stage.415 
Fourthly, the decision by the tribunal to address both counts of conspiracy and 
aggression together resulted, to a great extent, in a limited legal and critical analysis 
of the crime of conspiracy, with more emphasis being placed on analysing the crime 
of aggression.416 This decision may be attributed to the tribunal’s failure to clearly 
outline the elements of the conspiracy or discuss the propriety of cumulatively 
charging conspiracy and its executed underlying offence.417 As a result, the tribunal 
equated conspiracy with planning and preparation to wage war, confusing the 
element of agreement and the acts used to prove its existence. Since conspiracy is 
an agreement to pursue a criminal course, in this case the war of aggression, the 
joint planning and preparation of such war by the defendants was only evidence 
showing existence of a conspiracy, and should not have been equated to the 
conspiracy itself.   
                                                          
415 For example see the tribunal’s findings on defendant Speer who they considered to have only 
joined the conspiracy much later when it was already underway, and therefore, not liable. IMT, Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp.156-59; also opinion on defendant 
Bormann, IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp.164-66; see also 
F. Biddle, in G. Mettraux (ed.), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), p. 208; J. A. Bush, 109 
Columbia Law Review (2009), p. 1162. 
416 J. A. Bush, 109 Columbia Law Review (2009), p. 1162, stating that this decision led to a further 
collapse of the count on conspiracy into the count on aggression. 
417 S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International 
Law (1990), p. 236. 
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The consequence of the aforementioned limitations was that certain defendants who 
might have otherwise been found liable under a broader interpretation escaped 
liability for the crime of conspiracy. Of these defendants those that may be 
particularly mentioned include Funk, Schacht, Speer and Bormann. Regarding the 
defendant Funk, the tribunal observed that he had served in various capacities in the 
Nazi regime, including being the Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General 
for War Economy in 1938 and the president of the Reichs bank in January 1939. It 
observed that he only became active in the economic field after the Nazi plans to 
wage aggressive war had clearly been defined.418 It noted that although he had 
participated in the economic preparation for aggressive wars against Poland and the 
Soviet Union, his liability on this aspect could adequately be addressed in count two 
on waging aggressive war.419 Under common law conspiracy, a defendant may be 
held liable for acts committed pursuant to the conspiracy by co-conspirators both 
before and after joining the conspiracy, and it is not a prerequisite for the defendant 
to be present from inception of the conspiracy. This principle was clearly disregarded 
in this instance. Further, the failure to hold Funk liable for conspiracy for his 
participation in the economic planning of certain aggressive wars in preference of 
establishing his liability under the count of waging aggressive war shows the 
tribunal's obvious aversion for establishing liability under the conspiracy charge.420 
As for the defendant Speer, the tribunal found that he had been Hitler’s architect and 
personal confidant, and later became Minister for Armaments and Munitions. 
However, it held that he was not liable under the count of the common plan to 
                                                          
418 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, p. 131. 
419IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, p. 132. 
420 See H. Leventhal et al., 60 Harvard LR (1947), p. 879, asserting that Funk’s acquittal is only 
explicable on the ground that his planning was not at the Hitler level. 
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engage in aggressive war.421 The tribunal’s reasoning was that Speer only became 
head of the armament industry well after all the wars had been commenced and 
were underway. Under common law conspiracy, his later participation long after the 
conspiracy was underway would not have made him any less liable than the initiators 
of the conspiracy. This restriction and rationale was also applied in the case of 
Bormann who, although the tribunal observed that he became head of the party 
chancery in 1941 and later in 1943 its secretary, making him then privy to Hitler’s 
plans, his participation was considered to be much later, falling outside the restricted 
time frame of the conspiracy recognised by the tribunal.422 
In the case of Schacht, he had served as President of Reichs bank, Minister of 
Economics, and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, and later Minister without 
portfolio.423 The tribunal found that he had played a role in the vigorous German 
rearmament programme, which was heavily supported by facilities from the Reichs 
bank. It was also recognised that he was a central figure in organising the German 
economy for war and the steps he had taken in the early days of the Nazi regime 
were responsible for Germany's rapid rise to military power. He began to lose 
influence, however, by 1936, because of his conflicts with Goering and later with 
Hitler. This led him to resign as Minister of economics and plenipotentiary general for 
war economy in 1937, and in 1939 he was dismissed by Hitler as Reichs bank 
president. The tribunal found that although Schacht had continued to participate in 
German economic life and that in some minor way he even participated in some 
early Nazi aggressions, the case against him depended on inference that he in fact 
knew of the Nazi aggressive plans, which inference the tribunal declared was not 
                                                          
421 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp. 156-159.  
422 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp. 164-166. 
423 IMT, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I: Opinion and Judgment, pp. 134-137. 
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established beyond reasonable doubt. Schacht was clearly a beneficiary of the 
restricted time application to conspiracy, making his earlier participation in the Nazi 
programme not count for much in establishing his culpability.  
In addition, the tribunal required strict proof of knowledge of the objective of the 
conspiracy, refusing to infer any knowledge on the part of Schacht. The tribunal held 
to this view despite making a finding that the position that Schacht had occupied, 
would have made him realise the true significance of Hitler's frantic rearmament 
programme and the economic policy adopted was consistent only with war as its 
object. The position taken by the tribunal contrasts with the practice in common law 
jurisdictions where knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and in 
the case of Schacht, the concept of wilful blindness may have been applied. This 
concept would imply that he had closed his eyes to avoid knowing what was taking 
place around him. The tribunal should have perhaps made a finding that the 
defendant Schacht had participated in the conspiracy but later unequivocally 
withdrew from it. His withdrawal could be inferred from his insistence on adoption of 
policies that frustrated the conspiracy or were inconsistent with the object of the 
conspiracy.424 
The prosecution’s submission on conspiracy did not wholly carry the day at 
Nuremberg, with its perceived advantages being greatly watered down. Several 
factors contributed to this result. Conspiracy was ambiguously structured in the 
Charter. It was neither defined nor were its elements outlined. This task was left to a 
tribunal that proved to be very sceptical and critical of the concept.425 The Charter 
                                                          
424 See also H. Leventhal et al., 60 Harvard LR (1947), pp. 875-8; S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and 
V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (1990), p. 234, noting that 
Schacht benefited from the restrictive interpretation of knowledge. 
425 S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International 
Law (1990), p. 223; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 18. 
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was also silent on the issue of cumulatively charging conspiracy and its underlying 
crimes. The potential breadth of liability of the conspiracy presented by the 
prosecution was a cause of concern to the tribunal, with the apprehension that it 
might lead to collective criminality by imputing guilt to all defendants by virtue of 
mere association. This latter possibility would especially have caused a great dent 
on the legitimacy of the tribunal’s decision. These factors were compounded with two 
other factors: the one is that conspiracy was an unfamiliar concept in civil law 
jurisdictions; and secondly, conspiracy as a concept was also a subject of much 
criticism within common law jurisdictions themselves. The totality of these factors 
made conspiracy a shaky concept on which to ground liability.426 This decision was 
to later greatly influence the decisions of post-World War II trials, and was 
considered a great setback to the overall prosecution strategy to use conspiracy as 
the best concept of establishing liability of perpetrators under the Nazi regime.427 
The concepts of conspiracy and criminal organisations were included in the IMT 
Charter to deal with the problem of mass criminality. They were both considered 
important by the prosecution to overcome evidentiary or procedural difficulties. Not 
surprisingly, the use of the concept of conspiracy came from the Americans; and the 
idea of declaring certain organisations criminal, the result of which its members 
would be considered criminally responsible, came from the French. This is a 
reflection of the different concepts used in the common law and civil law jurisdictions 
respectively in dealing with group criminality.428 The use of the concept of conspiracy 
was opposed by the civil law jurisdictions from the onset of its proposal, declaring it 
                                                          
426 H. Leventhal et al., 60 Harvard LR (1947), p. 881. See also H. Ehard, in Wilbourn E Benton and 
Georg Grimm (eds), Nuremberg: German Views of the War Trials (1955), p. 81; S. Twist, 27 Liverpool Law 
Review (2006), p. 40, at p. 42 asserting conspiracy in the IMT Charter violated the principle of criminal law 
against retrospectivity. 
427 J. A. Bush, 109 Columbia Law Review (2009), p. 1163. 
428 See Ch 2 above on comparative analysis. 
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as a foreign concept. A compromise was reached for its inclusion resulting into a 
Charter that was ambiguously drafted, especially the aspect of criminal conspiracy. 
This ambiguity left room for the judges to develop an interpretation quite reflective of 
their own prejudices towards the conspiracy charge, failing to capture the intention of 
the drafters.429 
The prosecution’s attempt to have expedient mass trials through a broad 
interpretation of both concepts of conspiracy and criminal organisations was rebuffed 
by the tribunal. The breadth of submissions by the prosecution had the potential of 
casting a wide net of liability over all defendants remotely associated with the alleged 
conspiracy even by passive acquiescence. This would have resulted in convictions 
that reflect collective criminal guilt. Such a result would have violated a fundamental 
criminal law principle that guilt should be personal. This possibility also greatly 
contributed to the tribunal’s hostility towards conspiracy. The decision of the tribunal 
to apply the concept of conspiracy restrictively, thus avoiding the possibility of guilt 
by mere association, is in this aspect laudable.430 
However, the tribunal must also be criticised for being overly cautious and for 
excluding certain elements that would otherwise be considered admissible in 
conspiracy trials within domestic jurisdictions. This resulted in certain defendants 
escaping criminal responsibility, and certain criminal acts supposedly carried outside 
the recognised time span of the conspiracy were left unpunished altogether. The 
tribunal’s decision to restrict criminal responsibility for membership in a criminal 
organisation to those who remained members of such organisations with knowledge 
                                                          
429 Also see W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn. (2009), p. 
312, observing that the Judges at Nuremberg did not fully grasp the intent of the drafters. 
430 See also G. Mettraux, in W. A. Schabas and N. Bernaz (eds.), Routledge Handbook of 
International Criminal Law (2011), p. 11. 
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of the crimes perpetrated by such organisations is also commendable. This 
restriction ensured that fundamental principles of criminal law carried the day.431 
C. Subsequent Nuremberg Trials  
The main victorious parties, after the IMT judgment, carried out a series of other 
trials. Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL. 10) empowered the occupying authorities to 
try suspected war criminals in their respective occupation zones.432 
The crimes defined in Article II of CCL. 10 are to a great extent similar to those set 
out in the IMT Charter, with conspiracy only being specifically mentioned under the 
commission of crimes against peace. Under this law, the United States proceeded to 
hold 12 trials from 9 December 1946 to 13 April 1949.433 Seven of these trials 
                                                          
431 F. Biddle, in G. Mettraux (ed.), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), p. 210; S. Pomorski, in 
G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.),The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (1990), p. 243; 
E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law (2003), p. 24. 
432 The following acts were considered crimes in Article II (1) of CCL. 10:- 
(a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation 
of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. (Emphasis added). 
(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offenses against persons or property, constituting violations of the laws 
or customs of war, including but not limited to murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for 
any other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of 
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
(c) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated. 
(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International 
Military Tribunal. (Emphasis added). 
2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have 
committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an 
accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a 
consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) 
was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) 
with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) 
position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the 
financial, industrial or economic life of any such country. (Accessed from the Avalon Project 
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy: Yale Law School, Lilian Goldman Law Library). 
433 See K. J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law 
(2011), for a comprehensive analysis of the cases. 
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included a charge on conspiracy. The following analysis is strictly with respect to the 
seven cases, and is restricted to the tribunals’ interpretation of the law on conspiracy. 
Of the respective cases where applicable, an overview and comparison between 
conspiracy and its “sister concept” membership in a criminal organisation is also 
included, giving a more clear picture of the relationship between the two concepts. 
I. The United States of America v. Josef Altstöetter et al. (Justice Trial)434 
This case involved 16 German jurists and lawyers charged with participating and 
furthering the crimes perpetrated by the Nazi regime. Nine of the defendants had 
been officials at the Reich Ministry of Justice, the others were prosecutors and 
judges of the Special Courts and People’s Court of Nazi Germany. The defendants 
were charged under four counts: count one charged participation in the common 
design and conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity; count two 
charged war crimes; count three alleged commission of crimes against humanity; 
and count four charged seven of the defendants for membership in the criminal 
organisations of SS, SD, or the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party.435 In brief, the 
tribunal considered that the defendants had been charged with consciously 
participating ‘in a nationwide government-organised system of cruelty and injustice, 
in violation of the laws of war and of humanity, and perpetrated in the name of law by 
the authority of the Ministry of Justice, and through the instrumentality of the courts’, 
asserting that, ‘[t]he dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of 
justice’.436 
 The essence of Count one is illustrated in the following excerpts from the indictment: 
                                                          
434 The other defendants included; Wilhelm Von Ammon, Paul Barnickel, Hermann Cuhorst, Karl 
Engert, Guenther Joel, Herbert Klemm, Ernst Lautz, Wolfgang Mettgenberg, Guenther Nebelung 
Rudolf Oeschey, Hans Petersen, Oswald Rothaug, Curt Rothenberger, Franz Schlegelberger, and 
Carl Westphal. Source, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control 
Council Law No. 10 (Oct 1946- April 1949) (TWC), Vol. III, “The Justice Case”. 
435 TWC, Vol. III, Indictment, pp. 15-26.   
436 TWC, Vol. III, p. 985 (emphasis added). 
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a) Between January, 1933 and April, 1945, all of the defendants herein, acting pursuant to a 
common design, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together and 
with each other and with divers other persons, to commit War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity, as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article II. 
b) Throughout the period covered by this Indictment all of the defendants herein, acting in 
concert with each other and with others, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly were 
principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, and were 
connected with plans and enterprises involving, the commission of War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity. 
c) All of the defendants herein, acting in concert with each other and with others, unlawfully, 
wilfully, and knowingly participated as leaders, organisers, instigators, and accomplices 
in the formulation and execution of the said common design, conspiracy, plans, and 
enterprises to commit, and which involved the commission of, War Crimes, and Crimes 
against Humanity, and accordingly are individually responsible for their own acts and for 
all acts performed by any person or persons in execution of the said common design, 
conspiracy, plans, and enterprises. 
5. It was a part of the said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises to enact, 
issue, enforce, and give effect to certain purported statutes, decrees, and orders, which 
were criminal both in inception and execution, and to work with the Gestapo, SS, SD, 
SIPO and RSHA for criminal purposes, in the course of which the defendants, by 
distortion and denial of judicial and penal process, committed the murders, brutalities, 
cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other inhumane acts…. 
7. The said common design, conspiracy, plans, and enterprises embraced the use of the 
judicial process as a powerful weapon for the persecution and extermination of all 
opponents of the Nazi regime regardless of nationality and for the persecution and 
extermination of “races”….437 
The defendants challenged the sufficiency of count one, which charged conspiracy to 
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity as a separate crime, on 
jurisdictional grounds. A joint session of United States Military Tribunals was held to 
hear counsels in this case and two other cases that of Karl Brandt et al. (The 
Doctor’s trial),438 and the trial of Oswold Pohl et al.,439 all in which the count on 
                                                          
437 TWC, Vol. III, ‘Count One-The Common Design and Conspiracy’, pp. 17-23. 
438 See below Ch 3 section C. II. 
439 See below Ch 3 section C. III.  
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 123 
conspiracy had been charged and was being challenged by the respective 
defendants.440  
The main arguments presented by the defence were the following:441 
i) Both the IMT Charter and CCL.10 when referring to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity do not mention common planning as a punishable separate 
crime, whereas with the crime against peace, participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy is expressly declared punishable under both laws. 
ii) The IMT judgment declared that the IMT Charter only recognised conspiracy 
to commit acts of aggressive war, dismissing charges referring to conspiracy 
to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
iii) The wording “was connected with plans or enterprises involving its 
commission” contained in Article II, 2 (d) of CCL.10 could not be interpreted to 
allow charges of conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, because the structure of CCL.10 makes it clear that the crimes are 
defined in sub-paragraph 1 whereas sub-paragraph 2 only defines forms of 
complicity in the crimes. 
iv) The introduction of Anglo-American concept of conspiracy was inadmissible 
because it was a foreign concept to Germany. The concept of conspiracy, 
being strictly an Anglo-American notion when applied to a German accused 
would violate the maxim nullum crimen sine lege. 
v) The words “including conspiracy to commit such crimes”, contained in Article I 
of Ordinance No. 7 must be restricted to crimes against peace because this 
ordinance was not intended to alter matters of substantive law in CCL. 10.442 
                                                          
440 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vols. VI-X, pp. 104-110.  
441 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vols. VI-X, pp. 105-6. 
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The prosecution in response argued:443 
i) Conspiracy as a concept under common law elaborates on the law of 
attempts in cases where there was no success in attaining its unlawful 
objective, and in circumstances where the conspiracy was successful, the 
conspiracy charge was simply an elaboration on the law of accessories and 
accomplices. It emphasised that the conspiracy charged involved crimes well 
established at international law, and referred to crimes that had in fact been 
committed.   
ii) In the effort to ensure all persons connected to a crime are punished, ‘and in 
approaching the question of what degree of connection with these crimes 
must be established in order to attribute guilt to a defendant’, international law 
must be drawn from various legal sources and systems, including both 
common law and civil law, and the notion of conspiracy if used in a fairly and 
sensible way would be a useful doctrine in the circumstances.444 
iii) Under common law, conspiracy to commit felonies such as “murder, torture, 
enslavement, rape, plunder, destruction, devastation, …”, are punishable 
although not expressly provided for in the statutes, it is for this reason the 
drafters of the IMT Charter and CCL.10 saw no need to expressly refer to 
conspiracy in the definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
442 Article I of Ordinance No. 7 states: “The purpose of this Ordinance is to provide for the 
establishment of military tribunals which shall have power to try and punish persons charged with 
offences recognised as crimes in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, including conspiracies to 
commit such crimes. Nothing herein shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers of other courts 
established or which may be established for the trial of any such offences”. See Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals, Vol. III p. 115. The Military Governor of the American Zone enacted this ordinance 
pursuant to CCL. 10. 
443 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vols. VI-X, pp. 106-109. 
444 The defendants response to this argument was that the danger of conspiracy as a mode of 
participation unlike other modes of participation such as instigation, which were also recognised in 
continental jurisdictions, was that the conspiracy charge risked many people being caught up in its 
net, even those “who did not themselves desire such a deed but who got involved not through their 
own volition….”, see Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vols. VI-X, p. 107.   
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in essence constitute the above mentioned crimes. It added that the only 
reason conspiracy was included in the definition on crimes against peace was 
because of abundance of caution. The crime against peace, it argued, was 
peculiarly an international crime and the acts declared criminal under acts 
against peace were not acts declared criminal in most criminal codes, unlike 
those constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
iv) It opined that the decision in the IMT judgment to exclude conspiracies with 
respect to crimes against humanity and war crimes was made in disregard to 
the express provisions of Article 6 of the IMT Charter, mainly because of 
hostility on the part of the continental members of the court. Nonetheless, the 
prosecution was of the view that the decision of the IMT judgment was not 
binding on points of law to the tribunals constituted pursuant to Ordinance No. 
7. 
v) The scope of sub paragraph 2 of Article II of CCL.10 was broad enough to 
accommodate the doctrine of conspiracy and other notions of criminal 
participation.  
vi) Conspiracy is not necessarily a separate, subsequent crime but is more in this 
case an additional mode of participation in commission of the crime. 
vii) IMT Charter and CCL.10 are not complete codification of international penal 
law. They are merely illustrative rather than exhaustive attempts at statutory 
definition. 
viii) Ordinance No. 7 expressly made conspiracy punishable. 
ix) It also submitted that legal concepts, analogous to conspiracy were known in 
continental law systems giving the example on the law of criminal 
associations in the French Code Pénal.  
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The joint tribunals decided in favour of the defendants dismissing the counts on 
conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes. The tribunal ruled 
‘that neither the Charter of the International Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law 
No. 10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against humanity as a 
separate substantive crime’ therefore, the tribunal had no jurisdiction over count one. 
The tribunal however, refrained from striking out the whole of count one, noting that 
this count, ‘in addition to the separate charge of conspiracy, also alleged unlawful 
participation in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity which actually involved the commission of such crimes’.445 
Judge Blair, on this count, had a dissenting opinion. He argued that: ‘Since the 
language of paragraph 2 of Law No. 10 expressly provides that any person 
connected with plans involving the commission of a war crime or crime against 
humanity is deemed to have committed such crimes, it is equivalent to providing that 
the crime is committed by acts constituting a conspiracy under the ordinary meaning 
of the term’.446 He observed that the facts, under which certain defendants had been 
found criminally responsible for participating in plans and schemes to carry out the 
underlying war crimes and crimes against humanity, were similar to the facts alleged 
to constitute a conspiracy. He was of the view that no material difference existed 
between a plan or scheme to commit a particular crime and a common design or 
conspiracy to commit the same crime, asserting that both CCL. 10 and Ordinance 
                                                          
445 See Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vols. VI-X, pp. 5-6.  In the end these later parts of 
count 1 had no impact on the final judgment, with the tribunal stating: ‘This Tribunal has held that it 
has no jurisdiction to try any defendant for the crime of conspiracy as a separate substantive offence, 
but we recognise that there are allegations in Count One of the Indictment which constitute charges of 
direct commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, after eliminating the 
conspiracy charge from Count One, we find that all other alleged criminal acts therein set forth and 
committed after 1st September 1939, are also charged as crimes in the subsequent counts of the 
indictment. We therefore find it unnecessary to pass formally upon the remaining charges in Count 
One. Our pronouncements of guilt or innocence under Counts Two, Three, and Four dispose of all 
issues which have been submitted to us’, TWC, Vol. III, The Justice Trial, p.1177. 
446 TWC, Vol. III, The Justice Trial, p. 1197. 
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No. 7 authorised conviction for the crimes of conspiracies to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.447 In his opinion a conviction on conspiracy was the most 
appropriate ‘...because the Nazi crimes [were] in reality indivisible and each plan, 
scheme or conspiracy proved in the instant case was in reality an interlocking part of 
the whole criminal undertaking or enterprise’.448 
Nine of the defendants were found guilty for various crimes, with the tribunal noting 
that some of the defendants had actively participated in the plans or schemes 
involving commission of the underlying crimes.449 On the count of membership in a 
criminal organisation the tribunal observed that, to be considered guilty, a defendant 
had to have been a voluntary member with full knowledge of the criminal character of 
such organisation or was personally implicated in commission of crimes carried out 
by such organisation.450 Three of the seven defendants charged under this count 
were declared guilty of membership in certain criminal organisations: the defendant 
Joel was found to have been a member of the SS and SD with full knowledge of the 
criminal character of these organisations. Oeschey was found guilty of membership 
in the NSDAP, and Altstöetter was found to have been a member of the SS. Whereas 
both Joel and Oeschey were also found to have participated in the commission of 
other crimes, the defendant Altstöetter was declared guilty only for the count of 
membership in the SS, on grounds that he retained membership in this organisation 
                                                          
447 TWC, Vol. III, The Justice Trial, pp. 1195-1196. 
448 TWC, Vol. III, The Justice Trial, p. 1195. 
449 This is a notion that can generally be inferred from the analysis on the defendants found guilty, but 
was expressly stated in the case of some defendants, for example the defendant Joel is described to 
have taken ‘an active part in the execution of the plan or scheme for the persecution and 
extermination of Jews and Poles’, see TWC, Vol. III, The Justice Trial, p. 1142. 
450 TWC, Vol. III, The Justice Trial, pp. 1029-30. 
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on voluntary basis and with the knowledge of its criminal activities, this earned him a 
sentence of 5 years imprisonment.451 
Like in the IMT judgment the tribunal in this instance was not ready to acknowledge 
jurisdiction over conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity, basing 
its decision merely on lack of express provisions in CCL. 10. If indeed the allies had 
intended for the aforesaid conspiracies to be prosecuted as separate crimes, CCL. 
10 was another poor reflection of such intention. The final draft structure of CCL. 10 
left sufficient room for the tribunal to arrive at the interpretation it adopted. The term 
conspiracy had only been expressly referred to under the crime against peace and 
not even an alternative general clause on conspiracy liability had been provided for 
like in the IMT Charter, which may have supported an inference that conspiracy 
would be applicable to all crimes. Such a general clause would probably have 
formed a more valid basis to consider conspiracy as a mode of participation or form 
of complicity as suggested by the prosecution.  
In essence, by suggesting that conspiracy liability could be inferred within Article II of 
CCL. 10, the prosecution required that the tribunal use an expansive rule of 
interpretation. This is contrary to the practice in national jurisdictions where rules of 
strict interpretation are used, especially, on issues of criminal law. The tribunal did 
not address the assertion that conspiracy was only to be considered in this instance 
as a form of complicity as opposed to a separate crime. It may be argued that by 
choosing to deal with the alleged conduct under the other forms of complicity 
expressly provided in CCL. 10, the defendants were still sufficiently held criminally 
responsible for their conduct. The tribunal did not therefore, have to rely on 
                                                          
451 See TWC, Vol. III, The Justice Trial, p.1176, the tribunal while declaring his guilt under count four 
noted: ‘Surely whether or not he took a part in such activities or approved of them, he must have 
known of that part which was played by an organisation of which he was an officer’. 
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conspiracy as a form of complicity, which was supposedly to be inferred through 
broad rules of interpretation. The choice not to hold the defendants accountable 
under the count of conspiracy did not in the circumstances create any big loophole in 
their prosecution. In addition, if indeed the conspiracy charged was only to be 
considered a form of complicity, the prosecution did not have to draft it as a count on 
its own in the respective indictments. Rather, the prosecution should instead have 
alleged it as a form of participation within the other counts.  
The decision to adopt strict interpretation rules for provisions in CCL. 10 may have 
also been informed by the fear of perpetrating an injustice through applying 
conspiracy liability, a concept considered to be purely Anglo-American in its nature 
and not a general principle of law in all jurisdictions, to defendants from continental 
Europe who did not recognise such concept. This fear was most likely further 
compounded, with a supposition that the broad theory of conspiracy liability 
advanced by the prosecution threatened to impose collective criminality. Yet, it was 
inaccurate to assert, as submitted by the defendants, that the conspiracy concept 
was at the time alien to the German defendants, because the German law already 
made punishable the mere agreement to commit certain crimes.452   
Two shortcomings may however, be identified from the decision to dismiss the 
conspiracy count. The first as perhaps expressed in Judge Blair’s dissenting opinion 
is a question of the interest of justice which, considering the factual and legal 
complexities involving the cases at hand, demanded the need to give an overall 
picture of the circumstances of commission of the crimes. In this instance, the 
conspiracy charge may have been considered to carry out a ‘truth telling’ function.453 
                                                          
452 See above ch 2 section C. I, Germany had introduced a provision in its criminal code that made 
punishable conduct relating to criminal agreements by 1876, mainly relating to treasonable acts. 
453 See ch 2 section B. III, on the rationale of punishing conspiracy under common law jurisdictions. 
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The Judge argued that to punish the acts of participating in the planning of criminal 
schemes and enterprises under conspiracy, would have given a more accurate 
picture of the circumstances under which the Nazi crimes had been committed. That 
the defendants had acted concertedly with others in criminal schemes and 
enterprises it may be inferred that underlying such conduct was some form of 
criminal agreement, thus, the question whether to punish such conduct merely as 
forms of participation in certain ‘plans and schemes’ or conspiracy. The second 
shortcoming is with regards to the time frame of crimes committed. The conspiracy 
count provided a larger time frame charging crimes allegedly committed from 1933 to 
1945, whereas the other counts only charged conduct from 1939 to 1945. Dismissal 
of the conspiracy count meant that the defendants were not held accountable for any 
crimes committed prior to 1939.  
One of the main reasons behind the conspiracy charge was to ensure every 
defendant that was in any way closely linked to commission of the underlying crimes 
would be held accountable, this purpose seems to have also been satisfied by the 
charge of membership in a criminal organisation, ensuring that defendants such as 
Altstöetter were, in any case, held criminally responsible, where the conspiracy 
charge failed.    
II. The United States of America v. Karl Brandt et al. (Medical Case)454 
This trial involved 23 leading German physicians and administrators charged for their 
willing participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the 
Nazi regime. Twenty of the defendants were doctors. The defendants had carried out 
medical experiments, using the concentration camp prisoners without their consent. 
They also planned and enacted the “Euthanasia” programme, which involved the 
                                                          
454 See TWC, Vols. I and II, “The Medical Case”. 
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systematic killing of those they deemed “unworthy of life”. Their victims included the 
mentally retarded, the institutionalised mentally ill and the physically impaired.455  
The defendants were charged with four counts: i) common design or conspiracy to 
carry out war crimes and crimes against humanity, ii) war crimes committed through 
carrying out medical experiments on prisoners of war and civilians of occupied 
countries without the subject’s consent, iii) crimes against humanity committed by 
carrying out medical experiments against the German Nationals iv) membership in a 
criminal organisation, the SS.456 
The first count on the common design or conspiracy charged the defendants with, 
‘acting pursuant to a common design, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly [conspiring 
and agreeing] together and with each other and with divers other persons, to commit 
war crimes and crimes against humanity’. It also asserted that the defendants acting 
in concert with each other wilfully and knowingly took a consenting part in and were 
connected with plans and enterprises involving the underlying crimes as principals, 
accessories, ordering and abetting. It further, alleged that they were responsible as 
leaders, organisers, instigators, and accomplices, in the formulation and execution of 
the said common design, conspiracy, plans and enterprises to commit war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.457 
The defence counsel filed a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal with 
respect to conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. This 
motion was consolidated with similar motions in the Justice and Pohl cases. The 
ruling delivered dropped the count on conspiracy, with the tribunal holding that the 
charge was beyond its jurisdiction. The tribunal did not however, wholly strike out this 
                                                          
455 TWC, Vol. II, The Medical Case, Judgment, pp. 171-297. 
456 TWC, Vol. I, The Medical Case, Indictment, pp. 8-17. 
457 TWC, Vol. I, The Medical Case, Indictment, pp. 10-11. 
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count. Instead it chose to retain parts of it relating to the planning and preparation of 
the underlying crimes, describing these as involving actual commission of the 
underlying crimes.  
While making pronouncements on guilt of certain defendants, the tribunal specifically 
declared that they were connected with plans and enterprises involving commission 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Examples include: the defendant Karl 
Brandt who was declared responsible for, aiding and abetting, taking a consenting 
part in, ‘and being connected with plans and enterprises involving medical 
experiments conducted on non-German nationals against their consent, and in other 
atrocities…’;458 the tribunal found the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that the defendant Mrugowsky ‘was a principal in, accessory to, ordered, 
abetted, took a consenting part in, and was knowingly connected with plans and 
enterprises’ involving commission of the alleged crimes.459 The tribunal in these 
instances considered the respective defendants criminally responsible for conduct 
that the prosecution had initially described as forming part of the conspiracy count, 
only that the alleged conduct was now punished as a form of complicity rather than 
the independent crime of conspiracy.  
Ten defendants were charged with being members in an organisation declared 
criminal by the IMT namely, “SS”. All the respective defendants charged under this 
count were found guilty of this charge. The tribunal not only found that most of the 
defendants were members of the SS, but also made findings that the defendants had 
been implicated in commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Only the 
defendant Poppendick was found liable under this count without being implicated in 
the commission of the underlying crimes. The tribunal considered that the 
                                                          
458 TWC, Vol. I, The Medical Case, Judgment, p. 198. 
459 TWC, Vol. I, The Medical Case, Judgment, pp. 247-248. 
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prosecution had provided insufficient evidence to implicate Poppendick in the 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, stating that mere suspicion 
was not sufficient to secure a conviction. The tribunal nonetheless, made a finding 
that the defendant was guilty under count four because he remained a voluntary 
member of SS, with actual knowledge of the facts that the organisation was being 
used to carry out acts declared criminal by CCL. 10.460 This earned the defendant a 
sentence of ten years imprisonment. Eventually, 16 of the defendants were found 
guilty on various counts and seven sentenced to death.461 
III. The United States of America v. Oswald Pohl et al.462 
The defendant Oswald Pohl and 17 of his co-defendants were indicted under CCL.  
10. At varying times between January 1933 and April 1945, the defendants had been 
associated with Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt (WVHA), the Economics and 
Administrative department of the SS. The WVHA was the Nazi government office 
that maintained, administered, and operated the concentration and extermination 
camps. 
The defendants were charged with maintaining and administering concentration 
camps in a manner as to visit injury, disease, starvation, torture, and death on the 
inmates. The indictment also charged them with participation in a programme of 
mass murders, spoliation, and expropriation on millions of Jews, Slavs, Poles and 
other people both in and out of the conquered territories.463 The indictment filed 
against the defendants contained four counts. The counts charged included: i) 
participation in a common design or conspiracy; ii) war crimes carried out through the 
                                                          
460 TWC, Vol. I, The Medical Case, Judgment, pp. 248-253. 
461 TWC, Vol. I, The Medical Case, Sentences, pp. 298-300. 
462 See, TWC, Vol. V, The Pohl Case. The other defendants included August Frank, George Loerner, 
Heinz Karl Fanslau, Hans Loener, Josef Vogt, Erwin Tsdentscher, Rudolf Schide, Max Kiefer, Franz 
Eirenschmalz, Karl Sommer, Hermann Pook, Hans Baier, Hans Hohberg, Leo Volk, Karl 
Mummenthey, Hans Bobermin, and Horst Klein. 
463 TWC, Vol. V, The Pohl Case, (Indictment), pp. 200-208. 
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administration of concentration camps and extermination camps; iii) crimes against 
humanity also carried out through administration of the concentration and 
extermination camps, including slave labour charges; and iv) membership in a 
criminal organisation. 
Counts one and four stated in part:464  
Count one (THE COMMON DESIGN); 
6. Between January 1933 and April 1945 all of the defendants herein, acting pursuant to 
a common design unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together 
and with each other and with divers other persons, to commit War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity… 
7. …all of the defendants …, acting in concert with each other and with others, 
unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly, were principals in, accessories to, ordered, 
abetted, took a consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises 
involving the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
…. 
11.  All of the defendants…participated as leaders, organisers, instigators, and 
accomplices in the formulation and execution of the said common design, conspiracy, 
plans, and enterprises to commit, and which involved the commission of War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, and accordingly are individually responsible for their 
own acts and for all acts performed by any person or persons in execution of the said 
common design, conspiracy, plans and enterprises…. 
Count four (MEMBERSHIP IN CRIMINAL ORGANISATION); 
26.  All of the defendants herein, except defendant Hohberg, are charged with 
membership, …in the Schutsfaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deustchen 
Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the “SS”), declared to be criminal by the 
International Military Tribunal and Paragraph 1 (d) Article II of CCL 10. 
Although the tribunal acknowledged that administration of concentration camps 
involved a broad criminal programme, requiring co-operation of many persons, the 
count on conspiracy was never used to establish criminal liability of the defendants. 
During the trial the defendants challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the count of 
                                                          
464 TWC, Vol. V, The Pohl Case, (Indictment), pp. 200-208. 
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conspiracy, moving that the same be quashed and stricken from the indictment. The 
defence alleged that under the basic law the tribunal had no jurisdiction to try the 
charge of conspiracy as a separate substantive crime. This motion was granted 
together with similar motions in the Justice and Medical cases. The tribunal decided 
to disregard certain parts of count one in as far as it charged conspiracy as a 
separate crime.465 It however, declined to strike out the whole of count one, choosing 
to retain parts of it that referred to the unlawful participation in the formulation and 
execution of plans, involving the underlying crimes. It considered this conduct to 
constitute actual commission of the crimes, making an additional clarification that 
even these remaining parts would only be regarded in so far as they were not 
repeated in substance in counts two and three.466   
Thirteen of the defendants were found guilty under the count charging membership 
in a criminal organisation and four others were acquitted.467 To be considered 
criminally responsible under this count the conditions set out in the IMT judgment 
had to be met. An organisation declared criminal would fix the criminality of its 
members, but this liability would exclude defendants who had no knowledge of the 
criminal purposes or acts of the organisation and defendants drafted by the state, 
unless they were personally implicated in commission of any of the acts declared 
criminal under the IMT Charter. Although it was evident that the four defendants 
acquitted under count four had been associated with the criminal organisation SS, 
with one of them even admitting membership, the tribunal found that three of the said 
defendants had no knowledge or any connection with the criminal activities 
                                                          
465 See summary of decision above in the Justice case, Ch 3 section C. I. 
466 TWC, Vol. V, The Pohl Case, pp. 961-62. 
467 The four include Rudolf Scheide, Josef Vogt, Horst Klein and Leo Volk. 
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perpetrated by the organisation.468 Of these four defendants, only Leo Volk was 
found to be guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the others were 
acquitted on all other counts. The defendant Leo Volk was in any case found to have 
never been a member of the organisation.469 
IV. The United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al. (I.G. Farben Trial)470 
This trial involved the prosecution of 24 defendants who had been officials of I.G. 
Farben-Industrie Aktiengesellschaft (I.G. Farben), a large German Conglomerate of 
Chemical firms. During World War II Degesch a subsidiary of I.G. Farben was 
involved in the manufacture of Zykoln B, the poison gas used at extermination 
camps. I.G. Farben also developed the processes of synthesizing gasoline and 
rubber from coal, and thereby contributing much to Germany’s ability to wage war, 
although, it was cut off from all major oil fields.471 
The charges included five counts; i) planning, preparation, initiation, and waging 
wars of aggression and invasions of other countries, ii) war crimes and crimes 
against humanity through the plundering, exploitation, spoliation and other offences 
against property of occupied territories, and the seizure of plants in Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, France, and Russia, iii) war crimes and crimes 
against humanity through participation in the enslavement and deportation to slave 
labour, and mistreatment, terrorization, torture, and murder of enslaved persons, iv) 
membership in criminal organisation, the SS, v) participation in the formulation and 
                                                          
468 Rudolf Scheide admitted being a member of SS. The others who were also acquitted for lack of 
knowledge were Josef Vogt and Horst Klein.  
469 TWC, Vol. V, The Pohl Case, pp. 1047-51. 
470 TWC, Vols. VII and VIII, The I. G. Farben Case. 
471 TWC, Vol  VIII, The I. G. Farben Case, pp. 1085-1096, on ‘Farben as an Instrumentality’. 
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execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit the crimes under counts one, 
two, and three.472 
This time the prosecution adopted a new strategy in its formulation of the count on 
conspiracy. It alleged the defendants had been involved in a conspiracy involving 
crimes against peace, asserting that the commission of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity also formed an integral part of such crimes against peace.473 This 
new formulation was obviously an attempt to overcome the hurdle set by previous 
judgments, which had dismissed all counts of conspiracy to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
The tribunal in reaching its decision acknowledged the central relevance of the IMT 
judgment involving the 24 major war criminals stating that: 
[We] have determined that Control Council Law No. 10 cannot be made the basis of 
a determination of guilt for acts or conduct that would not have been criminal under 
the law as it existed at the time of the rendition of judgment by the IMT in this case of 
United States of America vs. Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al. That well considered 
judgment is basic and persuasive precedent as to all matters determined therein.474 
 As a result, the tribunal only proceeded with the count on conspiracy to commit 
crimes against peace, making no reference to allegations of commission of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, as part of this conspiracy. Recognising that 
indeed a conspiracy had existed in the aggressive wars waged by Germany against 
                                                          
472 TWC, Vols. VII, The I. G. Farben Case, pp. 10-60. 
473 Count five on the Common Plan or Conspiracy provided: 
146. All the defendants acting through the instrumentality of Farben and otherwise, with divers other 
persons, during a period of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated as leaders, organisers, 
instigators, and accomplices in the formulation and execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit, or which involved the commission of, crimes against peace ( including the acts constituting 
war crimes and crimes against humanity which were committed as an integral part of such crimes 
against peace) as defined by control council law no. 10, and are individually responsible for their own 
acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such common plan or conspiracy. 
147. The acts and conduct of the defendants set forth in counts one, two and three of this indictment 
formed a part of [the] said common plan or conspiracy and all the allegations made in said counts are 
incorporated in this count. (See TWC, Vols. VII, The I. G. Farben Case, p. 59). 
474 TWC, Vols. VII, The I. G. Farben Case, p. 1098. 
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other nations, the question before the tribunal was whether the defendants in this 
case had been a part of it.475 The tribunal stated that to be considered a participant in 
the common plan or conspiracy an accused must have had knowledge of it. 
Construction of knowledge in participation of the conspiracy was inferred from 
knowledge in the planning, preparation or initiation of an aggressive war.476 Having 
held that there was no evidence of the defendants knowingly participating in the 
planning, preparation, and initiation or waging of aggressive war, the tribunal 
considered that consequently, the defendants were not guilty under the count on 
conspiracy.477 
Of the ‘sister’ count to conspiracy, i. e membership in a criminal organisation, only 
the defendants Schneider, Buetefisch, and von der Heyde were charged with 
membership subsequent to 1 September 1939 in the ‘SS’.478 As observed by 
predecessor tribunals, the tribunal here declared that one would only be considered 
a member of an organisation declared criminal by the IMT, if one voluntarily became 
a member or remained a member of such organisation with knowledge that it was 
involved in commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. All three 
defendants were eventually acquitted of this count, with the tribunal asserting that 
the evidence adduced had failed to establish their membership beyond reasonable 
doubt.479 
                                                          
475 TWC, Vols. VII, The I. G. Farben Case, p. 1127. 
476 To infer this knowledge the tribunal following the precedent of the IMT judgment, restricted it to the 
leaders who formed part of Hitler’s close knit ‘circle of Nazi and military fanatics’, holding that 
defendants did not form part of this circle and being merely followers therefore lacked the knowledge 
that they were preparing Germany for participation in an aggressive war, see TWC, Vols. VII, The I. 
G. Farben Case, pp. 1096-1127. 
477 TWC, Vols. VII, The I. G. Farben Case, p. 1128, ‘Since we have already reached the conclusion 
that none of the defendants participated in the planning or knowingly participated in the preparation 
and initiation or waging of a war or wars of aggression or invasions of other countries, it follows they 
are not guilty of the charge of being parties to a common plan or conspiracy to do these same things’. 
478 TWC, Vols. VII, The I. G. Farben Case, p. 59 
479 TWC, Vol. VII, The I. G. Farben Case, pp. 1196-1204. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 139 
V.  The United States of America v. Alfred Krupp et al. (Krupp Trial)480 
This case involved 12 former directors of the Krupp Group. The Krupp concern was 
considered the ‘principal German maker of large calibre artillery, armour plate, and 
other high quality armament, the largest producer of iron and coal in Germany’ and 
as a result, it was alleged to have contributed substantially to Germany’s ability to 
wage its wars of aggression.481 The defendants were accused of holding high 
positions in the political, financial, industrial, and economic life of Germany and using 
their influence to facilitate coordination between activities of the Krupp firm and the 
German programme for rearmament.482 The indictment contained four counts which 
in summary included: i) Planning, preparation, initiation, and waging aggressive war, 
ii) plunder and spoliation, iii) crimes involving deportation, exploitation of prisoners of 
war and abuse of slave labour, and iv) common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes 
against peace.483 The conspiracy charge was formulated with the same ingenuity like 
in the I.G. Farben case, with the defendants being accused of participating as 
‘leaders, organisers, instigators, and accomplices in the formulation and execution of 
a common plan and conspiracy to commit, and which involved commission of crimes 
against peace (including the acts constituting war crimes and crimes against 
humanity which were committed as an integral part of such crimes against 
peace)’.484 Upon conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the defence filed a 
motion for dismissal of counts one and four for lack of sufficient evidence. On 
evaluating the evidence produced by the prosecution, the tribunal concluded that the 
relevant and competent evidence failed to show beyond reasonable doubt the 
                                                          
480 See TWC, Vol. IX, The Krupp Case. The other defendants included Ewald Loeser, Eduard 
Houdremont, Erich Mueller, Friedrich Janssen, Karl Pfirsch, Max Otto Ihn, Karl Eberhardt, Heinrich 
Korshan, Friedrich von Buelow, Werner Lehmann, and Hans Kupke. 
481 TWC, Vol. IX, The Krupp Case, Indictment, p. 11. 
482 TWC, Vol. IX, The Krupp Case, Indictment, p. 19. 
483 TWC, Vol. IX, The Krupp Case, Indictment, pp. 7-36. 
484 TWC, Vol. IX, The Krupp Case, Indictment, p. 35. 
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liability of any of the defendants under both counts one and four. The defendants 
were acquitted of both counts of conspiracy and wagging of aggressive war.485 
VI. The United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsäcker et al. (Ministries 
Trial)486 
This trial involved 21 defendants who had been officials of various Reich ministries. 
Most of the defendants were charged with criminal conduct arising principally out of 
their functions as officials under the Reich government, all covered in eight counts, 
which included charges for preparing and initiating aggressive war, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.487 Initially, 18 of the defendants were charged with the 
second count of having participated as leaders, organisers, instigators, and 
accomplices in a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, which 
included war crimes and crimes against humanity.488 On the motion of the 
prosecution three of the defendants were later dismissed from this count. In any 
case, the tribunal did not proceed to analyse in detail the validity of this count. 
Instead, it summarily discharged the remaining defendants of liability under this 
count, stating that ‘no evidence has been offered to substantiate a conviction’.489 
Count eight charged some of the defendants with membership in various criminal 
organisations.490 Like its predecessor tribunals, this tribunal avoided the possibility of 
mass punishment, asserting that guilt must be personal.  Criminal liability under this 
count was restricted to those who were voluntary members with knowledge of the 
                                                          
485 See TWC, Vol. IX, The Krupp Case, pp. 390-466, order and opinions of the tribunal acquitting the 
defendants of the charges of crimes against peace and conspiracy. 
486 TWC, Vols. XII, XIII, & XIV, The Ministries Case. The case is also referred to as the Wilhelm 
Strasse Trial because the German Foreign office was located at the Wilhelm Strasse in Berlin. 
487 See TWC, Vols. XII, The Ministries Case, Indictment, pp. 13-63. 
488 TWC, Vols. XIV, The Ministries Case, pp. 435-436. 
489 TWC, Vols. XIV, The Ministries Case, p. 436. 
490 TWC, Vols. XII, The Ministries Case, Indictment, pp. 62-63. Defendants von Weizsäcker, Keppler, 
Bohle, Woermann, Veesenmayer, Lammers, Stuckart, Darré, Dietrich, Berger, Schellenberg, Rasche, 
Kehrl, and Koerner, charged with membership in the SS; Schellenberg also charged with membership 
in the SD; Bohle, Darré, Dietrich and Keppler, also charged with membership in the Leadership Corps 
of the Nazi Party. 
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organisations criminal activities, or were personally implicated as members of the 
organisations in the commission of the acts declared criminal under Article 6 of the 
IMT Charter.491 Eventually 11 defendants were considered criminally responsible for 
the charge of membership in a criminal organisation. 
VII. The United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (High Command 
Trial)492 
The 14 defendants were high ranking generals of the German Wehrmacht and 
former members of the High Command of Nazi Germany’s military forces. The 
indictment contained four counts: i) crimes against peace by waging aggressive war 
against other nations violating international treaties, ii) war crimes carried out 
through murder, ill treatment and other crimes against prisoners of war and enemy 
belligerents iii) crimes against humanity by participating or ordering the murder, 
torture, deportation, hostage taking among others of civilians in occupied countries, 
iv) participating and organising the formulations and execution of a common plan and 
conspiracy, which involved the commission of crimes against peace, including the 
acts constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity that formed an integral part 
of the crimes against peace.493 
In an interesting twist, the count of conspiracy was dismissed on the ground that it 
was already covered by the other charges. The tribunal expressed that it failed to 
see of what use the conspiracy count was for the prosecution, asserting that if the 
defendants had committed the acts alleged under the conspiracy count, they would 
in any case be considered guilty as principals in crimes charged in preceding 
                                                          
491 TWC, Vols. XIV, The Ministries Case, pp. 855-65. 
492 TWC, Vols. X, XI, The High Command Case. 
493 TWC, Vols. X, The High Command Case, Indictment, pp. 10-55. 
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counts.494 In other words, the tribunal considered that the conspiracy in this case had 
merged into the completed crimes. In the words of the tribunal:- 
The conspiracy count has not resulted in the introduction of any evidence that is not 
admissible under the other counts, nor does it, as the evidence has developed in this 
case, impose any criminality not attached to a violation under such preceding 
counts.495 
VIII. Evaluation 
Despite the restrictive construction of the conspiracy count in the IMT judgment, the 
prosecution decided to engage in a renewed effort to establish broad conspiracy 
liability theory in the subsequent Nuremberg trials. Evidently, the conspiracy charge 
was a favourite of the American prosecutions. This conspiracy was alleged with 
respect to all the crimes in CCL. 10. The theory that informed this prosecutorial 
policy was that the IMT judgment was not binding on subsequent tribunals, and in 
any case, the prosecution was of the view that Article II (2) of CCL. 10 provided a 
non-exhaustive list of different forms of liability, and conspiracy liability could also be 
read in it. 
The defence in most of the cases vehemently opposed the charging of conspiracy to 
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity on jurisdictional grounds. It 
submitted that while the IMT judgment had rejected conspiracy to commit war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, CCL. 10 did not have any provision establishing 
criminal responsibility for such crimes. It also submitted on the impropriety of 
introducing an American concept into international law, arguing that the 
criminalisation of an agreement being a thought crime violated the principle of 
legality. It emphasized on the retroactivity of imposing criminal responsibility for such 
conduct upon a German defendant. The submission that conspiracy was a totally 
                                                          
494 TWC, Vols. XI, The High Command Case, p. 483. 
495 TWC, Vols. XI, The High Command Case, p. 483. 
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foreign concept to a German defendant was a misrepresentation by the defence, 
because Germany at the time already recognised agreements to commit certain 
crimes as punishable, although, they did not expressly relate to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
In answer thereto, the prosecution emphasized that Article II (2) was so broad also 
assigning liability to conspirators. The prosecution sought to distinguish between 
inchoate conspiracy, which the IMT judgment had rejected in reference to crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, and conspiracy as a form of complicity that applied 
to consummated conspiracies. It submitted that the later form of conspiracy was 
provided for in CCL. 10. The prosecution stressed that the conspiracy charged in the 
respective cases were complete conspiracies with all the crimes having been 
committed, and not conspiracies based on incomplete or preparatory criminal 
conduct. The conspiracy charged by the prosecution was therefore, intended to act 
as an elaboration on the law of accessories and accomplices. The defendants 
eventually carried the day in the joint ruling before the en banc panel in the Medical, 
Pohl and Justice cases. The counts of conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes 
against humanity were rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. This was in line 
with the decision of the IMT judgment, with the tribunal reiterating that neither the 
IMT Charter nor CCL. 10 bestowed such jurisdiction. It only recognised jurisdiction 
over conspiracy to commit crimes against peace.  
In the subsequent trials of I.G Farben, Krupp, Ministries and High Command cases, 
the prosecution adopted a second formulation of conspiracy to circumvent the 
restrictions of the IMT judgment. Therefore, rather than flout the IMT judgment, it 
charged the crime of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace describing it to 
include war crimes and crimes against humanity, which acts it alleged were 
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committed as an integral part of crimes against peace. An innovative approach, but it 
proved to be an exercise in futility. In both the I.G Farben and Krupp cases 
conspiracy was again restricted to war of aggression. In the I.G Farben trial the 
defendants were discharged from liability of conspiracy on account of lack of 
knowledge of the aggressive nature of the war, and in the Krupp case the tribunal 
found the evidence against the defendants insufficient to support a conviction. In 
respect to the Ministries case, the count on conspiracy was summarily dismissed, 
with the tribunal asserting that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of 
proof on this charge and no further analysis was made on the validity of the charge. 
In the High Command case, the conspiracy count was dismissed because the 
tribunal considered that the acts charged under this count had sufficiently been 
covered in the other counts referring to completed crimes. 
It is clear from the rulings that conspiracy did not enjoy favour before the Nuremberg 
tribunals. The tribunals simply chose to dismiss the charges of conspiracy to commit 
crimes against humanity and war crimes on jurisdictional grounds, failing to make 
any elaborate analysis on certain issues raised by the parties that merited a more 
detailed or reasoned judicial response.496 First, the tribunal should have considered 
addressing the prosecution’s submission that conspiracy to commit acts punishable 
under war crimes and crimes against humanity such as “murder, torture, 
enslavement, rape, plunder, destruction, devastation, etc”, were indictable offences 
at common law although not expressly provided for in the statutes. The tribunal in 
response could have reasoned that this practice was not a general principle of law 
therefore, should not be used on defendants from continental Europe, whose system 
                                                          
496 See also K. J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal 
Law (2011), p. 280, on this aspect he observes that the en blanc panel in fact never made a ruling at 
all. 
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of law required a strict adherence to the principle of legality.497 To be considered as 
punishable, CCL. 10 should have expressly provided for conspiracy to commit war 
crimes and crimes against humanity as separate crimes. 
Second, the tribunal should also have responded to the submission that the 
conspiracy alleged by the prosecution was an ‘adjunct of the crime’ as opposed to a 
separate subsequent crime. In other words, the prosecution considered conspiracy 
here to be a form of accessory or accomplice liability. A possible approach would 
have been to expressly dismiss this submission with the reason that conspiracy as a 
form of accessorial liability is derivative from the independent inchoate crime of 
conspiracy. This implies that conspiracy as a form of complicity can only be punished 
in the instances that conspiracy is expressly provided for as an independent crime in 
the applicable law. This was not the case in CCL. 10, especially, not with respect to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecution’s submission on this point 
was therefore, not acceptable.498  
The charge of conspiracy was treated with extreme caution such that even in the 
cases where jurisdiction over conspiracy to commit crimes against peace was 
acknowledged, no conviction was obtained because of the high evidentiary standard 
requirements. Knowingly participating in a conspiracy to wage an aggressive war 
was strictly construed and linked to planning and knowingly participating in the 
preparation and initiation to wage a war, which the defendant knew was aggressive 
and illegal in nature. This knowledge was only strictly inferred from the group of men 
who allegedly had a particular close and confidential relationship with Hitler, leaving 
                                                          
497 On this aspect, K. J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International 
Criminal Law (2011), p. 279, observes that the tribunals were not willing ‘to use conventional and 
customary international law’ to supplement CCL. 10, although, the same was all too willingly used to 
limit CCL.10.  
498 See also K. J. Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal 
Law (2011), p. 280, noting that the prosecution’s presentation on this point undermined the 
conspiracy counts. 
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out several other defendants who although played a crucial role in furthering the war, 
did not fall within the category of Hitler’s inner circle. 
A general positive observation that may be made is that the restrictive interpretation 
of the conspiracy charge played an essential role in avoiding the possibility of mass 
punishment. The counts on conspiracy in the indictments were generally and broadly 
drafted not giving any particulars of an accused’s actual participation in the 
conspiracy. This gave the prosecution the advantage of adducing a wide range of 
evidence, which only revealed particulars of a defendant’s alleged participation in the 
conspiracy during the course of the trial. This already put the defendants at a 
disadvantaged position because they were not fully forewarned of the case against 
them.  The decision to strictly construe the conspiracy charge was positive to the 
extent that it ensured guilt could not be established by the mere fact of association, 
without any culpable conduct, therefore, upholding fundamental principles of criminal 
law.  
The main conduct that the conspiracy count seemed to create criminal responsibility 
for in the face of complete crimes, as illustrated in the respective indictments, was 
the acts involving planning and preparatory activities with respect to the underlying 
crimes. This conduct was in any case considered punishable, by the tribunals, as 
actual participation in the committed crimes. Therefore, no big gap was created 
following the exclusion of the conspiracy charges. Save that, the conspiracy count 
had presented with it a time frame that made it possible to punish acts committed 
way before the war began, its dismissal effectively made it impossible to hold 
defendants criminally responsible for such acts. This is in fact one of the criticisms 
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that have been labelled against the decision to dismiss the conspiracy charge.499 
These results may again like in the case of the IMT Charter be traced to the drafting 
of CCL.10, which failed to expressly provide for conspiracy to commit war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, probably under the assumption that the tribunals would 
not be too hostile towards the possibility of punishing such conduct through 
expansive rules of construction. 
Comparing conspiracy to the count of membership in a criminal organisation, the 
later count had a more prominent role. The mere fact of voluntary membership with 
knowledge of the criminal activities of an organisation declared criminal by the IMT, 
made one criminally responsible, even with no evidence of having participated in the 
crimes themselves or having contributed to the functioning of such organisation. This 
seems to be a lower standard of addressing the question of a defendant’s degree of 
connection with the underlying crimes than the standards set out for the count on 
conspiracy. Under conspiracy, a defendant’s guilt was only inferred if he had 
knowledge of the aggressive nature of the war (with knowledge here being strictly 
construed), and had participated in its planning and preparation, mere acquiescence 
would not suffice. The count of membership in a criminal organisation in this sense 
compensated to some extent for the strategy by the prosecution to use conspiracy 
as a tool that ensured a substantial number of those who had even been remotely 
connected with the crimes, or supported the system that perpetrated the crimes 
would be punished.500  
                                                          
499 J. A. Bush, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (2009), pp. 1211; J. Schnitzer, ‘The Nuremberg Justice Trial 1947-
Vengeance of the Victors?’, LLM Thesis (2010), University of Wellington, p. 94. 
500 See also J. A. Bush, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (2009), pp. 1211; R. Wala, 41 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law (2010), p. 701; also see decisions above Ch 3 section C. I, on Altstöetter in the 
Justice case, and Ch 3 section C. II, on Poppendick in the Medical case. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 148 
D. Conspiracy before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
The IMTFE (Tokyo tribunal) was established by a special proclamation by General 
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the allied powers, following surrender of 
the Japanese at the end of the Second World War.501 The tribunal was established to 
implement the Cairo declaration, Potsdam declaration and Moscow conference, 
which all recommended the restraint and punishment of the aggression by Japan, 
and stern justice to be meted out to all war criminals.502 The tribunal was established 
for ‘the trial of those persons charged individually or as member of organisations or 
in both capacities with offences which include crimes against peace’. 
I. The Charter503 
Article 5 of the Charter of the IMTFE provided for the crimes under the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.504 Similar to the Nuremberg Charter, the IMTFE Charter recognised 
conspiracy in two aspects: in Article 5 (a) included under crimes against peace was 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy, and in Article 5 (c) following the 
                                                          
501 Special Proclamation-Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 
January 1946), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal 
(2008), pp. 5-6; also Japanese Instrument of Surrender at pp. 3-4. 
502 See for a detailed narration N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A 
Reappraisal (2008), pp. 17-27; IMTFE judgment (48,415-48,420), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, 
Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal (2008), pp. 5-6; also Japanese Instrument of 
Surrender at pp. 71-73 (hereafter IMTFE judgment). 
503 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (26 April 1946), in N. Boister and R. 
Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal (2008), pp. 7-15. 
504 It reads:-  
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which 
there shall be individual responsibility: 
a) Crimes against peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or 
undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements 
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing (emphasis added); 
b) Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war; 
c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, 
organisers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any person in execution of such plan (emphasis added). 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 149 
provision on crimes against humanity, an extra phrase was added to extend liability 
of all crimes to leaders and others participating in a conspiracy to commit any of the 
aforementioned crimes.505  
28 defendants were indicted with having carried out crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity during the period from 1st January 1928, to 2nd 
September 1945. The indictment contained 55 counts, divided into three groups, and 
among the charges the defendants faced was that of conspiracy. In group one 
charging crimes against peace, counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 alleged the defendants 
conspired as leaders, organisers, instigators or accomplices to have Japan, either 
alone or with other countries wage wars against other countries. Count 1 outlined a 
broad grand conspiracy basically giving a general outline of all charges in relation to 
crimes against peace. Counts 2 to 5 gave a breakdown of the grand conspiracy, 
alleging separate conspiracies with different goals. The prosecution adopted this 
strategy to guard against the possibility of failing to establish or rely on the charge of 
conspiracy should the tribunal decide to dismiss the first count for being too broad.506 
In group two charging murder, conspiracy was alleged in counts 37, 38 and 44, 
stating the defendants conspired to murder soldiers, civilians and prisoners of war. 
The third group charged conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity with 
count 53 alleging that the defendants had conspired to carry out war crimes.507 
                                                          
505 See M. Futamura, 14 European Review (2006), p. 472, observing that the IMTFE Charter was 
influenced by the IMT Charter. 
506 N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 207; Y. 
Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the wake of World War II (2008), p. 82, 
asserting that counts 2-4 were in a complementary relationship with count 1. 
507 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Indictment, in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents 
on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal (2008), pp. 16-69 (hereafter IMTFE indictment). See 
Appendix I.  
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II. The Trial and general findings on Conspiracy 
The Prosecution at the Tokyo tribunal apparently experienced difficulty in drafting the 
conspiracy charges. This has been attributed to the ambiguous structure of 
conspiracy in the IMTFE Charter.508 The Charter did not provide for a stand-alone 
conspiracy offence applying to all crimes, it failed to define and state the elements of 
‘conspiracy or common plan’, with the final phrase on Article 5 (c) suggesting that the 
concept of conspiracy that creates vicarious criminal responsibility would apply to all 
substantive crimes recognised by the Charter. The use of conspiracy in the 
indictment for all the categories of crimes was a reflection of the American proposal 
to establish total collective responsibility for all harm to those who conspire to start 
aggressive war.509 The trial eventually proceeded against 25 defendants because 
two of the defendants died while in custody and another was adjudged not fit for trial. 
During the trial, the prosecution submitted that conspiracy was an international crime 
and a general principle of law recognised by all civilized nations. It argued that 
conspiracy could be established by circumstantial evidence and it was not necessary 
that individuals be aware of each other’s actions to establish its existence.510 The 
defence countered by refuting the existence of conspiracy as a crime in international 
law and advocated for a more limited application of the conspiracy. The defence 
submitted that a defendant should only be declared guilty of conspiracy if he had 
been part of the inner circle that made decisions and had a guilty knowledge and 
intention to act. It contended that mere occupation of a prominent position when a 
certain incident occurred was not sufficient to establish guilt, conspiracy required its 
                                                          
508 N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 207. 
509 N. Boister, ANZLH (2006), part 5, E-Journal. 
510 N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 209. 
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schemers to work together to achieve its unlawful end.511 To this extent, the 
defendants’ submission was clearly in line with the IMT’s judgment findings on 
conspiracy. The defence further submitted that once the object of conspiracy had 
been realised, the conspiracy should be consummated into the substantive offence. 
The tribunal noted that under the IMTFE Charter participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy was one of the five listed separate crimes under which one could be 
considered to have participated in the commission of crimes against peace. The 
tribunal defined conspiracy to wage aggressive war as an agreement by two or more 
persons to carry out unlawful war, stating that what followed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy is the planning and preparation for such war.512 The implication of this 
definition was an acknowledgement that the conspiracy provided for in the Charter 
was an inchoate crime, with the bare agreement being sufficient to establish criminal 
liability. 
The tribunal noted that those who participated in the planning and preparation were 
either the original conspirators or later adherents. In respect to the later adherents, 
the tribunal observed that by adopting the purpose of the conspiracy and planning 
and preparing for its fulfilment they became conspirators. Having made this 
evaluation, the tribunal concluded that it would refrain from declaring an accused 
guilty of planning and preparation in the event that they were found guilty of 
conspiracy.513 Although the tribunal did not expressly equate conspiracy to planning 
and preparing to wage the war like their counterparts at Nuremberg, this inference 
can be drawn from their decision in this instance. As a result, the tribunal decided not 
                                                          
511 See for further details on the submissions, N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 209-210. 
512 IMTFE Judgment (48, 448), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), p. 84. 
513 IMTFE Judgment (48,448), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), p. 84. 
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to take into consideration counts six to 17 of the indictment, which had exclusively 
alleged planning and preparation to wage the war, considering it to be subsumed into 
the count on conspiracy if the prosecution proved the latter. 
In line with the precedent at Nuremberg, the tribunal rejected the charges of 
conspiracy to carry out crimes against humanity. These charges specifically accused 
the defendants of conspiracy to commit murder. It observed that the IMTFE Charter 
did not provide for such a crime. An attempt by the prosecution to have the counts 
sustained under Article 5 (a), arguing that waging aggressive war was unlawful and 
this also involved unlawful killing, was not persuasive. The tribunal rejected the 
prosecution’s submission, emphasizing that the Charter did not provide for 
conspiracy to commit murder by the waging of aggressive war.514 The tribunal also 
rejected the counts that charged the defendants with conspiracies to commit crimes 
in breach of the laws of war, observing that this was also not recognised in the 
Charter. 
Conspiracy to wage aggressive war was therefore, the only conspiracy the tribunal 
proceeded with. The tribunal found that the prosecution had proved the existence of 
a criminal conspiracy spelled out in count one, whose object was to secure Japan’s 
military, naval, political and economic domination over East Asia, the Western and 
South western Pacific Ocean and the India Ocean, and certain islands in these 
oceans.515 It decided not to make any findings on counts two, and three, which were 
considered to charge conspiracies with more limited objects than count one, and the 
same treatment was given to count four noting that it was merely a replica of count 
one. The conspiracy in count five, which had alleged that Japan had also entered 
                                                          
514 IMTFE Judgment (48,451), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), p. 85.  
515 IMTFE Judgment (49,770), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), pp. 596-7. 
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into a conspiracy with Germany and Italy for the purpose of mutual assistance to 
wage war was dismissed. The tribunal stated no sufficient evidence had been given 
to justify this count. The tribunal held that conspiracy to wage wars of aggression 
was a crime of the highest degree observing that: - 
Indeed no more grave crimes can be conceived of than a conspiracy to wage a war 
of aggression or the waging of a war aggression [,] for the conspiracy threatens the 
security of the peoples of the world, and the waging disrupts it. The probable result of 
such a conspiracy and the inevitable result of its execution is that death and suffering 
will be inflicted on countless human beings.516 
The tribunal narrated the history of Japan in relation to the wars it had participated in, 
setting out the various policies formulated by the alleged conspirators, illustrating the 
execution of these policies and the role played by the defendants in these acts. It 
concluded that the far reaching plans and prolonged and intricate preparation for 
waging the wars of aggression were not the work of one man but were, ‘...the work of 
many leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for the achievement of a 
common object’.517 It found that the conspiracy and its execution had occupied a 
period of many years, upholding the prosecution's submission of the 18 years grand 
conspiracy. With respect to participation in the conspiracy the tribunal observed:- 
Not all of the conspirators were parties to it at the beginning, and some of those who 
were parties to it had ceased to be active in its execution before the end. All of those 
who at any time were parties to the criminal conspiracy or who at any time with guilty 
knowledge played a part in its execution are guilty of the charge contained in count 
1.518 
                                                          
516 IMTFE Judgment (49,769), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), p. 596. 
517 IMTFE Judgment (49,769), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), p. 596. 
518 IMTFE Judgment (49,770), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), p. 596. 
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23 of the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to wage aggressive war in 
violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances.519  
III. Evaluation 
The conspiracy at the Tokyo tribunal clearly played a more prominent role than its 
Nuremberg counterpart.520 Various terms were used to describe the role played by 
the defendants in the conspiracy. These terms included “leader”, “collaborator”, 
“accomplice”, “principal”, “energetic member”, “active member”, “association”, “active 
association” and “close association”. This classification however, did not have any 
particular influence on the sentences eventually imposed on the accused. Several 
factors were used to infer a defendant’s participation in the conspiracy. These 
included: occupation of a prominent position in the military or government, this made 
one capable of contributing to the formulation and execution of the aggressive plans; 
presence at meetings in which the conspiracy agenda was discussed; participation in 
political schemes which involved the overthrowing and murder of leaders considered 
to be against the conspirators war plans; supporting the coming into power of the 
conspirators; suppression of democracy and condemnation of the opposition; spread 
of propaganda through publications which supported the aggressive plans of the 
conspirators and incited ‘the appetite of the Japanese people for the possessions of 
Japan’s neighbours’.521 
                                                          
519 The accused convicted of conspiracy included:- Araki Sadao, Dohihara Kenji, Hashimoto Kingoro, 
Hata Shunroko, Hiranuma Kiichiro, Hirota Koki, Hoshino Naoki, Itagaki Seishiro, Kaya Okinori, Kido 
Koichi, Kimura Heitaro, Koiso Kuniaki, Minami Jiro, Muto Akira, Oka Takasumi, Oshima Hiroshi, Sato 
Kenryo, Shimada Shigetaro, Shiratori Toshio, Suzuki Teiichi, Togo Shigenori, Tojo Hideki, Umezu 
Yoshijiro. 
520 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 20. 
521 IMTFE Judgment (49,782), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), pp. 600-1, see the tribunal’s view on the defendant’s Hashimoto’s 
contribution to the success of the conspiracy. 
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As for the mental element, the tribunal seemed to require a twofold test.522 First, the 
accused had to have knowledge of the conspiracy’s aggressive aims. This was 
inferred from the position occupied by an accused or participation in official 
decisions, or from public statements, published articles and private correspondence. 
The second element was the accused’s special intention to support the objects of the 
conspiracy. This latter requirement although not specifically referred to, can be 
inferred from the tribunal’s decision to acquit the defendant Matsui of the conspiracy 
charge. Although the evidence revealed that by his close association with the 
conspirators, he was most probably aware of their purposes and policies, the tribunal 
held that this was not sufficient to sustain a conviction on conspiracy.523 
Participation in the conspiracy seemed to also act as evidence to show the mens rea 
of an accused for the offence of waging a war of aggression in respect to some 
defendants. Therefore, with the defendant Matsui, although evidence was adduced 
to show that he had served in the Military operation in China, the tribunal, having 
held that he was not guilty of conspiracy, further observed that the prosecution had 
failed to tender evidence in which an inference could be drawn that he knew of the 
criminal character of the war.524 The tribunal did not maintain a consistent view in 
drawing its findings on this aspect. Thus, although it found that the defendant 
Shigemitsu was not liable for conspiracy because in its opinion at the time he 
became Foreign Minister, ‘…the policy of the conspirators to wage certain wars of 
aggression had been settled and was in course of execution’,525 and he did not 
participate in any formulation or development of policy on the war, the tribunal 
                                                          
522 N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 220. 
523 IMTFE Judgment (49,819), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), pp. 613-14. 
524 See verdict on Matsui in IMTFE Judgment (49,815); N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the 
Tokyo International Military Tribunal (2008), p. 612. 
525 IMTFE Judgment (49,828), in N. Boister and R. Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal (2008), p. 617. 
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nonetheless, found him guilty of waging certain aggressive wars for the principal role 
that he had played in them.526 
Apart from submitting that the accused be held liable for the inchoate crime of 
conspiracy, the prosecution also advocated for the use of conspiracy to attribute 
criminal responsibility to its adherents for all other substantive crimes, pursuant to 
the final clause in Article 5 (c). The tribunal however, was reluctant to wholly apply 
the full implication of this phrase. Upon holding an accused liable of conspiracy this 
did not automatically imply that an accused was liable for all wars of aggression 
perpetrated in pursuance of the conspiracy. An accused’s liability for any aggressive 
war would only be established if there was direct evidence showing their particular 
role of participation or contribution in the aggressive war charged. To illustrate this, 
the defendant Araki who had been a prominent figure in the hierarchy of the 
Japanese Army, was found to have been a leader of the conspiracy and liable under 
count one on conspiracy, but he was only held liable for waging the war against 
China because he had actively participated in it, and was discharged from liability of 
the other wars on account of lack of participation. Another example is the defendant 
Doihara, who was found guilty of conspiracy and had also been prominent in the 
Japanese army often referred to as a specialist on China. He was found guilty with 
respect to waging war in specific territories, which included China and U.S.S.R, on 
account of his actual contribution. However, in the case of waging war against 
France, the tribunal discharged Doihara of any liability, saying that he had not 
participated in the decision to wage this war and evidence did not establish that he 
took part in it.527 
                                                          
526 N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 224. 
527 Also see the defendant Hashimoto, despite his prominent role in the conspiracy, his liability for 
waging war was only found with respect to China for his direct participation. The defendant Hirota was 
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Boister and Cryer suggest that perhaps the tribunal’s failure to wholeheartedly 
embrace the full implications of the liability clause in Article 5 (c), was because it 
would have exposed weakness of the tribunal’s factual finding on the existence of a 
conspiracy.528 The tribunal did not also want the foundation of its convictions to be on 
account of mere association and therefore, the danger of being criticised for 
establishing collective guilt.529 The tribunal’s findings of a grand conspiracy has 
nevertheless been criticised by a number of scholars for being a contradiction of the 
true circumstances of the Japanese war, with the assertion that the Japanese 
government during that period had no unifying planning group or even a figure like 
Hitler as was the case in Germany.530 It is observed that a finding of multiple 
conspiracies to wage aggressive war would have been more consistent with the 
tribunal’s specific factual findings and a more accurate reflection of the ‘historical 
reality of Japan’s war- making process’.531 Some critics view the finding of 
conspiracy among the co-defendants some of whom had been political enemies and 
many of whom did not know each other by sight to be incredulous.532 This criticism is 
however, countered by the opinion that conspiracy punishes those who collude to 
carry out a crime and defendants don’t need to have known each other to establish 
that they worked together towards such criminal end.533 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
also convicted for conspiracy and waging war against China but discharged from liability of other wars 
due to lack of evidence showing his participation. 
528 N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 226. 
529 N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008), p. 226. 
530 R. H. Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (2001), pp.129-130; K. Noboru, in 
Hosoya et al. eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1986), p. 76; also see Yu Xinchun, in Hosoya et al. 
eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1986), p. 99, who adds that although conspiracy might not have 
been present in the early stages of the war it developed with its subsequent progress.  
531 Y. Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the wake of World War II (2008), 
p. 90. 
532 Noboru Kojima in Hosoya et al. eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1986) p. 76; Okawa Shumei in 
Hosoya et al. eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1986) p. 109. 
533 Y. Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the wake of World War II (2008), 
p. 83; O. Toshio, in Hosoya et al., eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1986), p. 108.  
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 158 
Of the 23 defendants found liable for conspiracy, two defendants Oshima and 
Shiratori were found guilty only on the count of conspiracy, which eventually earned 
each of them a life sentence. A clear indication of how grave the crime of conspiracy 
was considered to be.  
E. Comparison between the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals Conspiracy 
Judging from the number of defendants convicted of conspiracy, of the two tribunals, 
conspiracy seems to have had a better field day at Tokyo, with the Judges at Tokyo 
giving it more life and being more receptive to it in comparison to their Nuremberg 
counterparts. At Nuremberg, the decision to lump the analysis of conspiracy and the 
crime against peace together may have contributed to a more limited analysis of the 
elements of criminal conspiracy. At Tokyo, the tribunal set out the definition of 
conspiracy and gave it a broader interpretation.  
While the Tokyo tribunal made a finding of one grand conspiracy, at Nuremberg, it 
was found that the conspirators engaged in several separate conspiracies. The 
Nuremberg tribunal insisted on a conspiracy clearly outlined in its criminal purpose 
and sufficiently connected to the time of decision and action, these conditions did not 
have any role at the Tokyo tribunal. At Nuremberg, the conspiracy was zeroed in to 
those considered to have been part of Hitler’s inner circle and as a result, an 
inference was drawn of having knowledge of the conspiracy’s aggressive aims and 
participating in its formulation. In Tokyo, the conspiracy was viewed as having taken 
place over a long period of time, taking into account all of Japan’s domestic and 
foreign affairs for about a period close to two decades. Here, knowingly participating 
in the formulation of conspiracy was inferred from a wide aspect of activities, which 
included: political plots leading to the coming into power of the alleged conspirators 
who adopted policies that led to the war (this aspect of conspiracy was not 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 159 
accommodated at Nuremberg), occupation of a position in the military or Japanese 
government and society capable of influencing policy and decisions that promoted 
aggressive war, the use of propaganda was also seen as an integral part of the 
conspiracy. In fact, the Tokyo tribunal has been criticised for mostly accepting the 
prosecution’s submission on conspiracy without giving much thought to what in some 
instances were more reliable inferences and submission on the evidence by the 
defence.534 
Both the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals restricted conspiracy to crimes against 
peace. The tribunals’ decisions on the general liability clause of conspiracy failed to 
capture the initial intention of the proponents of the crime of conspiracy. The 
proponents had intended that the brains behind the aggressive wars would be held 
criminally responsible for all consequential crimes perpetrated in pursuance of the 
war, for they were considered to bear the most culpability. The judges in the tribunals 
may have been mainly apprehensive of enforcing collective guilt because of the 
broad conspiracy liability clause. The ultimate blame must however, be attributed to 
the drafters of the respective Charters, who are responsible for the ambiguous drafts 
that failed to capture the true intention of the proponents of the conspiracy crime. 
This left more possibilities for the judges to adopt their own interpretation. Both 
tribunals did not expressly address the issue of cumulative charges. By finding 
defendants liable for both conspiracy and its underlying offence, it can be inferred 
that the tribunals approved of the practice, and considered conspiracy punishable in 
spite of its consummation. 
                                                          
534 N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008) p. 217; E. 
Borgwardt, 26 Law and History Review (2008), pp. 698-9; see also criticisms on finding of conspiracy, 
Okawa Shumei in Hosoya et al. eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (1986) p. 109; see J. Pritchard, 149 
Mil. L. Rev. (1995), p. 30 stating that, ‘the defence interpretation at Tokyo was more trustworthy than 
that of the prosecution on many of the hotly contested issues’. 
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F. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  
The ICTY was established following a resolution by the UN Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.535 The resolution was made in response to a report by 
the Secretary-General, which revealed that war crimes were being committed in a 
systematic manner in the former Yugoslavia more particularly, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the scale of atrocities and magnitude of the resultant human 
suffering was horrific.536 In recognition of the threat posed by this situation to 
international peace and security, the ICTY was established in the belief that it would 
assist in restoration of peace in the region. The statute of the tribunal authorises it to 
deal with individuals responsible for four different categories of crimes: grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
I. Conspiracy 
Article 4 of the ICTY Statute gives the ICTY power to prosecute persons who 
committed genocide and also makes other acts punishable. Liability for conspiracy to 
commit genocide is recognised under Article 4 (3), having been adopted directly from 
the Genocide Convention.537 Article 4 reads in part: 
1. The International Tribunal shall have power to prosecute persons committing 
genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of Committing any other acts 
enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article. 
… 
3. The following acts shall be punishable: 
                                                          
535 Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. 
536 I. Simonovic, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. (1999-2000), at p. 443; see Report of the Secretary-General 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) S/25704 3 May 1993. 
537 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277 
(1948). 
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a) genocide; 
b) conspiracy to commit genocide; 
c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
d) attempt to commit genocide; 
e) complicity in genocide. 
The Genocide Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
9 December 1948.538 The Travaux Preparatoires reveal that inclusion of conspiracy 
was justified by the serious nature of the crime of genocide, which made the 
criminalisation of mere preparatory acts such as the agreement to commit it 
imperative. This was considered important, especially on the aspect of preventing 
genocide. As stated by the secretariat when advising the General Assembly, "[t]his 
prevention may involve making certain acts punishable which do not themselves 
constitute genocide, for example, certain material acts preparatory to genocide, an 
agreement or a conspiracy with a view to committing genocide, or systematic 
propaganda inciting to hatred and thus likely to lead to genocide". 539 As a result, 
Article III of the Convention makes the following acts punishable: (a) Genocide, (b) 
Conspiracy to commit genocide, (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide, (e) Complicity in genocide.540 
Conspiracy has not featured prominently in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. It was only 
recently that the ICTY considered a charge of conspiracy for the first time in its 
judgment Prosecutor v Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Prago Nikolic, Ljubomir 
Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero and Vinco Pandurevic (hereinafter 
Popovic et al).541 Another case currently proceeding before the ICTY is that of 
Zdravko Tolimir, a former assistant commander for Intelligence and Security of the 
Bosnian Serb Army (VRS), who has been indicted for conspiracy to commit genocide 
                                                          
538 Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A, and entered into force 12 January 1951. Source 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm last visited 25 November 2010. 
539 Musema (TC), para. 185. 
540 See E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (2003), at p. 32, observing that the conspiracy referred to here is the ‘inchoate, 
Anglo-American, type of conspiracy’, which surprisingly the drafters of the Genocide Convention had 
less trouble accepting. 
541 ICTY, IT-05-88-T, Judgment (TC II), 10 June 2010. 
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among other crimes.542 In Popovic et al., five of the seven accused persons were 
charged with the second count of conspiracy to commit genocide. The count alleged 
that the defendants Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin and Pandurevic entered into 
an agreement with others to kill the able bodied Muslim men from Srebrenica and to 
remove the remaining Muslim Population of Srebrenica and Zepa from Republika 
Srpska, with intent to destroy these Muslims. The ICTY while assessing the count on 
conspiracy adopted the ICTR definition, which refers to an agreement between two 
or more people to commit genocide.543 The tribunal confirmed that conspiracy to 
commit genocide as a crime was complete on conclusion of the agreement 
regardless of whether genocide is committed thereafter or not. It also confirmed that 
conspiracy is a continuing crime and an individual may join it after the initial 
agreement is concluded.544 The tribunal made a finding that:  
[…] the organised and systematic manner in which the executions were carried out 
[…] presupposes the existence of a concerted agreement to destroy the Muslims of 
Eastern Bosnia. The conduct of members [of] the Bosnia Serb Forces was not 
merely similar, it was concerted and coordinated. This level of similarity of purpose 
and conduct could not be achieved but by prior agreement.545  
Eventually, the tribunal only found Popovic and Beara, two of those charged with 
conspiracy guilty of entering into an agreement to commit genocide. The tribunal 
also made findings that the two were liable for genocide, and then had to deal with 
the issue of cumulative conviction. The tribunal, although acknowledging that 
conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide were two distinct crimes,546 it declined 
from convicting the accused on both counts, declaring that it would be ‘duplicative 
                                                          
542 See Zdravki Tolimir, case information “Srebrenica” IT-05-88/2 available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tolimir/cis/en/cis_tolimir_en.pdf. 
543 See below Ch 3, section G. II. 1, (ICTR Jurisprudence). 
544 Popovic et al. (TC), para. 876. 
545 Popovic et al. (TC), para. 886. 
546 Popovic et al. (TC), para. 2118. 
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and unfair to the accused’.547 The reasoning behind this conclusion was that the 
purpose of criminalising conspiracy was to prevent the commission of genocide, and 
once genocide was committed this justification became less compelling. This was 
especially true in instances like the present case, where proof of the genocide was 
found to be the main piece of evidence upon which criminal agreement could be 
inferred to obtain a conviction on conspiracy. In the circumstances, the tribunal found 
that a conviction on genocide made the conviction on conspiracy redundant.548 The 
chamber therefore, convicted the accused only for the count on genocide following 
the decision of ICTR in Musema.549 
II. Joint Criminal Enterprise  
Conspiracy may not be a leading tool of accountability before the ICTY but another 
alternative and equally controversial concept known as Joint Criminal Enterprise 
(“JCE”) seems to take precedence. Like the preceding concepts of conspiracy and 
criminal organisation, JCE is another one of the concepts that have been developed 
under international criminal law to deal with the issue of collective criminal action. It 
is suggested by some scholars that JCE is just another form of conspiracy doctrine if 
not its equivalent, contending that it is basically a product of conspiracy theory 
blended with doctrines of accomplice liability from civil law jurisdictions.550 This 
impression has been expressed variously with the JCE concept being described as 
                                                          
547 Popovic et al. (TC), para. 2127. 
548 Popovic et al. (TC), paras. 2124, 2125 and 2126. 
549 See below Ch 3 section G. II. 2, (ICTR Jurisprudence), for further discussions on the issue of 
cumulative convictions before the ICTR. 
550 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy 582 F. 3d 244, 260 (2d Cir. 2009), here the court 
describes JCE as a “conspiracy theory of liability”; R. P. Barret and L. E. Little, 88 Minnesota Law 
Review (2003), p.  42; C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: 
Selected Pertinent Issues (2008), p. 185, observes that the conspiracy concept is one of the founding 
bases of JCE; T. Dalton, Cornell Law School Graduate Student Papers (2010), p. 16; G. P. Fletcher, 
9 JICJ (2011), p. 186, generally asserting that JCE derives from the Anglo- American conspiracy 
concept; J. Meirhenrich, 2 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. (2006), pp. 341-357, describing the theory of 
conspiracy as revolving around the concept of JCE; J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications 
Paper 24 (2009), p. 196, refers to conspiracy as a mode of liability found in the concept of JCE.  
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an offshoot of the concept of conspiracy, the modern relative of conspiracy or as 
analogous to conspiracy theory. At Nuremberg, the terms ‘common plan’, ‘common 
design’ were used to refer to conspiracy.551 Similar terms have been used 
interchangeably to describe JCE.552 This makes it essential to analyse the extent to 
which JCE intersects with the concept conspiracy, if at all. A brief clarification of the 
genesis of JCE and particulars of its elements is therefore important, to enable one 
to make a full and clear distinction and explain the relationship between these two 
concepts.  
Although not expressly referred to in the ICTY Statute, JCE was first identified to 
exist in Article 7 of the Statute in the Tadic appeal judgment, as a form of 
commission. Article 7 provides that individual criminal responsibility is considered to 
arise from planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and 
abetting the planning, preparation, or execution of any of the crimes in the Statute. 
JCE forms the basis of holding an accused criminally responsible for the criminal 
acts carried out by a criminal enterprise involving commission of international crimes, 
if the accused is found to have participated in or contributed with intent to such 
criminal enterprise.553 The accused may be held responsible not only for the crimes 
that he committed or participated in with intent, but also for crimes carried out by 
other participants in the criminal enterprise for which the accused did not intend or 
participate in, if in the latter case the crimes were a ‘natural and foreseeable 
consequence’ of the purpose of the criminal enterprise. 
                                                          
551 See above Ch 3 section I. 2, the Nuremberg indictment refers to a ‘common plan or conspiracy’; 
also see Ch 3 section III, the indictments of the relevant subsequent tribunals referring to conspiracies 
pursuant to a ‘common design’.  
552 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-I, Judgment (AC), 15 July 1999 (Tadic AC), describes JCE as 
‘common criminal plan’ at para. 185, ‘common criminal design’ para. 196, ‘common enterprise’ para. 
199.   
553 See Tadic (AC), paras. 190, 191, 192. 
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The ICTY recognises three forms of JCE, the basic (JCE I), systemic (JCE II) and 
extended forms (JCE III).554 The actus reus of all three forms is similar. First, there 
must be a group of persons who decide to work towards a certain goal (plurality of 
persons). Second, a common plan should exist involving the commission of an 
international crime, the plan need not have existed before commission of the crime it 
may be spontaneous and may be inferred from the co-operation of several persons 
in carrying out a criminal act.555 Third, the accused must participate in execution of 
the common plan, any form of contribution suffices. The mens rea for the three 
categories however, differs. Under JCE 1 also referred to as co-perpetration 
cases,556 a group of persons sharing the same intent, plan to commit a certain crime 
and the crime is carried out according to the plan. Each participant is considered 
responsible for the crime. In the case of JCE II also known as “concentration camp” 
cases,557 they involve running a system of ill treatment of prisoners, the accused 
must be aware (knowledge) of the criminal nature of the system and participate in it 
with intent to further it. The accused will then be held responsible for all criminal acts 
committed within the common purpose. The third category JCE III represents the 
most controversial aspect of JCE. It involves holding an accused responsible for 
crimes carried out by other participants in the criminal enterprise although they were 
not part of the common plan, as long as such crimes were natural and foreseeable 
and the accused willingly took this risk.558 It is not necessary that the accused 
himself fulfil the mens rea of the crimes involved in this third category. 
                                                          
554 For a detailed analysis on JCE see C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core 
International Crimes. Selected Pertinent Issues (2008), pp. 127-258; also J. D. Ohlin, 5 JICJ (2007); 
N. Piacente, 2 JICJ (2004); S. Powles, 2 JICJ (2004); I. M. Ralby, 28 Boston University International 
Law Journal (2010).  
555 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1, Judgement (AC), 21 July 2000, para. 119. 
556 Tadic (AC), paras. 196, 197. 
557 Tadic (AC), paras. 202, 203. 
558 Tadic (AC), paras. 204, 205. 
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The JCE concept seems to resemble criminal conspiracy in several aspects. Its 
objective element requirement for plurality of persons and a common plan, merely 
imply the existence a group of persons who agree to carry out a crime, equating it to 
a conspiracy.559 While the common plan forms part of the actus reus for JCE, the 
agreement is the actus reus for conspiracy, both result from the decision of at least 
two or more persons working together to achieve a criminal objective. It is not 
necessary for the prosecution to prove an express agreement or common plan, their 
existence may be inferred from the conduct of a group of persons acting in unison. 
The extended form of JCE imputes liability to an accused, for criminal acts he did not 
personally carry out or even have knowledge of as long as they were natural and 
foreseeable. The legal reasoning in this form of JCE is similar to the legal theory 
behind the Pinkerton doctrine under Anglo American common law conspiracy.560 In 
addition, some of the criticisms towards JCE are similar to the criticisms towards the 
conspiracy concept. Both have been considered to be imprecise and vague 
doctrines, with vicarious conspiracy liability and JCE III being seen to violate the 
principle of personal culpability. Similar to conspiracy, JCE has also been considered 
by one of the Judges of the ICTY as a waste of time and confusing.561 The 
similarities between the two concepts gives the impression that the ICTY perhaps to 
fill a gap following the failure to provide for a conspiracy theory that would include all 
                                                          
559 See Prosecutor v Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Judgment (TC), Mar 15, 2002, at para. 80 stating that, ‘a 
joint criminal enterprise exists where there is an understanding or arrangement amounting to an 
agreement between two or more persons that they will commit a crime’; also J. D. Ohlin, 11 Chicago 
Journal of International Law (2011), p. 695, asserting that, ‘[t]he underlying and essential criteria that 
unites the two doctrines is the existence of a criminal agreement between the parties’.  
560 See above Ch 2 section II. 1.1, Pinkerton Doctrine: A party to a conspiracy is liable for substantive 
offences committed in furtherance of the conspiracy by co-conspirators, even though the party did not 
participate in their commission or have knowledge of them, if the offences were reasonably 
foreseeable; G. P. Fletcher, 9 JICJ (2011), p. 186; J. D. Ohlin, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2007), p. 
149, asserting that JCE is the international version of Pinkerton liability; J. Meirhenrich, 2 Annu. Rev. 
Law Soc. Sci. (2006), p. 351. 
561 Judge Johan Lindholm in Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic, Miroslav Tadic and Simo Zaric, IT-95-9-T, 
Judgment, Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion, (TC II), 17 October 2003, §§ 2 and 5. 
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the crimes in the Statute, decided to let in through the backdoor, a concept of 
conspiracy camouflaged in a different name that would be applicable to all crimes, 
and like the common law conspiracy a convenient tool for the prosecution.562 In fact 
in one of the cases before the ICTY, a defence counsel submitted that the concept of 
conspiracy “is precisely the basis of liability for joint criminal enterprise”.563 
Despite the above converging structural similarities, conspiracy and JCE have 
certain diverging aspects. On the one hand, conspiracy is a crime in its own right 
used to punish inchoate liability, with criminal responsibility accruing the moment the 
parties agree to carry out a criminal conduct. A conviction for conspiracy does not 
require its underlying offence to have been carried out. JCE on the other hand, is not 
a crime in itself but a tool used to attribute individual liability for substantive offences 
committed by groups, otherwise referred to as a mode of participation. To impute 
criminal responsibility through JCE the substantive offence must have actually been 
committed. While the mere act of agreement without more suffices for actus reus in 
conspiracy, JCE seems to have gone a step further in its actus reus demanding that 
the individual have made some contribution towards the common plan over and 
above merely agreeing to it.564 Clearly, the distinction between the two concepts is 
subtle and the doctrines indeed have some relation, with certain aspects in both 
                                                          
562 See A. Cassese, 5 JCIJ (2007), at p. 110, who describes JCE as the darling notion of the 
prosecution. It has also been considered a doctrine that may be used by the prosecution in 
addressing evidential barriers they face in proving international crimes. Compare this with the 
prosecutorial advantages of a conspiracy charge in common law jurisdictions cited above in Ch 2, 
section II.1.3; also see R. Wala, 41 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2010), p. 692 asserting 
that, ‘the absence of conspiracy liability in modern IHL is inextricably linked with the emergence of 
JCE liability in international criminal law’. 
563 See Prosecutor v Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, IT-99-37-AR72, 
“Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise”; see also 
G. P. Fletcher and J. D. Ohlin, 3 JICJ (2005), p. 548, who view JCE as ‘the law of conspiracy dressed 
up in the jargon of modern economic activity’. 
564 H. Olasolo, 20 Criminal Law Forum (2009), p. 270; R. Wala, 41 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law (2010), p. 704. 
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concepts overlapping.565 The conclusion that may be drawn here is that JCE 
resembles conspiracy as a form of complicity in common law jurisdictions. In fact, 
participation in JCE is often evidence of an existing conspiracy.566 
G. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
In April 1994 the death of the Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana following the 
shooting down of his Plane, sparked off a blood bath. Within a few hours of this 
incident a wave of violence spread throughout the country from its capital leading to 
the massacre of an estimated 800,000 Rwandans mostly of Tutsi ethnicity, in what 
seemed to have been a well organised and methodically executed genocide plan. 
The UN Security Council responding to the serious violations of humanitarian law 
committed in Rwanda created the ICTR, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
by resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.567 The ICTR was established to prosecute 
the organisers and leaders of these serious crimes and contribute to the national 
reconciliation of Rwanda and peace in the region.568 
I. The Statute 
 
The ICTR is governed by its statute and has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and 
of Additional Protocol II. Article 2 of the ICTR Statute gives the tribunal power to 
prosecute persons suspected of committing genocide. Conspiracy is only mentioned 
                                                          
565 I. M. Ralby, 28 Boston University International Law Journal (2010), p. 309; R. Wala, 41 
Georgetown Journal of International Law (2010), p. 687, observing that JCE provides individual 
responsibility for contributions to group criminality much in the same way as conspiracy. 
566 This was clearly established in the Popovic case, and in the Gatete and Karamera cases in the 
ICTR. See Gatete (TC), paras. 623, 626; Karamera (TC), para. 1576.  
567 See UN Security Council Resolution on the Establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda S/RES/955 (1994).  
568 See ICTR website www.unictr.org last accessed on 26th October 2011. 
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with respect to the crime of genocide.569 Like the ICTY Statute, the ICTR also reads 
verbatim as Article III in the Genocide Convention. 
Investigations by the office of the prosecutor of the ICTR have been carried out on 
the premise that the atrocities committed in Rwanda constituted one overarching and 
interconnected crime of genocide.570 It is believed that for the Rwandan tragedy to 
have taken place in the presence of a government, its armed forces and an 
entrenched civil administration, there must have been either a conspiracy of silence 
or a conspiracy of participation to allow perpetrators to kill.571 The crime of 
conspiracy to commit genocide has been brought to life by the ICTR. The perception 
that the Genocide in Rwanda was largely as a result of a conspiracy, guided the 
prosecution in charging a majority of the accused persons with conspiracy to commit 
genocide.572 In a report in support of its strategy the office of the prosecutor 
stated:573 
...the systematic, generalised and methodical nature of the crimes that were 
perpetrated throughout Rwanda during 1994 give rise to the inference of 
coordination, hence conspiracy to destroy in whole or in part the Tutsi, as such. 
The prosecution opted for a selective indictment approach and as a result proceeded 
to charge thematic, regional or national homogenous groups.574 The rationale behind 
                                                          
569 See Article 2 (3) ICTR. 
570 M. C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda 
and East Timor (2005), p. 224; also see ICTR Third Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, UN 
Doc.  A/53/429, S/ 1998/ 857, para. 57, asserting, ‘The investigations have revealed the existence of 
a nationwide plot in which the State authorities and elements of Civil Society, in particular members of 
the militia, were implicated. Determination of the components of the application and execution of this 
conspiracy remains a major objective of the investigations’; also ICTR Fourth Annual Report to the 
U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc.  A/54/315, S/ 1999/ 943, para. 53. 
571 M. C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda 
and East Timor (2005), p. 234. 
572 M. C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda 
and East Timor (2005), p. 224, stating that over 50% of the cases have charged conspiracy. 
573 ICTR Fifth Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc. A/55/435, S/2000/927, 2 
October 2000, para.132 . 
574 M. C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda 
and East Timor (2005), p. 225; also see ICTR Fifth Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, UN 
Doc.  A/55/435, S/2000/927, 2 October 2000, para. 60. 
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this strategy was that it would facilitate the handling of evidence and witnesses, and 
easily connect the co-perpetrators with the overt acts. This would disclose a 
conspiracy, which resulted in the commission of genocide in Rwanda in 1994. This 
strategy has led to development of jurisprudence on the crime of conspiracy to 
commit genocide by the ICTR. 
II. Jurisprudence 
 
1. The Law and Findings 
The tribunal’s judgments have so far addressed the issue of conspiracy in 14 cases: 
Kajelijeli, Kambanda, Musema, Nahimana et al., Niyitegeka, Ntagerura et al., 
Ntakirutimana, Seromba, Bagosora et al., Ndindiliyimana et al., Gatete, 
Nyiramasuhuko et al., Bizimungu et al. and Karemera.575 Of the 14 cases, the Trial 
Chamber gave a conviction for conspiracy in five cases, namely, Kambanda, 
Niyitegeka, Nahimana et al., Nyiramasuhuko et al., and Bizimungu et al. The 
conviction in the Nahimana et al. case was however, later overturned by the Appeals 
Chamber. 
Conspiracy to commit genocide was first defined in the Musema case as ‘an 
agreement between two or more persons to commit the crime of genocide’.576 
Musema a former director of a public enterprise, the Gisovu Tea Factory, was 
                                                          
575 Prosecutor v Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T (TC), paras. 785-798; Prosecutor v Kambanda, ICTR-97-
23-S (TC), para. 40; Prosecutor v Musema, ICTR -96-13-A (TC), paras.184-198, 937-941; Prosecutor 
v Nahimana et al., ICTR-99-52-T (TC), paras. 1040-1055; also Prosecutor v Nahimana et al., ICTR-
99-52-A (AC), paras. 893-912; Prosecutor v Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14-T (TC), paras. 422-479; 
Prosecutor v Ntagerura et al, ICTR-96-10A (TC), paras. 41, 50, 51, 70; Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana, 
ICTR-96-17-T (TC), paras. 797-801, 838-841; Prosecutor v Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-1 (TC), paras. 
344-351 ; also Prosecutor v Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A (AC), paras. 207-225; Prosecutor v Bagosora 
et al., ICTR-98-41-T (TC), paras. 2084-2113; Prosecutor v Gatete, ICTR-2000-61-T, paras. 610-629; 
Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al., ICTR-00-56-T (TC), paras. 2041-2069; Prosecutor v 
Nyiramasuhuko et al., ICTR-98-42-T (TC), paras. 5653-5728; Prosecutor v Casimir Bizimungu et. al., 
ICTR-99-50-I (TC), paras. 1954-1971; Prosecutor v Édouard Karemera and ano., ICTR-98-44-T, 
paras. 1575-1591. 
576 Musema (TC), para. 191. 
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accused of having conspired with others to destroy the Tutsi community in Bisesero 
region. He was acquitted of this count. The Chamber noted that the prosecutor had 
neither alleged clearly nor adduced evidence that the accused conspired with others 
to commit genocide. This definition has been adopted in all subsequent cases on 
conspiracy to commit genocide including as established above in the ICTY.577 
The agreement is considered the essence of a conspiracy charge.578 In Nahimana et 
al., the chamber recognised that ‘the offence of conspiracy requires the existence of 
an agreement, which is the defining element of the crime of conspiracy’.579 Three 
individuals Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze were charged with conspiring with 
each other and others to kill the Tutsi population. Ferdinand Nahimana was a former 
university lecturer of history, co-founder of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines 
S.A (RTLM), which was used to broadcast information and propaganda during the 
genocide helping to coordinate the killings and fuel hatred against the Tutsis. He was 
also a member of the party Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le 
Development (MRND). Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza a lawyer by profession was a 
founding member of the Coalition pour la Defense de la Repulique (CDR) party, and 
also co-founded RTLM, at the material time during the genocide he held the post of 
Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hassan Ngeze was a 
journalist and founded the newspaper Kangura used to spread propaganda and 
incite hatred against the Tutsi ethnic group, which was initially financed by powerful 
people within the MRND party and later the CDR party, he held the post of Editor in 
Chief. He was also a founding member of the CDR party. The Trial Chamber drew an 
                                                          
577 See Niyitigeka (TC), para. 423; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (TC), para. 798; Kajelijeli (TC), 
para. 787; Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1041; Seromba (AC), paras. 218, 221; Bagosora et al. (TC), 
para. 2087; Nyiramasuhuko et al. para. 5655. 
578 Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1045; Seromba (AC), para. 218, stating that the agreement is the 
actus reus. 
579 Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1042. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 172 
interesting inference by making a finding of conspiracy from institutional 
coordination. The Trial Chamber held that the accused persons were guilty of having 
conspired with one another, and others, through personal collaboration, as well as 
consciously interacting with one another, using the institutions that they controlled, 
namely, RTLM, Kangura and CDR to promote a joint agenda, which was targeting of 
the Tutsi population for destruction.580 It confirmed that, ‘conspiracy to commit 
genocide can be comprised of individuals acting in an institutional capacity as well as 
or even independently of their personal links with each other’.581 The chamber 
asserted that, ‘institutional coordination can form the basis of a conspiracy among 
those individuals who control the institutions that are engaged in coordinated 
action’.582 The finding of conspiracy was however, reversed by the Appeals Chamber 
because in its view though the factual basis for the conviction was consistent with a 
joint agenda to commit genocide, it was not the only reasonable conclusion that 
could be drawn from the evidence.583 
The tribunal has stated that conspiracy is an inchoate offence with a continuing 
nature that culminates in commission of acts contemplated in the conspiracy.584 The 
purpose of the conspiracy need not be successful, it is the act of conspiracy itself, in 
other words the process of making the agreement, which is punishable and not its 
result.585 The mens rea for conspiracy to commit genocide is similar to that of the 
crime of genocide. The persons involved must all share the dolus specialis of 
genocide, namely, the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial 
                                                          
580 Nahimana et al. (TC), paras. 1054-1055. 
581 Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1048. 
582 Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1048. 
583 Nahimana et al. (AC), paras. 906, 910. 
584 Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1044. 
585 Musema (TC), para. 193; Kajelijeli (TC), para. 788; Niyitegeka (TC), para. 423; Seromba (TC), 
para. 345. 
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or religious group as such.586 The mens rea includes a general awareness of 
existence of the conspiracy by its members, knowing they participate in it together 
with others, and knowledge of its role in furtherance of their common purpose, which 
is to commit genocide.587 In this aspect, a tacit understanding of the criminal purpose 
by those participating in the conspiracy would be sufficient. 
The agreement between members of a conspiracy may be explicit or implicit, as 
expressed in Nahimana et al., ‘the existence of a formal or express agreement is not 
needed to prove the charge of conspiracy’.588 It may be established through direct 
evidence by the existence of meetings planning for genocide, or may also be inferred 
from circumstantial evidence.589 To constitute evidence of an agreement, it is 
important that the action of the group members working within a unified framework 
be ‘concerted and coordinated’.590 The mere similarity of conduct is not enough.591  
In Niyitegeka, the tribunal inferred the existence of a conspiracy to commit genocide 
based on circumstantial evidence from various actions of the accused.592 The 
accused was a former information minister in the interim government in charge of 
Rwanda during the genocide period. He was alleged to have acted in concert with 
others in the interim government to plan and implement the genocide against the 
Tutsis. Among the conspiratorial acts he was accused of included, participating in 
meetings in which the genocide policies were generated and implemented, 
transporting armed individuals to Bisesero area to kill the Tutsi, organising to ensure 
                                                          
586 Nahimana et al. (AC), paras. 894, 896; Musema (TC), para. 192; Seromba (TC), para. 347 
Bagosora et al. (TC), para. 2087; Niyitegeka (TC), para. 423; Nyiramasuhuko et al. para. 5655. 
587 Ndindiliyimana et al. (TC), para. 2047; Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1047, where the tribunal 
observed, ‘A coalition, even an informal coalition, can constitute such a framework so long as those 
acting within the coalition are aware of its existence their participation in it, and its role in furtherance 
of their common purpose’. 
588 Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1045. 
589 Seromba (AC), para. 221; Bagosora et al. (TC), para.  2088; Nyiramasuhuko et al. para. 5656.  
590 Nahimana et al. (TC), para. 1047. 
591 Bagosora et al. (TC), para.  2088; Bizimungu et al. (TC), para. 1956. 
592 Niyitegeka (TC), paras.  427-429. 
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the assailants were provided with weapons, colluding with local administrators in 
Kibuye prefecture to not protect the Tutsi, and failing to maintain public order or 
deliberately undermining it in districts in which he exercised authority, to facilitate the 
destruction of the Tutsi. At paragraph 428 the Chamber noted,  
Bearing in mind that the Accused and others acted together as leaders of attacks 
against Tutsi [. . .] taking into account the organised manner in which the attacks 
were carried out, which presupposes the existence of a plan, and noting, in particular, 
that the Accused sketched a plan for an attack in Bisesero at a meeting [. . .] to which 
the people in attendance [. . .] agreed, the Chamber finds that the above facts 
evidence the existence of an agreement between the Accused and others [. . .] to 
commit genocide. 
The evidence adduced must show that the members of the conspiracy had indeed 
reached an agreement. The mere showing of a negotiation in process does not 
suffice.593 It is not necessary for the chamber to conclude that all of the accused 
conspired together; it will suffice if the prosecution can establish that the accused 
conspired with at least one other, with whom they are alleged to have planned to 
commit genocide.594 
Although circumstantial evidence may be used to establish conspiracy, the ICTR has 
not been too eager to infer the existence of a conspiracy, especially, when of the 
view that it is not the only reasonable inference that may be made from the evidence. 
This was the case with the Appeals Chamber judgment in Nahimana et al., as well 
as in the Trial Chamber judgments of Kajelijeli, Bagosora et al., Ndindiliyimana et al. 
and Nyiramasuhuko et al. This reluctance was especially displayed in the case of 
Bagasora, one of the cases that had been expected to confirm the prosecution 
strategy on the conspiracy theory. Colonel Bagosora labelled mastermind of the 
genocide that occurred in Rwanda, was the Directeur de Cabinet of the Ministry of 
                                                          
593 Kajelijeli (TC), para. 787. 
594 Bagosora et al. (TC), para. 2096; Ndindiliyimana et al. (TC), para. 2050. 
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Defence at the material time.595 The indictment stated that given his rank, office and 
the personal relations he had with the commanders of the units most implicated 
during the genocide, he had authority over the persons and members of the 
militia.596 It further noted that in his position of authority he acted in concert with 
others and participated in the ‘planning or execution of a common scheme, strategy 
or plan’, to commit atrocities set forth in the indictment. The other accused persons 
in this case were: General Gratien Kabiligi, the head of operations bureau (G-3) of 
the army general staff; Major Aloys Ntabakuze, the commander of the elite Para 
Commando Battalion; and Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the commander of the 
Gisenyi operational sector. It was alleged the accused conspired amongst 
themselves and with others from late 1990 through 7 April 1994 to exterminate the 
Tutsi population.597 The evidence relied on by the prosecution was mostly 
circumstantial. Among the conspiratorial acts relied on was Bagosora’s alleged 
comment about the coming of ‘apocalypse’, reference in a letter to a ‘Machiavellian 
plan’, participation in a commission that defined the enemy of which the Chamber 
noted the troubling over emphasis to Tutsi ethnicity, drafting of a target list and the 
arming of the civilian militia.598 While making its decision, the Chamber observed that 
even though certain aspects of the evidence had indications that may be construed 
as evidence of a plan to commit genocide in view of the targeted and speedy killings 
that happened immediately after the shooting down of the presidential jet, this 
however, was not the only inference that could be drawn from the evidence. It 
emphasised that ‘[…]the evidence is also consistent with preparations for a political 
or military power struggle and measures adopted in the context of an on-going war 
                                                          
595 See para. 4.2 Bagasora indictment. 
596 Para. 4.4 Bagasora indictment. 
597 See Bagosora et al. (TC), paras. 1, 2 and 6. 
598 Bagosora et al. (TC), para. 2085. 
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with the RPF[…]’.599 The Chamber therefore, held that it was not satisfied that the 
prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the four accused conspired 
amongst themselves or with others to commit genocide before it unfolded on 7 April 
1994.600 
The Chamber in Ndindiliyimana et al. also shared the above interpretation.601 The 
case concerned the role of four members of the Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie 
nationale in the events in Rwanda between 6th April and 17th July 1994. At the 
material time, Augustin Ndindiliyimana was Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie 
nationale; Augustin Bizimungu was the Commander of Operations for Ruhengeri 
secteur and Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army; Xavier Nzuwonemeye was the 
Commander of the elite Reconnaissance (RECCE) Battalion and Innocent Sagahutu 
was Commander of Squadron A of the RECCE Battalion. The defendants were 
alleged to have conspired among themselves together with other high ranking Hutu 
civilian and military authorities to commit genocide against the Tutsi. Here, the 
prosecution also mainly relied on circumstantial evidence. Among some of the visible 
components that the prosecution alleged underpinned the conspiracy included: a 
document drafted by the Enemy Commission that depicted the Tutsis as enemies or 
accomplices of the enemy; provision of military training and weapons to the 
interahamwe militiamen where Augustin Bizimungu and Innocent Sagahutu played 
key roles; participation in several meetings and gatherings between 1992 and 1994 
by Augustin Bizimungu, at which he devised with others a strategy for fighting the 
Tutsi enemy and allegedly also informed others that he did not want to see any Tutsi 
alive; opposition to the successful implementation of the Arusha Accords that set out 
                                                          
599 Bagosora et al. (TC), para. 13. 
600 Bagosora et al. (TC), paras. 2097-2113. 
601 Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Judgment delivered 17 May 2011. 
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a strategy of the return to peace and institutionalised power-sharing between the 
various political and/or military factions; transfer of Gendarmerie unit commanders 
opposed to the massacres; the killing of the Prime Minister and Belgian UNAMIR 
soldiers; Augustin Bizimungu’s alleged anti-Tutsi remarks and conduct.602 The 
Chamber dismissed this charge against the defendants stating it was not proved 
beyond reasonable doubt. Although, admitting that certain elements of the alleged 
visible components that the prosecution had proved could collectively be suggestive 
of a conspiracy to commit genocide, it asserted that this was not the only reasonable 
inference that could be drawn from the evidence.603 Certain allegations by the 
prosecution on the count of conspiracy were also dismissed for lack of proof, and 
others were dismissed on account of failure by the prosecution to specifically allege 
them in the indictment, this, the tribunal observed, made the indictment defective 
specifically with respect to these allegations.604 
The need for prosecution to specifically particularise the count on conspiracy, is 
further illustrated by the judgment delivered in Nyiramasuhuko et al.605 All six 
defendants in the case were alleged to have held position of authority in the 
préfecture of Butare in 1994, and were charged with elaborating, adhering to and 
executing a government plan to exterminate the civilian Tutsi population and 
moderate Hutus in that region. It was alleged that massacres in the Butare region 
started later than in the rest of the country, after a careful planning and after removal 
of the Préfet Habyalimana who had resisted the assassination of Tutsis in the area. 
Habyalimana was replaced with an individual who supported such crimes. The six 
accused were charged with contributing to the massacres by forming an alliance that 
                                                          
602 Ndindiliyimana et al. (TC), paras. 2052-2065. 
603 Ndindiliyimana et al. (TC), paras. 2068, 2069. 
604 Ndindiliyimana et al. (TC), para. 2055. 
605 Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment delivered 24 June 2011. 
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used state apparatus to facilitate such activity. The respective indictments alleged the 
accused acted ‘in concert with one another to participate in the planning, preparation, 
or execution of a common scheme, strategy, or plan, to commit the atrocities’.606 In 
the end, only the defendant Pauline Nyiramasuhuko who served as Minister of 
Family and Women’s Development under the interim government, was found guilty 
of conspiracy to commit genocide. Discussing the count of conspiracy, the Chamber 
noted that an indictment that charged conspiracy had to identify specific individuals 
who entered into the agreement or state when and where the agreement was 
executed and when the conspiracy ended, failure to do this made the indictment 
ambiguous and defective.607 This was the situation relating to the conspiracy charge 
before the Chamber in the instance case, but the prosecution having further clarified 
particulars of the conspiracy charge during its opening statement, the tribunal 
considered this to have sufficiently cured the defects in the indictment with regards to 
the charge. The Chamber observed that the defendants in the circumstances had not 
suffered prejudice. 
To prove the charge of conspiracy the prosecution mainly relied on circumstantial 
evidence. On evidence relating to the defendant Nyiramasuhuko, the tribunal 
asserted that the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn in the 
circumstances was that the defendant participated in a conspiracy to kill the Tutsis 
within Butare préfecture with intent to destroy in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic 
group.608 As part of the conspiracy, she was found to have participated in meetings 
at which Tutsi massacre was discussed, and she took part in decisions such as 
removal of the Préfet Habyalimana, which led to massacres in the concerned 
                                                          
606 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (TC), para. 5654. 
607 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (TC), paras. 5661-5665. 
608 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (TC), para. 5678. 
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region.609 In relation to the other defendants, the tribunal observed that being part of 
the conspiracy of the interim government was not the only reasonable inference that 
could be drawn from the evidence adduced against them in support of the 
conspiracy charge. As a result, they were acquitted of the charge.610 Of particular 
interest is the tribunal’s analysis of the evidence adduced against the defendant 
Ntahobali, where it noted that: 
Ntahobali did participate in the attacks at the BPO [ Butare préfecture office] and 
these attacks were methodical. Further, Ntahobali co-perpetrated these attacks at the 
BPO with Nyiramasuhuko, who was a member of the Interim Government which 
formulated a conspiracy to kill Tutsis in Butare préfecture. However, there was no 
clear-cut evidence that Ntahobali acceded to Nyiramasuhuko’s agreement with the 
Interim Government. The only evidence that could lead to an inference that Ntahobali 
agreed to commit genocide was his participation in acts of genocide. However, the 
co-perpetration of genocide does not equate to a conspiracy to commit genocide. 
Without some evidence pointing to Ntahobali’s awareness of, and accession to, the 
Interim Government’s conspiracy, the inference that Ntahobali joined a pre-existing 
plan is not the only reasonable one from the evidence.611  
It is curious that the tribunal was not ready to infer conspiracy even in such 
circumstances where the defendant had obviously acted at least in a concerted and 
coordinated manner with another one of his co-accused, already considered to have 
been part of the conspiracy. In asserting its position, the tribunal opined that the 
prosecution had to be held to the case it formulated prior to the trial and for which the 
defence had prior notice of. Since the prosecution had not alleged prior to the trial 
that it would base the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy in the attacks at 
Butare préfecture office, it could not now rely on it to secure a conviction.612 
Judgment delivered recently by the ICTR in Bizimungu et al., convicting two co-
                                                          
609 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (TC), paras. 5666 et seq. 
610 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (TC), paras. 5679 et seq. 
611 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (TC), para. 5683. 
612 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (TC), para. 5684. 
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accused persons of conspiracy to commit genocide while acquitting another two co-
accused of the same charge, is another demonstration of the Tribunal’s strict 
construction of the rule requiring particularisation of the conspiracy charge.613 The 
four accused had been appointed ministers in the interim government formed 
following shooting down of the plane of the late Rwandan president Juvénal 
Habyarimana. The prosecution alleged that the four like all other members of the 
interim government had been selected on the basis of their dedication to the 
elimination of Tutsis. It asserted that as a result, the four accused supported the 
interim government’s genocide plans, which included replacing local authorities who 
opposed the killing of Tutsis with individuals who supported it. The main foundation 
of the conspiracy count in this case was the interim government’s dismissal of Jean-
Baptiste Habyalimana as Butare’s prefect on 17 April 1994 and President Théodore 
Sindikubwabo’s speech in Butare on 19 April 1994, during the installation ceremony 
of Sylvain Nsabimana as the region’s new prefect.614 The Tribunal specifically found 
that the accused Mugenzi and Mugiraneza had agreed with several other interim 
government ministers who included the then Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, to 
commit genocide against the Tutsis. It found that they had participated in a decision 
to remove Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, the prefect of the Butare region, because of a 
common perception that he was a Tutsi and political moderate, and would have 
opposed ethnically driven killings and had indeed done so, considering that under his 
watch the location of Butare had remained relatively peaceful. To confirm their 
genocide intent the Chamber found that the two co-accused Mugenzi and 
Mugiraneza had attended the installation ceremony of Habyalimana’s replacement 
where President Théodore Sindikubwabo made an inflammatory speech that called 
                                                          
613 ICTR-99-50-T, Judgement delivered on 30 September 2011. 
614 Bizimungu et al. (TC), para. 1954. 
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for Tutsis in Butare to be killed.615 However, although the Chamber considered the 
allegations with respect to the Butare installation ceremony to be relevant to the 
conspiracy count, it refused to rely on it as an independent basis for conviction of the 
defendants on account of the conspiracy charge. The Chamber considered that the 
indictment, when read as a whole was ambiguous as to whether the Butare 
installation ceremony had been charged under the count on conspiracy. It therefore 
found that the indictment in as far as it related to this specific incident was defective, 
asserting that even the prosecution’s attempt to more clearly link this event as 
evidence of the conspiracy to commit genocide count in its opening statement was 
not sufficient to cure the defect.616 
2. The issue of Merger 
An issue that has drawn conflicting decisions in the ICTR is whether the Trial 
Chamber may convict simultaneously or only in the alternative a charge of genocide 
and that of conspiracy to commit genocide, particularly when the offences arise from 
the same set of facts. The Trial Chamber in Musema confirmed that an accused 
person may be charged with both the offence of conspiracy and the substantive 
crime of genocide.617 This is because conspiracy to commit genocide is a separate 
crime from genocide. Since conspiracy does not merge with its contemplated crime, 
the prosecution is permitted to charge the accused with both. This has been the 
practice in the ICTR. Two main reasons exist in support of this practice. The first 
reason is that, prior to the presentation of evidence it is difficult to know which of the 
charges against the accused will be proved.618 Secondly, the two crimes being 
                                                          
615 Bizimungu et al. (TC), paras. 1959-1962. 
616 Bizimungu et al. (TC), paras. 1964-1971. 
617  Musema (TC), para. 194. 
618 M.C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda 
and East Timor (2005), p. 205. 
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separate, the cumulative charging is important to hold the accused accountable for 
both crimes, reflecting the totality of crimes the accused has committed.619 
The Trial Chamber in Musema also discussed the civil and common law approaches 
to the issue of cumulative conviction. Under civil law systems, if conspiracy is 
successful and the substantive offence is consummated, the accused will be 
convicted only for the substantive offence and not the conspiracy. However, under 
common law systems, an accused may, in principle, be convicted for both conspiracy 
and the underlying substantive offence, in particular where the objective of the 
conspiracy extends beyond the offences actually committed.620 The Trial Chamber 
observed that conspiracy in the Genocide Convention was an inchoate crime more 
akin to conspiracy in common law systems, but curiously, it went ahead to adopt a 
definition of conspiracy it considered more favourable to the accused. This definition 
reflected the civil law approach to conspiracy. It stated that an accused could not be 
convicted for both genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide on basis of the 
same facts.621 This interpretation has influenced other decisions recently made by 
various chambers in the ICTR, choosing to dismiss the conspiracy count although it 
was proved, on account that the genocide count also proved by the same facts 
sufficiently covered the alleged crimes.622 In these later cases, the Chambers, 
although conceeding that genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide constituted 
different material elements, took queue from the judgment in the Popovic case-
influenced by Musema- and asserted that the basis of multiple convictions was not 
only about different material elements but also about fairness to the accused.623 
                                                          
619 A. Obote-Odora, 8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law No. 1 (2001), para. 95. 
620 Musema (TC), paras. 196-197; also see ch 2 above on comparative analysis. 
621 Musema (TC), para. 198.  
622 See Gatete (TC), paras. 654-662; Karamera et al. (TC), paras. 1709-1713. 
623 Gatete (TC), para. 661; Karamera et al. (TC), para. 1713. 
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Other cases also before the ICTR reflect a different view from the Musema 
judgment. This was case in Kambanda, the accused a former prime minister in the 
interim government, was convicted on his own plea of guilty to several charges, 
which included both the charges of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide. He 
admitted to having participated in meetings where the course of massacres was 
actively followed and his government took no action to stop them.624 The Chambers 
in Nahimana, Niyitigeka, and Nyiramasuhuko et al. also allowed cumulative 
convictions for conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide charges. In Nahimana, 
the Chamber observed that cumulative charging was generally permissible only if the 
crimes involved had materially distinct elements.625 It established that since the 
defining element for the offence of conspiracy was the agreement, an accused could 
be held criminally responsible for both the act of conspiracy and the substantive 
offence of genocide, which is the object of the conspiracy.626  
H. Evaluation of the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The conspiracy charge has clearly not had a prominent role in establishing criminal 
responsibility before the ad hoc tribunals, with the least cases before the ICTY. 
Despite the prosecution strategy and assertion that conspiracy formed an integral 
part of the genocide committed in Rwanda, the judgments that have been delivered 
before the ICTR do not overwhelmingly support this view. Given that genocide was 
committed, the conspiracy charge often most valuable for punishing incomplete 
crimes seems to have added no particular value to the prosecution’s case. It is even 
suggested that in certain cases the chambers decision to dismiss a charge of 
                                                          
624 Kambanda (TC), para. 39 et seq. 
625 Nahimana et al (TC), paras. 1043, 1089-1090. 
626 Nahimana et al (TC), paras. 1089-1090. 
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conspiracy to commit genocide, might mainly have been influenced by the reason 
that there was sufficient evidence to convict for the substantive crime of genocide.627   
The evidence before the tribunals has been strictly construed making the possibility 
of inferring conspiracy a difficult endeavour. The conspiracy that has been punished 
often has to deal with participation in some concrete plan, and even in cases where a 
defendant is seen to have acted concertedly with others to commit genocide, a 
conspiracy conviction will not be given unless it is the only reasonable inference that 
can be drawn in the circumstances. The prosecution must strictly prove conspiracy 
only from acts asserted in the indictment. The tribunals are not prepared to draw any 
other possible inference, regardless of how convincing it is, from other facts and 
evidence arising in the course of the prosecution if they were not alleged prior to the 
trial giving the defence sufficient notice. 
It is clear the ad hoc tribunals do not agree on the issue of cumulatively convicting 
conspiracy to commit genocide and the crime of genocide itself. While the ICTY so 
far seems to have adopted the merger doctrine, the chambers in the ICTR are 
divided. This division in opinion is strange in light of the fact that the chambers 
acknowledge that the inchoate crime of conspiracy is an independent crime 
punishable regardless of its results. This is clearly the form of conspiracy understood 
in common law jurisdictions where the merger doctrine does not apply.  
The argument advanced against the conviction of an accused on two or more counts 
in relation to the same facts, is that it amounts to judging the accused twice for the 
same crime. In other words, it violates the principle of double jeopardy or a 
                                                          
627 T. R. Dalton, Cornell Law School Graduate student papers (2010), p. 4, commenting on the 
Musema judgment; see also A. Zahar & G. Sluiter, International Criminal Law (2008), p. 183. This is 
especially reflected in the chambers decision to dismiss the conspiracy count against the defendant 
Ntahaboli in the case of Nyiramasuhuko et al.   
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substantive non bis in idem principle in criminal law.628 The ICTR jurisprudence has 
confirmed that multiple convictions need not be sustained by different factual 
situations.629 The principle of cumulative convictions recognises that a single criminal 
act may offend two or more criminal provisions and justify a finding of guilt on 
multiple counts.630 The Chamber in Akayesu set out the instances where this 
practice is justified. It stated that it was acceptable to convict an accused of two or 
more offences based on the same set of facts only where the offences have different 
elements,631 or where the laws in question protect different social interests, or when 
it is necessary to record a conviction for more than one of the offences in order to 
reflect what crimes an accused had committed.632 The Chamber also noted that the 
accused suffers no prejudice as the Chamber, to avoid double punishment for the 
same acts, imposes concurrent sentences for each cumulative charge.633  
Although it might seem duplicative and of no essence to convict an accused of 
conspiracy once genocide has been established, taking into consideration that 
similar facts and evidence are used to prove both charges, the interest of justice 
might dictate a necessity to record a conviction on both counts to reflect the totality of 
the accused’s culpable conduct. Here, conspiracy has the role of reflecting the whole 
story or the true circumstances under which the underlying crimes were carried out, 
in particular, the situation of Rwanda. The ICTR has acknowledged that the 
conspiracy adopted at the Genocide Convention was one founded on the principle of 
                                                          
628 See Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR (TC), para. 462. 
629 Akayesu (TC), paras. 461-470. 
630 A. Obote-Odora, 8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law No. 1 (2001), para. 97. 
631 See also Nyiramasuhuko et al. para. 6069, asserting that multiple criminal convictions on the same 
conduct is permissible when entered under different statutory provisions, only if the provisions have 
materially distinct and different elements.  
632 Akayesu (TC), para 468. 
633 Akayesu (TC), paras 463, 464, 465, 466. 
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common law conspiracy.634 Interestingly, the chambers always admit that both 
conspiracy and genocide have different material elements.635 Viewed from this 
perspective, it follows that a conviction should be recorded for both conspiracy and 
its underlying offence in resonance with the common law theory of conspiracy. The 
double conviction does not have to translate to a harsher penalty, as is often the 
case. This therefore, takes away the question of fairness to the accused because 
even in the cases of double conviction, there is never an extra penalty for the 
conspiracy offence. In the circumstances, the rationale adopted by the chambers that 
allow cumulative convictions on this issue, such as in Nahimana and Kambanda, 
reflects the correct legal position.636 
I. Planning and Preparation 
The concept of planning has an intimate correlation with conspiracy. In most 
prosecutions concerning the conspiracy charge before the international tribunals, the 
focus has been on facts surrounding planning and preparation for the respective 
crimes. This explains the inferences that give the impression of conspiracy and 
planning actually referring to one and the same concept. At the Nuremberg tribunal, 
conspiracy was equated to the planning and preparation to wage the war of 
                                                          
634 See A. Obote-Odora, 8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law No. 1 (2001), para. 34, 
asserting the Genocide Convention adopts common law principles. 
635 See Gatete (TC), para. 654; Karamera et al. (TC), para. 1709.  
636 See A. Obote-Odora, 8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law No. 1 (2001), para. 46, he 
asserts that conspiracy to commit genocide and the crime of committing genocide are independent 
and separate offences and as a result an accused ought to be found guilty on both counts; M.C. 
Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda and East 
Timor (2005), pp. 198 et seq, stating that such conviction is necessary for the truth function of 
accountability, especially in the case of Rwanda, showing that the genocide was not committed just 
by a certain individual but it was the result of conceived, prepared for, organised and well executed 
plan. In p. 239 he concludes, ‘As an accountability tool the prosecution of the consummated crime of 
genocide, without conspiracy, offers an unfinished explanation of the collective, collaborative, and 
coordinative nature of the atrocity crimes committed in 1994 in Rwanda’ ; cf But compare with T. R. 
Dalton, Cornell Law School Graduate student papers (2010), p. 13, who opposes such reasoning 
asserting that the application of a substantive crime of conspiracy by the ad hoc tribunals is dubious, 
stating that to hold conspiracy to commit genocide as a substantive crime contrasts with general 
principles of international law. 
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aggression, with conspiracy also being referred to as the common plan. The Tokyo 
tribunal observed that ‘conspiracy’ and the acts of ‘planning and preparation’ covered 
similar issues therefore, deciding that an accused could only be declared guilty for 
conspiracy and not for both. In the subsequent Nuremberg trials, while setting out 
particulars of the conspiracy counts in the various indictments, the prosecution used 
terms such as ‘the defendants were connected with plans and enterprises’, 
‘participated in the said common design, conspiracy, plans and enterprises’. The 
equation of conspiracy to planning is especially reflected in Judge Blair’s dissenting 
opinion in the Justice case, when he asserted that ‘there was no material difference 
between a plan or scheme to commit a particular crime and a common design or 
conspiracy to commit the same’.637 The 1996 ILC Draft at article 2 subparagraph 3 
(e) provided criminal responsibility for one who ‘directly participates in planning or 
conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact occurs’. The conspiracy charges 
before the ICTR also describe the defendants as having formulated and participated 
in plans to kill their victims among other acts. In fact, conduct that has been punished 
before the international criminal tribunals as conspiracy mostly relates to the 
accused’s participation in the planning of the underlying crimes together with other 
perpetrators.638  
Interestingly, the statutes that make conspiracy punishable, also expressly provide 
for punishment of the act of planning. Apart from conspiracy, planning and 
preparation to wage aggressive war was criminalised in both the IMT and IMTFE 
Charters.639 The planning or aiding and abetting in the planning of an international 
                                                          
637 NT-war criminals-vol III Justice case p. 1195. 
638 Also see J. D. Ohlin, 5 JCIJ (2007), p. 71 referring to Article 7 (1) of the ICTY which provides for 
criminal responsibility for those ‘who planned…or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation…of a crime…’ asserting that it refers to punishment of conspiracy.   
639 Nuremberg Charter Article 6; Article 5 IMTFE Charter. 
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crime also attract criminal responsibility in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.640 Both 
planning and conspiracy represent the preliminary stages of a crime and have been 
used to punish similar conduct before the international tribunals.641 This explains why 
the two concepts are often equated to each other. 
Inspite of the aforementioned similar aspects, the two terms are legally different 
concepts. In the Akayesu judgment the Trial Chamber made the following 
observation: 
…planning is similar to the notion of complicity in Civil law, or conspiracy under 
Common law… (b)ut the difference is that planning, unlike complicity or plotting, can 
be an act committed by one person. Planning can thus be defined as implying that 
one or several persons contemplate designing the commission of a crime at both the 
preparatory and execution phases.642 
Planning refers to the design to carry out a specific international crime,643 whereas 
conspiracy is the agreement to carry out such crime. In this context one might say 
that the conspiracy takes place before the planning.644 The successful 
implementation of a conspiracy often times requires planning.645 The defendants’ 
unison participation in planning commission of a crime often manifests the existence 
of a conspiracy between them. In addition, planning is a form of complicity that 
requires the underlying crime to be carried out,646 whereas conspiracy is an inchoate 
crime, punishable regardless of it results. While planning can be a solitary task,647 
conspiracy is a collective crime that must be carried out by at least two persons. 
                                                          
640 Articles 7 (1) ICTY and 6 (1) ICTR. 
641 See V. Morris and M. P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (1998), p. 236 
stating that the planning phase represents the initial stage of a crime. 
642 Akayesu ICTR (TC), para. 480. 
643 Prosecutor v Krsti´c, ICTY (TC), judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 601; G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), para. 624. 
644 See Gatete ICTR (TC), confirming this position on its analysis of conspiracy at paras. 618, 626. 
645 J. D. Ohlin, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2007), p. 176, stating that a plan makes the essence of a 
criminal conspiracy. 
646 Prosecutor v Kordi´c & Cerkez (TC), para. 26; P v Nahimana (AC) para. 479; E. van Sliedregt, The 
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 79. 
647 Akayesu ICTR (TC), para. 480; Kordi´c & Cerkez ICTY (TC), para. 386; E. van Sliedregt, The 
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 80. 
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Therefore, the conclusion that may be drawn here is that the joint participation in 
planning a crime is only the earliest evidence of a conspiracy, but not the conspiracy 
itself. 
J. Conclusion 
An overview on conspiracy shows that its use in the international plane has mainly 
emerged in the context of complete crimes. Conspiracy was introduced to deal with 
the post-world war II atrocities in response to the nature of crimes committed. The 
perpetrators had acted in a cohesive and concerted manner resulting into large-scale 
atrocities. The common law offence of conspiracy was seen as a central feature in 
the preparatory work to Nuremberg. The main motivation for its inclusion was that it 
presented with it unique characteristics, which created a basis for attributing liability 
to all its adherents, regardless of what role they played, as long as they had 
participated in the conspiracy with intent. A similar rationale was used to introduce 
conspiracy into the Charter of the Tokyo tribunal and into CCL. 10. 
The coming into force of the Genocide Convention introduced conspiracy to commit 
genocide. This crime was later to be provided for in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes and 
has formed a major part of the prosecution strategy before the ICTR, where the law 
on this aspect has evolved. Although, the idea behind conspiracy in the Genocide 
Convention was to facilitate the arrest of potentially harmful criminal conduct while 
still in its infancy stages, conspiracy before the ad hoc tribunals has been 
adjudicated in the context of completed genocide crimes, perpetrated in a large-
scale and systematic manner. The ICTY and ICTR have proceeded to use 
conspiracy to hold certain accused persons criminally liable, for conduct showing 
they participated in the planning of genocide, more particularly, in the case of the 
Rwanda tribunal. 
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Generally, the records of the international tribunals confirm that the prosecution of 
conspiracy is a difficult task, with most tribunals having adopted a strict approach to 
the conspiracy charge. In the face of complete crimes, conspiracy is inferred if the 
pattern of events discloses sufficient unity to qualify as such. Therefore, conspiracy 
will only be inferred if the crimes were committed in a concerted and coordinated 
manner, and in the case of circumstantial evidence, the ad hoc tribunals require that 
such conspiracy must be the only reasonable inference that can be drawn.  
An accused will only be considered criminally responsible if he participated in the 
conspiracy with intent that the underlying crime is committed. Intent here has also 
strictly been construed with some tribunals, for example the IMT, having preference 
for direct proof. The prosecution must often also prove that the alleged defendant 
had intent to participate in the conspiracy apart from having intent to commit the 
underlying crime. In applicable cases, the tribunals have restricted a defendant’s 
criminal responsibility to the actual finding of their complicity in a given conspiracy, 
refusing to give effect to vicarious criminal responsibility that makes co-conspirators 
liable for all substantive crimes committed in furtherance of conspiracy as long as 
they were foreseeable.  
There is also the requirement that the conspiracy counts be properly particularised, 
with the prosecution setting out in the indictment all overt acts that it intends to rely 
on to prove a defendant’s participation in the conspiracy. The ad hoc tribunals have 
especially adhered to this requirement, insisting that a conviction of conspiracy will 
only be obtained for the illegal acts that the prosecution specifically alleged in the 
indictment. This has put a heavy burden on the prosecution because often the 
evidence against an accused may not be too clear and is only disclosed in the 
course of trial. This requirement was not followed in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 191 
tribunals, but as a result the judges in these respective tribunals treated the 
prosecution’s evidence on conspiracy with extreme caution. 
An issue that has been of concern before the ad hoc tribunals is the rationale of 
punishing both conspiracy and its executed target crime. This issue was not 
addressed in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. Although, the ad hoc tribunals 
consider conspiracy itself to be an independent crime, in the face of the complete 
crimes some of the tribunals have preferred to merge conspiracy with the underlying 
crimes, punishing only the latter. The rationale applied here is that since inchoate 
conspiracy is intended for prevention purposes, when its underlying crime is 
committed then the justification for punishing conspiracy disappears. This issue has 
seen the ideologies of common law rationale of punishing conspiracy clash with the 
civil law theory behind punishing criminal agreements, resulting into a disparity of 
judgments. 
Common law conspiracy has obviously not had the prominence its proponents 
intended for it in holding perpetrators of international crimes accountable. It first 
encountered opposition from practitioners from civil law jurisdictions and even with 
its adoption; the tribunals prefer to exercise extreme caution when dealing with the 
conspiracy charge. This has led to far much fewer convictions for the offence of 
conspiracy than initially expected. The general apprehension is that the conspiracy 
charge often requires broad inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence and 
if not watched can lead to application of liability standards that are unsatisfactorily 
close to the doctrine of guilt by association.  The theory of conspiracy that the 
prosecution has at times advocated for involves grand conspiracies spanning over a 
period of many years, involving the commission of several crimes, which tend to 
exaggerate a defendant’s culpability exposing such accused to the possibility of 
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greater punishment. In such a scenario, a minor participant in a conspiracy has the 
potential of being held criminally responsible for the commission of many crimes over 
which they had little or no control. These looming dangers have made the tribunals 
have preference for a conspiracy interpreted more restrictively than even the 
standards used in common law jurisdictions, thus, downplaying the several 
perceived advantages of the common law conspiracy charge. This then presents the 
question whether the practice before the international tribunals has sufficiently 
established conspiracy as an independent crime in international criminal law.  
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Chapter Four: Customary International Law 
A. Introduction 
Having discussed the status, elements and function of conspiracy in the various 
domestic jurisdictions both from common law and civil law countries, and also 
analysed its use in prosecuting international crimes before the international tribunals, 
it is pertinent to discuss whether the aforesaid practice has given rise to a norm of 
customary international law. The following discussion will clarify the ambiguity on the 
status of conspiracy as a substantive crime under customary international law, and 
also forms an essential step towards analysing the position of such status in relation 
to the Rome Statute.648 
B. Characteristics of Customary International Law 
Customary law is unwritten and its existence is established by state practice and a 
belief that such practice is required as a matter of law (opinio juris).649 State practice 
is considered to include both what the state does and says. This will often be found 
in various official government acts such as the legislation made, court decisions, 
official statements and other actions taken by government agents with respect to 
international issues.650 Treaty practice is also relevant, including the decisions of 
international tribunals and international organisations, which may be classified as 
                                                          
648 See below Ch 5 section D; see also G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. 
(2009), marg no. 141, asserting the importance of customary law in international criminal law, ‘even 
after the ICC Statute’s entry into force’. 
649 Statute of the International Criminal Court of Justice, Article 38 (1) (b) describing customary law as 
“a general practice accepted as law”; International Court of Justice, Continental Shelf Case (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v Malta), 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, pp.29-30, § 27, ‘…the material of 
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of 
States’; see also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edn. (2008), pp. 6 et seq; A. 
Cassese, International Law, 2nd edn. (2005), p. 156; M. N. Shaw, International Law, 6th edn (2008), 
p. 84. 
650 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edn. (2008), p. 6; M. N. Shaw, International 
Law, 6th edn (2008), pp. 81-84; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), 
marg no. 142. 
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indirect evidence of state practice.651 Customary law is considered important in 
clarifying the content of treaty provisions that are inadequately covered, or filling in 
the gaps of such provisions.652 It is binding on all states. When a treaty restates a 
customary international rule, obligations and responsibilities arising from such a rule 
are also binding on non-party states.653 
I. State Practice 
The question to be answered here is whether conspiracy to commit international 
crimes is expressly punishable within the domestic legislation of the representative 
major legal jurisdictions discussed in chapter two of this study, and to what extent 
similar conduct has been prosecuted. In the United Kingdom, the International 
Criminal Court Act of 2001 makes punishable genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity including ancillary conduct in relation to these crimes committed 
outside the jurisdiction of England and Wales.654 Ancillary conduct is defined to 
include conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes.655 To determine if any 
offence under this Act has been committed the court is allowed to apply general 
principles of the law of England and Wales, this can be interpreted to also include 
criminal responsibility for conspiracy.656  
In the United States, Congress has enacted legislation prohibiting Genocide,657 and 
although it does not include a specific provision on conspiracy, this conduct may be 
                                                          
651 Tadic, ICTY (AC), decision of 2 October 1995, para. 133; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, 7th edn. (2008), p. 15; R. R. Baxter, 41 Brit. Y. B. Int’L., (1965-1966), pp. 275 et 
seq; M. N. Shaw, International Law, 6th edn (2008), pp. 82-83; G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg no. 142. 
652 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2008), p. 17. 
653 B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), p. 
91; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2008), p. 17. 
654 See sections 51 and 52. 
655 Section 55. 
656 See section 56 (1). 
657 The Genocide Convention implementation Act (also known as Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100-606, 
§2(a), 102 Stat. 3045 (4 Nov. 1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091 ff). 
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punished under the general federal statute on conspiracy.658 Crimes against 
humanity are not codified in the United States domestic law. Save for legislation that 
prohibits torture,659 most of the other crimes punishable under crimes against 
humanity such as murder, aggravated assault, or the like are punishable under the 
ordinary domestic law.660 It follows that conspiracy to commit such crimes is also 
punishable under the general federal statute on conspiracy. The War Crimes Act of 
1996 gives the federal courts ability to prosecute persons suspected of committing 
war crimes.661 Although this statute does not also expressly refer to punishment of 
conspiracy, it is presumed that this being a federal statute, the general federal 
conspiracy statute would also be applicable for punishment of crimes proscribed by 
it. 
Punishment of war crimes in the United States is also supplemented by the military 
justice system, where suspects may be subject to trial by a military tribunal for 
violation of the law of war.662 The law of war punished under the military courts is 
derived both from treaty law and custom, giving it a wide range of conduct 
punishable as war crimes.663 Only recently, the United States in further effort to 
combat terrorism enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2009, with a provision on 
conspiracy to commit war crimes.664 The use of the charge of conspiracy in the 
                                                          
658 J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 202. 
659 18 U.S.C. § 2340. 
660 E. Silverman, in Eser/Sieber/Kreicker (eds.), National Prosecution of International Crimes, vol. 5 
(2005), pp. 430-1. 
661 18 U.S.C. § 2441. 
662 10 U.S.C. § 818; E. Silverman, in Eser/Sieber/Kreicker (eds.), National Prosecution of International 
Crimes, vol. 5 (2005), p. 433.  
663 E. Silverman, in Eser/Sieber/Kreicker (eds.), National Prosecution of International Crimes, vol. 5 
(2005), p. 427. 
664 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009). The Act replaced the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, formed to authorise use of military tribunals to try violations of laws of war; 
R. Wala, 41 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2010), p. 684, asserts that, ‘the majority of 
cases pending in the military commissions contain allegations of conspiracy to commit war crimes, 
with many of [the] cases relying on conspiracy as the primary charge’. 
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military war crimes trials has been a subject of contention.665 In a recent case before 
the U.S Supreme Court, the issue of the customary law status of conspiracy to 
commit war crimes was revisited.666 Hamdan, a Yemeni national had been Osama 
bin Laden’s driver for five years and was arrested after the 9/11 attacks, during the 
hostilities between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan.667 He faced the 
charge of conspiracy to commit offences triable by the military commission convened 
by the president of the United States.668 Hamdan filed an application contesting the 
authority of the military commission to adjudicate conspiracy to commit certain 
crimes under the law of war, and the procedures adopted by the president that 
denied him a right to be present when the government’s witnesses testified. The 
issue on conspiracy emerged because under American laws the jurisdiction of 
military tribunals is limited to violations of the law of war. It thus follows that if 
conspiracy to commit war crimes is not recognised under the law of war, the military 
commission would not have jurisdiction to try Hamdan.669 A majority vote of four 
against one held that the stand-alone crime of conspiracy was not part of the law of 
war and therefore, the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to try Hamdan on this aspect. 
The Supreme Court advanced the reasons that the crime of conspiracy did not 
appear in the major treaties on the law of war (The Geneva Conventions and Hague 
Conventions) and that international sources confirmed that conspiracy under the law 
of war was not recognised, with specific reference made to the Nuremberg judgment 
                                                          
665 G. P. Fletcher, 4 JICJ (2006), pp. 442-447; G. P. Fletcher, 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l. L (2007), pp. 
427-467; R. Wala, 41 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2010), pp. 683-709. 
666Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
667 9/11 attacks refer to a series of coordinated suicide attacks conducted by al Qaida against the 
United States on 11 September 2001. 
668 The charge sheet charged Hamdan with wilfully and knowingly joining ‘an enterprise of persons 
who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with Osama bin Laden…and other 
members and associate of the al Qaida organisation, to commit the following offenses…attacking 
civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; destruction of property by an 
unprivileged; and terrorism.’ See List of charges at 2 (July 13, 2004), United States v Hamdan (U.S. 
Military Commission) at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul 2004/d20040714 hcc.pdf. 
669 G. P. Fletcher, 4 JICJ (2006), pp. 444-5. 
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where such conspiracy was rejected, alongside conspiracy to commit crimes against 
humanity.670  
In reference to the civil law countries, the German code of Crimes against 
International Law (“Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, VStGB”) expressly recognises criminal 
responsibility for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.671 Pursuant to 
section 2 of the VStGB, general criminal law is considered to be applicable to 
offences under this statute. It is presumable that this would include punishment of 
agreement to commit the underlying international crimes as recognised in § 30 of the 
German Criminal Code (“StGB”). Article 615 of the Spanish penal code makes 
conspiracy to commit crimes against the international community punishable; these 
include genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
 The French penal code in article 212-3 creates criminal responsibility for 
participation in a group formed or in an agreement made with a view to preparing to 
commit any of the international crimes. Such agreement must be demonstrated by 
one or more material actions. Under Italian law only conspiracy to commit genocide 
is expressly proscribed and is punishable with a sentence of imprisonment of 
between one to six years.672  
To sum up, this survey shows that agreeing to commit an international crime is 
punishable in most of the selected countries, albeit with varying application. Under 
common law countries such conduct is punishable under the independent crime of 
conspiracy. In Continental Europe such conduct although expressly punishable in 
Spain, Germany, and France, it is not an independent crime, but is considered to be 
a form of attempted participation only punishable to the extent that its underlying 
                                                          
670 Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.2749 (2006), at 2784. 
671 Völkersträfgesetzbuch, Federal Gazette 1 (2002) 2254, sections 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. 
672 Article 7, Italian Law 9 October 1967, no. 962, Prevention and Repression of the crime of 
Genocide. 
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crime is not committed. Consistent with their obligation under the Genocide 
Convention it seems most states have enacted legislations that cover conspiracy to 
commit genocide, even in the case of Italy. 
II. Treaty Law and Practice of International Tribunals 
At the end of World War II the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were established to 
prosecute those considered most criminally responsible for the crimes committed 
during the war. The controversial crime of aggression was made punishable and with 
it the equally controversial crime of conspiring to commit the crime against peace 
was introduced.673 Most defendants who especially held leadership positions or high 
military rankings and took part in the planning of the war were eventually held liable 
for the crime of conspiracy to wage the war of aggression. The Nuremberg tribunal 
and all subsequent tribunals established after the end of World War II recognised 
conspiracy as a separate crime only with respect to the crime of aggression. The law 
under Nuremberg is recognised as forming part of customary international law 
following the United Nations General Assembly resolution 95 (1), which affirmed the 
principles of international law recognised by the IMT Charter and Judgment.674 
Principle VI recognises the crimes punishable under international law codified in 
Article 6 of the IMT Charter this includes, “(a) Crimes against Peace: (i) Planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i)”. 
Conspiracy with respect to the crime of aggression has since this period never been 
prosecuted. 
                                                          
673 See Ch 3 above. 
674 See www.un.org/documents/ga/res/I/arel.htm (last visited 21. 02. 2011); Attorney General of Israel 
v Eichmann, Supreme Court of Israel (1962) 36 ILR 277, which affirms Nuremberg principles as 
forming part of customary international law. 
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In 1948, the Genocide Convention criminalised conspiracy to commit genocide. This 
statute was later to be replicated in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, and as a 
result, several defendants have been prosecuted for conspiring to commit genocide 
with respect to atrocities committed in the territories of the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.675 The Genocide Convention is recognised as forming part of customary 
international law and by virtue of this, conspiracy to commit genocide is also 
considered to form a part of customary international law.676 
The Nuremberg judgment dismissed the charges with respect to conspiracy to 
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity citing that the same were not 
recognised in the IMT Charter. This restrictive interpretation is usually attributed to 
the fact that conspiracy was not a concept recognised by the continental European 
legal systems. This interpretation influenced the decisions of all subsequent tribunals 
formed to deal with crimes after WWII, rendering all attempts by the prosecution to 
have these acts punished futile.677 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 do not include conspiracy to commit war crimes. Both 
statutes of the ICTY and ICTR do not recognise criminal responsibility for conspiracy 
to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, neither have the same been 
prosecuted and punished in any other international tribunal.  
A further look also at the Hybrid tribunals, whose jurisdictions partly include 
punishment of the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
                                                          
675Article III Genocide Convention; Articles 4(3) ICTY and 2(3) ICTR. 
676 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd  edn. (2008), p. 228; K. Kittichaisaree, International 
Criminal Law (2001), pp. 248 et seq.; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd  edn. 
(2009), marg no. 622, specifically recognises conspiracy to commit genocide as a crime under 
customary international law; cf J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper  24 (2009), he 
asserts that the provision on conspiracy does not form part of customary law, contending that the 
Genocide Convention is merely a treaty law, and not evidence of state practice. 
677 See analysis on Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunal judgments, in Ch 3 above. 
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crimes, these are the Special Court of Sierra Leone,678 the Special Panels in East 
Timor,679 and the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia,680 shows that only the 
Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia makes punishable conspiracy to commit 
genocide.  Interestingly, although the law in relation to the Special Panels of East 
Timor recognises criminal responsibility for genocide, no reference is made to 
punishment of conspiracy to commit genocide. This law instead adopts the principles 
of individual criminal responsibility as reflected in the Rome Statute,681 which has no 
express provisions on punishment of conspiracy.682 All these hybrid courts do not 
punish conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
C. Evaluation 
The general view is and as clearly indicated from the aspect of international practice 
above, conspiracy as a crime under customary international law has only been 
established with respect to the crimes of aggression and genocide.683 The status of 
conspiracy under customary international law with respect to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity is rejected.684 Two main reasons are usually cited to support 
                                                          
678 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone accessed from www.sc-sl.org on 24 August 2011. 
679 See UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 On Establishment of Panels with exclusive jurisdiction over 
serious criminal offences (East Timor).   
680 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006), Article 4. 
681 See UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, Section 4 on Genocide, and Section 14 on Individual Criminal 
Responsibility. 
682 See further discussions on the Rome Statute and conspiracy in Ch 5 below. 
683 Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), at 2784; B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), p. 91, commenting on conspiracy to commit 
genocide as creating liability under customary international law; A. Cassese, International Criminal 
Law, 2nd edn. (2008), p. 228; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), 
marg no. 622. 
684 G. P. Fletcher, 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l. L (2007), pp. 448-9, in this regard Fletcher asserts ‘When 
only some countries accept a particular doctrine, it cannot become part of customary international law 
applicable to all nations as part of the law of war’. Observing further that the general trend of treaties 
on international criminal law over the last half century, has been to deliberately avoid the concept of 
conspiracy; also see J. A. Bush, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (2009), pp. 1094 et seq; D. Scheffer, Why 
Hamdan is Right About Conspiracy Liability, Jurist, Mar. 30, 2006, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03=why-hamdan-is-right-about-conspiracy.php; R. Wala, 41 
Georgetown Journal of International Law (2010), p. 683 et seq stating that, ‘conspiracy to commit war 
crimes is not a cognizable law of war violation’. 
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restriction of the offence of conspiracy to the crimes of aggression and genocide. 
First is the existence of express provisions in international instruments. The judges at 
Nuremberg rejected conspiracy with respect to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity on the grounds of jurisdiction, arguing that unlike conspiracy to commit 
crimes against peace, no such separate crime with regards to the other crimes 
existed in the Charter. This decision was largely influenced by the fact that 
conspiracy was a notion not recognised in civil law jurisdictions, and the fear that the 
theory behind conspiracy would lead to collective punishment violating a major 
principle of criminal law that criminal responsibility should be personal.685 The 
second argument suggests that the apparent collective nature of the crimes of 
aggression and genocide makes it necessary to criminalise conspiracy to commit 
such conduct. Schabas asserts that, ‘(b) y its very nature, the crime of genocide will 
inevitably involve conspiracy and conspirators’,686 and with respect to the crime of 
aggression the general view is that the very dynamics of war involve organised 
activity carried out by a group of persons.687  
Whereas the first reason on express treaty provisions is self-explanatory, the second 
reasoning is questionable. The history of international crimes shows that in almost all 
                                                          
685 See T. Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (1992), p. 36, a prominent 
figure at the Nuremberg trial noting that “The Anglo-American concept of conspiracy was not part of 
European legal systems and arguably not an element of international recognised laws of war”, cited in 
Hamdan v Rumsfeld  548 U.S-(2006), p. 47. 
686 W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law; The Crime of Crimes, 2nd  edn. (2009), p. 310; H. 
van der Wilt, 4 JICJ (2006), p. 242, asserts, ‘It would simply be preposterous for an individual to boast 
that by his actions alone he could achieve the goal of destroying a whole group. In the normal 
situation, the perpetrator of genocide may at most feel confident that his conduct might contribute to 
the concerted action of annihilating the group’. 
687 See G. P. Fletcher, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law  (2007), p. 447, describing the acts 
of “planning, preparing, initiating, and waging” aggressive war as being by their very nature collective 
action; also see The Justice case , Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vols. VI-X, p. 108, the 
prosecution while making its arguments for the count on conspiracy made the following observation, 
“…while war crimes and crimes against humanity can certainly be committed by a single individual, it 
is hard to think of any one man as committing the crime of waging an aggressive war as a solo 
venture. It is peculiarly a crime brought about by the confederation or conspiracy of a number of men 
acting pursuant to well-laid plans. It matures over a long period of time, and many steps are involved 
in its consummation”.  
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contexts regardless of the crimes committed, collective action has been involved in 
their execution. It is also difficult to reconcile the fact that conspiracy to commit 
genocide is punishable, while it is excluded in the case of crimes against humanity, a 
crime from which genocide has evolved.688 Perhaps, the practice within domestic 
jurisdictions confirms the incredulous nature of such restriction, because there is a 
gradual recognition of criminal responsibility arising from agreeing to commit any of 
the international crimes, including both war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
D. Conclusion 
The Status of conspiracy as an independent crime under customary international law 
has only been confirmed in the case of the crime of aggression and genocide. This 
status mainly emerges from the fact that these are the only two crimes that the 
international tribunals have been willing to recognise criminal responsibility arising 
from conspiracy. This recognition stems from their interpretation of the jurisdiction 
expressly created by their underlying statutes. 
The rejection of conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes in the 
Nuremberg tribunal, has greatly affected any further attempts to create criminal 
responsibility for such conduct even in domestic jurisdictions that would normally 
punish such conduct. This is reflected in the case relating to Hamdan in the United 
States. It should be noted that the rejection by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunal 
was based on lack of express provisions creating jurisdiction over such conduct, and 
was not an assertion that punishment of such conduct was not a general principle of 
law. Therefore, the rationale of restricting punishment of conspiracy to only some of 
the international crimes is questionable, considering that the practice within domestic 
jurisdictions even among civil law jurisdictions shows a gradual recognition of 
                                                          
688 See also G. P. Fletcher, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 45 (2007), p. 448, observing the 
peculiarity of this status. 
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criminal responsibility arising from agreeing to commit any of the international 
crimes. This conduct is considered punishable by virtue of the serious nature of 
crimes that underline such agreement. Of course, in the case of civil law countries 
conspiracy is not an independent crime but remains a mode of participation. 
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Chapter Five: Conspiracy in the Statute of The International Criminal Court 
A. Introduction 
The coming into force of the Rome Statute is heralded as one of the greatest 
achievements in the field of international criminal justice.689 The main principle 
behind the court is to ensure that those who commit the most heinous and serious 
crimes that shock the conscious of humanity must be held accountable.690 Although 
the court stands for a noble course, its journey towards becoming a reality was 
encumbered by many roadblocks.691 Even now its existence continues to face 
several challenges.692 The ICC Statute is the result of negotiations and compromises 
made in an attempt to have an international criminal justice system that is compatible 
with and acceptable to most of the major world legal systems. In the end, every 
provision in the Statute is tailored to reflect to the greatest extent possible the views 
of all groups.693 The crime of conspiracy was one of the controversial issues 
considered during the negotiations.694 Like had happened previously with 
negotiations on the IMT Charter, the common law countries strongly advocated for 
inclusion of the conspiracy crime, whereas their civil law counterparts did not 
appreciate its relevance, a compromise had to be reached. This chapter explores the 
                                                          
689 R. S. Lee, The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute (1999), p. 37, stating 
that the Statute  represents an enormous progress; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 
2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 75. 
690 Preamble of the Rome Statute para. 4. 
691 See M. C. Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I (2005), pp. 
41 et seq., for a detailed discussion; W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court, 3rd edn. (2007), pp. 1-21. 
692 For example see objections by the United States discussed in P. Malanczuk, 11 EJIL (2000), pp. 
77 et seq; W. A. Schabas, 15 EJIL (2004), pp. 701 et seq. The African Union (AU) has also raised 
objections on the ICC’s focus on Africa with all cases before the ICC being situations in Africa. As a 
consequence the AU has made various resolutions refusing to cooperate with the ICC on arrest 
warrants for Sudan’s president Bashir (decision adopted in July, 2009 at a summit in Sirte Libya), and 
has also rejected a request by the ICC to open a liaison office in Ethiopia. See 3 July 2009 AU 
Decision Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII), Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Rev.l, para. 10. 
693 P. Kirsch, Introductory note, in O. Triffterer (edn.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (1999), p. XXIV. 
694 See Per Saland, in The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (1999), p. 
199; K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 24. 
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results of this decision. It answers the question to what extent specific provisions in 
the Rome Statute accommodate prosecutions for conspiracy and if not, whether a 
gap has been created as a result of its exclusion making it necessary to amend the 
Rome Statute.  
B. Negotiations Surrounding the Conspiracy Doctrine 
The term conspiracy is not expressly referred to in any way in the Rome Statute. 
One does not find it in the definition of crimes,695 and neither is it mentioned in Article 
25, which provides for modes of perpetration and participation in an international 
crime. It is interesting to note that in previous proposed drafts of the Rome Statute 
conspiracy had expressly been included.696 These earlier drafts curiously reflect a 
general trend of viewing conspiracy as a mode of participation as opposed to a 
separate inchoate crime.697 During the 51st session of the General Assembly a 
                                                          
695See Articles, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
696 The 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Article 2 paragraph 
13 provided for conspiracy to commit offences recognised in the code, see Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (YILC), 1954, Vol. II; Draft Code of 1991, Article 3 on Responsibility 
and Punishment provided in part (2) ‘An individual who aids, abets or provides the means for the 
commission of a crime against the peace and security of mankind or conspires in or directly incites 
the commission of such a crime is responsible therefor and is liable to punishment’, see 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2) YILC, 1991, Vol. II; Article 2(3) of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind lists various forms of participation or contribution to the 
crimes. ‘An individual shall be responsible for a crime …if that individual: 
a) Intentionally commits such a crime; 
b) Orders the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; 
c) Fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime in the circumstances set out in 
article 6; 
d) Knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of 
such a crime, including providing the means for commission, 
e) Directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact occurs 
(emphasis added), 
f) Directly and publicly incites another individual to commit such a crime which in fact occurs; 
(…)’, Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) to the General Assembly (1996 ILC Draft 
Code), UN Doc. A/51/10 (1996). 
697 The Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its 43rd Session with 
reference to the Draft Code of 1991, shows the conspiracy discussed was participation in a common 
plan for commission of a crime against peace and security of mankind, with the meaning of 
conspiracy being a form of participation and not a separate crime, A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 
Two) YILC 1991 Vol. II ; also Report of the ILC’s 48th Session containing commentaries on the Draft 
Code of 1996, commentary 13 on participating in planning or conspiring to commit a crime shows 
liability in this context was limited only to situations where the criminal plan is in fact carried out, and 
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detailed provision on conspiracy was set forth and several issues were raised 
following this proposal.698 The divisiveness on this provision arose because of 
different conceptual approaches on the crime of conspiracy between the common 
law and civil law traditions.699 It can be deduced from the negotiation sessions that 
the conspiracy offence was intended to punish offenders who participated in planning 
and other preparatory activities involving the underlying crimes.700 The delegates 
expressed various sentiments with some wondering whether this concept should be 
included in the general part of the Statute, although, it was generally acknowledged 
that punishment of such conduct should be reserved for exceptionally serious 
crimes.701 Some delegates urged the inclusion of the concept of conspiracy in the 
ICC Statute because it had previously been recognised under international law, with 
particular reference to the Nuremberg trials. Among the issues raised included, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
referred to individual responsibility with respect to a particular form of participation rather than a 
distinct crime,YILC,1996, Vol. II (Part Two). 
698 The proposal stated:- 
1. A person is criminally responsible and is liable for punishment for conspiracy if that person, (with 
the intent to commit a specific crime) agrees with one or more persons to perpetrate that crime (or 
that a common intention to commit a crime will be carried out) and an overt act is committed by that 
person (or by another party to the agreement) (for the purpose of furthering the agreement) (that 
manifests the intent). 
2. A person is guilty of conspiracy even if the object of the conspiracy is impossible or is prevented by 
a fortuitous event. 
3. A person shall only be criminally responsible for conspiracy in respect of a crime where so provided 
in this Statute. 
4. A person who is criminally responsible for conspiracy is liable for the same punishment as the 
person who committed or would have committed the crime as a principal. 
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
U.N.GAOR, 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 22A, at 94-95, U.N.Doc. A/51/22 (1996), reprinted in M. Bassiouni, 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (1998), p. 489. 
699 See M. Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (1998), 
p. 490, indicating that discussions showed that the negotiators encountered ‘conceptual differences 
concerning conspiracy among...different legal systems’. 
700 See M. Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (1998), 
p. 490, on the question whether a planner should still be punished when the crime was not completed, 
yet action had been taken to implement the plan. A previous proposal had recognised importance of 
being able to punish planners and during this session it was noted that an alternative way of 
addressing the situation of planners would be through the concept of conspiracy. See Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, vol. II (Proceedings 
of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August 1996, Doc. A/51/22 (1996) reprinted in 
M. Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (1998), p. 483. 
701 M. Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 2: An Article-by 
Article Evolution of the Statute from 1994-1998 (2005), pp. 228, 229.  
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whether conspiracy should merge into the completed crime, and once conspiracy 
merged into the completed crime whether a conspirator would still be responsible for 
other foreseeable crimes committed pursuant to the conspiracy.702 Other specific 
questions arising from this draft included: 
“(a) whether the accused conspirator must have an intent to commit the crime or 
whether it is sufficient that there is an intention that a crime be carried out and that 
others may be the actual committers; 
(b) whether the accused conspirator must commit the overt act or whether it is 
sufficient if one of the other co-conspirators commits the overt act; 
(c) what must be the nature of the overt act (e.g. the act is undertaken for the 
purpose of furthering the agreement or must it actually manifest the agreement); 
(d) whether a conspiracy exists even if the object of the conspiracy is factually 
impossible to achieve; 
(e) whether a conspiracy should be limited in respect of an agreement to commit 
certain listed crimes; and 
(f) the appropriate punishment for the crime”.703  
The negotiations led to the development of a draft, which described conspiracy 
without mentioning its name, but even this was not sufficient to settle the issue.704 A 
compromise was further reached with guidance from previous negotiations carried 
                                                          
702 M. Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 2: An Article-by 
Article Evolution of the Statute from 1994-1998 (2005), p. 229. 
703 See M. Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 2: An Article-by 
Article Evolution of the Statute from 1994-1998 (2005), p. 229. 
704 The draft provided for criminal responsibility if one “agrees with another person or persons that 
such a crime be committed and an overt act in the furtherance of the agreement is committed by any 
of these persons that manifests their intent (and such a crime in fact occurs or is attempted)”, see 
Decision Taken by the Preparatory Committee in Its Session Held from 11 to 21 February, U.N 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1997, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.249/1998/L.13, reprinted in M. C. Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Documentary History (1998), p. 379. 
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out in 1997 with respect to the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings.705 As a result, a mode of participation was adopted in Article 25 (3) (d) 
ICC Statute referring to contribution to commission or attempted commission of a 
crime within the court’s jurisdiction by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose, omitting any express mention of conspiracy in the ICC Statute. The Article 
provides that a person may be considered criminally responsible for an international 
crime if he: 
In any other way contributes to the commission of such a crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and 
shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the 
group, where such activity or criminal purpose involves the commission of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime. 
This mode of participation has been referred to in recent cases before the ICC as 
‘common purpose criminal liability’.706 To what extent this provision substantially 
covers the doctrine of conspiracy is called to question. A cursory look at the above 
provision dictates that it cannot in the context of this study be analysed in isolation. 
The words at the beginning of the provision are a clear indication that the provision is 
intricately linked to the other provisions in Article 25 of the Rome Statute. To give a 
sufficient and comprehensive evaluation of the relationship between this provision 
and the concept of conspiracy, the rules of interpretation and construction require an 
                                                          
705 Per Saland, in The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (1999), p. 199; 
see also K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 24; International Convention of the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings of 1997-UN Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1998), annex, Art. 2 (3). 
706 See ICC-01/09-30-Red 15-12-2010 Pre-Trial Chamber II Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Joshua Arap Sang, para. 27; ICC-01/09-31 Red 15-12-2010 Pre Trial Chamber II Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, para. 31. 
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analysis of the provision in its proper context, which is together with the other 
provisions that constitute in particular Article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
C. Article 25 of the Rome Statute 
The provision adopted at the Rome conference provides a basis for which to look 
into the particulars of Article 25, setting out the limits to which this provision 
significantly accommodates or excludes conduct that is punishable under the 
concept of conspiracy.707 The various modes of liability by which an individual will be 
considered criminally responsible for international crimes are set out in paragraph 25 
(3).708 Subparagraphs (a-d) systematically enumerate the modes of criminal 
perpetration and participation, while subparagraphs (e-f) provide for the inchoate 
crimes of incitement to commit genocide and attempt. 
                                                          
707 Article 25 specifically states: 
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute. 
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute. 
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another 
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; 
b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is 
attempted; 
c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise 
assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its 
commission; 
d)…; 
e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide; 
f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means 
of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of 
the person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this 
Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up 
the criminal purpose. 
No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of 
States under international law. 
The 2010 amendments to the Rome Statute add the following to this paragraph: ‘In respect of the 
crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply only to persons in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.’, See The Crime of 
Aggression, RC/Res. 4, Annex I, para. 5. 
708 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 2, observes that the article differentiates at level of allocation 
of responsibility the degree of participation, rejecting a purely Unitarian concept of perpetration; G. 
Werle, 5 JCIJ (2007), p. 956, describes it as a ‘…differentiated system of participation, involving 
value-oriented levels of responsibility…’. 
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Conspiracy has been considered in the international context as providing a basis to 
attribute individual criminal responsibility for contributing to crimes carried out in 
concert, particularly, in respect to the preparatory and coordination activities 
surrounding the underlying crimes. It has been seen as a useful tool to punish those 
who in any way make some meaningful contribution to the commission of a crime by 
a collective. A brief enumeration of the elements of the specific modes of liability with 
regards to this context is therefore necessary, taking into account the following 
questions: To what extent would a defendant who participates together with others in 
planning and co-ordinating the commission of international crimes be liable under 
Article 25? To what extent is the idea of co-operating for purposes of committing 
international crimes sufficiently covered by the modes of liability set out in Article 25? 
Is the element of agreement, which is the cornerstone of conspiracy a fundamental 
element in the modes of perpetration? Would a defendant who simply agrees with 
others in commission of international crimes, merely setting up a plan for them but 
no further action follows thereafter still be liable under any mode of liability in the 
Rome Statute? 
I. Commission 
The first level of criminal responsibility in subparagraph 25 (3) (a) represents the 
highest form of culpability.709 It refers to three forms of commission or what is 
otherwise known as modes of perpetration.710 Criminal responsibility here arises 
                                                          
709 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 2; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd 
edn. (2009), marg. no. 449, describes the distinction of modes of participation as also indicators of 
degree of individual guilt and refers to commission as warranting the highest level of individual 
responsibility. 
710 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 
318, referring to ‘direct perpetration’, ‘co-perpetration’ and ‘indirect perpetration’; Prosecutor v 
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), decision on the confirmation of the charges, 30 September 2008, 
para. 488. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Rome Statute the general view is that commission 
under Article 25 also includes commission by omission, for this see Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, ICTY 
(AC), judgment of 17 September 2003, para. 73; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of 
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when the crime has been executed. The defining factor of all three forms of 
commission is the perpetrator having control over commission of the crime.711 In the 
first alternative, a person may commit the crime in person, which means the 
perpetrator physically carries out the criminal act with the requisite mens rea.712 
The second alternative of commission refers to joint commission, also known as co-
perpetration.713 The elements of this form of participation have been discussed 
before the ICC Pre Trial Chamber.714 It connotes several persons acting together 
and contributing to commission of a crime. Such co-operation forms the basis of 
mutually attributing the acts of the co-perpetrators to each other, making each of 
them responsible for the whole crime.715 The important criterion here is the existence 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), pp. 53-57; G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 453. 
711 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 
332, the Chamber observes that only those who have control over commission of the crime and are 
aware of such control should be considered principals because: 
‘ i) they physically carry out the objective elements of the offence (commission of the crime in person, 
or direct perpetration), 
ii) they control the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offence (commission of the 
crime through another person, or indirect perpetration), or 
iii) they have, along with others, control over the offence by reason of the essential tasks assigned to 
them (commission of the crime jointly with others or co-perpetration)’; Prosecutor v Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 30 September 2008, para. 488; Prosecutor v 
Jean Pierre Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber II, “Decision Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the charges of the prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo”, ICC-01/ 05-01/08-424, 
paras. 346-347, acknowledging that the concept of co-perpetration must go together with the notion of 
“control over the crime”. 
712 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art 25 marg. no. 7; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 789; G. Werle, 
Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd  edn. (2009), marg. no. 453. 
713 See E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (2003), pp. 72-76, he views this mode of participation as having evolved from the 
ad hoc tribunals theory of common purpose or JCE. 
714 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 
342 et seq., decision on confirmation of charges. 
715 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 
326, the Pre-Trial Chamber has noted, ‘the concept of co-perpetration is originally rooted in the idea 
that when the sum of co-ordinated contributions of a plurality of persons results in realisation of all 
objective elements of a crimes, any person making a contribution can be held vicariously responsible 
for the contributions of all the others and as a result, can be considered as a principal to the whole 
crime’; K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. no. 8; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 790; E. van Sliedregt, The 
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 72; G. 
Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 471. 
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of a plurality of persons bound together by a common plan or agreement, and the 
task carried out by each co-perpetrator must be essential in fulfillment of the crime. 
Each co-perpetrator must also personally fulfill the subjective elements of the 
crime.716 The ICC has identified agreement or common plan between two or more 
persons as being one of the fundamental objective elements for the concept of co-
perpetration.717 This common plan must have an element of criminality, although, it 
need not specifically be directed at the commission of a crime and it need not be 
explicit, it may be inferred from the concerted action of the co-perpetrators.718 Under 
the notion of conspiracy, the mere existence of such an agreement would sufficiently 
form a basis of punishing an accused found to be associated with it. It is clear from 
this observation that the constitutive elements of conspiracy form the preliminary 
basis or foundation for joint perpetration. However, this mode of perpetration requires 
more for an accused to be labelled as a co-perpetrator pursuant to the common plan 
(agreement). Such a participant must also have essential tasks assigned to him 
making it possible for him to frustrate commission of the crime.719 Defendants, who 
have been held criminally responsible for conspiracy inferred from their participation 
in the planning and preparatory activities of the underlying crimes, may be punished 
as co-perpetrators if their contribution is considered to have been essential to 
                                                          
716 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. no. 8; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. 
(2009), marg. no. 472. 
717 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, 
paras. 343, 344, 345. 
718 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, 
paras. 344, 345. 
719 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 
347; Prosecutor v Bemba, (ICC-01/05-01/08), decision pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, 
para. 350. 
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commission of the underlying crimes.720 Co-perpetratorship like the anglo American 
form of conspiracy creates a basis for crimes perpetrated by persons cooperating for 
purposes of their commission to be attributed to each of one of them. This mode of 
perpetration would capture the leading figures in a conspiracy, but only in the case 
that crimes are actually committed.   
The third alternative mode of perpetration is committing an international crime 
through another person, also referred to as ‘indirect perpetration’, ‘perpetration by 
means’ or ‘intermediary perpetration’.721 The rationale under this form of perpetration 
is that the dominant indirect perpetrator uses as a tool the perpetrator who physically 
carries out the crime.722 Criminal responsibility for the indirect perpetrator arises 
regardless of culpability of the direct perpetrator.723 This means of perpetration is 
especially relevant in the typical situations involved in commission of international 
crimes through having control over an organised hierarchical structure.724 This 
connotes that the indirect perpetrator through means of an organisation, dominates 
the acts of subordinates who carry out crimes conceived and directed by the indirect 
perpetrator. Discussing its elements, the Pre Trial Chamber established the objective 
elements for control of another person by means of control over an hierarchical 
organisation to include: i) control over the organisation, ii) organised and hierarchical 
                                                          
720 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 792-3; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal 
Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 467. 
721 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. no. 10; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 793.  
722 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 793; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of 
Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 68; G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 473. 
723 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. nos. 12, 13; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. 
(2009), marg. no. 475; for some critical views see T. Weigend, 9 JCIJ (2011), pp. 91 et seq. 
724 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. no. 11; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), pp. 70, 71; G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 476 et seq. 
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apparatus of power, iii) execution of the crimes secured by almost automatic 
compliance with the orders.725 On the mental element, the Chamber observed that 
the accused ought to fulfil all subjective elements of the subject crime.726 Although 
this mode of perpetration caters for certain circumstances involving group criminality 
or cooperation for purposes of committing international crimes, the notion of 
agreement does not form the basis of the relationship between the direct and indirect 
perpetrator. At Nuremberg, one problem encountered by the allies was how to 
attribute to the leaders crimes carried out by their subordinates. It was obvious the 
leaders were the most criminally responsible, although, most of them had not 
personally or directly executed any of the underlying crimes. The common law theory 
of conspiracy was then considered to offer an appropriate solution. Recognising the 
leaders as being part of a criminal agreement with their subordinates, formed a basis 
to connect the leaders with crimes committed by their subordinates, and as a result, 
attribute criminal responsibility for the underlying crimes to the respective leaders. 
The notion of agreement in most cases connotes persons with equal bargaining 
power, or persons of more or less equal standing coming together and having a 
meeting of minds. In reality, the relationship between the leaders and their 
subordinates can hardly be described as one of an agreement between supposed 
equals. The subordinates are usually there to serve the wishes of their masters, in 
actual sense, mere tools at the disposal of the leaders to execute their criminal ends. 
The mode of indirect perpetration in the circumstances gives a more accurate 
description of the connection between the leaders, their subordinates and the 
underlying crimes. In addition, the Chamber has recognised the possibility of joint 
                                                          
725 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC (Pre Trial Chamber), decision of 30 September 
2008, para. 494 et seq. 
726 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC (Pre Trial Chamber), decision of 30 September 
2008, para. 527 et seq. 
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commission by several indirect perpetrators referred to as indirect co-perpetration.727 
The concept of indirect co-perpetration integrates the elements of joint perpetration 
and indirect perpetration, and it refers to several persons in control of different 
hierarchical organisations agreeing to commit crimes. As a result, the crimes 
committed pursuant to the agreement by the direct perpetrators they use as tools, 
are subject to reciprocal attribution.728 
II. Accomplice Liability 
Apart from perpetration, criminal responsibility for other forms of participation in 
commission of international crimes is addressed in the subsequent subparagraphs of 
Article 25 (3). Complicity or accomplice liability is specifically provided for in sub 
paragraphs (b) and (c). 
1. Instigation 
A person may incur criminal responsibility by ordering, soliciting or inducing another 
to commit an international crime.729 These forms of participation are generally 
referred to as instigation.730 Liability here only accrues when the crime is carried out 
                                                          
727 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC (Pre Trial Chamber), decision of 30 September 
2008, para. 520 et seq. 
728 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC (Pre Trial Chamber), decision of 30 September 
2008, para. 520 et seq; The Pre Trial Chamber cited its elements to include: ‘(i) the suspect must be 
part of a common plan or an agreement with one or more persons, (ii) the suspect and other co-
perpetrator(s) must carry out essential contributions in a coordinated manner which result in the 
fulfilment of the material elements of the crime, (iii) the suspect must have control over the 
organisation, (iv) the organisation must consist of an organised and hierarchical apparatus of power, 
(v) the execution of the crimes must be secured by almost automatic compliance with the orders 
issued by the suspect, (vi) the suspect must satisfy the subjective elements of the crime, (vii) the 
suspect and the other co-perpetrator(s) must be mutually aware and accept that implementing the 
common plan will result in the fulfilment of the material elements of the crimes; and (viii) the suspect 
must be aware of the factual circumstances enabling him to exercise joint control over the 
commission of the crime through another person(s)’; see also Pre Trial Chamber II, “ Decision 
Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo”, ICC-01/ 05-01/08-424, paras. 350-351; Pre Trial Chamber I, “Decision 
on the Prosecution’s Application for a warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, ICC-
02/05-01/09-3, paras. 209-213. 
729 Article 25 (3) (b). 
730 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 795; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of 
Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 77. 
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or attempted. This mode of liability targets those who may be classified as 
‘accessories before the fact’.731 Criminal responsibility for ordering presupposes a 
superior–subordinate relationship between the one giving the order and the one 
receiving it. Soliciting and inducement have an element of the accused prompting or 
encouraging the direct perpetrator to commit the crime, and these two latter forms do 
not necessarily need the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship.732 
Subjectively, in the case of ordering, the accused while giving the order must intend 
that a crime be executed pursuant to the order or be aware of the substantial 
likelihood that the crime will be committed.733 In respect to soliciting and inducing, 
the accused should wish to “provoke or induce” the commission of the crime or be 
aware of the substantial likelihood that his conduct would lead to the commission of 
the crime.734 Under instigation, the accused does not need to have a specific intent 
with respect to the underlying crime, it is sufficient for him to have known the 
perpetrator’s specific intent without having to share it.735 
The act of instigation obviously has some influence on the actions of the direct 
perpetrator and to some extent portrays an understanding between the parties 
towards attaining a criminal end. To the extent that a defendant’s participation in a 
conspiracy may be inferred from their role in encouraging or prompting commission 
of its target offence, this mode of participation would capture such conduct. However, 
unlike conspiracy agreement does not form the basis of the relationship between the 
                                                          
731 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 795; R. Gallmetzer and M. Klamberg, ‘Individual 
Responsibility under International Law : The UN Ad Hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal 
Court’ (March 21, 2007), p. 73. 
732 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 78; see also K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. nos. 14, 15. 
733 Nahimana et al., ICTR (AC), para. 481; Prosecutor v Martic ICTY (AC), judgment of 8 October 
2008, para. 221 et seq. 
734 Nahimana et al., ICTR (AC), para. 480; Prosecutor v Kordic and Cerkez, ICTY (AC), judgment of 
17 December 2004, para. 32. 
735 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. nos. 485, 488. 
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instigator and direct perpetrator. The understanding between the parties falls short of 
the mutual understanding and the somewhat ‘intimate’ connection required of parties 
who form part of a conspiracy. Whereas the instigator does not have to have a 
specific intent with respect to the commission of the underlying crime, nor share such 
intent with the perpetrator, so far, the cases that have been adjudicated at the 
international level make it imperative that conspirators have knowledge of the facts 
constituting the underlying crime and share the intent for its commission. 
2. Assistance 
The other form of accessorial liability is assisting in the commission or attempted 
commission of an international crime.736 Although like instigation it is a form of 
complicity, it actually implies a lower degree of responsibility than instigation.737 To 
be punishable, such assistance must have a substantial effect on commission of the 
crime.738 This assistance may be given before, after or during commission of the 
crime.739 The accused in this case must have knowledge that his contribution is 
supporting the perpetrator in commission of the crime and he must also wish that his 
assistance facilitates commission of the crime.740 The accused does not have to 
                                                          
736 This liability is also recognised in the judgements of the ad hoc tribunals see Prosecutor v. 
Vasiljevic, ICTY (AC), judgment of 25 February 2004, para. 102; Prosecutor v Furundzija, ICTY (TC), 
judgment of 10 December 1998, paras. 192 et. seq, which analyses the state of customary law on 
assistance in carrying out an international crime. 
737 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. no. 16; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 798; E. van Sliedregt, The 
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 87. 
738 Prosecutor v Blaskic, ICTY (AC), judgment of 29 July 2004, para. 46; Nahimana et al., ICTR (AC), 
para. 482; K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. no. 21. 
739 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 491. 
740 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 801; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of 
Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 88; G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 492. 
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share the primary perpetrator’s specific intent, it suffices that he has knowledge of 
it.741 
Assistance in a crime implies some level of cooperation to achieve such criminal 
end. Defendants whose participation in a conspiracy could be implied from the 
assisting role they give in achieving the collective criminal activity, for example by 
giving advise or seemingly lending moral support to the physical perpetrator, would 
be considered criminally responsible under this mode of liability. However, again like 
instigation, assitance does not imply consensus because it lacks the level of mutual 
understanding and ‘intimate’ connections that constitute conspiracy relationships. 
Agreement does not form the basis of this relationship. A perpetrator might receive 
assistance in commission of a crime and not be aware of it or if aware of it rejects it, 
for conspiracy to be construed the perpetrator must have been aware of such 
assistance and worked in concert with the person offering the assistance.742 The 
requirement that an accomplice does not have to share in the direct perpetrator’s 
specific intent to commit the underlying crime would also negate an inference of 
conspiracy, in as far as such intent has been considered an essential element in 
cases that have so far been adjudicated concerning conspiracy at the international 
level. 
 
 
 
                                                          
741 Prosecutor v Aleksovski, ICTY (AC), judgment of 24 March 2000, para. 162; Prosecutor v 
Seromba ICTR (AC), judgment of 12 March 2008, paras. 56, 65, 173; also see G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 492. 
742 See A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 791, stating that ‘aiding and abetting does not 
presuppose a common concerted plan, as it is possible that the principal is not aware of the 
accomplice’s support’; B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice (2009), p. 86. 
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III. Complicity in group crimes 
Article 25 (3) (d) sets out a special form of participation and as indicated above it was 
specifically adopted as a ‘surrogate’ to the crime of conspiracy.743 Participation under 
this sub-paragraph connotes complicity in group crimes. An accused’s criminal 
responsibility is as a result of contributing to the commission or attempted 
commission of international crimes by a group acting with a common purpose. The 
actus reus for participation under this mode of liability is not specifically stated, but by 
providing for contribution in ‘any other way’ it leaves room for the accommodation of 
a wide range of activities not captured in the other forms of participation, setting out 
the lowest possible objective standard requirements.744 It is considered that 
contribution here refers to other indirect forms of support that may be given for the 
commission of international crimes.745 Such support may involve financing the group, 
giving technical support such as advice on the logistics of an area, providing a base 
from which the group plans its activities, or sale of weapons and other necessary 
material support. It is interesting to see how far or wide the ICC in the future will be 
willing to stretch the list of activities considered as contribution in this mode of 
liability, whether this could also include conduct such as merely connecting the group 
with a person willing to supply it with weapons, or willing to carry out the killings. The 
only limit provided in its objective element is the requirement that such assistance 
must be to a group involved in carrying out an international crime. The group referred 
                                                          
743 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Individual Criminal Responsibility Mental Elements, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 802; 
K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (2001), p. 235; G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 623. 
744 See K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), marg. no. 25; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 802 ; E. van Sliedregt, The 
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 107; 
G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 493. 
745 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 494. 
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to here should consist of a minimum of three people.746 In comparison to other 
modes of liability in the preceding sub-paragraphs of the differentiation model of 
participation in Article 25 (3), participation at this level implies the lowest level of 
culpability.747 
The main focus of this mode of participation is with respect to its mental element 
where more specific restrictions are provided. The mental element has two prongs, 
the first relates to the contribution itself and the second relates to the underlying 
crime.748 In respect to the first mental standard, any such contribution by the 
accused given to the group must be with intention, for example intentionally selling 
machetes and clubs to a militia group engaged in exterminating members of another 
ethnic group. The second mental standard refers to the underlying crime and codifies 
two possible qualifications. In the first place, the accused’s intentional act of 
contribution may be carried out with the aim of promoting the group’s common 
criminal objective. This means that the accused has a specific intention to support 
the group’s criminal activities, which in the case of our example means the accused 
possesses the specific intention to promote the group’s practical acts of 
exterminating the targeted ethnic group.749 The second alternative requires the 
accused to only have knowledge of the group’s intention, which means the accused 
                                                          
746 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 802; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 
2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 494; see also Fletcher-Ohlin, 3 JICJ (2005), p. 546, who reiterate that this 
provision contemplates groups such as military units, militias and gangs engaged in a common 
criminal purpose. 
747 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 337, 
the chamber considers it a residual form of accessory liability; G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 493, describes it as ‘the least grave, mode of participation’. 
748 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 107. 
749 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 29 ; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 803; E. van Sliedregt, 
The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals  for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 
107. 
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in this instance does not have the specific intent that may be required of a crime or 
share the same intent as the actual perpetrator, offering a lower mental standard 
than in the first alternative.750 The common view is that knowledge here requires the 
accused to be personally aware of the specific crime that the group intends to 
commit, and therefore, mere knowledge of the general common purpose of the 
group would not suffice.751  
An overview of the qualifications given with respect to the subjective elements of this 
mode of liability reveals that the second mental qualification seems to provide an 
even lower mental standard, than that which the international tribunals have often 
required to establish an accused’s criminally responsibility under the charge of 
conspiracy. Only those who specifically intended that the underlying crime be 
committed, for example having genocide intent as illustrated by the ad hoc tribunals’ 
jurisprudence, have been adjudged guilty of conspiracy.752 These defendants would 
in the circumstances fall under the first mental culpability standard. Some scholars 
that have critically looked at the elements of this mode of liability consider that the 
drafters of the Rome Statute included this provision into the Statute without given 
much regard to whether it was doctrinally comprehensible under criminal law 
theory.753 
Recent cases filed by the ICC prosecutor with respect to the situation in Kenya, refer 
to this mode of participation as ‘common purpose criminal liability’. This term is 
                                                          
750 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 30; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of 
Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003), p. 108; G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 495.  
751 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 30; G. A. Knoops, 30 Fordham International Law Journal 
(2006), p. 617.  
752 See Ch 3 above. 
753  K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 28; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 803; J. D. Ohlin, 12 
New Crim. L. Rev. (2009), pp. 406 et seq. 
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similar to the language the ad hoc tribunals have used to describe the concept of 
JCE. Some scholars opine that Article 25 (3) (d) embraces ICTY’s JCE mode of 
perpetration, which as shown previously in this study also creates individual criminal 
responsibility for contributions to group criminality, and has also been referred to as a 
form of conspiracy liability.754 On first impression this analogy may be drawn from 
use of the phrase ‘group of persons acting with a common purpose’, and also 
because the focus of this mode of participation places greater emphasis on its 
mental elements. The ad hoc tribunals have used the same terms and a similar 
analytical approach to describe the constitutive elements of JCE, placing more 
emphasis on JCE’s subjective elements.755 The common assumption is that should 
the Court read the JCE concept in this mode of participation it can only infer 
elements of JCE I and JCE II in its understanding of this provision.756 Although the 
ICC had previously acknowledged the close resemblance between this mode of 
participation and the JCE concept,757 the latest analysis by the Pre Trial Chamber on 
                                                          
754 C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (2008), pp. 167 et 
seq.; Fletcher-Ohlin, 3 JICJ (2005), pp. 546 ,547 describing Article 25 (3) (d) as the statutory 
surrogate of JCE; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (2003), pp. 94-109; R. Wala, 41 Georgetown Journal of International 
Law (2010), p. 703; T. Weigend, 9 JCIJ (2011), pp. 108-109; but compare with the later opinion of J. 
D. Ohlin, 12 New Crim. L. Rev. (2009), pp. 407, 408, expressing that the exact relationship between 
this  mode of liability and JCE is not clear, although he acknowledges that Article 25 (3) (d) covers 
similar ground as both JCE and common law conspiracy; also see B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), p. 85, stating that both JCE and Art. 25 (3) 
(d) ‘contain elements that are reminiscent of the notion of conspiracy’; W. A. Schabas, An Introduction 
to the International Criminal Court, 3rd. edn (2007), p. 215, indicating the ICC may draw a lot from the 
ad hoc tribunals case law in its application of this provision.  
755 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 329; E. 
van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law (2003), p. 107, asserting that this mode of participation is similar to JCE because its focus is on 
the mens rea. 
756 C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal responsibility for Core International Crime: Selected Pertinent 
Issues (2008), pp. 255, 405, 406, stating that it avoids connotations of collective responsibility; 
Fletcher and Ohlin Darfur Commission of inquiry, 3 JCIJ (2005), p. 550; G. A. Knoops, 30 Fordham 
International Law Journal (2006), p. 617; E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility Of Individuals 
For Violations Of International Humanitarian Law (2003), pp. 36, 108, 109  who suggests that sub-
paragraph (d) reflects albeit weakly JCE and that it only leaves out ‘collateral liability’ recognised 
under JCE III.  
757 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre Trial Chamber), decision of 29 January 2007, para. 
335. 
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the elements of Article 25 (3) (d) makes no reference to the JCE concept.758 This is a 
strong indication that the Court is not likely to infer JCE in its interpretation of this 
Article. Looking at sub-paragraph 25 (3) (d) in light of the logic that flows from the 
differentiated model of participation under Article 25 (3), and given that it provides for 
the lowest level of culpability, it is incompatible to read in it JCE a form of liability that 
creates a basis for co-perpetration, which to the contrary provides for the highest 
form of culpability.759  
‘Common purpose criminal liability’ makes it possible to punish persons who 
cooperate for purposes of committing international crimes. Like conspiracy, it creates 
individual criminal responsibility for contributions to group criminality, but no 
reference so far implies that agreement is one of its fundamental elements. It is 
suggested that by use of the word ‘contributes’ an accused’s action is required to 
form part of the causal nexus of commission or attempted commission of the 
crime.760 As a result a defendant who only agrees to support in some aspect a group 
already engaged in committing international crimes, but the criminal endeavour of 
such group is brought to an end before it receives the aforementioned support might 
not meet the criteria of contribution under 25 (3) (d), whereas such conduct would be 
considered to create criminal responsibility under the concept of conspiracy. This 
seems to also imply that an alleged accused may only be considered criminally 
                                                          
758 See Pre Trial Chamber II, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear 
for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang’, 8 March 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11, 
para. 51. The Court at this stage does not shed much light on the particulars of the elements apart 
from reiterate what the Statute provides; Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Callixte Mbarushimana’, 28 September 2010, 
ICC-01/04-01/10, para. 39. 
759 See G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 493, who 
considers that this mode of participation has no model under customary international law and further 
argues that while JCE is a mode of perpetration, Article 25 (3) (d) in contrast provides for the lowest 
level of mode of participation; also see A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn (2008), p. 
213, this latest view of Cassese differs from a previous opinion expressed in A. Cassese, 5 JICJ 
(2007), pp. 132 et seq; B. Swart, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice (2009), p. 86. 
760 G. A. Knoops, 30 Fordham International Law Journal (2006), p. 616. 
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responsible under this mode of liability if their support amounts to some form of 
physical support to the group as opposed to mere psychological support. This latter 
form of support may be inferred from instances like publicly expressing agreement 
with the aims of such group or through some other solidarity actions that increase or 
encourage the group’s readiness to carry out crimes. Under the concept of 
conspiracy, this latter form of conduct could be used to infer criminal responsibility.761 
Under the current provisions of Rome Statute, such conduct would perhaps be 
punishable as instigation, but only if the crimes are committed or attempted. 
Therefore, while this mode of participation would be available to punish crimes 
involving relationships of a conspiracy nature and some conduct that has been 
considered punishable under conspiracy,762 it is more restrictive than traditional 
conspiracy provisions.763 The delegates while adopting this mode of participation 
specifically in place of conspiracy liability don’t seem to have given enough 
consideration on its implication in relation to conduct that has previously been 
punished under conspiracy. Conduct involving conspiracy has often implied the 
highest level of culpability involving persons who usually hold leadership positions. 
Such defendants cannot in the relevant context be described as the least culpable. In 
this sense, Article 25 (3) (d) would only essentially capture those that may be 
considered to be the the lower level participants in a conspiracy. Admittedly though, 
                                                          
761 See for example Bizimungu et al., ICTR (TC), para. 1965, the Trial Chamber considered that, the 
attendance of a meeting by two of the defendants, where a new prefect viewed to be more dedicated 
to and in support of the genocidal plan to kill Tutsis in the Butare region was installed in replacement 
of the former who opposed such activities, was further evidence of their involvement in a conspiracy 
to commit genocide. However, this evidence was not eventually considered in their conviction for 
other technical reasons. See discussion above Ch 3 section G. II. 1, ICTR jurisprudence. 
762 See H-H Jescheck, 2 JCIJ (2004) p. 51, who suggests that this provision creates criminal 
responsibility that  lies somewhere between the concepts of conspiracy, JCE and preparation; also 
see K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (2001), p. 235, suggesting that planning the 
commission of an international crime is covered under this mode of participation.  
763 See K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 24. 
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given the low threshold that assisting under Article 25 (3) (c) presents, Art. 25 (3) (d) 
may hardly be utilised to establish responsibility in cases before the ICC.764 
IV. Attempt 
Article 25 (3) (f) of the Rome Statute contemplates liability for attempt to commit a 
crime under international law.765 Attempt begins from the moment the perpetrator 
carries an act that commences the execution of an international crime by a 
substantial step, but the crime fails to occur because of some action independent of 
the perpetrator’s intention.766 Criminal attempt is reached only once the perpetrator 
has begun to execute the crime with a material element that forms part of the crime 
definition already being in place.767 This means the defendant has already carried 
out an act that constitutes a significant step towards commission of the crime. The 
main question here is whether the threshold liability for attempt is low enough to 
make the mere act of agreeing without more to commit an international crime 
punishable. It is opined that by use of the words ‘by means of a substantial step’, 
attempt gives more stringent requirements and the conduct punishable under this 
heading excludes criminal liability for mere preparatory acts not criminalised by the 
Rome Statute.768 Although attempt may avail a threshold low enough to 
accommodate prosecution of certain conduct prior to the actual commission of a 
crime, it would not be sufficient in the face of plans made by several persons in 
                                                          
764 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 803.  
765 See G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 628, stating that 
the law of attempt forms part of international criminal law by virtue of being a general principle of law. 
766 A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 809; K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law 
(2001), p. 250. 
767 K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. no. 37; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), pp. 812-13; G. Werle, 
Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 629. 
768 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 629. 
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contemplation of international crimes with no sufficient step taken to execute them. 
Such a situation could sufficiently be punished under the crime of conspiracy. 
V. Evaluation 
The offence of conspiracy is distinct from its target offence, it precedes commission 
of the target offence and is complete at the moment of agreement before such 
offence is attempted or completed. Article 25 by imputing criminal responsibility for 
conduct involving commission or attempted commission effectively negates criminal 
responsibility for the inchoate form of conspiracy, which creates criminal 
responsibility for acts preceding even the preparation or attempt to commit a 
crime.769 Despite the attribute of being an inchoate crime, thereby providing an 
opportunity to punish incomplete crimes, conduct that has actually been punished 
before the international tribunals (apart from the ICC) under the conspiracy concept 
refers to defendants’ participation in the collective planning, preparation, coordination 
and organisation of crimes that have actually been committed. All the cases under 
which conspiracy has been prosecuted involve complete crimes, with conspiracy 
often being construed from the defendants’ action of simultaneously pursuing the 
same object. A defendant’s association with the agreement is mainly inferred from 
his course of conduct in the concerted and co-ordinated action involving commission 
of the underlying international crime. In this context, the underlying theory of 
punishing conspiracy has been to ensure all those who co-operate for purposes of 
committing international crimes, regardless of whether their role had a direct causal 
contribution in the execution phase of the respective crimes, are held criminally 
responsible. In this latter case, conspiracy has performed more the function of a form 
                                                          
769 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no. 621; see also A. 
Eser, in A. Cassese; P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 802. 
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of criminal participation or mode of complicity creating a basis for holding co-
conspirators reciprocally liable for their respective crimes.  
The analysis on Article 25 (3) shows that the concepts of joint perpetration, indirect 
perpetration, instigation, assitance and contributing to a group crime variously create 
criminal responsibility for conduct that has been considered punishable under the 
doctrine of conspiracy. Co-perpetration under Article 25 (3) (a) sufficiently lays a 
basis to punish the combination of two or more persons to commit a crime, when 
their role in the criminal endeavour forms an essential contribution to the crime with 
the requisite subjective elements being present. The Pre Trial Chamber has 
acknowledged that essential tasks here could constitute tasks carried out either 
before or during the executing stages of a crime and this would include ‘designing 
the attack’ and ‘co-ordinating and monitoring activities’ that form part of commission 
of the crime.770 The theory of indirect perpetration offers a sufficient, and may be 
considered a better alternative legal theory than conspiracy, to ensure the leaders 
who mastermind crimes in criminal enterprises are held accountable. The concept of 
conspiracy does not capture the reality of relations between the leaders and their 
subordinates, especially in the context of warfare, for such circumstances the theory 
of indirect perpetration gives a more accurate picture of the reality and true 
relationship of persons involved in such criminal endeavours. 
Apart from the perpetrators, accused persons whose participation in a conspiracy 
may be inferred from acts that prompt, encourage or lend moral support and give 
practical assistance to commission of crimes carried out by a collective, are under 
Article 25 3 (b) and (c) punished as instigators or assistants of the underlying 
                                                          
770 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the confirmation of 
charges, 30 September 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 526; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. 
W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 790; G. 
Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), marg. no.  467. 
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criminal conduct. Unlike conspiracy, these modes of participation would not require 
proof of agreement between the perpetrators and accomplices. Here again, the 
accomplices do not need to share in the intent to commit the crime, which is a 
prerequisite for conspiracy, it only suffices that they know the perpetrator intends to 
commit the crime. 
Article 25 (3) (d) does not expressly mention conspiracy but like conspiracy, its 
elements indicate that it provides an opportunity to punish crimes committed in a 
collective context by creating individual criminal responsibility for contributions to 
group criminality. It would cover, although to a more limited extent, conduct that has 
been considered punishable under conspiracy concept that does not otherwise 
satisfy the criteria of criminal responsibility provided by the other modes of 
participation.771 The concepts of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration under 
Article 25 (3) (a) would capture the architects, planners and those who co-ordinate 
criminal plans involving commission of international crimes. Article 25 (3) (d) would 
capture those who simply subscribe to these plans (the small fish) and co-operate by 
rendering support for commission of group crimes, if such support does not 
sufficiently qualify as instigation or assistance. 
D. Can Conspiracy be punished through a purposive construction of the Rome 
Statute? 
It has been suggested that although the Rome Statute does not expressly authorise 
conspiracy, the provision in Article 25 (3) (d) is seen to indirectly cover the concept of 
conspiracy and creates an ambiguity sufficient to accommodate pursuit of conspiracy 
                                                          
771 W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crime of Crimes, 2nd  edn. (2009), p. 314, 
describing the Rome Statute as contemplating conspiracy as a form of complicity; see also J. D. 
Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 199, 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/24. 
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convictions by the prosecutor.772 This issue calls for further reflection. Article 21 of 
the Rome Statute provides that the sources of which the ICC may look into apart 
from the Statute itself include ‘principles and rules of international law’.773 This later 
source of law although not expressly mentioned, refers to customary international 
law.774 Conspiracy as a crime under customary international law is only 
acknowledged with respect to the crime of aggression and genocide.775 The Rome 
Statute in a clear departure from customary international law neither provides for the 
crime of conspiracy to commit genocide, nor even for the crime of aggression as 
reflected in the recent consensus on the definition of aggression.776 In the case of 
genocide, only the inchoate crime of incitement to commit genocide is retained.777 It 
may be presumed that by virtue of Article 21, the Rome Statute leaves room for 
judicial creativity, which allows an interpretation for the prosecution and punishment 
of conspiracy as a substantive crime under customary international law, at least with 
respect to genocide and the crime of aggression.  
                                                          
772 See R. P. Barret and L. E. Little, 88 Minn. L. Rev. (2003), p. 75, asserting that Article 21 grants 
licence to ICC to expansively interpret crime definitions ‘…in light of gender concerns and activities 
from other international conventions’; K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (2001), p. 250, 
asserting that in the case of genocide the ICC is likely to construe punishment of conspiracy under 
this article seeking guidance from jurisprudence of the ICTR on the issue. 
773 Article 21 reads in part: 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of  
international law, including established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognised norms 
and standards.  
774 D. Akande, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), p. 
50; M. McAuliffe deGuzman, in O. Triffterer (ed.), in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (2008), Art. 21 marg. no. 13, asserting that ‘rules of international law’ 
actually refer to customary international law; W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International 
Criminal Court, 2nd edn. (2004), p. 92. 
775 See Ch 4 above discussing the customary status of conspiracy as a substantive crime. 
776 See RC/Res.6, adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, on 11 June 2010, by consensus. Article 8 bis 
paragraph 1 states the ‘“crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, 
by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations’. 
777 Article 25 (3) (e). 
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The Rome Statute does not give express guidance on rules of interpretation. Two 
schools of thought exist, either an expansive or restrictive rule of interpretation may 
be used. Under the expansive interpretation, one may look into the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Articles 31 and 32, which respectively provide for 
a general rule and subsequent means of interpreting treaties.778 As a general rule, a 
treaty should be interpreted in good faith with an ordinary meaning given to its terms 
in their context and in light of its object and purpose. The context includes the text of 
the treaty, its preamble, annexes and subsequent treaties adopted by state parties in 
relation to the treaty. If the meaning resulting from the general rule is ambiguous or 
obscure or leads to an absurd or unreasonable result, the Vienna Convention 
provides for supplementary means of interpretation. This includes resolving to look 
into the drafting history of the treaty. In light of these rules an expansive approach 
may be used to interpret the Rome Statute. This approach in interpretation was used 
by the ICTY in the Tadic decision while adopting JCE as a mode of liability. The 
Appeals Chamber on realising that adhering to the strict language of the ICTY 
Statute limited the proper analysis and categorisation of the defendant’s criminal 
responsibility in respect to the underlying crimes, it went ahead to adopt an 
expansive approach in its interpretation. As a result, the Chamber construed a 
reading of the ICTY Statute that recognised JCE as a mode of perpetration in the 
object and purpose of this Statute.779 Consistent with this expansive view of 
interpretation, some scholars see the possibility of the ICC judges reading 
                                                          
778 Adopted on 22 May 1969, and entered into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty 
series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
779 Tadic (AC), para. 189; G. P. Fletcher, 9 JCIJ (2011), p. 185; J. D. Ohlin, 5 JICJ (2007), p. 72; W. A. 
Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2 edn. (2004), p. 94, observing that the 
Judges at the ICTY often relied on the principles of interpretation of the Vienna Convention, ‘which 
are essentially contextual and purposive in scope’. 
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conspiracy in Article 25 (3) (d).780 This reasoning is tied to the negotiating history on 
the crime of conspiracy, which culminated into the mode of participation adopted in 
Article 25 (3) (d). 
In the second alternative, under the practice of national jurisdictions, criminal law 
statutes are often interpreted restrictively. In case of ambiguity the result more 
favourable to the accused is adopted. Subsequently, since the Rome Statute is a 
source of international criminal law rules, it is asserted that it should be subject to the 
rule of strict construction.781 By virtue of this reasoning, any ambiguity that may be 
construed in Article 25 (3) (d) can only be interpreted to exclude the crime of 
conspiracy. This rationale is strongly bolstered by a reading of Article 22 of the Rome 
Statute, which articulates the principle of Nullum crimen sine lege.782 This Article 
provides that a person may only be criminally responsible for a conduct that 
constitutes a crime under the Statute at the time it is carried out, further, instructing 
that the definition of crimes should be strictly construed.783 Pursuant to this rule of 
strict construction, conspiracy under customary international law cannot be 
construed to form part of the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The nullum crimen 
principle also restricts customary law, making it impossible for a court or tribunal to 
                                                          
780 R. P. Barret and L. E. Little, 88 Minn. L. Rev. (2003), at p. 75; A. K. A. Greenwalt, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. (1999), p. 2284; K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (2001), p. 250; W. K. Letzau, 32 
Cornell Int’l. J. (1999), p. 485. 
781 W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2nd edn. (2004), p. 94. 
782Article 22 reads: 
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In 
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being 
investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international 
law independently of this Statute. 
783 W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2 edn. (2004), p. 95, observes 
that Article 22 (2) leaves room for ‘the question of whether or not strict construction applies to 
provisions of the Statute other than those that define the offences themselves’, making it possible for 
the use of the contextual interpretation rule of the Vienna Convention. 
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apply a customary rule, which criminalises conduct that does not fall under one of 
the categories of crimes over which its statute gives jurisdiction.784 
E. A Deliberate Decision or Inadvertent Omission: A Case for Conspiracy 
The decision to exclude criminal responsibility for conspiracy as a distinct crime in 
the Rome Statute has drawn mixed sentiments. This has especially generated much 
debate with respect to the crime of genocide, where prosecution of conspiracy has 
featured prominently in the practice of the ad hoc tribunals. There is the view that the 
exclusion of conspiracy particularly in reference to genocide could have been the 
result of inadvertence on the part of drafters of the Rome Statute.785 The opposing 
view asserts that this exclusion represents a deliberate desire by States to change 
the applicable law regarding conspiracy to commit genocide.786  
The assertion that such exclusion was a result of carelessness is not persuasive, 
when analysed in light of the background information on the drafting history of the 
Rome Statute. This history reveals a deliberate adoption of the common purpose 
mode of participation as a substitute to the offence of conspiracy. The opinion that it 
was a deliberate attempt by States to change the law may on the face of it seem 
more convincing. This later opinion however, contradicts the fact that at the level of 
domestic law, several jurisdictions continue to at least maintain conspiracy to commit 
genocide as a crime.787 This confirms the fact that States continue to acknowledge 
the criminal nature of conspiracy conduct, although, there is some hesitation with 
                                                          
784 D. Akande, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), p. 
50; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2008) p. 17; M. C. Othman, Accountability for 
International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda and East Timor (2005), p. 223. 
785 W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn. (2009), p. 315, 
Schabas sees it as ‘an oversight of exhausted drafters’, a view which stems from the inclusion of the 
inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to genocide. He opines that the Diplomatic conference 
was attempting to transfer to the Rome Statute ‘all of the offences defined in the Genocide 
Convention’. 
786J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 201, 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/24. 
787 See Ch 4 above.  
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respect to its implementation at the international level. This hesitation can be 
attributed to the different treatment accorded to a conspiracy charge in the common 
law and civil law legal systems.788 These differences resulted into what has been 
termed as a political compromise on the question of conspiracy, to ensure the Rome 
Statute became a reality.789 On the one hand, the mode of liability adopted in Article 
25 (3) (d) avoids the express language of punishing conspiracy thereby meeting 
demands of the civil law countries. On the other hand, like the concept of conspiracy 
under common law jurisdictions, it creates criminal responsibility for participation in 
group criminality seemingly meeting the demands of this later group of countries, 
with the modification that such conduct can only be punished if the underlying crime 
has been attempted or carried out.  
This inevitably creates a need to discuss the wisdom of such compromise, especially 
in light of suggestions that it represents a drawback in prosecutions before the ICC, 
particularly, in reference to the crime of genocide.790  This argument is drawn against 
a contrary view that supports the exclusion of conspiracy liability, asserting that this 
has resulted into a more defensible Statute from the perspective of criminal law 
theory, and is evidence of a stronger commitment to the principle of individual 
accountability.791 The following discussion answers the question whether such 
exclusion has created a dangerous gap in the prosecution of international crimes, or 
it may be considered to have been a prudent decision. The question at hand is 
answered from the perspective of justifications that have been given in support of 
                                                          
788 See Ch 2 above on comparative analysis; M. C. Othman, Accountability for International 
Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda and East Timor (2005), p. 222.  
789 R. P. Barret and L. E. Little, 88 Minn. L. Rev (2003), p. 82, view this decision as a pragmatic move 
made by the drafters who ‘may have chosen to sacrifice clear authorization for conspiracy 
prosecutions in the interest of completing the enterprise’. 
790 Y. Askar, Implementing International Humanitarian Law: From the Ad Hoc Tribunals to a 
Permanent International Criminal Court (2004), p. 230; M. C. Othman, Accountability for International 
Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda and East Timor (2005), p. 224.  
791 G. P. Fletcher, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2007), p. 448; J. D. Ohlin, Cornell Law 
Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), p. 200, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/24. 
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conspiracy as a distinct crime, and in light of the function the conspiracy charge has 
had in prosecution of international crimes. It shall also include an analysis of the 
objections that have been directed towards the offence of conspiracy. These findings 
will be weighed against the alternative structures that Article 25 (3) presents in 
holding perpetrators of international crimes accountable. 
I. Rationale for punishing conspiracy in International Criminal Law 
Under international criminal law several justifications for the offence of conspiracy 
have been set forth.792 These justifications may generally be classified under three 
main categories: prevention, procedural convenience, and the full story rationales.  
a) Prevention 
The first justification emanates from the characteristic of conspiracy as an inchoate 
crime, making it an essential tool for prosecuting criminal conduct while still in its 
early stages. Therefore, it prevents further criminal activity from occurring on a large 
scale. Conspiracy’s role in prevention was first acknowledged and emphasised in the 
General Assembly’s resolution 96 (1) of 11 December 1948 adopting the Genocide 
Convention. This resolution acknowledged that the Convention would not only 
concern punishment for the crime of genocide but also focus on prevention.793 To 
facilitate prevention, it was considered imperative to make certain preparatory acts 
punishable, although, they did not amount to genocide. These acts would include 
agreements or plots with a view to committing genocide. In this sense therefore, 
conspiracy satisfies the international criminal law goal of prevention. It provides a 
                                                          
792 In comparison see Ch 2 section B. III, for the rationale of conspiracy under domestic jurisdictions. 
793 The resolution reads in part, ‘…the General Assembly…recommends that international co-
operation be organised between States with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide…’, cited in H. Abtahi and P. Webb, “From The Ad Hoc 
Committee Draft To The Sixth Committee.” The Genocide Convention: The Travaux Preparatoires 
(2008), Martinus Nijhoff Online. 04 March 2011 DOI:10.1163/ej.9789004164185.i-2236.III, E/AC.25/3 
665. 
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legal foundation for punishing conduct involved in the very preliminary stages when 
the commission of a crime is conceived and agreed upon, and before any substantial 
step is taken towards its commission. Yet the practice in international criminal law 
has only addressed crimes retrospectively. Conspiracy in the respective cases 
before the international tribunals has been punished after substantive crimes have 
occurred. This puts the notion of prevention into doubt.  
Although the basic idea of conspiracy is to punish incomplete crimes, the common 
law concept of conspiracy also offers certain special features that have made it an 
appealing tool for prosecuting international crimes, even in the circumstances that 
the underlying crimes have already been committed. In the prevailing circumstances, 
the prosecution of conspiracy has mainly been maintained under the banner of 
procedural convenience and the full story justifications.  
b) Procedural Convenience 
International crimes almost always occur in a large scale and systematic context 
usually involving a group of persons executing a pre-determined plan. Given the 
collective nature of international crimes, it is not always readily apparent or clear 
what an individual’s contribution to the resulting crime was. A feature common in the 
reality of international crimes is that their execution involves cooperation between 
several persons. This means that the responsibility for commission of a single crime 
is spread over a number of actors who have various responsibilities towards its 
completion, a phenomenon termed as ‘diffusion of crime’.794 This makes it difficult to 
                                                          
794 N. K. Kaytal, 112 The Yale Law Journal (2003), p. 1326; see also K. Ambos, in O. Triffterer (ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2nd edn. (2008), Art. 25 marg. 
no. 3; T. Weigend, 9 JCIJ (2011), p. 108, also briefly illuminates on this problem, asserting that it 
contributed to the introduction of the concepts of JCE and indirect perpetration. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 236 
establish a person’s culpability in commission of the crime.795 When several 
individuals commit parts of a crime proving a person’s actus reus becomes difficult. 
This distribution of tasks also makes it difficult to prove a more culpable mental state 
for individuals who carry out a minor or discrete task. The common law conspiracy 
has been considered to give a suitable answer to this problem. First, it offers the 
lowest possible objective element by which one may be held criminally responsible 
for a crime, the mere act of agreeing. Second, to combat the special challenges 
presented by crimes carried out by a collective, common law conspiracy also acts as 
a special criterion of complicity. The underlying idea is that a conspirator will be held 
liable for all substantive crimes committed by his co-conspirators in the course of the 
conspiracy. The crimes referred to here include those that were reasonably 
foreseeable within the scope of the agreement or criminal enterprise. Thus, the 
common law conspiracy in these circumstances offers a legal tool that facilitates 
prosecution of those who hide behind the veneer of the group, giving the possibility 
of securing several convictions.796 As a result, following the end of World War II with 
crimes involving a large number of victims and perpetrators, which were executed in 
a highly organised manner, the common law conspiracy was seen to have the 
necessary special legal underpinnings that made it suitable for prosecution of such 
crimes.797  
Further, under the banner of procedural convenience, the conspiracy charge has 
especially been considered to be an important tool in holding accountable, leaders 
                                                          
795 A. Maljevic, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different Legal Models 
against Criminal Collectives (2011), p. 20, also reflects this position by stating that the participants in 
the upper and lower level of a criminal collective hardly meet the strictly defined subjective elements 
of criminal liability. 
796 R. P. Barret and L. E. Little, 88 Minn. L. Rev. (2003), p. 68; N. K. Kaytal, 112 The Yale Law Journal 
(2003), p. 1326. 
797 J. A. Bush, Columbia Law Review (2009), p. 1137; S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. 
Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (1990), p. 213; B. F. Smith, The 
American Road to Nuremberg. The Documentary Record 1944-1945, Doc. 16 (1982), p. 35. 
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who organise and inspire their subordinates to carry out international crimes, but do 
not themselves soil their hands in actual execution of the crimes.798 One main 
feature of atrocities perpetrated during the Second World War was the fact that the 
crimes were planned and ordered by leaders, and eventually carried out by a 
powerful apparatus consisting of several subordinates.799 This is a feature that 
recurs in almost all scenarios involving commission of international crimes. The 
leaders, often the masterminds of such criminal schemes, skilfully distance 
themselves from the actual acts involving the substantive crimes. This makes it 
difficult to prove their actus reus and mens rea, helping them to evade punishment. 
By focusing on the agreement between the actors who form an integral part in the 
planning and deliberations of criminal schemes, the conspiracy charge is seen to 
allow the prosecution to avoid the unnecessary focus on a crime committed by 
another, of which the accused’s proximate role in its commission may be difficult to 
prove.800 The conspiracy charge was proposed at Nuremberg because it presented 
with it characteristics that would ensure the most notorious criminals (the leaders) 
who manage to insulate themselves from direct liability, by hiding their actions 
behind layers of middle persons would not escape criminal responsibility.801 The idea 
of holding the leaders accountable under conspiracy also seemed to offer a better 
theory that would reflect their true level of criminal responsibility, rather than holding 
them accountable merely as accessories by reason of complicity, which infers a 
lower level of responsibility. As a result, conspiracy was a fundamental charge in the 
                                                          
798 R. P. Barret and L. E. Little, 88 Minn. L. Rev (2003), p. 63, describing such persons as the ‘key 
players…whose charisma, intelligence, and power fuel the conspiratorial process’. A similar argument 
is given under domestic jurisdictions; see above Ch 2 section B. III.  
799 S. Pomorski, in G. Ginsburgs and V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.),The Nuremberg Trial and International 
Law (1990), p. 213. 
800 Y. Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the wake of World War II (2008), 
p. 83. 
801 J. A. Bush, Columbia Law Review (2009), p. 1138; See above Ch 3 sections B. I. and II.  
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case of the 24 major war criminals before the IMT, and the 28 Japanese leaders 
before the Tokyo tribunal. This rationale is also one of the contributing factors that 
have informed prosecution of conspiracy before the ICTR.802 It has resulted in the 
indictment of several leaders who formed part of the interim government of Rwanda 
during the genocide period, with the charge of conspiracy. Among the leaders 
prosecuted was a former prime minister of the Republic of Rwanda Jean Kambanda, 
who pleaded guilty to the count of conspiracy to commit genocide among other 
charges.803  
This justification behind using conspiracy for its procedural convenience is also 
questionable, in view of the few convictions that have been obtained under this 
charge. The tribunals have often restrictedly interpreted the elements of conspiracy, 
rendering its perceived procedural advantages redundant. This restrictive application 
is driven by the apprehension of applying collective guilt. The preferred tendency is 
to find the accused liable for the underlying crimes through other modes of 
participation. In this respect, modes of participation such as JCE in the ad hoc 
tribunals, and to some limited extent the theory of criminal organisations in the 
subsequent Nuremberg tribunals have had a more prominent function.804 
c) Full Story Rationale 
One main challenge against the conspiracy charge is what benefit accrues to 
prosecute and convict for inchoate liability in the face of complete crimes. This 
dilemma is even more persistent when the evidence used to prove conspiracy is 
inferred from the evidence used to establish commission of the underlying 
substantive crimes. In the perspective of continental jurisdictions legal theory, the 
                                                          
802 M. C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda 
and East Timor (2005), p. 228. 
803 Kambanda, ICTR (TC). 
804 See above Ch 3. 
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essence of convicting or even prosecuting conspiracy disappears once its underlying 
crimes have been perpetrated. In contrast, under the common law jurisdictions since 
conspiracy is an independent crime, conviction for conspiracy even when its 
underlying objective has been achieved can still be maintained. The reasoning under 
the common law school of thought is that an accused found guilty of the underlying 
crimes, should nonetheless, be held liable for conspiracy to give a complete 
representation of the accused’s criminal responsibility.805 Second, a conviction for 
conspiracy is also considered imperative when the crimes underlying the objective of 
such conspiracy, in fact, exceed the crimes actually committed pursuant to the same 
conspiracy. Third, a conviction for conspiracy is necessary to show that the crimes 
were part of some overall criminal scheme carefully planned and executed.806 
Conspiracy in this aspect is seen to play a bigger picture in the truth-telling function 
of judicial decisions, showing the true context in which the underlying crimes were 
carried out. The full story justification seems to emphasise and considers it important 
to punish conspiracy because it gives a good account of the group behaviour 
involved in committing the underlying crimes, and for the extra stigma that such 
conviction carries with it. Therefore, the conspiracy charge in this case captures the 
collective circumstances under which the crimes were committed and acts as an 
aggravating factor. In this sense, it is not sufficient to only allege that an accused 
perpetrated certain crimes, but it is also imperative to say that the crimes were 
perpetrated as part of a conspiracy of which the accused was party to, ensuring the 
accused’s criminal responsibility is analysed in its true context.  
                                                          
805 A. Obote-Odora, 8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, No. 1 (2001), para. 95. 
806 M. C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of Rwanda 
and East Timor (2005), p. 206, referring to judicial truth of atrocity crimes which requires full 
accountability for both conspiracy and the substantive crime; see also C. M. V. Clarkson & H. M. 
Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials, 5th edn. (2003), p. 507 describing this as the “full story” 
rationale; P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. (1977), p. 937. 
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This rationale has been a major guiding principle for the use of the conspiracy 
charge before the ICTR.807 The investigations on the genocide in Rwanda revealed 
that from its conception through to its execution stages, the genocide was planned 
and organised and evidently involved the collaboration of the State and certain 
elements of the civil society. This ensured that a large number of the population 
participated in the killings, thus evidence of some grand conspiracy.808 Whether this 
rationale actually plays an essential role is also doubtful. In the ad hoc tribunals, 
there has been a tendency not to convict for conspiracy, when the underlying crime 
of genocide has been proved.  
II. Objections to punishing Conspiracy 
Despite the above special attributes of conspiracy, in the context of international 
crimes the propriety of having it as a stand-alone crime has continually been 
challenged. Among the main objections is often citing conspiracy as distinctively a 
common law idea.809 Historical evidence shows that civil law jurisdictions have 
continuously opposed use of the common law concept of conspiracy to prosecute 
international crimes.810 Many countries under civil law jurisdiction are generally 
cautious about the idea of criminalising the mere act of agreement. It is considered 
to amount to criminalising mere thoughts, which are seen to pose no actual danger 
to society. In most civil law jurisdictions, the preference is to punish group crimes 
through offences of participation in a criminal association.811 To a great extent, these 
                                                          
807 See M. C. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of 
Rwanda and East Timor (2005), p. 224 et seq. 
808 See Annual Report of ICTR to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc. A/55/435, S/2000/927, 2 
October 2000, para.132; also Annual Report of ICTR to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/53/429, S/1998/857, 23 September 1998, para. 57. 
809 G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), p. 221; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 
2nd edn. (2008), p. 227; also see Ch 3 above, arguments of defence counsel in the Nuremberg 
tribunal and subsequent Nuremberg tribunals. 
810 This was a main argument raised during the Nuremberg trials opposing the conspiracy charges, 
see Ch 3 above. 
811 See Ch 2 above section C, discussing punishment of group criminality under civil law countries. 
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offences punish conduct of the nature punished under the common law conspiracy, 
although, there is the requirement in most instances that such associations have a 
more structured organisation as opposed to loosely formed spontaneous criminal 
associations. Conversely, recent continuous reforms in some major civil law 
jurisdictions disclose a gradual tendency towards punishing criminal agreements in 
their penal laws with respect to certain serious crimes, among these include 
international crimes.812 
In addition to a general objection to the common law conspiracy concept, even in 
instances that criminal responsibility for the offence of criminal agreement is 
recognised, most continental jurisdictions adopt a different approach to punishing 
conspiracy.813 While under common law jurisdictions conspiracy is an autonomous 
crime punishable the moment two or more people agree regardless of its results, 
under continental jurisdictions conspiracy is a form of attempted participation that is 
only punishable to the extent that its target crime is not committed or even 
attempted. In this latter form, conspiracy is absorbed in the completed or attempted 
crime. These conceptual differences have contributed to a number of contradictory 
decisions with respect to the charge of conspiracy to commit genocide before the ad 
hoc international tribunals.814  
The special features of the common law concept of conspiracy have also generated 
much criticism from several scholars, with some labelling it as a theory of collective 
criminality. By virtue of its features, participation under the common law conspiracy is 
conclusive on complicity, making such a participant punishable for all crimes carried 
out pursuant to the conspiracy even if they contributed only marginally. Participation 
                                                          
812 Ch 2 above section C. I., II. and III. (Germany, Spain and France). 
813 Musema, ICTR (TC), paras. 196, 197; W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime 
of Crimes, 2nd edn. (2009), p. 310. 
814 See Ch 3 above section G. II. 2. 
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in such a conspiracy also carries with it the potential of being held liable for 
foreseeable crimes committed thereto. In this sense, conspiracy is considered to 
cast a wide net over its adherents making it indistinguishable from collective 
punishment.815 It is thus seen to violate the principle of Nulla Poena Sine Culpa. 
Fletcher on this aspect in fact observes that the conspiracy charge before 
Nuremberg ‘reflected a yearning to impose collective guilt on the German 
leadership’.816 
III. Evaluation 
In the context of complete crimes, conspiracy before the international criminal 
tribunals has mainly performed the function of a mode of participation as opposed to 
an inchoate crime. This explains the dilemma that has been displayed before the ad 
hoc tribunals, questioning the essence of convicting an accused for conspiracy, 
mainly seen as an inchoate crime, when commission of the substantive crime has 
been proved. In such circumstances, the international tribunals have in most cases 
inferred an accused’s criminal responsibility for conspiracy from participating in the 
planning and preparatory activities relating to the underlying crimes. The agreement 
is often deduced from the concerted and coordinated action involved in commission 
of these crimes.  
From the onset of negotiations on formation of a permanent international criminal 
court, conspiracy in the proposed draft statutes was labelled either advertently or 
inadvertently as a mode of complicity, losing out on its value as a purely independent 
                                                          
815 A. Fichtelberg, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006), at pp. 159, 160; also see P. Marcus, 65 Geo. L. J. 
(1977), p. 943, who asserts that if conspiracy is not approached with caution it can be a ‘drag net’ 
capable of great oppression; C. Robert, Southern California Law Review (2007), p. 473; E. van 
Sliedregt: The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(2003), p. 17. 
816 G. P. Fletcher, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2007), p. 448. 
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inchoate crime essential for punishing incomplete crimes.817 The influence that led to 
this course of events can most likely be attributed to the actual function and context 
in which conspiracy has been used to prosecute international crimes and the 
interpretation of its elements by the international tribunals.818 
If one looks at conspiracy strictly from the perspective of its actual role in prosecuting 
complete international crimes that is as proof of participation in other substantive 
crimes (a mode of participation), then it suffices to say that this conduct has 
sufficiently been captured by the modes of liability under Article 25 of the Rome 
Statute. First, those who plan and prepare for execution of crimes in a concerted and 
co-ordinated manner, which conduct has previously been punished by conspiracy, 
may in Article 25 (3) (a) be criminally responsible under the concept of joint 
perpetration or indirect co-perpetration. The concept of joint perpetration provides a 
basis to punish those who act concertedly as co-perpetrators and give essential 
contribution pursuant to a common plan for accomplishment of a crime. Agreement is 
one of the fundamental elements of this mode of liability. Co-perpetration would 
sufficiently capture the leading figures in a criminal scheme that come together, plan, 
prepare and make essential decisions regarding commission of crimes. Second, the 
concept of indirect perpetration offers an alternative legal tool to conspiracy, for the 
cases in which conspiracy was considered essential in facilitating the prosecution of 
leaders who manage to insulate themselves from direct liability in actual commission 
of international crimes, although, they are the brains that plan and ensure execution 
of such crimes through a ‘powerful machinery’. Indirect perpetration provides a 
                                                          
817 See Ch 5 section B above on negotiations; A. Eser, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. R. W. D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 1 (2002), p. 786, wonders if the 
drafters had realised that structuring conspiracy on accessorial principles would lead to loosing its 
function as an inchoate crime. 
818 On this, also see W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn. 
(2009), p. 314, commenting that ‘[l]aw-makers continue to be haunted by the restrictive construction 
given to conspiracy at Nuremberg’. 
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sufficient basis to punish those who engineer execution of international crimes 
through control of an organisation.  
Apart from the perpetrators, there are those participants who though not having 
control over the crimes, give essential support to a collective criminal endeavour. 
They are generally termed as accessories to the crime and would under the theory of 
conspiracy be punished together with the perpetrators as conspirators. These 
participants are usually responsible for prompting, encouraging, advising and giving 
some other practical assistance that facilitates the commission of the crime or 
crimes. Under the Rome Statute they are responsible pursuant to Article 25 (3) (b) 
and (c), which recognises criminal responsibility for ordering, soliciting or inducing, 
and aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in commission or attempted commission 
of crimes punishable in the Statute. Accessories under the Rome Statute do not have 
to share an intention with the perpetrators on commission of the crimes, it suffices 
only that they knew of the perpetrator’s intention to commit the crime. This contrasts 
the liability theory under conspiracy, which requires an inferrence of shared 
intentions. 
Third, to deal with the challenges of system criminality, where several persons 
commit crimes by hiding behind the veil of the group making it difficult to ascertain 
who actually committed the crime in question, the conspiracy charge provided a 
safety net for the prosecution. It offered the lowest possible objective element by 
which an accused may be held criminally responsible, the mere act of agreeing. To 
address this challenge Article 25 offers an alternative legal approach under the 
‘common purpose’ or ‘complicity in group crimes’ liability. This mode of participation 
also provides for the lowest possible objective requirement that would create criminal 
responsibility for commission of international crimes. When it is obvious that an 
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accused made some contribution to the commission of a crime carried out by a 
collective, but such contribution does not satisfy the definitional elements of a 
perpetrator, nor is the contribution substantial to suffice as instigation or assistance, 
Article 25 (3) (d) covers such subsidiary conduct. Although, the contribution that 
qualifies for punishment under this mode of participation would require more than the 
mere act of agreement, it still makes it possible to punish those who give indirect but 
what may be considered to be essential support for criminal collectives. This mode of 
liability can be considered to provide an opportunity to hold accountable those who 
participate at the periphery of criminal schemes. Therefore, the mode of common 
purpose liability like conspiracy seems to compensate for challenges of diffusion that 
are evident in group crimes. It however, avoids the threat of criminal responsibility 
arising from the mere fact of association by excluding the possibility of ‘collateral 
liability’, which is often associated with the anglo American concept of conspiracy 
under its Pinkerton liability theory and JCE III. A defendant under the common 
purpose mode of liability is only responsible for criminal conduct that he is actually 
complicit in. This excludes criminally responsibility for additional crimes committed by 
a member of the group that were allegedly foreseeable, even though, they were not 
part of the crimes intended by the group or the defendant was unaware of them. 
In addition, the common purpose mode of participation expressly makes punishable 
conduct that commentators under domestic law in common law jurisdictions have 
classified as ‘aiding and abetting’ a conspiracy. It makes it possible to establish 
criminal responsibility for those who contribute to a group crime with the mere 
knowledge of the group’s intention to commit certain criminal activities, without 
having to share in such intention. This conduct although considered punishable by 
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domestic courts, they often have difficulties in supporting such convictions under the 
conspiracy theory liability.819  
Fourth, in response to the full story justification for conspiracy, the manner in which 
the charges are drawn and the judgments drafted before the ICC, satisfactorily give a 
full account of a defendant’s alleged participation in commission of international 
crimes. This counters the need for a conspiracy charge and conviction to give a 
rounded impression of facts surrounding commission of the crimes. The modes of 
liability in Article 25 are structured in a manner that recognises the various ways that 
individuals may collectively contribute to commission of crimes. In practice, an 
indictment charging an accused before the ICC not only includes the crimes he is 
suspected of, but also the mode of participation by which it is alleged he contributed 
to the crimes. In addition, the ICC’s jurisdiction is restricted to serious crimes that are 
either termed as collective by their very nature or were part of a plan or policy.820 The 
inference here is that all crimes punishable before the ICC by their very nature have 
a collective element, or involve the cooperation of several individuals. All these 
factors provide an opportunity to give a full account, or tell the whole story with 
respect to any incident involving commission of international crimes. This negates 
the need to label the commission of such crimes under the term conspiracy, for one 
to draw conclusion that an accused acted in cooperation with others in commission 
of such crimes.   
                                                          
819 See above Ch 2 section B. 2.1. b.  
820 See A. Chouliaras, in A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach (2010), p. 68; G. P. Fletcher Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 45 
(2007), p. 447, describing aggressive war as being by its very nature collective; W. A. Schabas, 
Genocide in International Law; The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn. (2009), p. 310, asserting on the 
collective nature of Genocide; Rome Statute article 7 (2) (a) indicating an attack against any civilian 
population should be pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy; Rome Statute 8 
(1) stating the court shall have jurisdiction for war crimes particularly when committed as part of a plan 
or policy. 
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It can be said that Article 25 of the Rome Statute comprehensively covers all conduct 
by which an individual may contribute to commission or attempted commission of 
international crimes. Under the theory of conspiracy as a mode of participation, all 
who contribute to commission of the crime in whatever form or degree are equally 
liable as conspirators without making a distinction between the perpetrators and 
mere accessories to the crime. Unlike the concept of conspiracy that bundles all 
participants together in one mode of participation, the differentiated model of 
participation in Article 25 provides for a qualitative distinction for the different levels of 
contribution undertaken by participants in a group crime. In this sense, Article 25 
avoids the dangers that are more apparent in the conspiracy offence, which blur’s 
the difference in degree of participation of accused involved in a collective criminal 
scheme, exposing a minor participant to the possibility of criminal responsibility that 
is wider than their actual extent of participation. 
Whereas the function of conspiracy as a mode of complicity is satisfactorily covered 
under Article 25, its function as an inchoate crime designed for punishment of 
incomplete crimes is obviously excluded in the Rome Statute. The importance of 
inchoate conspiracy within domestic jurisdictions cannot be gainsaid. It has the 
essential role of providing a tool that enables early intervention by law enforcers, 
frustrating the realisation of any criminal schemes involving crimes with serious 
repercussions to the society. To implement this aspect of law embodied in the 
conspiracy concept, domestic jurisdictions put in place several monitoring 
mechanisms and measures that facilitate early intervention. This ensures effective 
utilisation of the conspiracy doctrine. The reality of practice in international law, and 
the manner in which states relate to each other under the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, makes the possibility of putting in place effective mechanisms for early 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 248 
intervention a difficult if not impossible ideal to achieve.821 In most cases, the 
international community only intervenes after substantive crimes have been 
committed. The practice before the international tribunals reveals that the idea of 
conspiracy as an inchoate crime is almost entirely fictional, with all prosecutions 
relating to the conspiracy charge only involving consummated conspiracies. An 
intervention after commission of crimes defeats the very idea of conspiracy, which is 
to prevent crimes even before they are attempted. In the circumstances, if 
conspiracy is not functional as a mode of complicity and neither is it considered 
necessary under the full story rationale it becomes a redundant crime. It may be 
stated that given the reality of relations between states in the international arena, 
conspiracy is an irrelevant crime and the decision by the states to exclude it within 
the ambit of the ICC, does not in any way affect the prosecution of international 
crimes.822 This argument may also be reinforced by an assertion that by the time the 
international community considers to intervene in a situation where the potential to 
commit international crimes is eminent, steps to implement such plans will often have 
been substantially undertaken. This is enough to meet the standards that create 
criminal responsibility under attempt. Therefore, the Rome Statute may be 
considered to still adequately satisfy the rationale of prevention, because in practice 
the criminalisation of conspiracy may have no real significance. On account of this 
perspective alone it would be correct to assert that there is no gap in the law.  
Looking at conspiracy exclusively from the above limited perspective misses out on 
the symbolic and functional value of the Rome Statute, and the need to deter certain 
criminal activities that threaten the very existence of humanity from the moment of 
                                                          
821 See G. P. Fletcher, 4 JICJ (2006), p. 455, on States jealously guarding their sovereignty. 
822 See G. P. Fletcher, 4 JICJ (2006), p. 455, asserting that the international community has rejected 
purely inchoate offences, including conspiracy because of lack of an early intervention mechanism. A 
good example is the Veto adopted by China and Russia stopping UN’s bid to exert pressure on Syria 
to stop attacks on civilians calling for regime change and the right to democratic space. 
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their conception. Supposing investigations carried out in a certain area reveal that 
international crimes have been committed, and apart from plans relating to the 
executed crimes, there were more plans to perpetrate other crimes but no further 
substantial steps had yet been taken towards their accomplishment. The 
international community in such a case under the Rome Statute would only be able 
to hold accountable the most responsible figures with respect to crimes committed or 
at least attempted. This leaves out the extra plans relating to unexecuted crimes. 
Perhaps a hypothetical situation would better illustrate the problem. 
The leader of a country ‘A’ is facing political dissent. He has been the president for 
several years and has successfully suppressed all political dissent. The political 
structures in country ‘A’ make it impossible for the election of another leader through 
democratic institutions. Uprising by the civilian population in certain countries 
neighbouring country ‘A’ leads to the overthrowing of equally autocratic leaders in the 
respective countries. This course of events inspires the civilian population in country 
‘A’ leading to demonstrations in certain parts of the country. Country ‘A’ is highly 
divided along ethnic lines, and its leader mainly enjoys majority support from his 
ethnic community, and a few other ethnic communities whose members seem to 
benefit from their close relationship with the leader. The protests in country ‘A’ are 
seen to arise from parts of the country occupied by other ethnic communities from 
which the leader does not seem to have a majority support. To suppress these 
protests, the leader and other leading personalities in his government decide to 
engage the army to attack the population perceived to be opposing the current 
leadership. Country ‘A’ has a vast landscape and logistics do not allow the army to 
concurrently attack the demonstrating population in various parts of the country. The 
leading figures of country ‘A’ proceed to make plans that will guide the systematic 
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attack by the army against the protestors, deciding to start in the cities ‘X, Y, Z’, 
considered most crucial for the governance of country A and later to follow cities ‘K, 
L, M’.  The army following these plans begin to attack city ‘X’ and thereafter city ‘Y’. 
These attacks generally seem to target persons who come from the ethnic groups 
perceived to be steering the protests. In the course of the army’s operations, the 
international community notices the large number of civilians fleeing from country ‘A’, 
and realises the potential death of several defenceless civilians. Through a United 
Nations resolution troops are sent in to protect the civilians of country A. This 
eventually leads to arrest of the leader in country A alongside his generals and key 
leaders of his government. They are arraigned before the ICC following a reference 
by the Security Council. Evidence before the prosecutor reveals that plans of the 
leader and his cronies extended beyond the crimes actually committed or attempted. 
The attacks were only executed in city ‘X’ and measures had been taken to begin 
attacks in city ‘Y’, but no further measures had been taken on cities ‘Z, K, L and M’ 
apart from the initial plans made. The prosecutor realises that he can only prosecute 
for crimes committed in city ‘X’ and possibly city ‘Y’ but no judicial recourse is 
available for the plans made with respect to the other cities because no further steps 
were taken with respect to their execution. 
If the doctrine of conspiracy were available to the prosecutor it would suffice to hold 
the leaders criminally responsible for all the unexecuted plans, although, no 
substantial steps had been undertaken to execute some of them. In the prevailing 
focus of international criminal law it may suffice to argue that the ICC’s focus on the 
most serious crimes means that it concerns itself only with crimes that pass the 
‘gravity test’.823 Such a test may be considered to only apply in the context of 
                                                          
823 See Rome Statute Articles 17(1) (d). 
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committed and attempted crimes. However, since the Rome Statute reiterates that 
certain crimes are considered so serious that they threaten the very core of 
humanity, hence, certain conduct towards their accomplishment will not be tolerated; 
this conduct should also include conspiracies that do not extend beyond the 
conceptual or planning stage. A conspiracy charge would also especially be useful in 
the context of a criminal plan that extends beyond the criminal acts actually carried 
out. The justification for making such conduct punishable is that such plans or 
preparatory conduct, although still a long way from execution or the beginning 
thereof, are a clear manifestation of their authors’ intentions to carry out  serious 
crimes. It may also be said that by their mere existence, these plans already create 
an increased danger to humanity. Such plans also have the potential of creating a 
situation beyond the control of those who drew them up, given that other persons 
may still choose to adopt them and execute them at a later stage. Hence, there is a 
need to create criminal responsibility for such conduct making it possible to 
expressly condemn such plans through a judicial process. This would act as 
deterrence to any future adherence to the alleged plans or ideology, avoiding any 
possibilities of commission of the conceived international crimes. 
IV. Recommendation 
Although, the exclusion from punishment of the inchoate form of conspiracy in the 
Rome Statute can be described as a relatively small gap, given the serious threat 
that commission of international crimes pose to humanity, I would recommend that 
any conduct towards their execution, even the mere act of agreement, should be 
punished. This is a notion already recognised in many domestic jurisdictions mostly 
within the common law and is gradually gaining ground in continental jurisdictions, 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 252 
with some civil law countries already making the act of agreeing to commit certain 
serious crimes punishable albeit with different parameters. 
The realities in international relations dictates that States will almost only intervene 
when crimes have been committed. This means that the Rome Statute sufficiently 
covers all conduct that may be involved with respect to commission and attempted 
commission of crimes. This however, excludes the possibility of holding defendants 
criminally responsible for criminal plans that extend beyond the crimes committed or 
attempted, in the case that no substantial steps are taken towards their execution. As 
demonstrated by the hypothetical situation above, there may be instances where the 
modes of liability are not sufficient to capture criminal responsibility for certain 
preparatory conduct that may otherwise be considered punishable under conspiracy. 
Conspiracy should therefore, be included as a back-up option or safety net 
mechanism for punishment of criminal plans and such acts that do not qualify as 
attempt but may still be considered to pose a serious danger to humanity by initiating 
the possibility of commission of international crimes. 
 An amendment of the Rome Statute in the circumstances is therefore necessary in 
order to broaden the possibility of intervention in relation to international crimes, and 
to give the ICC the potential of dealing with such conduct in future. Apart from 
prevention and censure, criminal law also has a declaratory function.824 It then 
follows that it is important and imperative, to create criminal responsibility for 
conspiracy for its symbolic and deterrent value, underscoring the seriousness of 
international crimes, and confirming that states will not tolerate even the slightest 
notion of simply agreeing to commit an international crime. Conspiracy also needs to 
be included in the Rome Statute because it sets the standards of the ideal model 
                                                          
824 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), pp. 15 et seq.  
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statute on international crimes that several domestic jurisdictions look up to. This 
revision is also important because the Rome Statute will most likely influence the 
structure of statutes formed for other institutions that the U.N might create to deal 
with special situations like in the case of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon, and 
Special Panels of East Timor.825 
I suggest that the notion of conspiracy being included in the Rome Statute is one 
likely to be acceptable by a majority of the states. In this case the conspiracy 
punishable should be a form of attempted participation as opposed to an 
independent crime, leaving out all its controversial features that are provided for 
under common law countries. Since the function of conspiracy as a form of 
complicity is sufficiently covered by the current modes of liability, the only justification 
left is for the punishment of conspiracy under the notion of prevention. Therefore, 
conspiracy should only be restricted to punishment of incomplete crimes, to the 
extent that they are not committed or attempted. It may be confined to punish 
instances where there is evidence of concrete plans to commit international crimes, 
but no further steps have been carried out that satisfy the attempt threshold. I would 
recommend that Article 25 (3) be revised and a sub paragraph (g) be introduced that 
provides: 
[A] person shall be criminal responsible… if that person: 
… 
(g) Agrees with another or others to commit a crime punishable under this Statute. 
                                                          
825 The language of Article 3 (I) (b) of the statute of Special Tribunal of Lebanon greatly resembles 
Article 25 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute, and  Section 14 on Individual Criminal Responsibility in the 
Special Panels of East Timor, resembles Article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
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Chapter Six: General Conclusion 
Since it was first proposed to hold the major war criminals accountable for atrocities 
committed in the course of Second World War, to the most recent negotiations on 
codification of the Rome Statute, objections have often been raised against the use 
of conspiracy as a tool of accountability. Its greatest proponents mainly come from a 
common law background, whereas its opponents mostly come from civil law 
jurisdictions. 
It has often been asserted that conspiracy is strictly a common law concept. Under 
common law, conspiracy is an independent crime that creates criminal responsibility 
for the mere act of agreement.826 The agreement is seen as a manifestation of the 
criminal intent of the parties participating in it. It is essentially an inchoate crime that 
punishes conduct preliminary to the commission of crimes. This makes it a crucial 
tool for the prevention of crimes, particularly, those committed by groups.  
In contrast, most civil law jurisdictions prefer to combat collective criminal activity 
through the criminal association rule.827 Thus, the jurisdictions of Germany, Spain, 
France and Italy create criminal responsibility for participating in a criminal 
organisation. To participate in founding, or to be a member, or to participate in other 
activities that support such organisation, is subject to punishment. In most 
jurisdictions, a criminal organisation constitutes at least three members, should exist 
for a certain period of time, has some form of hierarchical structure, with a long term 
goal of carrying out criminal activity. These requirements distinguish the criminal 
organisation offences from the offence of conspiracy, where a minimum of two 
people who spontaneously agree to commit a crime are considered punishable. 
Offences formed under the criminal association rule are independent crimes, and 
                                                          
826 See Ch 2 section B. 
827 See Ch 2 section C. 
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they perform in civil law jurisdictions the analogous function of conspiracy in common 
law jurisdictions. They are intended to prevent criminal activity while still at the 
preparatory stage. 
Nonetheless, contrary to popular belief, civil law jurisdictions also punish conduct of 
a conspiracy nature. This negates the assertion that this conduct is only punishable 
under common law jurisdictions. Although most civil law jurisdictions did not for some 
time favour creating criminal responsibility for the mere act of agreeing to commit a 
crime, and initially restricted punishment for such conduct to subversive acts or what 
may be termed as offences against the state such as treason, there has been a 
gradual extension of punishment of such conduct in relation to other serious crimes.  
The objection against punishing conspiracy in civil law jurisdictions has been that it is 
considered purely mental in composition, and is seen to present no apparent harm to 
society. Punishment of conspiracy in civil law jurisdictions has mainly been motivated 
by the realisation that the requirements for offences under the criminal association 
rule are not broad enough to meet all situations of group criminality. The criminal 
association offences, in some instances, could not sufficiently arrest criminal conduct 
while in its preliminary stages. Hence, there has been a need to broadly define what 
constitutes a criminal association, making it possible to even punish an agreement 
made to form such an association.   
This gradual extension of criminal responsibility to capture conduct of conspiracy 
nature in some civil law jurisdictions can mainly be attributed to the ingenuity of 
criminals who continually pursue criminal activities that threaten security of the state 
and public goods, particularly, the increased threat of terrorist activities. This 
increasingly creates the demand for criminal law to intervene at the earliest possible 
point, even before the said crimes have been attempted. Conspiracy in this case 
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seems to present a more flexible concept, than that of criminal organisations, 
sufficient to meet this need. 
The main controversy between civil law and common law countries arises not so 
much from the principle behind criminalising conspiracy, but from the approaches 
used to prosecute and punish conspiracy. The common law conspiracy charge 
carries with it broad liability rules, where an alleged conspirator faces the possibility 
of his criminal responsibility being extended to other criminal acts carried out in 
pursuance of the conspiracy by co-conspirators. Liability for such acts arises 
although they were carried out without the defendant’s knowledge, consent or 
participation, as long as they were a foreseeable consequence of such conspiracy. 
This extensive characteristic of liability in common law conspiracy is mainly 
manifested in the controversial Anglo-American Pinkerton liability doctrine.828 
Circumstantial evidence is often used expansively to establish existence of the 
agreement and intention of the parties in relation to participation in the agreement 
and its underlying crime. 
Unlike common law conspiracy, conspiracy under the respective civil law countries is 
a form of attempted participation and not an independent crime. It is used to strictly 
punish preparatory conduct, and once the target offence has been realised or even 
attempted the criminal agreement offence merges into it. The civil law countries do 
not provide any special procedural or evidential advantages for charges relating to 
the offence of criminal agreement. The criminal agreement offence does not also act 
as a form of complicity and the principle of liability for personal conduct is strictly 
adhered to. Whereas participation in a conspiracy under common law jurisdictions 
may be considered to be as serious as commission of its underlying crime, under 
                                                          
828 See Ch 2 section B. II, 1.1.  
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civil law jurisdictions participation in a conspiracy attracts less culpability and is 
punished more leniently.  
The distinct attributes of common law conspiracy have made it the subject of much 
criticism, with some scholars even calling for its complete elimination.  The 
respective civil law countries have clearly chosen to leave out the controversial 
aspects of common law conspiracy. Although, the critics of the common law 
conspiracy raise some valid concerns, the radical view of abolishing it altogether 
ignores the significant role of conspiracy in arresting criminal activity while still in its 
infancy, and would not be the best solution. A more appropriate approach is to carry 
out reforms that eliminate the unacceptable elements of common law conspiracy. 
Indeed, several steps have been made towards this end, if not expressly by law, at 
least in practice. There is the persistent and quite persuasive view that conduct 
punished under conspiracy often involves action where sufficient steps have been 
taken, and can satisfactorily be punished as attempt or in some cases instigation. 
The rationale of punishing conspiracy once its contemplated crime has been 
committed is also objected to. The recommended view is that conspiracy should be 
restricted to punish only incomplete crimes that do not meet the standards of criminal 
responsibility under attempt. There could also be exceptional cases where the 
interest of justice demands that conspiracy still be punished, even when its 
underlying crime has been committed. Circumstances embracing the interest of 
justice could include where the conspiracy involved commission of crimes beyond 
those actually executed. 
Conspiracy was introduced into the scene of international criminal law on the 
initiative of Americans.829 It was included in the Nuremberg Charter despite objection 
                                                          
829 See Ch 3 section B. 
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from participants of civil law jurisdictions, and was later included in both the Tokyo 
tribunal Charter and Control Council Law (CCL) No. 10.830 Although, its proponents 
intended that conspiracy would be used as a tool of accountability for all crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the international tribunals, conspiracy was eventually only 
punished with respect to the crime against peace. The conspiracy count was so 
serious that a conviction on account of this charge alone earned two accused before 
the Tokyo tribunal life imprisonment sentences. In the end, however, conspiracy was 
strictly construed by the tribunals. It was considered to be a leadership crime and 
was restricted to punish conduct relating to the top brass who were able to plan, 
prepare and make decisions with respect to the waging of war with full knowledge of 
its criminal nature. This limited construction is attributed to the ambiguous manner in 
which the Charters were drafted, and the skeptical attitude of the judges, especially 
those from civil law jurisdictions, towards the conspiracy charge.  
The limited construction given to the conspiracy count by the Nuremberg tribunal 
affected all further attempts by the prosecution to charge conspiracy in the 
subsequent Nuremberg military tribunals.831 No further conviction on account of the 
conspiracy charge was obtained in these tribunals. They also rejected counts on 
conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity on jurisdictional 
grounds. Even though conspiracy was not punished in these tribunals, a conclusion 
drawn from the analysis is that conduct the prosecution actually charged under the 
conspiracy count, which referred to planning and preparatory activities in relation to 
the underlying crimes, was still sufficiently punished by the tribunals as participation 
in the completed crimes. 
                                                          
830 See above Ch 3. 
831 See Ch 3 section C. 
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The main reason for including conspiracy in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters was 
to overcome the procedural and evidential burden involved in proving every 
defendant’s participation in commission of the crimes. The crimes in question had 
been committed on a large scale and in a systematic manner.  Since conspiracy 
under common law is conclusive on complicity, an inference of conspiracy in such 
circumstances would have ensured all participants involved are punished for all 
crimes carried out pursuant to the alleged conspiracy. This was the same reasoning 
that influenced introduction of the concept of criminal organisation, the other tool of 
accountability often associated with conspiracy, adopted in the Nuremberg, Tokyo 
Charters and CCL. 10, to facilitate prosecution of collective criminal activity.832 Here, 
the idea was that once a certain organisation was declared criminal it would create a 
rebuttable presumption of guilt for its members. This, as a result, would make such 
members criminally responsible for all crimes carried out by other members of the 
criminal organisation.  
The tribunals were especially wary of the broad theories of liability that these two 
concepts presented, because they raised the possibility of guilt being established by 
the mere fact of association. This would have violated a general principle of criminal 
law that guilt should be personal. Therefore, the tribunals decided to treat both 
concepts with extreme caution. The vicarious form of criminal responsibility arising 
from conspiracy did not play any role. Most accused persons were held liable 
specifically for their contribution to the commission of crime/s for which he was 
charged. Criminal responsibility for membership in a criminal organisation was 
restricted to defendants who voluntarily remained members of such organisation with 
knowledge of its criminal nature, or were personally implicated in commission of 
                                                          
832 Ch 3 section B. II. 2. 
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crimes attributed to such organisation. As opposed to conspiracy, the concept of 
criminal organisations played a bigger role in the subsequent Nuremberg tribunals, 
with defendants such as Altstöetter in the Justice Case and Poppendick in the 
Medical Case being declared guilty for this offence alone.833 This earned Altstöetter a 
sentence of five years imprisonment, and Poppendick was sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment. It can be concluded that in the subsequent Nuremberg military 
tribunals the offence of criminal organisation in a way compensated for the restricted 
theory of conspiracy liability, where mere knowledge or acquiescence was not 
sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. This concept has since been 
abandoned. 
The coming into force of the Genocide Convention in 1948 introduced criminal 
responsibility for conspiracy to commit genocide. Genocide was considered to be a 
very serious crime against humanity, whose occurrence needed to be prevented at 
the earliest possible opportunity. Therefore, preliminary activities such as the mere 
conduct of agreeing to commit genocide were declared punishable. Punishment of 
this conduct only began with the formation of the ICTY and ICTR, following atrocities 
committed in the early nineties in the territories of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
The law on conspiracy to commit genocide has mainly been articulated by the 
jurisprudence of the ICTR.834 Several defendants have been charged with the 
conspiracy count. However, the conviction rate has been very low.  So far of the 14 
judgments that have discussed conspiracy, only five have returned a verdict of guilty, 
with one being overturned on appeal. Conspiracy is defined as the agreement 
between two or more persons to commit genocide, and is punishable regardless of 
its results. Conspiracy may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. To 
                                                          
833 See Ch 3 sections C. I, II. 
834 Ch 3 section G. 
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establish conspiracy by circumstantial evidence, it must be the only reasonable 
inference that may be drawn in the circumstances. This rule has been strictly 
followed by the tribunal, and has contributed to dismissal of the conspiracy charge in 
a number of cases in which otherwise a conspiracy conviction would have been 
obtained.835 The prosecution is also required to aver in the indictment all acts that it 
intends to rely on to prove the conspiracy charge. The failure to adhere to this rule 
has led to the dismissal of a number conspiracy charges before the ICTR.  
An issue that has drawn varying opinions from the chambers in the ICTR is the 
justification of convicting an accused of conspiracy when his liability for the offence 
of genocide has been established.836 This controversy especially arises if the same 
facts and evidence were used to prove both counts. The controversy is catalysed by 
the differences between civil and common law systems in punishing conspiracy. 
Although, the practice of cumulatively charging conspiracy and genocide is allowed 
on the principle that both are independent crimes with different elements, at the point 
of conviction some chambers hesitate to convict for both. The justification often is 
that to convict on both counts violates the rule of double jeopardy, and since the 
purpose of conspiracy is prevention, once the crime is committed the reason for 
punishing conspiracy is seen to disappear. While the opposing views against 
convicting conspiracy in light of complete crimes may be justified, to look at it only 
from its purpose of prevention, especially when relating to the ICTR, is a very limited 
perspective that fails to reflect on the other functions intended for the conspiracy 
count in this respect. The conspiracy here should also be seen as having the role of 
fully explaining the circumstances under which the genocide in Rwanda was 
perpetrated. The prosecution before the ICTR proceeded under the notion that the 
                                                          
835 Ch 3 section G. II. 
836 Ch 3 section G. II. 2. 
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genocide in Rwanda was a result of one overarching conspiracy between the 
government, civil and military authorities, who hatched plans, organised and 
facilitated the massacre of Rwandans mostly of the Tutsi ethnicity. It would therefore, 
be more prudent to meet the interests of justice in these circumstances by convicting 
an accused on both counts of conspiracy and genocide to reflect the totality of 
crimes that he is culpable of. Since the conspiracy adopted in the Genocide 
Convention was intended to reflect common law conspiracy, it should follow that 
conviction of conspiracy even when commission of its underlying crime has been 
established should in principle still be maintained. Having established that conspiracy 
in the ICTR Statute is an independent crime, the chambers should consistently apply 
the rules of conviction like with all other independent crimes. Such conviction does 
not necessarily need to translate to harsher punishment, as the tribunals can and 
indeed order that the sentences be served concurrently. 
In the ICTY, conspiracy has not played a major role in establishing criminal 
responsibility of the accused.837 In the only judgment in which conspiracy to commit 
genocide was proved, the chamber decided to apply the merger rule, choosing to 
convict the defendants only for genocide, for which their guilt had also been 
determined. The criminal responsibility of most defendants before the ICTY has 
mainly been established through the concept of JCE, a tool of accountability that 
may be referred to as conspiracy’s sister concept.838 Several scholars have equated 
JCE to conspiracy because of the many similarities that run across both concepts. 
JCE forms the basis of holding an accused criminally responsible for crimes carried 
out by a criminal enterprise involving commission of international crimes, if the 
accused participated in it with intent. This resembles the underlying theory of 
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conspiracy as a form of complicity in common law jurisdictions.  Just like the 
American Pinkerton conspiracy liability theory, criminal responsibility in JCE also 
includes foreseeable crimes. Both concepts are used to establish criminal 
responsibility for crimes carried out by a group, and require a plurality of persons 
involved in a common plan or agreement. However, whereas conspiracy is an 
independent inchoate crime punishable regardless of its results, JCE is a mode of 
perpetration that only comes into use after and is dependent upon the commission of 
crimes. The conclusion drawn here is that JCE reflects conspiracy as a form of 
complicity. 
The international tribunals have severally equated conspiracy to participating in the 
planning and preparation of the underlying international crimes. Often, conduct that 
has been charged under the conspiracy count is that of planning and preparing for 
the underlying crimes. As a result, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals did not find it 
prudent to punish both conspiracy and the charge of planning and preparing to wage 
war, choosing instead to punish such conduct under conspiracy. This practice has 
also in certain instances been adopted by other subsequent international tribunals. 
The linking of both concepts often arises because both present preliminary stages of 
a crime. However, it has been established that planning and conspiracy are two 
different concepts.839 While planning is a form of complicity that can be carried out by 
a single person, conspiracy is an independent collective crime. The former when 
carried out by a group of persons is often conclusive evidence of conspiracy. 
Conspiracy before the international tribunals has only been punished in the context 
of complete crimes. In the respective cases, conspiracy has been used more as a 
mode of participation. First, it has been used to punish the leaders who although did 
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not directly carry out the crimes were the brains behind them. Second, it has been 
used as a liability net to ensure all those who act in a concerted and coordinate 
manner in commission of international crimes, or support persons participating in 
such activities, even if their role in the circumstances was not very distinctive, are 
held criminally responsible. Third, it has been seen as an important theory of 
accountability that illustrates the collective context in which the underlying crimes 
were carried out. 
 Conspiracy as an independent crime under customary international law is only 
confirmed with respect to the crime of aggression and genocide.840 Two assertions 
are advanced to reject conspiracy with respect to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity: The first is often traced back to the judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal, 
and the second opines that punishment of conspiracy is only restricted to genocide 
and the crime of aggression because these crimes will always involve a collective. 
The validity of both arguments is questioned because in the first case, the tribunal’s 
rejection of the other forms of conspiracy was purely on account of jurisdictional 
grounds, with no further analysis made on its status as a general principle of law. 
This judgment should thus not be seen as having given a conclusive position on the 
status of conspiracy. The second argument cannot also hold fort because all 
situations involving commission of international crimes of all forms, more often than 
not, involve a plurality of persons. This puts to doubt the collective theory restriction 
of conspiracy to only genocide and the crime of aggression. Current state practice 
shows a growing recognition of punishment of conspiracy at least in respect to 
serious crimes, which includes the international crimes. This supports a view that 
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goal posts have since shifted and the restricted status of conspiracy under 
customary international law should now include all international crimes. 
 In spite of steps made in civil law countries towards criminalising conduct of 
conspiracy nature, they still objected to its inclusion as a tool of accountability during 
negotiations on the Rome Statute. Instead, a substitute was adopted in Article 25 (3) 
(d), a mode of participation in international crimes otherwise known as ‘complicity in 
group crimes’ or ‘common purpose liability’.841 Criminal responsibility in this mode of 
participation arises from contributing to the commission or attempted commission of 
an international crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.  
It is established that the common law conspiracy concept has two characteristic 
traits. In the first case, it is an inchoate crime intended to punish incomplete crimes. 
Criminal responsibility here is created even before the crimes have been attempted. 
In the second instance, it is a form of complicity that creates a basis to hold, all who 
contribute to the commission of crimes carried out pursuant to a common plan or 
agreement, criminally responsible for the underlying crimes. A more critical look at 
Article 25 (3) (d) shows that it does not wholly encompass the features of conspiracy 
liability theory. It does not create criminal responsibility for conspiracy in its pure 
inchoate form because like all other modes of liability in the Rome Statute, it requires 
that responsibility begin at the point of attempt. Therefore, merely agreeing to 
commit an international crime would not be punishable under this mode of liability. It 
represents the lowest form of culpability for participating in commission or attempted 
commission of international crimes. This means it would be available mainly for 
punishing those who work at the periphery of a conspiracy and not the masterminds 
who are often considered to be most criminally responsible. Instead of conspiracy, to 
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hold the leaders or masterminds of a criminal enterprise accountable, the Rome 
Statute provides for alternative modes of individual criminal liability under its 
concepts of co-perpetration or indirect perpetration.842 Further, the Rome Statute 
through its modes of liability of instigation and assistance covers other persons who 
although not in a leadership position substantially support commission of crimes by a 
collective. Indeed, Article 25 (3) satisfactorily captures conduct for which other 
international criminal tribunals may have had to rely on the theory of conspiracy to 
establish criminal responsibility.   
What is obviously excluded in the Rome Statute is punishment of conspiracy for 
purely inchoate liability. This refers to instances where there is evidence of plans 
made but no further acts are carried out towards their realisation, or where it is 
revealed that accused persons participated in plans involving commission of 
international crimes beyond those actually committed. In these circumstances, even 
the crime of attempt, which requires substantive steps to have been taken towards 
commission of the crimes, would not suffice in creating criminal responsibility. Since 
international crimes are classified as the gravest crimes against humanity, even the 
mere conduct of coming together and agreeing to carry out such acts ought to be 
punished. Especially, when such conduct is manifested in concrete plans, although, 
no further action has been undertaken in relation to them.  
It may be argued that given the reality of relations between states in the international 
arena, any intervention to stop commission of international crimes while still merely 
at the preparatory stage is highly unlikely. Indeed, prosecuting crimes that are merely 
agreed upon, discussed and planned, with no further steps undertaken would be 
rare. Nevertheless, even with the possibility of such exceptional circumstances, 
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punishment of conspiracy should be considered imperative, both for its symbolic 
value and deterrent function. This would be a confirmation that humanity will not 
tolerate even the mere fact of agreeing to carry out conduct that appears to threaten 
its peace and security. The practice, even among civil law jurisdictions shows a 
gradual acceptance of criminal responsibility arising from the mere act of agreement 
for very serious crimes, this often includes international crimes. Therefore, it would 
be recommendable for the international community to revise the Rome Statute and 
include criminal responsibility for conspiracy. The main objection it seems is adopting 
a conspiracy concept with the objectionable elements of the common law conspiracy. 
It is recommended that if conspiracy is made punishable, it should strictly be adopted 
for its inchoate liability function, and should fall within the standards accepted by 
most civil law jurisdictions. This means that when the crimes underlying such 
agreement are attempted or committed, the conspiracy will merge into them. Such 
conspiracy will also not need to act as a form of complicity, as the other modes of 
liability already in the Rome Statute satisfactorily meet this requirement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 268 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A PRIMARY SOURCES 
I STATUTES 
INTERNATIONAL 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
2010 amendments to the Rome Statute, The Crime of Aggression, RC/ Res.4, 
Annex I. 
Statute of the International Criminal Court of Justice. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. 
S/RES/827(1993) annex. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955 
(1994) annex.   
International Convention of the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997-UN Doc. 
A/RES/52/164 (1998), annex. 
1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, Vol. II. 
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1991, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1991 Vol. II. 
1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of 
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/51/10(1996). 
Charter for the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, in Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression, Vol. I, pp. 4-12. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 269 
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War crimes, Dec. 20, 
1945, Official Gazette Control Council for Germany No. 3, 31 January 1946, pp. 50-
55. 
Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 
U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 appended to letter dated 6 March 2002 from the Seccretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) Regulation 
2000/15: On Establishment of Panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal 
offences (East Timor), 6 June 2000. 
UN Doc. A/RES/57/228 B, ‘Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea’, 2003; Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as 
promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). 
NATIONAL  
Criminal Law Act of 1977, Chapter 45 (United Kingdom). 
Criminal Attempts Act of 1981, Chapter 47 (United Kingdom). 
Practice Direction (Crime: Conspiracy [1977] 1 WLR 537; [1977] 2 All ER 540; 
(1977) 64 Cr App R 258; 9/5/77. 
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (United Kingdom). 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (United Kingdom). 
International Criminal Court Act of 2001 (United Kingdom). 
Constitution of the United States. 
Federal Statute, Title 18 United States Code § 371. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 270 
Federal Statute, Title 15 United States Code § 1 (2000). 
Federal Statute, Title 18 United States Code § 224 (2000). 
Federal Statute, Title 18 United States Code § 241 (2000). 
Federal Statute, Title 21 United States Code § 846 (2000). 
Federal Statute, Title 18 United States Code § 3282. 
Federal Statute, Title 18 United States Code § 2339 B. 
Federal Statute, Title 18 United States Code § 1962 (d). 
Federal Statute, Title 18 United States Code § 2340. 
Federal Statute, Title 10 United States Code § 818, War Crimes Act of 1996. 
The Genocide Convention implementation Act (also known as Proxmire Act), Pub. L. 
No. 100-606, §2(a), 102 Stat. 3045 (4 Nov. 1988) (codified at Federal Statute, Title 
18 United States Code §§ 1091 ff). 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).  
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009). 
The German Penal Code as amended on 31 December 2007 (Strafgesetzbuch), 
Bundesgesetzblatt I (2007), 3209. 
German code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), Federal 
Gazette 1 (2002) 2254. 
Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich, Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt 1876 Nr. 6. 
Drittes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz, August 4, 1953, Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 44, 
August 6, 1953. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 271 
Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts, July  4, 1969, Bundesgesetzblatt Nr. 56, 
July 10, 1969. 
Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Rahmenbeschlusse des Rates vom 13. Juni 2002 zur 
Terrorismusbekämpfung vom 22.12.2002, Bundesgesetzblatt 2003 I, 2836. 
Spanish Penal Code (Código Penal), Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, 
del Código Penal. 
French penal code (Code Pénal 2010). 
The Italian Penal Code (Codice Penale). 
Prevention and Repression of the crime of Genocide, Italian Law 9 October 1967, 
no. 962. 
II CASE LAW 
International Criminal Court 
ICC-01/09-30-Red 15-12-2010 Pre Trial chamber II Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang. 
ICC-01/09-31 Red 15-12-2010 Pre Trial Chambers II Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali. 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber), (ICC-01/04-01/06), 
Decision on Confirmation of the Charges, 29 January 2007. 
Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC (Pre-Trial Chamber) (ICC-01/04-
01/07), Decision on the Confirmation of the charges, 30 September 2008. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 272 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba (Pre-Trial Chamber II), (ICC-01/ 05-01/08) 
Decision Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the charges of 
the prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009. 
Yugoslavia Tribunal 
Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, ICTY (Trial Chamber) (IT-97-25-T), judgment of 15 
March 2002; and ICTY (Appeals Chamber) (IT-97-25-A), judgment of 17 September 
2003. 
Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber) (IT-95-11-A), judgment of 8 
October 2008. 
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, ICTY (Appeals Chamber) (IT-95-14/2-
A), judgment of 17 December 2004. 
Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber) (IT-98-32-A), judgment of 25 
February 2004. 
Prosecutor v. Anton Furundzija, ICTY (Trial Chamber) (IT-98-17/1), judgment of 10 
December 1998. 
Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic and Dragoljub Ojdanic, ICTY (IT-99-
37-PT), Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, decision of 22 March 2006. 
Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic, Miroslav Tadic and Simo Zaric, ICTY (Trial Chamber II) 
(IT-95-9-T), judgment of 17 October 2003. 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber) (IT-95-14-A), judgment of 
29 July 2004. 
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, ICTY (Appeals Chamber) (IT-95-14/1-A), judgment 
of 24 March 2000. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 273 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY (Appeals Chamber) (IT-94-1-I-A), judgement of 15 
July 1999. 
Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Prago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, 
Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero and Vinco Pandurevic, ICTY (Trial Chamber II) (IT-05-
88-T), judgment of 10 June 2010. 
Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, ICTY (IT-05-88/2-PT). 
Rwanda Tribunal 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 2 
September 1998. 
Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-S (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 4 
September 1998. 
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR-96-13-A (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 27 January 
2000. 
Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14-T (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 16 May 
2003. 
Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T (Trial Chamber II), Judgment, 1 
December 2003. 
Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10 & 
ICTR-96-17-T (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 21 February 2003. 
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, 
ICTR-99-52-T (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 3 December 2003. 
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, 
ICTR-99-52-A (Appeals Chamber), Judgment, 28 November 2007. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 274 
Prosecutor v. Aloys Simba, ICTR-01-76 (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 13 December 
2005. 
Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-1 (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 13 
December 2006. 
Prosecutor v. Athanase Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A (Appeals Chamber), Judgment, 
12 March 2008. 
Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze, Anatole 
Nsengiyumva, ICTR-98-41-T (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 18 December 2008. 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Baptiste Gatete, ICTR-2000-61-T (Trial Chamber III), Judgment, 
31 March 2011. 
Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, Sylvain 
Nsabimana, Alphonse Nteziryayo, Joseph Kanyabashi, Élie Ndayambaje, ICTR-98-
42-T (Trial Chamber II), Judgment, 24 June 2011. 
Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu, Justin Mugenzi, Jerome Bicamumpaka, Prosper 
Mugiraneza, ICTR-99-50-I (Trial Chamber), Judgment, 30 September 2011. 
Prosecutor v. Édouard Karamera, Matthieu Ngirumpatse, ICTR-98-44-T (Trial 
Chamber III), Judgment, 2 February 2012. 
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) 
International Military Tribunal, judgment of 1 October 1946, in Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, Vol. I. 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, judgment of 12 November 1948, in 
Neil Boister and Robert Cryer (eds.), Documents on the Tokyo International Military 
Tribunal, (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 275 
International Court of Justice 
Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 
1985. 
Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, Supreme Court of Israel (1962) 36 ILR 277. 
U.S. Military Tribunals at Nuremberg 
Josef Altstöetter et al. U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 4 December 
1947, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. III; also in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals: 
Selected and Prepared by The Unite Nations War Crimes Commission, Volumes VI-
X, pp. 1-110. 
Karl Brandt et al. U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 20 August 1947, in 
Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vols. I-II. 
Oswald Pohl et al. U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 3 November 1947, 
in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. V. 
Carl Krauch et al. U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 30 July 1948, in 
Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vols. VII-VIII. 
Alfred Krupp et al. U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 31 July 1948, in 
Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No. 10, Vol. IX. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 276 
Ernst von Weizsäcker et al. U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 11 April 
1949, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, Vols. XII, XII, XIV. 
Wilhelm von Leeb et al. U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, judgment of 28 October 
1948, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, Vols. X, XI. 
NATIONAL COURTS 
United Kingdom 
People v. Schwimmer 66 A, D, 2d 91, 94 (2d Dept. 1978). 
Poulterers’ Case 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (KB 1611). 
Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1962) AC 220. 
Kamara v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1973) 2 All ER 1242; (1974) AC 104. 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bhagwan (1972) AC 60. 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Withers (1975) AC 842. 
Regina v. Ayres (1984) AC 447. 
Regina v. Anderson (1986) AC 27. 
Regina v. Chrastny (1991) 1 WLR 1381. 
Mulcahy v. Regina (1868) LR 3 HL 306. 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot (1973) 1 All ER 940 HL. 
Regina v. Simmonds [1969] 1 QB 685. 
Regina v. West (1948) 1 KB 709; 32 Cr. App. 152. 
R v. Ali, Hussan, Khan and Bhatti (2006) QB 322. 
R v. Griffiths (1966) 1 QB 589. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 277 
R v. Edwards (1991) Crim. L. Rev. 45. 
R v. Harvey (1999) Crim. L. Rev. 70. 
R v. Siracusa (1989) 90 Cr App R 340; Crim L. Rev. 712.  
R v. Hollinshead, Dettlaf and Griffiths, Crim. L. Rev. 653 (1985). 
R v. Ashton (1992) Crim. L. Rev. 667. 
Yip Chiu-Cheung v. R (1994) 3 WLR 514. 
Regina v. Button 11 QB (1848) 929. 
O, Connell v. Regina  8 Eng. Rep.1061 (HL1844). 
R v. Dawson (1960) 1 WLR 163. 
Regina v. Dawson (1960) 44 Cr. App. R 87. 
Rex v. Morris (1951) 1 KB 394. 
Verrier v. Director of Public Prosecutions 2 AC 195 (1967); (1966) 3 All ER 568. 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Stewart  (1982) 3 WL R 884 (PC). 
Jones v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1962) AC 635. 
Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495. 
Regina v. Anderson and Morris (1966) 2 QB 110.  
Regina v. Powell (Anthony) and English, (1999)1 AC 1 (HL) (UK). 
Regina v. Prime (1983) 5 Cr. App. R(s) 127. 
United States 
Harrison v. United States, 7 F. 2d 259 (2d Circuit 1925). 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F. 3d 566 (7th Circuit 2005). 
United States v. Jimenez Recio et al., 537 U.S. 270 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 278 
United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960). 
United States v. Singh, 518 F. 3d 236 (4th Circuit 2008). 
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770 (1975). 
United States v. Pullman, 187 F. 3d 816 (8th Circuit 1999). 
United States v. Delgadio, 321 F. 3d 1338 (11th Circuit 2008). 
United States v. Chavez, 549 F. 3d 119 (2d Circuit 2008). 
State v. Carbone, 10 N. J. 329, 91 A. 2d 571(1952). 
United States v. Rodriguez-Velez, 597 F. 3d 32 (1st Circuit 2010). 
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 59 S. Ct 467, 83 L. Ed. 610 (1939). 
United States v Wardell, 591 F. 3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2009). 
United States v. Milligan, 17 F. 3d 177 (6th Circuit 1994). 
United States v. Desena, 260 F. 3d 150 (2d Circuit 2001). 
United States v. Searan, 259 F. 3d 434 (6th Circuit 2001). 
State of New Jersey v. Brian Samuels, A-0967-02 T 40967-02T4. 
United States v. Ceballos, 340 F. 3d 115, 123 (2d Cir.2001). 
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947). 
United States v. Samaria, 239 F. 3d 228 (2d Circuit 2001). 
United States v. Whittington, 26 F. 3d 456 (4th Circuit 1994). 
United States v. Ereme, No.05-4263 (4th Circuit) Unpublished. 
United States v. Reyes, 302 F. 3d 48 (2d Circuit 2002). 
United States v. Faulkner, 17 F. 3d 745 (5th Circuit 1994). 
United States v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 579 (2d. Circuit 1940). 
Direct sales v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 279 
United States v. Leahy, 82 F. 3d 624 (5th Circuit 1996). 
United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F. 3d 992 (6th Circuit 1998). 
United States v. Pupo, 841 F. 2d 1235 (4th Circuit 1988). 
United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F. 3d 163 (1st Circuit 2000). 
United States v. Corneaux, 955 F. 2d 586 (8th Circuit 1992). 
Yates v United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
United States v. Crabtree, 979 F. 2d 1261 (7th Circuit 1992). 
United States v. Montour, 944 F. 2d 1019 (2d Cir.1991). 
United States v. LaSpina, 299 F. 3d 165 (2d Circuit 2002). 
United States v. McKinney, 954 F. 2d 471 (7th Circuit 1992). 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
United States v. Solis, 299 F. 3d 420 (5th Circuit 2002). 
United States v. Rea, 958 F. 2d 1206 (2d Circuit 1991). 
United States v. Ocampo, 973 F. 2d 1015 (1st Circuit 1992). 
United States v. Luthian, 976 F. 2d 1257 (9th Circuit 1992). 
State v. Stein, 144 Wn. 2D  236, 27P. 3d 184 (Wash. 2001). 
State  ex.rel. Woods v Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 844 .P.2d 1147 (Ariz.1992). 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
United States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784 (7th Circuit 2000). 
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). 
United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F. 3d 110 (1st Circuit 2000). 
United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F. 3d 54 (1st Circuit 2000). 
United States v. Knowles, 66 F. 3d 1146 (11th Circuit 1995). 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 280 
United States v. Roshko, 969 F. 2d 9 (2d Circuit 1992). 
United States v. Corres, 356 U.S. 405, 78 S. Ct. 875, 2 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1958). 
Zafiro v. United States, 5056 U.S. 534 (1993). 
United States v. Angiulo, 847 F. 2d 956 (1st Circuit 1988). 
Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 94 S. Ct. 2253, 41 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1974). 
United States v. Kelly, 204 F. 3d 652 (6th Circuit 2000). 
United States v. Seher, 562 F. 3d 1344 (11th Circuit 2009). 
United States v. Bornman, 559 F. 3d 150 (3d Circuit 2009). 
United States v. Julian, 427 F. 3d 471 (7th Circuit 2005). 
United States v. Yearwood, 518 F. 3d 220 (4th Circuit 2008). 
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). 
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1(1954). 
United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1985). 
Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590 (1895). 
United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F. 2d 232 (10th Circuit 1986). 
United States v. Martinez, 83 F. 3d 371 (11th Circuit 1996). 
United States v. Loe, 248 F. 3d 449 (5th Circuit 2001). 
United States v Rehak, 589 F. 3d 965 (8th Circuit 2009). 
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 78 (1915). 
State v. Barton, 424 A. 2d 1033 (R.I. 1981). 
State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S. E. 2d 128 (1980). 
United States v. Blackmon, 839 F. 2d 900 (2d Circuit 1988). 
Hyde v United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 281 
United States v. Beil, 577 F. 2d 1313 (5th Circuit 1978). 
United States v. Dabbs, 134 F. 3d 1071 (11th Circuit 1998). 
Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005). 
United States v. Roberson, 474 F. 3d 432 (7th Cir. 2007). 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, 582 F. 3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
Germany 
RGSt (decisions of the Supreme Court of the German Reich) Vol. 5. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 11.7.1961, no. 1 StR 257/61. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 27.1.1983, no. 3 StR 437/81. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 18.10.1955, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1956. 
Decision of the Higher Regional Court of Cologne (OLG Köln) of 1.6.1951, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1951. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 11.10.1978, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1979. 
 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of  21.10.2004, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift  2005. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 10.1.2006, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift  2006. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 1.10.1991, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1992. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 3.10.1979, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1980. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 282 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 11.6.1980, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1980. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 12.5.1954, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1954. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 22.2.1995, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1995. 
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 10.3.2005, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift  2005. 
Spain 
Decision of the Spanish High Court 2nd Hall [sentencia del Tribunal supremo], 1 
January 1988 and 27 May 27 STS. 
France 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division) [Chambre Criminelle de la Cou 
de cassation], 12 May 1950: Bull. crim., no. 153. 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 29 December 1970: JCP 71, 
II, 1670. 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 22 January 1986: Bull. crim., 
no. 29.  
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 30 April 1996: Bull. crim., no. 
176. 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 26 May 1999: Bull. crim., no. 
103. 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 11 June 1970: Bull. crim., no. 
199. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 283 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 22 August 1959: Bull. crim., 
no. 389. 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 20 June 1989, Martin, inédit. 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 15 December 1993: Dr. pénal 
1994, comm. No 131. 
Decision of the French High Court (Criminal Division), 4 July 1989, inédit. 
Israel 
Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, Supreme Court of Israel (1962) 36 ILR 277. 
III REPORTS 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the work of 
its 43rd Session, A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part Two), YILC, 1991, Vol.II. 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its 48th 
Session, (Part Two),YILC,1996, Vol. II. 
Annual Report of ICTR to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc. A/55/435, 
S/2000/927, 2 October 2000. 
ICTR Third Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc.  A/53/429, S/ 
1998/ 857, 23 September 1998. 
ICTR Fifth Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc.  A/55/435, 
S/2000/927, 2 October 2000. 
Annual Report of ICTR to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc. 
A/53/429,S/1998/857, 23 September 1998 
Criminal Law: Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform, 7 Law Commission 
Report  No. 76 (March 14, 1976). 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 284 
Inchoate Offences: Conspiracy Attempt and Indictment, 6 Law Commission Working 
Paper No. 50 (June 5, 1973). 
Doyle C, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, Congressional Research 
Service, Congress Report April 30, 2010 www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41223.pdf . 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law in support of 
Petitioner, [Conspiracy-not a triable offence], in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, Salim Ahmed Hamdan v Donald H. Rumsfeld, George P. Fletcher, Counsel 
for Amici Curiae. 
Einhorn Lorin, ‘Issue: Mens Rea required for Genocide vs mens rea required for 
conspiracy to commit genocide’, Memorandum to Deputy Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, January 9, 2004. 
Punja Rajiv K.,  ‘Issue: What is the distinction between “Joint Criminal Enterprise” as 
defined by the ICTY case law and Conspiracy in Common Law Jurisdictions?’, 
Memorandum for the Office of The Prosecutor of the ICTR, (2003), Case Western 
University School of Law International War Crimes Research Lab. 
African Union, Assembly, "Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICC) Doc. 
Assembly/AU/13(XIII)", 3 July 2009, Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Rev.l. 
B SECONDARY SOURCES 
I BOOKS  
Akande, Dapo, ‘Sources of International Criminal Law’, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), 
The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 285 
Allen, Michael, Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th edn. (2007), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Ambos, Kai, ‘Article 25 Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' 
Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edn. (2008), Verlag C. H. Beck, München, Germany.  
Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th edn. (2006), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Askar, Yusuf, Implementing International Humanitarian Law: From the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals to a Permanent International Criminal Court (2004), Routledge, London. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary 
History (1998), Transnat. Publ., Ardsley NY. 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 
2: An Article-by Article Evolution of the Statute from 1994-1998 (2005), Transnat. 
Publ., Ardsley NY. 
Biddle, Francis, ‘The Nürnberg Trial’, in Mettraux Guénaël (ed.), Perspectives on the 
Nuremberg Trial (2008), Oxford University Press. 
Bohlander, Michael, The German Criminal Code, a modern English translation 
(2008), Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon. 
Bohlander, Michael, Principles of German Criminal Law (2009), Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon. 
Boister, Neil and Robert Cryer, Documents on the Tokyo International Military 
Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (2008), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.  
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 286 
Boister, Neil and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A 
Reappraisal (2008), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edn. (2008), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2008), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Chouliaras, Athanasios, ‘Discourses on international criminality’, in Smeulers Alette 
(ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach (2010), intersentia, Antwerpen-Oxford-Portland. 
Clarkson, Christopher M. V. and Heather M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials, 5th edn. (2003), Sweet & Maxwell, London. 
Damgaard, Ciara, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes: 
Selected Pertinent Issues (2008), Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg. 
Dix, E. George and Michael M. Sharlot, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (1999), 
West/Wadsworth, An International Thomson Publishing Company, Belmont USA. 
Donnedieu, de Vabres Henri, ‘The Nuremberg Trial and the Modern Principles of 
International Criminal Law’, in Mettraux Guénaël (ed.), Perspectives on the 
Nuremberg Trial (2008), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Ehard, Hans, ‘The Nuremberg Trial against the Major War Criminals and 
International Law’, in Wilbourn E Benton and Georg Grimm (eds.), Nuremberg: 
German views of the War Trials (1955), Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas.  
Eser, Albin, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & 
John R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, Vol. 1 (2002), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 287 
Fischer, Thomas, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 58th edn. (2010), C.H. Beck, 
München. 
Fletcher, George P., Rethinking Criminal Law (2000), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Fletcher, George P., ‘The Influence of the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions on 
International Criminal Law’, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (2009), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Francisco, Munoz Conde, Mercedes García Arán, Derecho Penal, Parte General, 
8th edn. (2010), Tiranto Lo Blanch. 
Francisco, Munoz Conde, Derecho Penal, Parte Especial, 18th edn. (2010), Tiranto 
Lo Blanch. 
Gillies, Peter, The Law of Criminal Conspiracy, 2nd edn. (1990), The Federation 
Press, Sydney. 
Glanville, Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2 edn. (1961), Steven & Sons, 
London. 
Godefroy, Thierry, ‘The Control of Organised Crime in France: A Fuzzy Concept but 
a Handy Reference’, in Fijnaut Cyrille, Paoli Letizia (eds.), Organised Crime in 
Europe: Concepts, Patterns, and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond 
(2004), Springer, The Netherlands. 
Harrison, David, Conspiracy as a Crime and as a Tort in English Law (1924), Sweet 
& Maxwell, London. 
Hazel, Robert, Conspiracies and Civil Liberties: A memorandum submitted to the 
Law commission by the Cobden Trust and the National Council for Civil Liberties 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 288 
(Occasional papers on social administration) (1974), Bell (for the Social 
Administration Research Trust). 
Heller, Kevin J., The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International 
Criminal Law (2011), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Herring, Jonathan, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edn. (2008), 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hosoya, Chihiro, Ando Nisuke, Onuma Yasuaki, and Minear H. Richard (eds.), The 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium (1986), Kodansha Ltd and 
Kodansha International Ltd., Tokyo. 
Hoyer, Andreas, in Wolter Jürgen et al., Sytematischer Kommentar zum 
Strafgesetzbuch, 7th edn. (2001), 35th “Lieferung”, Carl Heymans Verlag, Köln. 
Jänke, Burkhard, Heinrich W. Laufhütte, Walter Odersky, Strafgesetzbuch Leipziger 
Kommentar, 11th edn. (2003), De Gruyter Recht, Berlin. 
Jescheck, Hans-Heinrich/ Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner 
Teil, 5th edn. (1996), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin. 
José, Luis De la Cuesta, ‘Organised Crime Control Policies in Spain: A 
‘Disorganised’ Criminal Policy for ‘Organised’ Crime’, in Fijnaut Cyrille, Paoli Letizia 
(eds.), Organised Crime in Europe, Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the 
European Union and Beyond (2004), Springer, The Netherlands. 
Jorgensen, Nina H. B., ‘Criminality of organisations under international law’, in 
Nollkaemper André and Herman van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in 
International Law (2009), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Kelsen, Hans, ‘Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in 
International Law?’, in Mettraux Guénaël (ed.), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial 
(2008), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 289 
Kilching, Michael, ‘Organised Crime Policies in Germany’, in Fijnaut Cyrille, Paoli 
Letizia (eds.), Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns, and Control Policies 
in the European Union and Beyond (2004), Springer, The Netherlands. 
Kittichaisaree, Kriangsak, International Criminal Law (2001), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Laufhütte, Heinrich W. et al., Strafgesetzbuch, Leipziger Kommentar, 12th edn. 
(2006), De Gruyter Recht, Berlin. 
Lee, Roy S. (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, 
Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999), Kluwer Law International, The Hague. 
v. Listz Franz, Lehrbuch des Deustchen Strafrechts, 5th edn. (1996), Keip Verlag, 
Goldbach. 
Maiwald, Manfred, Einführung in das italienische Strafrecht und Strafprozessrecht 
(2009), Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Frankfurt am 
Main.  
Maljevic, Almir, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’: Different 
Legal Models Against Criminal Collectives (2011), Max-Plank-Gesellschaft zur 
Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V, Duncker & Humblot. Berlin. 
Marinucci, Giorgio and Emilio Dolcini, Manuale di Diritto Penale, Parte Generale 
(2009), Dott. A. Giuffré Editore, S. p. A. Milano.  
Mettraux, Guénaël (ed.), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (2008), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
Mettraux, Guénaël, ‘Trial at Nuremberg’, in Schabas William A. and Bernaz Nadia 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (2011), Routledge, 
London and New York. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 290 
Miebach, Klaus/ Jürgen Schäfer, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch 
(2005), C. H. Beck, München. 
Minear, Richard H., Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (2001), Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Nollkaemper, André and Herman van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in 
International Law (2009), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Ormerod, David, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 11th edn. (2005), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Othman, Mohamed C., Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: 
The Case of Rwanda and East Timor (2005), Springer, Berlin Heidelberg. 
Padfield, Nicola, Criminal Law, 6th edn. (2008), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Per, Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in Roy S. Lee (ed.) The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (1999), Kluwer Law International, The Hague.  
Pomorski, Stanislaw, ‘Conspiracy and Criminal Organization’, in George Ginsburgs 
and V.N. Kudriavtsev (eds.) The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (1990), 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London. 
Rudolphi, Hans-Joachim/Ulrich Stein, in Systematischer Kommentar zum 
Strafgesetzbuch, 7th/8th edn. (2006), Luchterhand, München. 
Roxin, Claus, in Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. II (2006), C.H. Beck, München. 
Roxin, Claus, Lepiziger Kommentar, 11th edn. (1994), de Gruyter, Berlin. 
Schabas, William A., Genocide in International Law, The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn. 
(2009), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 291 
Schabas, William A., An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3rd edn 
(2007), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Schabas, William A., ‘Article 6 Genocide’, in Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, 
2nd edn. (2008), Verlag C. H. Beck, München, Germany. 
Shaw, Malcom N., International Law, 6th edn. (2008), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Silverman, Emily, ‘Prosecution of International Crimes in the United States of 
America’, in Eser Albin, Sieber Ulrich, Helmut Kreicker (eds.), National Prosecution 
of International Crimes: Nationale Strafverfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen, 
Volume 5 (2005), Max-Plank-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V, 
Duncker & Humblot. Berlin. 
van Sliedregt, Elies, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (2003), T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. 
Smith, Bradley F., The American Road to Nuremberg, The Documentary Record 
1944-1945 (1982), Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California. 
Smith, Bradley F., Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (1977), Andre Deutsch 
Limited, New York London. 
Strader, Kelly. J. and Sandra D. Jordan, White Collar Crime Cases, Materials, and 
Problems, 2nd edn. (2009), Matthew Bender, United States. 
Swart, Bert, ‘Modes of International Criminal Liability’, in Antonio Cassese (ed.), The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 292 
Taylor, Telford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (1992), 
Little Brown & Co (P), London. 
Totani, Yuma, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of 
World War II (2008), Havard University Asia Center, USA Massachusetts. 
Vincenzo, Manzini, 7 Trattaro Di Diritto Penale Italiano, 5th edn. (1986), Gian 
Domenico Pisapia. 
Wasik, Martin, Emmins on Sentencing, 3rd edn. (2001), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Wayne, R. La Fave, Criminal Law, 4th edn. (2003), West, a Thomson business, St. 
Paul, Minnesota. 
Wayne, R. La Fave, Substantive Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2005), West, a Thomson 
business, St. Paul, Minnesota. 
Werle, Gerhard, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (2009), T.M.C. 
Asser Press, The Hague.  
Wessels, Johannes, Beulke Werner, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 40th edn. (2010), 
C.F. Müller, Hüthig Jehle Rehm GmbH Heidelberg, München, Landsberg, Frechen, 
Hamburg. 
Wolfgang, Joecks, Klaus Miebach, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 
Band 2/2 § 80-184f (2005), C.H. Beck, München. 
Wright, Robert S., The Law of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements (1873), 
Butterworths, London. 
Zahar, Alexander & Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law (2008), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 293 
II ARTICLES  
Ambos, Kai, ‘General Principles of Criminal Law in The Rome Statute’, 10 Criminal 
Law Forum (1999), pp. 1–32. 
Barrett, Richard P. and Laura E. Little, ‘Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for 
Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals’, 88 Minnesota Law Review (2003), pp. 
30-84. 
Baxter, R. R., ‘Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law’, 41 
British Year Book of International Law (1965-1966), pp. 275-300. 
Borgwardt, Elizabeth, ‘A New Deal for the Nuremberg Trial: The Limits of Law in 
Generating Human Rights Norms’, 26 Law and History Review (2008), pp. 679-705. 
Bush, Jonathan A., ‘The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International 
Criminal Law: What Nuremberg really said’, 109 Columbia Law Review (2009), pp. 
1095-1261. 
Burgman, Diedre A., ‘Unilateral Conspiracy: Three Critical Perspectives’, 29 DePaul 
Law Review (1979), pp. 75-113. 
Cassese, Antonio, ‘The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the doctrine 
of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), pp. 
109-133. 
Chesney, Robert M., ‘Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the 
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism’, 80 Southern California Law Review (2007), pp. 
425-502. 
Clark, Roger S., ‘Nuremberg and the Crime against Peace’, 6 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review (2007), pp. 527-550. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 294 
Dalton, Taylor R., ‘Counterfeit Conspiracy: The Misapplication of Conspiracy as a 
Substantive Crime in International Law’, Cornell Law Student Papers (2010), pp. 1-
21. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_papers/24. 
Danner, Allison M. and Jenny S. Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal 
Law’, 93 California Law Review (2005), pp. 75-170. 
David, Kenneth A., ‘The Movement Toward Statute-Based Conspiracy Law in the 
United Kingdom and the United States’, 25 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
(1993), pp. 951-990. 
Dencker, Friedrich, ‘Kronzeuge, Terroristische Vereinigung und Rechtsstaatliche 
Strafgesetzgebung’,  Kritische Justiz (1987), pp. 36-53.  
Dennis, Ian H., ‘The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy’, 93 Law Quarterly Review 
(1977), pp. 31-64  
Drumbl, Mark A., ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of 
Mass Atrocity’, 99 Northwestern University Law Review (2005), pp. 539-610. 
Fichtelberg, Aaron, ‘Conspiracy and International Criminal Justice’, 17 Criminal Law 
Forum (2006), pp. 149-176. 
Fletcher, George P., ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The 
problem of Collective Guilt’, 111 Yale Law Journal (2002), pp. 1499-1573. 
Fletcher, George P. and Jens David Ohlin, ‘The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur and 
its Follow-up: A Critical View Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in 
the Darfur Case’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), pp. 539-561.  
Fletcher, George P., ‘The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime’, 4 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2006), pp. 442-447. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 295 
Fletcher, George P., ‘Hamdan Confronts the Military Commissions Act of 2006’, 45 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2007), pp. 427-467. 
Fletcher, George P., ‘New Court, Old Dogmatik’, 9 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2011), pp. 179-190. 
Gallmetzer, Reinhold and Mark Klamberg, ‘Individual Responsibility For Crimes 
Under International Law The Un Ad Hoc Tribunals And The International Criminal 
Court’ (March 21, 2007) The Summer School on International Criminal Law, 2005. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1576024. 
Giles, Peter, ‘The Indictment of Criminal Conspiracy’, 10 Ottawa Law Review (1973), 
pp. 273-298. 
Goldstein, Abraham S., ‘Conspiracy to Defraud the United States’, 68 Yale Law 
Journal (1959), pp. 405-463. 
Greenawalt, Alexander K. A., ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent. The Case for a 
Knowledge-Based Interpretation’, 99 Columbia Law Review (1999), pp. 2259-2294. 
Guliyeva, Gunel, ‘The Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise and ICC Jurisdiction’, 5 
Eyes on the ICC (2008-2009), pp. 49-84. 
Harding, Alan, ‘The Origins of the Crime of Conspiracy’, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society (1982), pp. 89-108. 
Harno, Albert J., ‘Intent in Criminal Conspiracy’, 89 University Pennsylvania Law 
Review (1941), pp. 624-647. 
Hassemer, Winfried, ‘Symbolisches Strafrecht und Rechtsgüterschutz’ Neue 
Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1989), pp. 553-559. 
Henning, Peter J., ‘Individual Liability for Conduct by Criminal Organisations in the 
United States’, 44 Wayne Law Review (1998-1999), pp. 1305-1349. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 296 
Hoskins, Richard J., ‘A comparative Analysis of the Crime of Conspiracy in 
Germany, France and the United States’, 6 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law & 
Politics (1973), pp. 245-270. 
Jescheck, Hans-Heinrich, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law set out in, 
Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute’, 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2004), pp. 38-55. 
Johnson, Philip E., ‘The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy’, 61 California Law 
Review (1973), pp. 1137-1188. 
Matti, Jousten, ‘International Cooperation against Transnational Organized Crime: 
Criminalising Participation in an Organised Criminal Group’, Resource Material 
Series No. 59, 119th International Training Course Visiting Experts’ Papers, pp. 417-
428. 
Katyal, Neal K., ‘Conspiracy Theory’, 112 Yale Law Journal (2003), pp. 1307-1398. 
Kaufman, Nicholas, ‘Problems Encountered in Investigating and Prosecuting 
Conspiracies to commit Terrorist Offences’. Paper presented at the First Annual 
Conference on Human Security, Terrorism and Organised Crime in the Western 
Balkan Region, organised by the HUMSEC project in Ljublana, 23-25 November 
2006, pp. 1-11. 
Knoops, Geert-Jan Alexander, ‘The Proliferation of the Law of International 
Criminal Tribunals within Terrorism and “Unlawful” Combatancy Trials after Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld’, 30 Fordham International Law Journal (2006), pp. 599-641. 
Laughland, John, ‘Conspiracy, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command 
Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, Speech given at the International Law 
Defence Conference, The Hague, 14 November 2009, pp. 1-9 . 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 297 
Leventhal, Harold, Sam Harris, John M. Woolsey, Jr., Farr Warren Farr F., ‘The 
Nuernberg Verdict’, 60 Harvard Law Review (1947), pp. 857-907. 
Lietzau, William K., ‘Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: Structural Pillars 
for The International Criminal Court’, 32 Cornell International Law Journal (1999), pp. 
477-488. 
Luban, David, ‘Contrived Ignorance’, 87 Georgetown Law Journal (1999), pp. 957-
980. 
Madoka, Futamura, ‘Individual and Collective Guilt: Post-War Japan and the Tokyo 
War Crimes Tribunal’, 14 European Review (2006), pp. 471-483. 
Malanczuk, Peter, ‘The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What are the 
consequences of leaving the U.S. behind?’, 11 European Journal of International 
Law (2000), pp. 77-90. 
Manacorda, Stefano and Chantal Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal 
Enterprise: Concurring Approaches in the Practice of International Criminal Law?’, 9 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011), pp. 159-178. 
Marcus, Paul, ‘Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice’, 65 
Georgetown Law Journal (1977), pp. 925-969. 
Maurach, Reinhart, ‘Die Problematik der Verbrechensverabredung’, Juristen Zeitung 
(1961), pp. 137-148. 
Meierhenrich, Jens, ‘Conspiracy in International Law’, 2 Annual Review Law Social 
Science (2006), pp. 341-357. 
Noferi, Mark L., ‘Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton 
Conspiracy Liability’, 33 American Journal of Criminal Law (2006), pp. 91-156. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 298 
Obote-Odora, Alex, ‘Conspiracy to Commit Genocide: Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda 
and Prosecutor v Alfred Musema’, 8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law,  
No. 1 (March 2001), paras. 1-52. 
Ohlin, Jens D., ‘Joint Criminal Confusion’, 12 New Criminal Law Review (2009), pp. 
406-419. 
Ohlin, Jens D., ‘Group Think: Conspiracy and Collective Reason’, 98 The Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology (2007), pp. 147-206. 
Ohlin, Jens D., ‘Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), pp. 69-90.  
Ohlin, Jens D., ‘Incitement and Conspiracy to Commit Genocide’, Cornell Law 
Faculty Publications, Paper 24 (2009), pp.186-204.  
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/24.  
Ohlin, Jens D., ‘Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes’, 11 Chicago Journal 
of International Law (2011), pp. 693-753. 
Olasolo, Hector, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and its Extended Form: A Theory of Co-
Perpetration giving rise to Principal Liability, A Notion of Accessorial Liability, or A 
Form of Partnership in Crime?’, 20 Criminal Law Forum (2009), pp. 263-287. 
Orchard, Gerald F., ‘Agreement in Criminal Conspiracy’, Criminal Law Review 
(1974), pp. 297-304. 
Osiel, Mark, ‘The Banality of the Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity’, 
105 Columbia Law Review (2005), pp. 1751-1862. 
Pelser, Caroline M., ‘Preparations to commit a crime: The Dutch approach to 
inchoate offences’, 4 Utrecht Law Review 3 (2008), pp. 57-80. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 299 
Piacente, Nicola, ‘Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY 
Prosecutorial Policy’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004), pp. 446-454. 
Pollack, Benjamin F., ‘Common Law Conspiracy’, 35 The Georgetown Law Journal 
(1947), pp. 328-352. 
Powles, Steven N., ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial 
Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004), 
pp. 606-619. 
Pritchard, John, ‘The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and its 
Contemporary Resonances’, 149 Military Law Review (1995), pp. 25-35. 
Ralby, Ian M., ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability in the Iraqi High Tribunal’, 28 
Boston University Law Journal (2010), pp. 281-340. 
Ramer, Jacob A., ‘Hate by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for 
Persecution’, 7 Chicago-Kent Journal of International & Comparative Law (2007), pp. 
31-116. 
Sayre, Francis B., ‘Criminal Conspiracy’, 35 Harvard Law Review (1921-22), pp. 
393-427.  
Schabas, William. A., ‘United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's 
All About the Security Council’, 15 European Journal of International Law (2004), pp. 
701-720. 
Scheffer, David, ‘Why Hamdan is Right about Conspiracy Liability’, Jurist, Mar. 30, 
2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/03=why-hamdan-is-right-about-
conspiracy.php.  
Schuler, Kenneth G., ‘Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple 
Punishment Doctrine’, Michigan Law Review (1993), pp. 2220-2258. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 300 
Schnitzer, Jan, ‘The Nuremberg Justice Trial 1947-Vengeance of the Victors?’, LLM 
Thesis (2010), Faculty of Law, University of Wellington, pp. 1-233.  
Selz, Shirley A., ‘Conspiracy Law in Theory and in Practice: Federal Conspiracy 
Prosecutions in Chicago’, 5 American Journal of Criminal Law (1977), pp. 35-71. 
Stenson, Tom, ‘Inchoate Crimes and Criminal Responsibility under International 
Law’, 1 The Journal of International law & Policy (2003-2004), pp. 1-24. 
http://www.pennjil.com/jilp.html . 
Tatone, Vincent J., ‘Conspiracy and Double Jeopardy’, 61 Journal of Urban Law 
(1984), pp. 505-517. 
Thomas, George C., ‘A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment’, 47 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review (1985), pp. 1-94. 
Tripp, Alexander D., ‘Margins of the mob: A comparison of REVES .V. ERNST § 
YOUNG with criminal association laws in Italy and France’, 20 Fordham International 
Law Journal (1996-1997), pp. 263-322. 
Twist, Susan, ‘Rethinking Retrospective Criminality in the context of War Crimes 
Trials’, 27 Liverpool Law Review (2006), pp. 31–66. 
van der Vyver, Johan D., ‘Prosecution and Punishment of the crime of Genocide’, 23 
Fordham International Law Journal (1999), pp. 286-356.  
Wala, Raha, ‘From Guantanamo to Nuremberg and back: An analysis of Conspiracy 
to commit War Crimes under International Humanitarian Law’, 41 Georgetown 
Journal of International Law (2010), pp. 683-709. 
Wechsler, Herbert, William Kenneth Jones, and Harold L. Korn, ‘The Treatment of 
Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, 
Solicitation, and Conspiracy’, 61 Columbia Law Review (1961), pp. 957-1030. 
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy as a Crime in International Criminal Law: Juliet Okoth 301 
Weigend, Thomas, ‘Perpetration through an Organisation’, 9 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2011), pp. 91-111. 
Werle, Gerhard, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’, 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), pp. 953-975. 
Whitman, James Q., ‘The Comparative Study of Criminal Punishment’, 1 Annual 
Review Law and Social Science (2005), pp. 17-34. 
Wienczyslaw, Wagner J., ‘Conspiracy in Civil Law Countries’, 42 The Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 2 (1951), pp. 171-183. 
van der Wilt, Harmen, ‘Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. 
Domestic Jurisdiction Reflections on the Anraat Case’, 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2006), pp. 239-257. 
van der Wilt, Harmen, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise Possibilities and Limitations’, 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), pp. 91-108. 
Winograd, Jesse, ‘Federal Criminal Conspiracy’, 41 American Criminal Law Review 
(2004), pp. 611-646. 
Wise, Edward M., ‘RICO and its Analogues: Some Comparative Considerations’, 27 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Comparative (2000), pp. 303-324. 
Wright, Quincy, ‘The Law of the Nuremberg Trial’, 41 American Journal of 
International Law (1947), pp. 38-72. 
 
 
 
 
